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Abstract
This thesis is a detailed case study about employee 
fraud in a bank in Malaysia. As this bank is set up by the 
Government in 1965, the fraud has political implications. 
This thesis discusses the internal structure of the
organisation as well as the political and social climate
conducive to fraud and corruption in Malaysia. Two other 
major financial fraud cases in Malaysia will be discussed as 
comparative case studies. Fraud and corruption trends in 
other countries will also be discussed to illustrate that 
the Malaysian case is not a unique one.
In chapter one, a theoretical framework suitable for 
the studies of crime in developing countries will be
formulated. In Malaysia, the historical development of the
country is important.
Chapter two introduces the concepts and definitions of 
crimes at the workplace, in particular fraud.
Chapter three tries to trace the detailed movements of 
the funds that were defrauded in the Bumiputra Malaysian 
Finance Limited (BMF) case. In doing so, they give a good 
idea of how frauds can occur and how they can be prevented.
Chapter four is an analysis of the BMF case. The 
chapter is divided into two sections. The first section is 
the micro-analysis which deals with the structure of the 
organisation that is problematic. The second section is the 
macro-analysis which deals with the wider political and 
social structure that is problematic.
Chapter five is on the comparative case studies which 
tries to establish the trend of how public organisations can 
be defrauded in Malaysia. A comparison with other countries 
will also show that the Malaysian case is not a unique one.
Chapter six deals with the overall commercial crime 
scenario in Malaysia.
Chapter seven tries to give some suggestions on 
combating and preventing fraud.
The thesis is concluded with chapter eight.
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Introduction And Methodology
This thesis is a detailed case study of employee fraud 
in a Malaysian financial institution set up in Hong Kong 
i.e. the Bumiputra Malaysia Finance Limited (BMF). Its 
parent bank is the Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad (BBMB) in 
Malaysia. However, because this bank was set up by the 
Government in 1965, the fraud had political implications. 
This thesis tries to piece together the complicated BMF case 
in order to show how fraud offences can be committed in 
financial institutions. In the BMF case, M$2.5 bil. 
(approximately £0.625 bil.1) were lost. Two other major 
financial fraud cases which took place in Malaysia will also 
be discussed as comparative case studies to establish a 
trend of how corrupt politicians and elite members of 
society defraud institutions set up by the Government. This 
will entail an analysis into the internal structure of the 
organisations as well as the political and social climate 
conducive to fraud and corruption in Malaysia. Finally, the 
pattern of fraud and corruption in Malaysia will be compared 
with those in other countries of different social and 
political systems, and economic situations.
Chapter one focuses on theories of crime in developing 
countries (with specific reference to Malaysia). This 
chapter tries to formulate a theoretical framework suitable 
for the studies of crime in developing countries. In 
Malaysia, the historical development of the country and its 
multicultural nature are important factors.
l1994 exchange rate.
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Chapter 2 deals with the concepts and definitions of 
crimes at the workplace (in particular fraud).
Chapter 3 is on the BMF case. This chapter tries to 
trace the detailed movements of the funds that were 
defrauded. This will give a good idea of how frauds can take 
place and how they can be prevented.
Chapter 4 is an analysis of the BMF case. This chapter 
is divided into two sections. The first section is the 
micro-analysis which deals with the structure of the 
organisation that is problematic. The second section is the 
macro-analysis which deals with the wider political and 
social structures in Malaysia which are problematic.
Chapter 5 deals with the comparative case studies. Two 
cases are chosen to establish the trend of how public 
organisations can be defrauded. This chapter also tries to 
compare the fraud and corruption trends in Malaysia with 
those of other countries of different social and political 
systems, and economic situation.
Chapter 6 is on the general commercial crime rate in 
Malaysia. This chapter deals with the overall commercial 
crime scenario in Malaysia.
Chapter 7 is a discussion of possible ways of combating 
and preventing fraud.
Chapter 8 is the conclusion which summarizes the 
important points in the thesis.
Methodology
When I first made the decision to look into the BMF 
case for my thesis, I did not expect to stumble on any
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political involvement. However, I was wrong. The BMF case 
was steeped in political involvement and that was the 
biggest obstacle to my fieldwork. I had to go back to 
Malaysia twice to collect my data. The first time round, I 
managed to interview a few people who were important for my 
thesis. Some allowed me to mention their names in my thesis. 
A couple of them gave me their opinions and advice, but they 
did not want me to mention their names at all. The police 
and the officers of Bank Bumiputra were not helpful at all, 
especially when they realised I was using the BMF case in my 
research. I could not even obtain the data on overall fraud 
or commercial crime in Malaysia although such data could be 
translated into public information. My second obstacle to 
collecting data was the Official Secrets Act which will be 
explained in chapters 3 and 4. Officers in the police 
headquarters were afraid to breach the Act. One police 
officer I contacted told me not to tell anyone I had spoken 
to him. I was introduced to him through a colleague of mine. 
At that time, I decided to drop the chapter on overall fraud 
or commercial crime in Malaysia. I came back to England and 
started writing with whatever material I had, but I realised 
that it was just not enough for a thesis. I decided to go 
back to Malaysia again. This time I was also going back to 
Malaysia to attend a symposium on economic crime where all 
the important figures of the different law enforcement 
agencies would also be attending. I was lucky to have a 
coursemate who introduced me to one of the organisers of the 
symposium who took pity on me and allowed me to attend free 
of charge. At the symposium, I saw the head of the
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Commercial Crime Division at the police headquarters, the 
Director of the Anti-corruption Agency and a few officers 
from the central bank. I took the opportunity to introduce 
myself and arranged some interviews with them.
The Head of the Commercial Crime Division instructed 
one of his officers to help me. The data I wanted were 
actually general data which could be published in the 
newspapers.
At the central bank, I obtained data on fraud cases in 
financial institutions in Malaysia. Before giving me the 
data, I was passed from one department to another. My guess 
is that nobody wanted to be responsible for releasing the 
data to me. I was fortunate to get my sponsor i.e. my 
University back home to intervene on my behalf. My Vice- 
chancellor had to write a letter specifying what I was doing 
and what I needed to the Manager of the Public Affairs Unit 
of the central bank. A carbon copy was also sent to the 
Deputy-Governor of the central bank who happened to be an 
adjunct professor at my University at that time. Finally, I 
was sent some data on fraud in the financial institutions 
and a couple of working papers.
The Anti-corruption Agency was more generous. I saw the 
Director-General himself. He gave me very up-to-date data 
and all the papers he had presented.
Other people I managed to interview were two persons 
involved in the Committee of Enquiry into the BMF case. One 
of them was the leader of the Committee.
I also managed to interview the leader of the 
opposition party (Democratic Action Party), Lim Kit Siang.
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He wrote and published quite extensively his views on the 
BMF case as well as the political and social environment in 
Malaysia. However, I was quite disappointed with the 
interview because he did not want to say much. He asked me 
to refer to his books instead. My guess is that after being 
put behind bars during the Internal Security Act clampdown 
in the 1980s which will be explained in chapter 4, he has 
toned down a lot.
Another person who wrote extensively on the BMF case 
and the political and social environment of Malaysia is 
Chandra Muzaffar. He was very kind in giving me an interview 
despite his tight schedule. He was, at the time of the BMF 
scandal, the leader of the pressure group, Aliran. Aliran is 
an informal movement for freedom, justice and solidarity. 
Aliran staged a protest for a Royal Commission to be formed 
for the BMF investigation. Aliran also protested when the 
findings of the Committee of Enquiry were not released to 
the public.
The other group which protested at the height of the 
BMF scandal was the Consumer Association of Penang. I 
managed to speak to one of its officers. The Association was 
also kind enough to allow me to use their reference library 
where they kept all the local newspapers clippings on the 
BMF case.
I also spoke to two officers from the head office of 
Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad. It was an informal 
discussion. I started by asking them about loans procedures. 
But, when I touched on the BMF case, they refused to discuss 
matters further.
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There are a few people whom I have interviewed who do 
not want their identity revealed. I am very grateful to them 
and I respect their wishes.
Finally, one person who has given me a lot of 
information and in-sights is a British reporter, Kevin 
Cahill. I managed to get in touch with him through his 
campaign in England to free Lorrain Osman, one of the BMF 
directors who was involved in the scandal. By chance, one of 
my supervisors was sent a pamphlet on this campaign and he 
passed it to me. I had two long interviews with him and he 
had kindly given me all the information he had.
Lastly, I tried to interview Lorrain Osman himself, but 
was turned down by the Brixton Prison authority. Please see 
Appendix III for a copy of the letter from the authority.
When I wrote to the people I wanted to interview, I 
sent them two introductory letters; one from my supervisors 
and one from my sponsor. I also enclosed a self-addressed 
envelope and a very short form for them to fill in to state 
whether I could see them and also their contact number if 
they permitted me to do so, so that I could ring them to 
arrange the time and place (see Appendix IV) . This form was 
important as it would allow me the freedom to make the 
appointment at the time convenient to me as well as to the 
interviewees, especially if they were from another town. I 
could then arrange to interview all the people from the same 
town within a particular week.
Besides the people I have interviewed, I also managed 
to meet a few people who were kind enough to send me 
information which was relevant to my thesis, for example, an
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officer from the Securities and Futures Commission in Hong 
Kong who had been sending me the latest newspapers clippings 
of the BMF trials in Hong Kong, Dr. Jon Vagg who recommended 
some books to me on the BMF case, librarians from my 
university in Malaysia who helped me to locate the 
investigation reports on the cases I needed for my research 
and colleagues of mine who sent them to me. I used the 
library extensively during my fieldwork. The librarians also 
helped me to get local seminar papers and books written by 
local authors.
For my chapter on general commercial crime in Malaysia, 
I borrowed Simon Field's theory. His is the only theory 
which briefly mentions fraud although it was generally on 
property crime. I confirmed with him whether I could use his 
theory to compare with my data. He said he could not see the 
reason for not doing so.
Finally, I would like to say that for my research, I 
was lucky enough to meet the right people at the right time. 
Research methods formulated by social researchers were good 
guides to me, but ultimately it was up to me to grab 
whatever opportunities that presented themselves at that 
time. If not, I had to try to create my own opportunities in 
whatever ways I could. I am glad I have been lucky so far.
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T h e  London  School of Economics  and Poli t ical  Science
H o u g h to n  S tree t
L o n d o n  W C 2 A  2 A E
Telepho ne: 0 71 -40 5  7686 
T e le x : 24655 L S E L O N  G
Fax: 071 -95 5  7405
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY D ire c t line: 071 -95 5  7
26 October 1992
The Governor 
HM Prison Brixton 
Jebb Avenue 
London SW2
Dear Sir,
I am a lecturer at the Northern University of Malaysia currently 
studying at the London School of Economics as a graduate student 
under the supervisions of Prof. Paul Rock and Prof. Leonard 
Leigh. My research focuses on the history of the Bumiputra 
Malaysia Finance Limited and as you know, one of your current 
inmates, Lorrain Esme Osman, played a key role. I have written 
to Mr. Osman and spoken to his legal advisor and I understand he 
may be prepared to see me. If that is so, it would greatly assist 
my research work if I could bring in a tape recorder. I would be 
very grateful if you could give me permission to do so.
Prof. Rock or Prof. Leigh would be willing to clarify the matter 
further if there is a need to do so.
Thanking you in advance for your kind consideration.
Yours faithfully,
(Yik Koon Teh) .
I he London School o f •■tunnies is a School nt the U n ivcrs it\ ol London. It isa c h a rm  arid is incorporated 
in tn d . in d  ;t» a ■ >nipanv lim ited l>\ tiu.iranicc under the Companies Acts (Rev: No. 70527) 
Appendix I
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Brixton 
P.O. Box 369 
Jebb Avenue 
London SW 2 5X F
Telephone 081-674 9811 ext 344 
Fax 081-674 6128
Professor Rock
The London School of Economics 
& Political Science 
Houghton Street 
LONDON WC2A 2AE
Dear Professor Rock
The Governor has asked me to reply on his behalf to a letter he has received 
from one of your students Yik Koon Teh, a copy of which is attached for ease 
of reference.
Before considering this request it would be helpful to have clarification in 
particular about how discussions might relate to Mr Osman’s outstanding case 
and any possible prejudice to legal action.
Please do not hesitate to contact me should you wish to discuss this matter. 
Yours sincerely
I A Stewart GIV 
Head of Residential
cc Yik Koon Keh
Appendix II
Your reference 
Our reference
Date 28 . 10.92
HM PRISON 
SERVICE
W=»
. __  C_
be.
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H M  Prison 
Brixton 
P.O. Box 369 
Jebb Avenue 
London SW2 5XF
Telephone 081-674 9811 
Fax 081-674 6128
Professor Paul Rock 
Director of the Mannheim Centre 
London School of Economics & 
Political Scienfc«* 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE
Dear Professor Rock 
Ms YIK KOON TEH
I am replying to your letter of 3 December to Mr Kitteridge.
Following your letter of 4 November, I asked Miss Stewart to 
confirm that there would be no legal objection from an 
official perspective to the interview which had been 
requested. The initial legal opinion which we received was 
not enthusiastic about the proposal. It was this interim 
opinion which was fed back to Ms Teh. Miss Stewart was 
pursuing the matter with our advisers and for this reason 
delayed letting you have a final response.
You will be aware that Mr Osman's legal objections to 
extradition have been exhausted and he has now returned to 
Hong Kong. I regret that we were not able to give you a 
positive response prior to his departure.
I hope that we shall be able to give assistance to some of 
your students in the future.
Yours sincerely
Dr A.G COYLE 
Governor
Appendix III
Your reference
Our reference A G C / j r i
Date 17 December 1992 »
HM PRISON 
SERVICE
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Appendix IV
Teh Yik Koon 
(address)
Dear Sir/Madam,
I will / will not be able to grant you an interview. 
My telephone number is _______________________.
Yours faithfully,
( ).
Chapter 1
Theories Of Crime In Developing Countries 
(With Specific Reference To Malaysia)
This chapter will discuss some theories on crime in 
developing countries and whether these theories are relevant 
to the situation in Malaysia. It should be pointed out that 
the literature on development hardly ever mentions the 
impact it has on crime. The crime issue has been left out as 
if it were not a problem for developing countries. 
Literature on development and crime in Malaysia is 
practically non-existent. Thus, I have to rely on existing 
literature on crime in developing countries in general to 
form my own research framework for the case of Malaysia. 
This is an important starting point for any research on 
crime in Malaysia. I will discuss the theory of crime in 
developing countries propounded by Clinard and Abbott in 
1973 as a starting point. This theory is lacking in many 
ways as a model for the study of crime in developing 
countries. A critique of this theory will highlight other 
important factors that must be considered. Other theories 
will then be compared with this theory and finally, I hope 
to propose a framework suitable for studying crime in 
Malaysia.
1. The theory of Clinard and Abbott
Clinard and Abbott (1973) proposed that the developing 
countries were undergoing processes of development similar 
to those experienced by developed countries like the United
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States and those of Europe. The types of crime in the less 
developed countries were said to be at a stage that 
reflected those of England, the United States and other 
developed societies at the time of rapid industrialization, 
urbanization and development in the early nineteenth century 
(Clinard & Abbott, 1973; 4). The two writers equated
industrialization, urbanization and development with 
'modernization'; "the combination of technological mastery 
and the concomitant, to a certain degree resultant, 
expansion of human horizons marks a period in human 
development generally termed 'modernization'” (p.7). The 
growth of industrialization was said to affect the direction 
and nature of urbanization and both, in turn would affect 
the growth of modernization. Industrialization was said to 
be concentrated in the cities. The cities became an impetus 
for migration of the population, especially the youth, from 
rural area in response to the economic and social stimulus. 
However, the ability to generate urban employment was unable 
to meet the influx of migration. Continual unemployment 
forced destitute migrants to gravitate towards the vast 
physically depressed living area which ultimately became the 
slum area of the cities.
The two writers argued that the key to wealth and 
status was through education. Unfortunately, only a small 
percentage of the population could expect to have access to 
educational facilities. The writers concluded that 
unemployment and the emphasis on education with the 
relatively few possibilities of success gave rise to social 
structural conditions that created deep feelings of
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alienation in many youths (p.8). These feelings were 
reinforced by a decline in their relationship with the 
extended family. Thus, isolated, friendless and frustrated 
youth in the city might get support from new friends in a 
delinquent group.
The urban crime rate was more significant than that in 
the rural area. Generally, the crimes were more strongly 
related to property crimes than crimes against the person. 
This was due to increasing demand for prestige articles or 
articles that lent a sense of modernization. The offenders 
were usually young males in their twenties living in the 
slum area. Most of their property crimes were committed by 
the poor against the poor and the stolen articles were of 
little monetary value. Other major offences in the 
developing countries were vagrancy, black market offences, 
illegal begging and sex crimes.
The writers supported their observations with a study 
carried out in Uganda. They found that offenders had a 
greater tendency to view their political system as ' corrupt' 
and that they had fewer opportunities for advancement. Thus, 
their only recourse was to illegal means. Their criminal 
behaviour was learnt from "bad company". This "bad company" 
furnishes an alternate source of support in place of the 
family unit which was severely disrupted by the effects of 
urbanization.
However, there was increasing concern that crimes 
involving violence were rising in developing countries. 
There was an increase in the use of weapons like knives and 
firearms in robbery. The writers argued that armed robbery
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was learnt in prison. Thus, the prison was seen as a 
breeding ground for more violent offences.
The writers concluded that the widespread increase in 
crime in developing countries as they passed through the 
stages of modernization indicated that similar crime- 
producing conditions were taking place throughout the world. 
This view was supported by the United Nation Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in 1970 
which concluded that, "As any country begins to open up, 
outgrows its traditionalism and responds to outside 
influences or new ideas by modernizing, industrializing and 
concentrating people in certain areas, its people and 
particularly its younger generation seize the many new 
opportunities. And in doing so, a small, but progressively 
increasing number of them succumb to temptations and seek 
illegal satisfaction through crime" (p.11).
The writers were careful not to blame the increase in 
the crime rate in developing countries solely on poverty and 
unemployment. They stressed that norms permitting and even 
sanctioning acts of theft must generally have been 
incorporated into a person's life organisation by intimate 
contact with others who transmitted deviant cultural, 
neighbourhood and occupational norms (p.176). They also 
suggested that persons who were employed might have greater 
opportunities for crime and that there was an increase in 
white collar crime among middle and upper class politicians, 
Government officials, businessmen and lawyers (p.140). 
However, there were no statistics to support their argument 
as the power elites were believed to be usually beyond the
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law and were seldom prosecuted or imprisoned.
The two writers believed that Merton's concept of 
anomie i.e. the clash between institutional means and 
cultural goals in the provision of access to a given success 
goal by legitimate means was applicable only as a partial 
explanation of some of the social forces leading to 
increased crime in developing countries (p.176). Relative 
deprivation theory which correlated those who felt they were 
at a disadvantage with the crime rate in developing 
countries was another possible explanation. The theory of 
differential opportunity which had been developed to explain 
the growth of delinquent gang behaviour among urban youth 
was another theory which should be considered for the 
increase in crime rate in the developing countries. 
According to Cloward and Ohlin, delinquent gang behaviour 
grew wherever legitimate means to the attainment of the 
success goals, such as economic and higher educational 
opportunities were blocked (p.177). The lower class youths 
had internalised the emphasis on conventional goals, but 
they faced limitations on legitimate access to these goals. 
Thus, many reacted to these restrictions on opportunities by 
adopting illegal means such as crime to attain their goals; 
their choice depending on the means available (p.178). This 
theory incorporated Sutherland's theory of differential 
association. The individual must have the opportunity to 
acquire the techniques to commit the offence and be able to 
rationalise his actions. The writers believed that the 
theory of differential association fitted the facts about 
criminal behaviour better than any other theories (p.193);
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"Extensive worldwide evidence now exists to support the 
position that criminal behaviour is learned. Criminal norms 
are acquired primarily by group association and 
participation in deviant subcultures such as those existing 
in the slums, in youth gangs and in certain occupations"
(p.261).
The writers concluded that as development continues, 
the levelling off of certain crimes was to be expected, for 
example, prostitution, begging and political crime. 
Developing countries were said to be facing a dilemma. On 
the one hand, they must plan for development and on the 
other, they must recognise the price they would have to pay 
for development (p.263). The writers argued that 
unfortunately, most developing countries believed that by 
improving general socio-economic conditions, crime would 
automatically be eliminated, thus neglecting crime control 
planning.
2. Critique of the theory of Clinard and Abbott
The two writers have presented a general theory of 
crime and criminal behaviour and not a specific theory for 
developing countries. Their theory has neglected wider 
issues which have important effects on a particular 
developing country, for example, colonialism, pluralism and 
the economic policies of the particular country. These 
factors no doubt would affect the crime scenario of a 
particular country. They imported theories of crime 
developed for Western society during the beginning of 
industrialization to fit their theory to developing
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countries. It is just not possible to import Western crime 
theories per se to fit developing countries as pointed out 
by some Western writers like Ronald Troyer et.al. (1989) who 
have done research on developing countries. In their 
research on the Chinese social control system, they pointed 
out that, "the more we see of China, the less relevant many 
Western theories and social science seem. More and more 
Western social science appears to be culturally specific. 
The grand narratives constructed and used in the West just 
do not work very well in China. Indeed, many of our 
favourite ideas may have to be reconceptualized" (Troyer, 
1989; 190). One reason for this conclusion was the vast
cultural differences between Western countries and China. As 
pointed out by Klein and Gatz, the basic social unit in 
China was simply not the individual, but the group (Troyer, 
1989; 172). Clinard and Abbott have failed to construct an 
alternative research framework suitable for the study of the 
increase in crime rate in developing countries. They also 
seem to suggest that every developing country will undergo 
the same stages of modernization. I do agree that there may 
be certain similarities between different developing 
countries. However, one should not overlook the distinctive 
features of a particular country. The problem one has to 
face is to resolve how much similarity can be made and how 
much specificity can be sacrificed. Clinard and Abbott have 
failed to recognise the differences in the rate of economic 
growth and modernization of different developing countries. 
This different in speed may be caused by different forms of 
colonialism or different economic policies pursued by a
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particular Government. Developing countries cannot be 
treated as a single unit. Each developing country has its 
own unique features and differences with other developing 
countries.
Other important factors that must be considered are the 
culture, racial composition and religion of each specific 
developing country. Malaysia is a country where economic and 
social policies constantly evolved around the diversity of 
race, culture and religion. When one is doing research in 
Malaysia, especially on development, it is necessary to look 
at these issues and link them to the historical past which 
made Malaysia what it is today. This point is well 
illustrated by Tariq in his study of crime in Pakistan; 
"Owing to its peculiar social, economic and cultural 
conditions, the crime in all its characteristics is bound to 
have a peculiar nature in the country...As our social 
values, moral teachings and legal statutes are different 
from those of other lands in the world, it is expected that 
the crime, its nature and its etiology are peculiar and 
specific. Therefore, any foreign theory, developed for the 
understanding of the criminal behaviour, may -just fail to 
explain the phenomenon in Pakistan” (Tariq, 1983; 1).
Clinard and Abbott also rely too heavily on official 
statistics and their interviews with a sample of prisoners 
who had committed property offences. They fail to see that 
the way crime is reported and the legal system of the 
country may be different from other countries. Moreover, 
even if the legal system is similar, the crime rate may be 
different in different societies as pointed out by Traver
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and Vagg in their study of Hong Kong; "Hong Kong's
comparatively low crime rate cannot be attributed to the 
efficiency of its criminal justice system since similar
systems elsewhere have proven unable to stem the tide of 
crime. The answer is not to be found in the criminal justice 
itself, but in the way it is perceived and used by members 
of society. This brings us to the question of culture and 
how it affects crime and criminal justice” (Traver & Vagg, 
1991; 7).
Clinard and Abbott only briefly mentioned crimes of 
politicians, officials and businessmen. Evidently, the crime 
problem is seen as a problem with the lower class. Sumner 
suggests that it serves as an ideological agency for the
class control procedures of the capitalist state (Sumner,
1982; 21).
I would like to elaborate my arguments in more detail 
in relation to the study of crime in Malaysia. Although I am 
not a historian, a brief outline of the history of Malaysia 
is needed to illustrate my point that: a) the theory of
modernization is not sufficient for the study of crime in 
Malaysia and b) economic and social policies have indirect 
effect on the crime rate. For a more detailed study of the 
history of Malaysia, refer to "History of Malaysia" by 
Barbara and Leonard Andaya, 1982 or "A History of Malaysia 
and Singapore" by N.J.Ryan, 1976.
3. Brief history of Malaysia
Malaysia is a country rich in culture and diversity. 
Its population is made up of three dominant races i.e.
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Malay, Chinese and Indian. The colourful historical 
background of Malaysia led to the emergence of a plural 
society. The eighty years of colonial rule and its earlier 
past have established cultural, political and economic 
patterns which can still be experienced today and these 
patterns have considerable influence on both the present 
problems and achievements of contemporary Malaysian society.
The Malay peninsula had been a very important trading 
place for hundreds of years before the founding of the 
Melaka sultanate around 1400. Trading stretched from Africa 
to China due to its geographical position. The regional 
overlord at that period was Srivijaya in Palembang, Sumatra. 
In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Srivijaya began to 
lose its hold over the Malay peninsula as the Chinese 
traders decided to deal directly with the Malay ports. When 
the Javanese army invaded Palembang, one of the Palembang 
princes, Parameswara, fled the country to Singapore. His 
son, Iskandar Shah, founded the Melaka sultanate in the 
Malay peninsula around-1400. Thus, Melaka's heritage was the 
Palembang tradition with its codified laws for efficient 
management of legal and administrative matters which were 
essential for long term international trading. On the 
political front, the Melaka court formulated its own concept 
of the state and how it should function. Melaka became a 
prosperous and renowned trading centre in the fifteenth 
century. It was strongly influenced by traders from 
overseas, in particular, Indian traders who introduced Islam 
to the Malay people in the early fifteenth century. Melaka 
also received vassal status from China, Thailand and Java.
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By the time of the reign of Melaka's last ruler in the 
early sixteenth century, the kingdom had grown to include 
almost the whole of the peninsula except Kedah, Trengganu 
and Kelatan (see map).
Melaka's period of greatness came to an end with the 
arrival of the first colonial power. The Portuguese captured 
Melaka in 1511. This was followed by the arrival of the 
Dutch who captured Melaka from the Portuguese in 1641. 
Finally, the British assumed control of Melaka in 1795.
The revival of the Malay sultanate was achieved in 
Johor. However, various rulers were attempting to assert 
their independence or supremacy. The civil wars among the 
different peninsula states were a sign of the 'decay' of the 
Malay society.
The British followed a policy of non-intervention when 
they first arrived at the peninsula. However, the
disturbance in the Malay states endangered trade and 
investment. Thus, the notion of a British Resident advising 
the Malay ruler and helping to run the peninsula in a
'civilized' manner was introduced. 'Civilization' meant the 
adoption of English law, English government and even an 
English way of life. The British Resident's advice had to be 
asked and acted upon in all questions other than those 
touching Malay religion and custom. Thus, the term "British 
Malaya" was introduced.
Chinese participation in agriculture and mining in the 
Malay peninsula was already apparent in the eighteenth
century and in the nineteenth century. The Chinese dominated 
these two industries. The Chinese came to the Malay
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peninsula to escape the life of grinding poverty in China. 
Their arrival at the Malay peninsula to seek economic gains 
affected the rate of change in the Malay world. They 
revealed the potentialities and limitations of the economic 
environment of the peninsula. They were also involved in 
internal disputes between the Chinese secret societies as 
well as the conflicts between the Malay princes.
Between 1911 and 1931, there was worldwide demand for 
tin and rubber. The British government encouraged 
immigration from China and India to ease the labour shortage 
in the tin mines and rubber plantations of the Malay 
peninsula. This was because Malay peasants generally 
controlled the land which they cultivated and it was 
difficult to induce them to work for any employer.
Although the Malay peninsula now had three main ethnic 
groups i.e. the Malay, Chinese and Indian, the British 
created a "divide and rule" system of Government to 
administer the three major ethnic groups. Apart from a few 
prominent Chinese being included in the State Council, the 
Chinese and the Indians were not allowed to join the civil 
service. They were strictly confined to maintaining the 
economic progress of the peninsula. This was because they 
were regarded as temporary sojourners rather than permanent 
residents and potential future citizens of the country 
despite evidence of a growing immigrant population. 
Although the Malays were allowed to be involved in 
administrative matters, limited posts were assigned only to 
the Malay elites, creating a cleavage between the Malay 
elites and the rural peasants. Unlike the Malay rural
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peasants, the Chinese had become an urban group since new 
towns were developing in the Chinese dominated mining areas. 
This served to maintain the cultural and economic gap 
between the Chinese and the Malays. The "divide and rule" 
system seemed to serve the interest of the British in 
developing the colonial economy.
Malaya was invaded by the Japanese in December 1941. 
During the Japanese occupation, the Chinese received harsh 
treatment from them because of the anti-Japanese resistance 
in China while the Malays were given prominent roles. The 
main anti-Japanese activity thus understandably came from 
the Chinese. They comprised the largest component in the 
Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army, which in turn was 
dominated by the Malayan Communist Party. The Japanese 
counteracted by stirring up nationalist feelings among the 
Malays. Anti-Chinese feelings was further encouraged by the 
Japanese who used Malays in their paramilitary units to 
fight the Chinese resistance group. This caused Sino-Malay 
antagonism which erupted into fighting in the period between 
the surrender of the Japanese and the return of the British. 
It was during this situation that the proposals for Malayan 
Union were introduced by the Colonial Office Planning Unit 
in Britain. It referred to a new constitution which 
eliminated the Malay states' rights and the transfer of 
jurisdiction from the Malay rulers to the King of England. 
A Malayan Union citizenship was also created which gave 
equal rights to members of all races who had been born in 
Malaya or who had lived in the country for ten out of the 
preceding fifteen years. The introduction of the Malayan
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Union would destroy the special political status of the 
Malays. A storm of protest broke out amongst the Malays. The 
Malayan Union had aroused nationalistic feelings in the 
Malays. The United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) was 
formed to represent the people. Negotiations between the 
British, the Malay rulers and UMNO brought about a new 
concept of a Federation of Malaya whereby the sovereignty of 
the Sultans, the individuality of the states and Malay 
special privileges were upheld.
Another problem for the British at that time was the 
growing strength of the Malayan Communist Party, formed in 
1931, which had moved towards open rebellion. Its root was 
in China. Thus, the Chinese were associated with the Malayan 
Communist Party and were mistrusted by the Malays. The 
declaration of a state of emergency under the Emergency 
Regulations enabled the Government and police to have wider 
powers for the arrest and detention of persons suspected of 
taking part in subversive activities without bringing him to 
trial. The British also initiated the resettlement of 
Chinese squatters in "new villages" under curfew conditions 
to prevent them giving assistance to the guerrillas. 
Military and police operations became more aggressive. By 
1953, the worst of the Emergency had subsided, although it 
had lasted ten years.
During the Emergency years, the British realised that 
the best way of defeating the terrorists was by encouraging 
the development of Malayan nationalism which would mobilize 
public feelings against the communists. The Emergency gave 
an impetus to plans for independence. By 1949, the Malayan
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Chinese Association was established. At the Kuala Lumpur 
municipal elections in 1952, an alliance between UMNO and 
the Malayan Chinese Association won the majority. In 1954, 
the alliance was joined by the Malayan Indian Congress. The 
alliance pledged to achieve independence within the shortest 
possible time. An Independent Constitutional Commission was 
set up in June 1956 and submitted its proposals to the 
British Government early 1957. The Federation of Malaya 
Agreement was signed in August 1957 and independence was 
achieved on 31 August 1957. The Chinese and Indian wanted 
citizenship based on the principle of jus soli where all 
those born in Malaya would automatically become citizens. 
The Malays agreed in return being awarded Malay becoming the 
national language, a four-to-one ratio of Malays to non- 
Malays in the Malayan civil service and the preservation of 
certain other Malay rights and privileges. A Paramount Ruler 
would be chosen by the Conference of Rulers from the 
different States on the basis of seniority for a term of 
five years. The legal framework and other British 
institutions introduced during the colonial period were 
maintained, strengthened and developed. The Parliamentary 
and Cabinet system was modelled on the Westminster model. 
Parliament was composed of the House of Representatives of 
104 directly elected members and a Senate of 38 members, 
nominated and indirectly elected.
The Federation of Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo 
states of Sabah and Sarawak were amalgamated in 1963 to form 
Malaysia. However, Singapore left Malaysia in 1965 to become 
an independent republic for the following reasons:
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a. Singapore's overwhelming Chinese population would upset
the racial balance in the Malay peninsula;
b. Singapore did not agree with retaining certain rights
and privileges for the Malays.
3.1. First Malaysia Plan, 1966-70
The First Malaysia Plan was the first integrated 
economic development plan for the three regions; Malaya, 
Sarawak and Sabah. The plan was also the first of a series 
of plans to solve both the economic and social problems of 
the country.
The main objectives of the First Malaysia Plan were:
1. the integration of the peoples and states of
Malaysia by promoting the welfare of all;
2. a steady increase in the level of income and
consumption per head;
3. an improvement in the standard of living of the
rural population and other low income groups by
increasing their productivity;
4. the provision of employment opportunities for the
additional labour force and a reduction in the
existing level of unemployment and
underemployment;
5. a diversification programme in agriculture and
industry so as to reduce the dependence on rubber 
and tin;
6. an educational programme for all Malaysians so
that they might participate effectively in the
process of economic and social development;
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7. a programme for effective family planning to 
reduce the demographic pressure;
8. a land settlement scheme to provide the landless 
with economic-sized farms;
9. an efficient and sufficient infrastructure.
(Malaysia, 1965: 2)
Plans before the formation of Malaysia were committed 
to extensive rural development. This entailed the provision 
of infrastructural works, land development schemes and the 
modernization of the rural areas.
The First Malaysia Plan reflected a gradual shift 
towards the socio-economic and welfare concern of the 
people. Its major aim was to establish a more equitable 
distribution of income and wealth, especially between the 
rural and urban areas of the country. This was to be 
achieved through a faster rate of economic growth and the 
creation of greater employment opportunities. Thus, the plan 
also reflected "the understanding that structural change was 
a sine qua non of continued high growth of the Malaysian 
economy" (Higgins, 1982: 156). The private sector was
expected to play an important part especially in the 
industrial sector and its related trade.
3.2. Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-5
The Second Malaysia Plan was concerned with the 
implementation of the New Economic Policy. The introduction 
of the New Economic Policy was due to the occurrence of 
civil unrest on 13 May 1969 which showed deep discontent
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among the different races in Malaysia. The political parties 
which contested the 1969 elections in Peninsula Malaysia 
were the Alliance, the Democratic Action Party, the Gerakan, 
the People's Progressive Party and the Pan-Malayan Islamic 
Party (Ongkili, 1985; 199). Although the Democratic Action 
Party claimed to be a non-communal party i.e. it was opened 
to all races, it was predominantly a Chinese party. The 
party rejected the special position of the Bumiputras (Malay 
and other indigenous people) and reaffirmed that, "a 
Malaysian Malaysia1 is the anti-thesis of a Malay Malaysia2. 
They cannot co-exist” (Ongkili, 1985; 200). Ethnic equality 
and cultural pluralism were the basic principles underlying 
its platform (Andaya & Andaya, 1982; 280). The People's
Progressive Party, like the Democratic Action Party, was 
basically a Chinese party although led by two Ceylonese 
brothers. The People's Progressive Party was even more 
critical than the Democratic Action Party of the Bumiputras' 
privileges. The Gerakan was a non-communal party campaigning 
for "equality, justice and equal opportunity for all". The 
election campaigns generated strong communal feelings and 
verbal battles. The result of the election was unexpected 
and a severe blow to the Alliance. Although it still had the 
majority of seats in the House of Representatives, the 
number dropped from 89 in 1964 to 66, out of 104. The 
Gerakan, the Democratic Action Party and the People's
!Malaysian Malaysia means that Malaysia belongs to all 
Malaysians, regardless of race.
2Malay Malaysia means that Malaysia belongs 
predominantly to the Malays. Thus, any preference should be 
given first to the Malays.
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Progressive Party together won a total of 25 seats while the 
Pan-Malayan Islamic Party won 12 seats. The Alliance votes 
dropped from 58.4% in 1964 to 48.8%. On 13 May, the jubilant 
Gerakan and Democratic Action Party supporters held a 
victory rally on the streets of Kuala Lumpur (the capital of 
Malaysia) . The processions were not only noisy, but also 
provocative and abusive. A counter-rally that evening by 
UMNO supporters quickly deteriorated into communal violence. 
A curfew was declared. The Constitution was suspended and a 
national emergency was announced. The city was finally 
restored after four days of bloody violence. However, riot 
incidents persisted for two months. The May 13 riots 
revealed deep racial discontent in the society. One of the 
major reasons for this deep discontent was the inequality in 
the distribution of income and wealth among the different 
races in Malaysia. The status quo seemed to benefit the non- 
Malays more than the Malays. Jomo pointed out that there was 
a worsening distribution of income over the 1960s, a growing 
gap between town and country and growing inequality within 
all the major ethnic groups, with inequality in the Malay 
community increasing most (Jomo, 1990; 9) . Although the
average annual growth rate of the gross domestic product in 
Peninsula Malaysia was 5.8% during 1957-70 while the gross 
domestic product for the whole of Malaysia rose by an 
average of 7.8% (Jomo, 1990; 10), problems of unemployment 
and poverty persisted.
In 1970, the mean monthly income of Malay households 
was less than half that of the Chinese households. This is 
shown in Table 1.1. Mean household income of the Malays was
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Table 1.1 
Peninsular Malaysia: Household Income Inequality
1957-1958 1967-1968 1970 1973
Mean Gint Mean Gini Mean Gini Mean Gini
H ousehold Coefficient Household Coefficient Household Coefficient Household Coefficient
Incom e Incom e Incom e Incom e
($ per m on th ) (S per m onth) ($ per m onth) (S per m onth)
Peninsular Malaysia 199 0.3705 217 0.5624 264 0.5129 362 0.4872
Rural areas 170 0.3549 114 0.4794 200 0.4689 269 0.4516
Urban areas1 261 0.3514 283 0.5224 428 0.5037 570 0.4742
Malays 144 0.3410 130 0.5072 172 0.4664 242 0.4437
Chinese 272 0.3322 321 0.5081 394 0.4656 534 0.4553
Indians 21> 0.3117 253 0.4974 304 0.4722 408 0.4693
Others4 - - 839 0.4912 813 0.6673 1,299 -
Sourcest S. Anand, 1978: 61; Ismail, 1978a; Malaysia, 1979ci 44. ’ 
1 Urban area ii defined as an area with more than 10,000 people. 
^Others Include Thai, other Aslu.i, Eurasian and European.
Source: Salleh  & Osman, 1982; 143.
M$172 (approximately £433) per month compared to the Chinese 
which was M$394 (£98.5). The mean monthly household income 
of the Indians was M$304 (£76) . This means that the Malay 
households had the lowest mean monthly income. The Andayas 
refer to a study done in 1970 which showed that 49.3% of all 
households in Peninsula Malaysia received incomes below the 
poverty line estimated at M$33 (£8.25) per capita monthly. 
Of these, about 75% were Malays (Andaya, 1982; 284). Malay 
households were concentrated in the rural areas whereas the 
Chinese were predominantly in the cities. In 1980, it was 
estimated that some 53.8% of the urban population were 
Chinese, with Malays 32.8% and Indians 12.3% (Sharif, 1982; 
86) .
The gap between the richest region i.e. the south-west 
region where the proportion of Malays was the least and the 
poorest region i.e. the east where there was a high 
concentration of Malays, was indeed very wide. Thus, the 
disparities between the different ethnic groups were also 
regional disparities. This growing inequality was primarily 
perceived in racial terms. The matter was made worse by 
political mobilization along ethnic lines; each ethnic 
political party trying to gain the support of their people 
by championing their rights and interests. Communal politics 
seem to be the best way for a political party to gain votes 
in Malaysia. The Malays resented the Chinese for dominating 
the economy. The non-Malays were frustrated with the Malay 
dominated state machinery which was believed to discriminate 
against them. In actual fact, it was the relatively few
31994 exchange rate.
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Chinese capitalists together with the Malay administrative- 
political elite who enjoyed the bulk of the fruits of rapid 
economic growth in the 1960s (Jomo, 1990; 144).
From Table 1.2, it can be seen that in 1970, in the 
corporate sector of modern agriculture, only 0.3% of the 
acreage was owned by the Malays whereas the Chinese held 
25.9% of the acreage. The bulk was held by foreigners i.e. 
70.8%. In corporate industry, the Malays also played an 
almost negligible part i.e. 0.9%. In non-corporate industry, 
they held only 2.3% of the assets. In the corporate sector 
of the industry, foreigners were predominant i.e. 57.2%. 
Even so, the Chinese holdings (26.2%) were quite significant 
compared to the Malays. The non-corporate industrial sector 
was dominated significantly by the Chinese i.e. 92.2%.
Table 1.3 shows employment by ethnic groups and sector 
from 1967 to 1968 and 1975. It can be seen that the Indians 
and the Malays made up 50.9% and 32.1% respectively of those 
in the agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing sector 
compared to 21.5% of the Chinese from 1967 to 1968. The 
Chinese dominated the manufacturing and commercial sector
i.e. 15.5% and 19.1% respectively compared to the Malays 
5.9% and 5.5%, and the Indians 3.5% and 8.1%.
The highly unequal distribution of wealth and income in 
Malaysia and the occurrence of civil unrest gave rise to the 
New Economic Policy. Thus, the New Economic Policy became 
the main objective of the Second Malaysia Plan. The New 
Economic Policy had a two-pronged polices for development to 
be adopted for a period of twenty years:
43
Table 1.2
Ownership of Assets in Modem Agriculture and Industry, 
Peninsular Malaysia, 1070
Ownership
Modem Agriculture 1 (planted acreage) Industry* ,(fixed assets)
Corporate Sector Non-corporate Sector Corporate Sector Non-corporate Sector
( ’000 acres) ( * ) ( ’000 acres) (%) t
(million)
(%) S
(million)
(%)
Malaysians 615.0 29.2 697.6 94.1 559.7 42.8 167.2 97.6
Malay 5.0 0.8 849.8 47.1 11.2 0.9 3.9 2.3
Chinese 457.0 25.9 249.3 32.8 342.3 26.2 158.0 92.2
Indian 4.9 0.8 74.8 10.1 1.5 0.1 3.9 2.9
Others 48.1 2.7 19.2 1.8 187.2 14.3 1.4 0.8
Government* — - 17.0 2.3 17.5 1.3 _
Non-Malaysians 1,249.6 70.8 44.0 5.9 747.3 ■ 57.2 4.1 2.4
Total 1,764.4 100.0 741.6 100.0 1,307.0 100.0 171.3 100.0
% of total 70.4 29.6 87.4 12.6
Sourest Reproduced from 1973a, Table 1*4,
'Modem agriculture covers estate acreage under rubber, oil palm, coconut and * Government ownership of 17,000 acres In modem agriculture Is included In
tea. FELDA Is included in this category-under the non-corporate sector. the noncorporate sector, while its ownership of $17.5 million of fixed assets
Ownership is in terms of totsd planted acreage. in industry is included in the corporate sector.
a The industry sector covers manufacturing, construction and mining. Ownership 
is in terms of fixed assets. Total excludes unallocatable assets amounting to 
$25.2 million.
Source: Higgins, 1982; 154.
Table 1.3
Peninsular Malaysia: Employment by Ethnic Groups and Sector, 1967-8 and 1975
1967/1968 1975
Total O f which Total O f which
No. % % % % No. % % %
(•000) A ll 
Races
Malays Chinese Indians (•000) A ll
Races
Malays Chinese
. 1. Agriculture, forestry, hunting Sc 
Ashing 500,7 21.1 33.7 10.4 1.7 640.1 17.9 28.4 7.2
2. Agricultural products requiring 
substantial processing 718.8 30.4 32.1 21.5 50.9 871.7 24.4 27.3 15.6
S. Mining, quarrying 72.0 3.0 1.6 5.1 2.9 37.1 1.0 0.7 1.6
4. Manufacturing 214.8 9.0 5.9 15.5 3.5 533.5 15.0 9.7 24.1
5. Construction 78.9 3.3 1.9 5.6 2.7 164.1 4.6 2.7 7.3
6. Electricity, gas, water, sanitary 
services 22.3 0.9 0.8 0.4 3.1 37.1 1.0 1.3 0.3
7. Commerce 255.2 10.8 5.5 19.1 8.1 492.8 13.8 8.2 22.3
8. Transport, storage Sc 
communications 86.2 3.6 3.1 3.6 6.1 146.9 4.1 3.7 4.1
9. Services 413.0 17.4 15.3 18.6 20.9 643.2 18.0 18.0 17.5
10. Not specified 3.5 01 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.2 — —
Total 2,365.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 3,567.2 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: Malaysia, n.d. (d), 95; Malaysia, 1976c: 76—7.
Source: Salleh & Osman, 1982; 138.
The first prong is to reduce and eventually eradicate 
poverty, by raising income levels and increasing 
employment opportunities for all Malaysians, 
irrespective of race. The second prong aims at 
accelerating the process of restructuring Malaysian 
society to correct economic imbalance, so as to reduce 
and eventually eliminate the identification of race 
with economic function. The process involves the 
modernization of rural life, a rapid and balanced 
growth of urban activities and the creation of a Malay 
commercial and industrial community in all categories 
and at all levels of operation, so that Malays and 
other indigenous people will become full partners in 
all aspects of the economic life of the nation.
(Malaysia, 1971: 1)
It was assumed that national unity would prevail from 
greater equity and balance among the different social and 
ethnic groups. Thus, the Second Malaysia Plan had two 
quantitative goals:
1. Employment by sector should reflect the ethnic
composition of the population i.e. Bumiputras 54%,
Chinese 35%, Indians 10% and others 1%;
2. By 1990, the Bumiputras' share capital of the
corporate sector should increase to 30% from 2.4% 
in 1970, non-Bumiputras' share should increase 
from 34.3% to 40% and that of foreigners would 
drop from 63.3% to 30%.
(Lim, 1983: 8)
These goals would be attainable under conditions of 
sustained growth. The increase of the Bumiputras' share of 
the corporate sectors would be achieved through their active 
participation in the expanding output instead of through the 
redistribution of existing wealth. Likewise, it was assumed 
that the employment of the Bumiputras was to be secured
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through new employment opportunities generated by economic 
growth rather than by a displacement of existing non- 
Bumiputra workers.
The introduction of the New Economic Policy required 
greater state intervention in resource allocation as well as 
public sector ownership and control of business enterprises. 
Public enterprises were set up to help expand the 
opportunities for participation by the Bumiputras in the 
commercial sectors through financial, technical, practical, 
advisory and other assistance to help them start and sustain 
their own commercial ventures, for example, Majlis Amanah 
Rakyat (Council for Trust for Indigenous People), Malay 
Development Finance Limited, Urban Development Authority, 
State Economic Development Corporation, etc.. The public 
enterprises also took up share capital and held them in 
trust for the Bumiputras until such time as they were able 
to purchase them on their own. Quotas were introduced in 
certain areas to safeguard Bumiputras' participation, for 
example, a quota of places within institutions of higher 
learning was set aside for Bumiputras so that top Bumiputra 
students would get a chance of entering the institutions of 
higher learning. This was seen as one means of redressing 
the ethnic imbalance in the professions. Subsidies were 
given to the Bumiputras in certain areas, for example, to 
paddy farmers to help poverty reduction. All these policies 
inevitably led to some positive discrimination.
Actual public expenditure for the various public 
corporations and agencies in the commercial and industrial 
sector increased from M$137 mil. in 1966-70 to M$l,552 mil.
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in 1970-5 and more than doubled to M$3,370 mil. in 1976-80 
(Jomo, 1990; 156). The people who run these public
corporations and agencies which still exist today are mainly 
politicians, Government officials and members of the Royal 
households. The immediate reaction to this situation is that 
these public institutions are run only by members of the 
elite group and thus poses several problems. Moreover, in 
Malaysia, politicians are allowed to own and run businesses 
at the same time. There is definitely a conflict of 
interests when politicians are also businessmen. Writers 
like Jomo (1990) and Snodgrass (1980) warn that these people 
have an opportunity to acquire financial resources and 
operating autonomy. "This creates several dangers. One is 
large scale corruption. Another is the use of wealth and 
power to 'buy' a political following, yet, a third is the 
possibility that the policy will spawn an industrial empire 
which will eventually become uncontrollable by political 
authority" (Snodgrass, 1980; 221). The Prime Minister of 
Malaysia has openly acknowledged the growing phenomenon of 
"money politics" i.e. money used to 'buy' supporters and it 
is usually given by big businessmen or rich people with 
vested interest to politicians for their political career in 
return for securing favours, especially business favours. 
Jomo attributed this trend to the expanded role of the 
public sector, state intervention and the corresponding 
influence of politically well-connected businessmen, 
especially under the New Economic Policy. "In fact, it is 
openly acknowledged that business interests now influence 
politics more than ever before in recent Malaysian history.
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For instance, at the last general assembly of United Malays 
National Organisation (UMNO), the dominant partner in the 
ruling coalition, about half the delegates were businessmen" 
(Jomo, 1990; 235). This trend has important implications for 
wealth accumulation and distribution and income inequality 
in Malaysia. Of course it will also have an impact on the 
types of crime and crime rate in Malaysia. This is one 
important area of research for a developing country like 
Malaysia i.e. how the New Economic Policy, a political 
policy, has been abused by a few at the expense of the many 
and leading to wider ethnic polarisation rather than 
national unity. A few major monetary scandals have already 
taken place in Malaysia within the last ten years. For 
instance, in August 1986, Tan Koon Swan resigned as 
president of the Malaysian Chinese Association, an alliance 
group of the ruling party, after admitting to fraudulent 
business malpractice. In late 1986, Tee Ann Chuan, then 
president of the People's Progressive Party, another ruling 
party coalition partner, pleaded guilty to fraudulent 
business practices in Malaysia. The Bumiputra Malaysia 
Finance (BMF) scandal, which is the focus of this thesis, 
implicated major political leaders from UMNO. "It is now 
widely believed that most new opportunities for wealth 
accumulation are crucially determined by political access 
rather than entrepreneurial ability" (Jomo, 1990; 231). It 
is a well known fact (although there are no actual data) 
among Malaysians that many businessmen-politicians and 
politically well-connected businessmen have secured 
businesses from the public-sector projects and policies
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(Jomo, 1991; 236).
The Andayas argued that the most important feature 
helping the Malaysian Government to pursue its policies is 
constitutional amendments restricting discussion of 
"sensitive issues" (Andaya, 1982; 292). The Internal
Security Act (ISA) of 1960 limits public discussions, even 
among Parliamentary members, of topics which may lead to 
promote feelings of hostility between different races or 
classes of the population. The ISA allows the State to 
detain people without trial for any length of time. The Act 
provides "for the internal security of Malaysia, preventive 
detention, the prevention of subversion, the suppression of 
organised violence against persons and property in specified 
areas of Malaysia and for matters incidental thereto" (ISA 
1960) . The amendment to Article 150 empowered the King to 
make declarations of "emergency even before the actual 
occurrence of an event if he is satisfied there is imminent 
danger of it taking place". Section 8(1) of the Act states 
that, "If the Minister (Home Affairs) is satisfied that the 
detention of any person is necessary with a view to 
preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the 
security of Malaysia or any part thereof or to the 
maintenance of essential services therein or to the economic 
life thereof, he may make an order (hereinafter referred to 
as a detention order) directing that person to be detained 
for any period not exceeding two years". Police and security 
forces are given wide-ranging powers of search and arrest, 
based on hearsay and suspicion and the detention of persons 
in the first 60 days for investigation. This can be followed
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by a confirmed two-year detention, based on allegations 
extracted from investigations without any trial in court and 
further extension of detention every two years at the 
discretion of the Minister of Home Affairs, on the 
recommendation of the Advisory Board and the Special Branch. 
There is a wider use of this Act after the 1969 race riot.
3.3. Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-80
The New Economic Policy was still the underlying 
objective of the Third Malaysia Plan. The major theme was 
the enhancement of the well-being of Malaysians of all 
races, from all walks of life and in all regions of the 
country. While the New Economic Policy in the Second 
Malaysia Plan addressed exclusively the problem of Malay 
poverty, in the Third Malaysia Plan, "rural poverty” took on 
a broader meaning. The pattern of capital ownership was 
expected to change from a ratio of 3:34:63 for Malays, non- 
Malays and foreigners respectively to 30:40:30 by 1990 
(Third Malaysia Plan, 1976: 88-89). Land development which 
had been utilised as one of the major ways to combat 
Bumiputra poverty was less heavily emphasized. Attention was 
shifted to the root causes of poverty such as landlessness, 
low productivity in human and capital resources, and 
unemployment. Thus, programmes were formulated to aim at 
higher productivity, expanding employment and creating a 
more conducive and dynamic economic and social environment 
in rural areas. A large proportion of overall development 
expenditure was still committed to the agricultural sector 
because primary commodities such as rubber, oil palm and
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timber were still major sources of export earnings.
In conclusion, the Third Malaysia Plan provided "a 
fascinating case study of the massive intervention and use 
of Government policy and machinery to meet, contain and 
shape political developments in the country since the very 
scope and breadth of the plan is based, for all its economic 
strengths, on political factors” (MacAndrews, 1977: 308).
3.4. Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981-85
The Fourth Malaysia Plan could be seen as elaborating 
and refining policies instituted in the Second Malaysia Plan 
and Third Malaysia Plan. "Attention was being switched to 
the theme of employment and by implication, 
industrialization policies" (Cho, 1990: 69). Export
promotion was given priority over import substitution in 
industrial development policies. The agricultural sector was 
still the source of export earnings. It also provided the 
raw materials for the manufacturing sector. The expansion in 
agricultural production was expected as productivity 
increased. There was also an increased concentration on 
regional development so that the distribution of economic 
activities would be better balanced. Policies and programmes 
were also implemented to control inflation so that it would 
not affect the poor adversely.
Overall, the Fourth Malaysia Plan "projected a greater 
reliance on private investment than the previous plan" (Cho, 
1990: 79).
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3.5. Fifth Malaysia Plan, 1986-90
At the end of the Fifth Malaysia Plan, the objectives 
of the New Economic Policy was expected to be achieved. The 
Fifth Malaysia Plan had strong emphasis on privatization, 
regional development and urbanization policies.
However, the Fifth Malaysia Plan also coincided with 
lagging international demand, weak commodities prices and 
increasing protectionism in overseas markets. These had 
affected export earnings. Inevitably, moderate growth with 
stability was to be pursued. Public expenditure on 
development had to be cut although agriculture and rural 
development continued to be emphasized. The major cuts fell 
on defence and security. The push was towards increased food 
production, small-scale industries and small-scale 
businesses in urban areas.
Although the Government was expected to play a lesser 
role in the Fifth Malaysia Plan, it would still provide an 
investment climate to stimulate certain domestic activities, 
for example, road construction, low-cost housing and rising 
standards of living in rural areas. The reduction in the 
role of the public sector was prompted by increasing foreign 
debts and huge budget deficits. Privatization policies would 
be pursued by the Government to enable it to reduce its 
participation in the domestic economy.
Thus, the role of the private sector was expected to 
increase dramatically. "The private sector, however, is 
expected to provide the dynamism in the economy with the 
progressive withdrawal of the Government from the economic 
sector. In this, the Government expects that the private
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sector will switch from its preoccupation with finance, 
property development and real estate to manufacturing for 
export. Malaysia Incorporated, a term adopted to refer to 
the integration of the roles and functions of the 
Government, the private sector, employers and employees and 
producers and consumers has been adopted as the theme to 
help develop a united, just, stable and progressive society" 
(Cho, 1990: 79).
In conclusion, the Fifth Malaysia Plan expected much 
growth to come from the private sector.
4. Research framework for studying crime in Malaysia
From this brief outline of the history of Malaysia, one 
can understand why the crime problem of Malaysia falls 
outside the modernization theory of Clinard and Abbott. Many 
other factors like ethnicity, religion, government policies 
(especially plural development goals like the New Economic 
Policy), historical factors, etc., shape the society and 
thus they must have an impact on the types of crime and 
crime rate in Malaysia. As Tariq pointed out, "whenever an 
attempt is made to understand the phenomenon of crime, it is 
imperative to study it in its legal, social and cultural 
perspective. Only then a better understanding can be reached 
at and such complex matters can be understood as why there 
is a social approval of certain crimes in the society and 
what impedes their effective prevention and control" (Tariq, 
1983; 1-2).
It is unfortunate that criminology in the developing 
countries has not received as much attention as in the West
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and thus Western criminology has to be relied upon for 
research on crime in developing countries. However, this 
should not be taken as a set back. Western theories can 
still be used, but the researchers have to be aware of their 
limitations and the necessary modifications required to suit 
the developing country.
In formulating a theoretical framework for studying 
crimes in developing countries, I do not want to take a 
relativist position which stresses the uniqueness of each 
culture and denies the possibility of comparison and 
generalization. Neither do I want to take a reductionist 
viewpoint i.e. generalizing criminal behaviour across 
culture and thus denying the unique features of different 
countries. I would like to adopt a theoretical framework 
that incorporates both the relativist and reductionist 
viewpoints i.e. there are certain criminal behaviours which 
are universal and others which are unique to a particular 
country due to its historical, cultural and economic 
perspectives.
In my "middle-of-the-road” stand, I would like to 
introduce Sumner's theory. Sumner proposed a more valid 
theoretical framework for research on crime in developing 
countries. He proposed three factors which must be taken 
into consideration although I only agree with two i.e. 
internationalism, historical perspective and socialism.
1. Internationalism
Criminological study of developing countries has to 
take an international perspective because what happens in
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one country will affect other countries. The economy, 
politics and culture have become international matters. 
Sumner believed that we now live in an international society 
created by the "second imperialism” (Sumner, 1982; 5). The 
imperialists are the supra-national economic blocs. The
policy for underdeveloped countries is not so much a policy 
of 'rural socialism' integrating the economy nationally, but 
more of a strategy to integrate the national economy into 
the international capitalist system. Moreover, most 
developing countries like Malaysia, depend on Western
technology and capital investments of the developed 
countries in its development process. As a developing 
country, it is also keen to get involved in foreign
investments either jointly or on its own, for example, the 
setting up of Bumiputra Malaysia Finance, the case study of 
this thesis, in Hong Kong. The Bumiputra Malaysia Finance 
scandal is an example of how a major fraud was committed by 
a few Malaysian elites with the cooperation of a group of 
people from another country i.e. prominent Hong Kong
businessmen and professionals. This case also calls into 
question if internationalism has set up an international 
class system of its own. This issue will be discussed in 
later chapters.
2. The historical perspective
Sumner said, "Internationalism itself clearly springs 
from an historical perspective which demands an 
understanding of the present as a moment in a definite line 
of movement begun in the past. This perspective therefore
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demands categories and studies which are consonant with an 
understanding of that line of movement. This line of 
movement which concerns me, and which underpins our present, 
is the growth of imperialism and international social 
relations” (Sumner, 1982; 8). Thus, the growth of
imperialism and international social relations has to be 
mapped. Their effect on the processes that give rise to the 
concept and procedures of crime and justice has to be 
determined. This also inevitably leads to the study of who 
the legal process protects and who it helps to exploit in 
the society. As he says, "crime is not behaviour universally 
given in human nature and history, but a moral-political 
concept with culturally and historically varying form and 
content. It will remind us that modern criminal justice 
procedures are not universal, inevitable or 'natural', but 
legitimated practices of moral-political control which 
develop in response to conflicts spawned by the class 
relationships of exploitation and domination constituting 
the capitalist mode of production" (Sumner, 1982; 10). The 
criminal justice process in developing countries did not in 
many cases evolve naturally, but was imported and modified 
in response to conflicts in class relationships and 
exploitation. This is the central issue in Marxist theory 
which argues that the criminal law was used and abused by 
powerful classes in the process of primitive accumulation of 
land and labour (Sumner, 1982; 30). Sumner argues that crime 
is an integral ally of capitalist penetration into the third 
world (Sumner, 1982; 33). "The penetration of capitalism 
into the weaker areas of the globe, now the third world,
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involved the use, non-use and abuse of the criminal law. 
Without this state power, nothing would have been possible, 
for it helped create and sustain the labour force needed for 
capital” (Sumner, 1982; 35). The modernization theory put 
forward by Clinard and Abbott does not see criminal law and 
crime as containing underdevelopment rather than helping it.
I agree with Sumner that a historical perspective of 
the country has to be laid out when studying crime of that 
country. However, I would not want to be trapped in a simple 
Marxist argument i.e. crime is only about crimes by and 
against the bourgeoisie. The criminal law is not only for 
the protection of the bourgeoisie from the proletariat. 
Moreover, his argument seems to suggest that there is no 
crime without capitalism and that crime can only be analyzed 
under the capitalist context.
The study of the historical perspective of crime should 
include factors like ethnicity, culture and religious 
differentiation and domination, the struggle for 
independence, the formation of its legal system and the 
process of nation building. Moreover, the crime problem 
during the colonial period has to be redefined in post­
colonial era. The questions that were asked during the 
colonial period need to be reevaluated in the post colonial 
era. These factors are the unique features of a country 
which could influence the types and rate of crimes in that 
country. As Myrdal said we must often make historical 
generalisations and include selected material of a 
historical kind in order to explain present conditions. We 
must also realize that the lack of historical depth in our
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approach restricts our understanding of the social reality 
we are investigating (Myrdal, 1968; 43). For a country like 
Malaysia, this historical perspective on criminal law 
inevitably turns us towards colonialism and the nature and 
policies of a plural society.
3. Socialism
Sumner suggested that the socialist revolution needed 
to be studied as it took place in the third world. As such, 
their crime rate and justice policy needed to be 
investigated. Sumner argued that this had sprung from 
fundamental methodological premises and substantive issues 
in Marxist theory.
From Sumner's theory, it can be seen that the two 
factors of internationalism and historicism are important to 
the Malaysian case. These two factors are already enough to 
form a reliable research framework to study the crime 
problem in Malaysia. Moreover, it is already very time 
consuming to do research based on these two factors. The 
third factor of socialism is not as important as the other 
two factors although it would be interesting to do research 
on it if time permits.
Heiland and Shelley (1991) suggested that the concept 
of the centralization of power structures and processes 
could be integrated with the conceptions of civilization and 
modernization. "Crime very often is a function of the power 
structure and influences struggles among dominant national 
elites and among the powerless seeking to regain or expand
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their power. The explanatory value of the power dimension, 
added to the historical and developmental dimension 
suggested by us enhances our understanding of the changing 
patterns, forms and levels of crime and social control. We 
can suggest that the triad of modernization, power and 
civilization leads to a comprehensive macro-structural 
explanatory framework, which may be able to explain 
different criminological developments in diverse societies" 
(Heiland, 1991; 18) . The centralization of power is taken to 
refer not only to the Government, but also to the corporate 
world.
The concept of the centralization of power structures 
and processes suggested by Heiland and Shelley should be 
taken into consideration in the study of crime in Malaysia. 
As noted earlier on, the New Economic Policy is run by a 
centralized power. So are most of the business enterprises. 
However, as the two writers caution, this factor should be 
studied along with other important historical factors.
Conclusion
The intention of this chapter has been to set up a 
research framework for the study of crime in developing 
countries, especially for the case of Malaysia. In doing so, 
this chapter has arrived at the conclusion that the study of 
crime in developing countries goes beyond the issue of how 
countries are industrialized, urbanized and modernized. Each 
developing country has its own unique factors which can 
affect its crime problem directly or indirectly. These 
unique factors need to be analyzed in order to understand
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the crime situation of that particular country.
For the case of Malaysia, this chapter has shown that 
the following perspectives are of great importance:
1. Historical perspectives;
2. Plural development goals;
3. Centralization of power structures and processes;
4. The laws of the country;
5. Internationalism.
This will be part of the focus of the subsequent 
chapters when the Bumiputra Malaysia Finance case is 
analyzed.
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Chapter 2
Concepts And Definitions Of Crimes At The Workplace
(In Particular Fraud)
In chapter 1, I discussed theories of crime in 
developing countries. I tried to pinpoint some areas which 
had been excluded by Western theories of crime when studying 
such crime by referring to Malaysia.
In this chapter, I shall discuss the development of the 
concepts and definitions of crimes committed at the 
workplace, in particular the crime of fraud, which is the 
specific focus of this thesis. From this discussion, I shall 
proceed to introduce and clarify the concepts and 
definitions which are suitable for this thesis.
1. Development of the concepts and definitions of crimes
at the workplace
In this section, I will introduce the concepts and 
definitions which are suitable for my thesis. In doing so, 
I need to look at past concepts and definitions given by 
prominent criminologists in order to consider the strength 
and weakness of each of them before arriving at my own 
concepts and definitions.
In the 1940s, the attention of criminologists and 
academics was drawn to deviant behaviour associated with the 
corporation, universally known as "white collar crime".
Sutherland (1949) was the first person to try to 
conceptualise the crimes that were committed in the business 
world. He noted that such crimes were committed by offenders
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who were mentally sound and well to do. He introduced the 
concept of "white collar crime" which he defined as "a crime 
committed by a person of respectability and high social 
status in the course of his occupation" (Sutherland, 1949; 
9) . This concept was introduced to distinguish crimes 
committed at the workplace from crimes associated with 
poverty and the personal pathologies which accompany 
poverty.
The identification of white collar crimes with high 
status offenders had generated much criticism. One of the 
criticisms by writers like Braithwaite (1985) and Shapiro 
(1990) was that the types of crime termed as white collar 
could also be committed by persons who were not of "high 
social status". Thus, the concept of white collar crime has 
been deemed vague. For example, fraud could be committed by 
both high level and low level workers. The word "white 
collar" gave problems in the study of the specific crime. 
There have been suggestions about redefining or changing the 
concept.
Clinard and Quinney (1973) divided white collar crimes 
into occupational and corporate crimes. "Occupational crime 
consists of offences committed by individuals for themselves 
in the course of their occupations and the offences of 
employees against their employers" (Clinard & Quinney, 1973; 
188). This definition incorporated both white collar and 
blue collar crimes. It did not differentiate the class, 
status or respectability of the person. Corporate crime was 
defined as "the offences committed by corporate officials 
for their corporation and the offences of the corporation
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itself" (Clinard & Quinney, 1973; 188).
Schrager and Short (1978) chose to use the term 
"organisational crime" instead of corporate crime. The 
advantage of using this term was that it incorporated both 
crimes committed by public as well as private organisations. 
Organisational crime was defined by both writers as 
"... illegal acts of omission or commission of an individual 
or a group of individuals in a legitimate formal 
organisation in accordance with the operative goals of the 
organisation which have a serious physical or economic 
impact on employees, consumers or the general public" 
(Schrager & Short, 1978; 411-412). Box (1983) agreed with 
this definition, but he believed that organisational crimes 
could also affect other organisations. Thus, Box suggested 
that the definition given by Schrager and Short should end 
with the words "...the general public and other 
organisations" (Box, 1983; 22). Box (1983), himself,
differentiated between corporate crimes i.e. crimes 
committed for the corporations and "employee crimes" i.e. 
crimes committed by employees against the corporations for 
their own benefit. In addition, he introduced the term 
"criminal corporations" which was used for corporations 
deliberately set up, taken over or controlled for the 
explicit and sole purpose of executing criminal activities 
(Box, 1983; 22).
Calavita and Pontell (1992), in their study of the 
savings and loans crisis, introduced the term "collective 
embezzlement" or 'looting' which was defined as "the 
siphoning off of funds from a savings and loans institution
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for personal gain, at the expense of the institution itself 
and with the implicit or explicit sanction of its 
management" or in simpler terms "robbing of one's own bank" 
(Calavita & Pontell, 1992; 234).
Pearce (1976), who could be considered a Marxist 
criminologist, differentiated between offences at the 
workplace which threatened the interest of capitalism and 
those which were primarily committed in the course of 
capitalist activities. The example he cited was that an 
increase in embezzlement might lead to the collapse of 
capitalism whereas violations of anti-trust laws did not 
pose a threat to the social structure of capitalism. This 
example is difficult to substantiate. No capitalist country 
so far has collapsed due to increase in the rate of 
embez zlement•
There is a general acceptance among criminologists and 
academics that offences committed at the workplace can be 
for or against the organisations. Offences committed for the 
organisations will bring gains to the employers and the 
organisations whereas offences committed against the 
organisations will benefit the employees at the expense of 
the organisations.
Croall (1992) and Braithwaite (1985) preferred to keep 
the term "white collar crime" as "the concept is shared and 
understood by ordinary folk as more meaningful than 
occupational crime, corporate deviance, commercial offences, 
economic crime or any competing concept" (Braithwaite, 1985; 
3) . However, Braithwaite noted that occupational crimes 
should be separated from corporate or organisational crimes
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(Braithwaite, 1985; 19).
For my thesis, I would accept that the term "white 
collar crime" denotes occupational crimes of workers of all 
levels because of the common usage of the term in the 
society. However, I do not agree with the differentiation 
between corporate or organizational crime as crimes 
committed for the corporation and occupational crime as 
crimes committed by the employees for themselves. I shall 
consider corporate or organisational crime as part of 
occupational crime. This is because corporate or 
organisational crimes are committed by the workers for their 
corporations in the course of their occupations. I prefer to 
accept the differentiation made by Box (1983) between 
corporate or organisational crime and employee crime. The 
term "employee crime" used to describe crimes committed by 
workers for their own benefit in the course of their 
occupations is more specific and accurate than the term 
occupational crimes. See diagram 1 below.
Diagram 1 
white collar or occupational crime
employee crimecorporate or organizational crime
3. Development of the concepts and definitions of fraud
Fraud is one specific type of white collar or
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occupational crime. This specific crime will be the main 
focus of this thesis. As with the definition of white collar 
crime, there is no commonly accepted definition of fraud. 
Neither has there been any commonly acceptable systematic 
classification of fraud.
One of the early writers on fraud was Maurice C. Moore 
whose book, "Frauds & Swindles: A Cautionary Handbook" was 
first published in 1933. It contained an early account of 
the types of fraud that existed at his time i.e. mainly 
petty and small time frauds on shopkeepers, till-robbing, 
shoplifting, etc.. The book did not refer to any class 
system.
Moore could also be considered as one of the early 
writers who propounded what is later know as labelling 
theory when he said, "...such an individual would be more 
likely to 'get away with it', because one would be on the 
look out for someone of quite different type and the only 
thing to do is to take nobody for granted - no stranger, no 
one of whose bona fides you are not thoroughly well assured, 
no matter how well-dressed, plausible, with 'an honest 
face', he or she may be" (Moore, 1947; 10). What is
particularly interesting in his book is the way he concluded 
by warning readers not to leave their names and addresses in 
public places, for example, throwing a used envelope or 
spoiled telegram forms with personal details in the post 
office. Although this piece of advice is still valid today 
to prevent crimes like credit card fraud and supplementary 
benefit fraud, society has to be more careful than that 
these days because technology has introduced many more
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sophisticated crimes.
Comer defined fraud as "any behaviour by which one 
person intends to gain a dishonest advantage over another" 
(Comer, 1977; 1). The definition of fraud covered such acts 
as petty theft, embezzlement, forgery, commercial espionage, 
extortion and other white and blue collar crimes. Comer 
defined corporate fraud as those frauds in which a company 
was involved (Comer, 1977; 380).
Fraud, in its broadest context according to Bologna, 
was "intentional deception of another person through means 
such as lying and cheating for the purpose of deriving an 
unjust personal, social, political or economic advantage 
over that other person" (Bologna, 1984; 2). This definition 
incorporated simple acts like telling a white lie to complex 
acts like corporate fraud. With this broad definition, 
everyone can claim to be a victim of fraud. Thus, any 
empirical research on fraud has to try to put boundaries 
around the area it is dealing with, for example, computer 
fraud, management fraud, business fraud, consumer fraud, 
etc.. The list will get longer as time goes by with new 
technology and new knowledge.
Bologna initially defined corporate fraud together with 
management fraud as "wilful misrepresentations of financial 
facts by management and non-management personnel of business 
organisations" (Bologna, 1984; 9). Within this definition, 
Bologna included embezzlement as it involved people in 
positions of trust in business organisations and the 
manipulation of accounting records. Employee theft or 
larceny would also be included if it involved manipulation
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of accounting records. This definition of corporate fraud 
and management fraud is too specific as it excludes offences 
which are not wilful misrepresentations of financial facts. 
Bologna also decided to include commercial bribery i.e. 
employees' corruption by outside vendors, contractors and 
suppliers. It should be noted that bribery may not lead to 
wilful misrepresentation of financial facts. For example, 
bribery to get a contract or bribery to get things done 
faster which do not harm the corporation cannot be included 
in his definition of corporate or management fraud. He 
summed up corporate fraud or management fraud as "that class 
of business crimes in which a business organisation may 
become a victim of fraud, theft or embezzlement by insiders 
or outsiders" (Bologna, 1984; 9). This definition of
corporate or management fraud is too specific and it also 
limits the definitions of other terms.
However, in subsequent pages of his book, Bologna 
decided to define corporate fraud and management fraud 
separately (Bologna, 1984; 19).
Corporate fraud was then defined as any fraud 
perpetrated by, for or against a business corporation. 
Frauds that were directed against the corporation included 
theft and embezzlement. Frauds that benefitted the 
corporation included price fixing, cheating customers and 
political corruption. Corporate frauds could be generated 
internally by employees, executives and agents for or 
against the corporation. They could also be generated 
externally by customers, suppliers or vendors for or against 
the corporation.
69
Management fraud was defined by Bologna as "the 
intentional overstatement of corporate or unit profits, 
inspired, perpetrated or induced by employees serving in 
management roles who seek to benefit from such frauds in 
terms of coveted promotions, job stability, larger bonuses, 
or other economic incentives and status symbols" (Bologna, 
1984; 20).
Huntington defined management fraud as "the 
misrepresentation of the financial position or the concealed 
theft or improper use of the resources of a business, 
carried out by existing management at a senior level of the 
entity concerned" (Huntington, 1992; viii). He went on to 
define employee fraud as "the concealed theft or improper 
use of the resources of a business, carried out by employees 
below management level of the entity concerned".
Huntington's definition of employee fraud as committed 
by employees below management level is problematic as it 
does not see the people in the management level as employees 
of the organisation.
The professional view on fraud given by The Chartered 
Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) defined 
fraud as "Those intentional distortions of financial 
statements or other records which are carried out to conceal 
the misappropriation of assets or otherwise for gain" 
(Jones, 1993; 7).
I agree with Bologna in his differentiation between 
fraud committed for the corporation and fraud committed 
against the corporation. However, I would like to use the 
terms I used for work place crimes in general for the
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specific crime of fraud i.e. occupational fraud or white 
collar fraud to mean frauds committed by individuals for 
themselves or for the corporation in the course of their 
occupations; corporate fraud as frauds committed by 
employees for the benefit of the corporation and employee 
fraud as frauds committed by employees for their own 
benefit. See diagram 2 below.
Diagram 2 
white collar or occupational fraud
corporate fraud employee fraud
These categories are applicable to other types of white 
collar or occupational crimes. This system of categorising 
crimes at the workplace also prevents the introduction of 
too many confusing terms.
I would also like to add the fact that fraud is also 
one specific type of corruption. The word corruption will be 
used constantly throughout this thesis. My justification 
could be found in the definitions of corruption given by a 
few prominent criminologists as given below.
Corruption was defined by Brooks in 1910 as "the 
intentional misperformance or neglect of a recognised duty, 
or the unwarranted exercise of power, with the motive of 
gaining some advantage more or less directly personal" 
(Alatas, 1990; 1) . This definition can be used to
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incorporate employee fraud.
In 1936, Garrigues said that, "Graft in the broadest 
sense is merely any act which constitutes the avoidance by 
a public official of the terms of his contract of employment 
with the public and the substitution of his own interest in 
place of the public interest as the controlling factor over 
his conduct" (Garrigues, 193 6; 5) .
Nye derived a more detailed definition of corruption 
which is considered as a classic definition by some writers. 
He saw corruption as "...behaviour which deviates from the 
formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding 
(personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status 
gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain 
types of private-regarding influence" (Nye, 1967; 419). Nye 
saw corruption in terms of personal influence.
In his book "The Sociology of Corruption", Alatas 
defined corruption as the subordination of public interests 
to private aims involving a violation of the norms of duty 
and welfare, accompanied by secrecy, betrayal, deception and 
a callous disregard for any consequences suffered by the 
public (Alatas, 1980; 12). Thus, corruption was viewed as 
the abuse of trust in the interest of private gain.
With the definitions of corruption above given by 
prominent criminologists, fraud, especially employee fraud, 
would be considered as part of corruption in this thesis.
In the next chapter, I will discuss, in detail, a case 
study of the different ways employee fraud can be committed 
in a financial institution. The case that I will be 
discussing is the Bumiputra Malaysia Finance/Carrian case.
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This case is also an example of "collective embezzlement” 
or "robbing of one's own bank” with the implicit or explicit 
sanction of its management as introduced by Calavita and 
Pontell (Calavita & Pontell, 1992; 234).
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Chapter 3
The Bumiputra Malaysian Finance Limited Case
This chapter intends to piece together the complicated 
Bumiputra Malaysia Finance (BMF)/Carrian case in order to 
show how frauds can be committed in financial institutions. 
The facts used in this chapter were obtained from the final 
report of the investigation of the Committee of Enquiry, 
"Far Eastern Economic Review", Malaysian newspapers, British 
newspapers, Parliamentary speeches of Lim Kit Siang, the 
leader of the Democratic Action Party (opposition) in 
Malaysia, articles from pressure groups like Aliran and 
academic articles. It should be pointed out that no quote 
was taken from the report of the Committee of Enquiry 
because the leader of the enquiry, Ahmad Noordin had warned 
me that I could be sued by Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad 
(BBMB) , the parent bank of BMF, if I did so without its 
permission. Any quotes taken would be from secondary sources 
or from Lim Kit Siang's (the opposition party leader) 
parliamentary speech as it would be covered by parliamentary 
privilege. I was also fortunate enough to meet a journalist 
by the name of Kevin Cahill. He was the organizer of the 
"Lorrain Osman (a Director of BMF) Appeal Committee" in 
England. Kevin Cahill had given me some important cables 
relating to the case. However, as these cables are still 
under the Public Interest Immunity granted by the High Court 
in England, which means that they can never be used in any 
trial in a Crown jurisdiction or made public, I cannot 
include them in my thesis. However, I will be able to show
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them to my examiners on the day of my viva voce. I also 
managed to interview a few people who were directly or 
indirectly involved in this case. But, I have given them my 
word that I would not reveal their identities in this 
thesis.
It was a lot of hard work trying to understand, verify 
the facts and piece the case together. Thus, it would be an 
injustice to my effort and to the academic community who are 
interested in this area not to report the case in as 
detailed a way as possible for a thesis such as this has 
never been done before by other academic writers. Moreover, 
the examples of fraud that will be given in this chapter 
illustrate the different ways it can be perpetrated and how 
money can go missing. This should be illuminating to any 
researchers in fraud offences. In the following chapter, 
i.e. chapter 4, the sociological problems and the Malaysian 
perspective of this case will be discussed.
1. Introduction to the case
The introduction of the New Economic Policy in Malaysia 
to help eradicate the unequal distribution of income and 
wealth among the different races (as explained in Chapter 1) 
led to the development of a large number of public bodies 
and corporations to promote the Bumiputras' (indigenous 
people of Malaysia) participation in the economy.
Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad (BBMB) was established 
in 1965 with public funds as one of the projects in line 
with the New Economic Policy. In the words of the then Prime 
Minister of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak, when he launched BBMB
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on 3 0 September 1965, "to remedy the lack of capital among 
the Bumiputras so as to enable them to improve their 
existing business and to encourage them to undertake new 
enterprises which are expected to accelerate development and 
increase the wealth of the country”. Thus, a wide range of 
local and international banking facilities were provided for 
the Bumiputras. From 1971 to 1980, Parliament allocated a 
total of M$253.5 million to BBMB.
BBMB's rapid growth could be said to be due largely to 
Government backing. It had preferential treatment in access 
to deposits of Government agencies. Its first Chairman, 
Tengku Razaleigh, was an aristocrat and a rising star in the 
United Malays National Organisation (UNMO), the ruling 
political party.
During the late 1970s, property and share markets were 
booming in Hong Kong due to rapid industrial expansion. 
Large profits could be made from escalating property values 
even though the investments might be on a short term. A 
subsidiary company of BBMB, Bumiputra Malaysian Finance 
Limited (BMF) in Hong Kong which was set up on 12 December 
1977, took advantage of the situation and began investing 
heavily in the Hong Kong property market through several 
investment and property firms. The largest of these firms 
was the Carrian Group under the leadership of George Tan.
When negotiations between Britain and China began in 
September 1982 for the return of Hong Kong by 1997, the Hong 
Kong stock market plunged, property prices collapsed and the 
value of the Hong Kong dollar fell. The Carrian group had 
borrowed large sums of money from BMF without proper
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collateral. The collapse of market prices left the Carrian 
Group on the brink of bankruptcy and BBMB began an internal 
investigation into the operations of BMF, its subsidiary in 
Hong Kong.
The "Asian Wall Street Journal" on 10 November 1982 
gave the first newspaper detail of BMF involvement with 
Carrian. The Chairman of BBMB, Nawawi, denied the extent of 
involvement. In February 1983, the Finance Minister who was 
also BBMB's first Chairman, Tengku Razaleigh, told the press 
conference that the loans were "nothing more than a normal 
business problem". He also said that BBMB and BMF were not 
under the control of the central bank and presumably not 
within the purview of his Ministry (FEER, 3/3/1983).
In July 1983, Permodalan Nasional Berhad which held 70% 
controlling shares of BBMB, injected M$600 mil. into BBMB 
shareholders fund in an apparent rescue mission. Permodalan 
Nasional Berhad was throwing good money after bad money. 
Permodalan Nasional Berhad was the parent body of Amanah 
Saham Nasional, the unit fund of 1.3 mil. Malay small-time 
investors. This action could mean that the interests of the 
small investors in Amanah Saham Nasional had been prejudiced 
by the Permodalan Nasional Berhad move.
On 18 July 1983, Jalil Ibrahim, a senior BBMB auditor 
seconded to BMF to look into the matter, was murdered. He 
was trying to stop a loan of US$4 mil. to the Carrian Group. 
Jalil's death led to the arrest of George Tan and his 
appearance in the Hong Kong High Court in October on fraud 
charges.
At the court hearing, it was revealed that Carrian
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Investment Holdings, one of the companies in the Carrian 
Group, owed BMF about M$1.7 bil. . No one had ever given a 
thought to BMF's deep involvement with the Carrian saga. BMF 
had also given loans which exceeded M$2 bil. to Carrian 
related companies i.e. the Eda Group and the Kevin Hsu 
Group. The total sum of money lost was estimated to be 
around M$2.5 bil.. These loans had exceeded the capital and 
reserves of BBMB, the parent organisation, which had been 
established at M$1.2 bil..
When the whole case surfaced with the murder of Jalil, 
the Chairman of BBMB claimed that "there was no crisis" even 
as evidence unfolded to reveal massive lending to the 
Carrian Group. On 11 October 1983, the Prime Minister, 
Mahathir Mohamad, announced at a press conference that a 
former Chairman and four officials of BMF had been given 
"consultancy fees" amounting to HK$3.3 mil. from BMF on top 
of their salaries and allowances. He described that action 
as a "betrayal of trust" and a "heinous crime", but claimed 
that no action could be taken as "what they did was morally 
wrong although legally, it was within the law, we cannot 
take them to court" (NST, 12/10/1983). The Malaysian 
Government still tried to deny the illegality that had taken 
place.
When the opposition party in Malaysia, the Democratic 
Action Party, asked the Government in the March and July 
1983 Parliamentary meetings about the BMF crisis, Tengku 
Razaleigh, the Finance Minister, invoked the Central Bank 
Ordinance 1958 and the Banking Act 1973 to justify the legal 
inability to disclose any information relating to the
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affairs of any bank except by way of a High Court order. The 
press discussion of the BMF case, including in the New 
Straits Times (NST) which was owned by UMNO, the ruling 
political party, was intense.
The height of the scandal coincided with the 
constitutional crisis over the power of the Malay Rulers 
where the Government proposed to take away the privileges 
and immunities enjoyed by the Malaysian royal families. It 
led to the Government introducing in Parliament a new 
Official Secrets Act which made it an offence for anyone 
seeking official information about Government activities or 
operations unless he or she reported immediately to the 
police or to the department head if he was a public officer. 
The penalty for failure to do so was a jail sentence of up 
to five years or a M$20,000 fine or both (FEER, 3/11/1983). 
I believe the introduction of this new Act was to deter the 
public from probing and questioning the activities of the 
Government.
The general public, the Consumer Association of Penang, 
the Malaysian Trade Union Congress, the opposition parties, 
the Selangor Graduates Association and the youth wing of 
UMNO asked the Government to set up a Royal Commission of 
Inquiry on the BMF scandal. Eventually, due to the pressure, 
a limited three-men Committee of Enquiry headed by the 
Auditor-General, Ahmad Noordin, was set up in January 1984 
by BBMB with the support of the Government. The Committee, 
however, lacked the power of a Royal Commission which was 
favoured by the general public and the pressure groups. For 
example, it did not have the power to subpoena persons,
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papers and records and it did not give legal immunity to the 
investigators against possible cases of defamation (see 
Appendix 3.1). The Prime Minister said that as BMF was 
registered in Hong Kong and was thus outside the 
jurisdiction of Malaysia, a Royal Commission was not 
possible (Star, 4/1/1984).
When the Committee had finished the report, which cost 
the Malaysian taxpayers M$1.8 mil., in January 1986, the 
Government was very reluctant to have it published so that 
it would be available to the general public. The reason 
given by the Prime Minister was the fear of libel suits 
taken against the Government by the people named in the 
report. Fifteen public interest groups, the labour union and 
the opposition parties signed a joined memorandum addressed 
to the Prime Minister calling for the release of the report. 
On 11 January 1986, the Deputy Chairman of the opposition 
Malaysian People's Socialist Party sought a court order in 
his capacity as an account holder with BBMB that the 
documents be made public. Ahmad Noordin, head of the 
Committee of Enquiry, also pleaded with the Government to 
release the report. The Prime Minister said to him, "if 
damage is done to the credibility or credit-worthiness of 
BBMB", as a result of publishing the report, "the bank will 
be fully justified in suing you for damages" (FEER 
30/1/1986) and that he must also take responsibility for any 
legal actions by persons named in the report. Ahmad Noordin 
and one other member of the. Enquiry Committee, Chooi Mun 
Sou, agreed to take responsibility. The reports were sold at 
M$250 (about £63) per set with a limited edition of 2,000
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copies. The price was beyond the reach of many Malaysian 
citizens. Most of the copies were bought up by BBMB, itself.
The Government finally produced a white paper on 11 
March 1986 which reported on the financial losses, but 
assigned no blame for mismanagement or for the corrupt 
practices. The white paper was a very shallow paper which 
the Malaysian public called a "white wash” (Aliran Monthly, 
March/April 1986; 22; Karim, 1989; 103). The police did not 
take any action even though there were clear indications of 
criminal acts. The Attorney-General, Abu Talib Othman, 
claimed that the Enquiry Committee's findings could not be 
the basis for legal actions because only police 
investigations could be taken into account. He also claimed 
that he could not arrest and charge anyone because BMF 
culprits could not be prosecuted in Malaysia for offences 
committed outside the country (Star, 30/11/1984).The Anti­
corruption Agency in Malaysia, which was supposed to be an 
independent body empowered to bring any corruption cases to 
justice, also did not carry out any investigation even 
though there were clear evidences of corruption. The Anti­
corruption Agency must have been aware of the report on 18- 
19 March 1983 by the "Asian Wall Street Journal” which named 
names and their detailed corrupt transactions.
On 31 December 1983, all the problematic loans of BMF 
were assigned to BBMB which amounted to M$2.255 bil.. The 
Government then used Petronas, the Malaysian national oil 
corporation, to take over BBMB's debts on 17 September 1984. 
Petronas bought 90% of the share capital of BBMB for M$933 
mil. and also the problematic loans of BMF for M$1.255 bil..
81
In December 1983, BMF commenced civil proceedings in 
Hong Kong against the Carrian Group.
2. A brief account of some of the management procedures of 
BMF
2.1. Reporting to BBMB
BMF, as one of the overseas branches of BBMB, was 
required to submit regular reports to the BBMB Head Office 
in Kuala Lumpur. These reports consisted of:
a. Weekly Reports
These reports, which covered Money Market lending and 
borrowing from financial institutions as well as foreign 
exchange transactions, were sent to the International 
Division of BBMB. Thus, monitoring of the foreign exchange 
exposure of BBMB and checks on compliance with the lending 
limits placed on all the branches including BMF were 
possible through these reports.
b. Monthly Returns
Monthly returns covered more details than the Weekly 
Reports. However, when BMF started operating in Hong Kong, 
it did not give details of local loans and Money Market 
lending to corporate customers who were not involved in the 
finance industry. Local loans to customers were listed in 
the Monthly Returns only from January 1982 onwards and Money 
Market lending to corporate customers were only itemised 
from January 1983.
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c. Quarterly Reports
Quarterly Reports were submitted by the International 
Banking Division of BBMB to the Board of BBMB. These reports 
covered the operation of the bank's overseas branches as 
well as of BMF.
2.2. Who was sent the Monthly Returns?
Until mid 1982, the Monthly Returns were sent by BMF to 
Rais, the Senior General Manager of the International 
Banking Division of BBMB, who was also the alternate 
Director of BMF, and a copy was sent to Lorrain Osman and 
Hashim, the Directors of BMF (see Table 3.1 below). 
Beginning from July 1982, a set of Monthly Returns was sent 
to the General Manager, Funds Management Department. A set 
was also sent to the central bank beginning January 1983.
Table 3.1
Board of Directors of BBMB as at April 1981
Kamarul Ariffin (replaced by Nawawi on 9 February 1982) -
Chairman
Hashim Shamsuddin 
Lorrain Osman 
Haji K. Munshir Ariff 
S.O.K. Ubaidulla 
Suleiman Ninam Shah 
John K.D. Eu
Board of Directors of BMF
Tengku Razaleigh (replaced by Hashim on 8 July 1977) 
Lorrain Osman
Rais Saniman (alternate director)
Management team of BMF
General Manager - Ibrahim Jaafar 
Assistant General Managers - Henry Chin
Jalil Ibrahim
Chief Dealer - Mansor Saat
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2.3. Lending limits of banks
At BBMB, the lending limits to customers that were 
placed on overseas branches were known as Global Placement 
Limits. These Global Placement Limits included limits that 
overseas branches or Kuala Lumpur, the Head Office, could 
lend to BMF. These were more commonly known as Inter-branch 
Placement Limits. However, these limits did not control or 
determine the types or quality of loans that BMF made. The 
Global Placement Limits were determined every year by the 
managing committee of BBMB and then approved by the 
Executive Committee and the Board of Directors of BBMB. The 
General Manager and Deputy General Manager of the 
International Banking Division were given an additional 
limit of 30% over and above the approved Global Placement 
Limit. An additional limit of 30% was also given to any 
member of management. However, this discretion was seldom 
used. Requests for increases in limits were usually referred 
to the appropriate committee. However, on 24 January 1981, 
BMF revised the lending authority of its Board members 
without getting the approval of BBMB (see Appendix 3.2 for 
details).
The Inter-branch Placement Limits were also revised 
annually by the management committee. However, there was no 
specification by BBMB as to which committee could do the 
job. There were instances where the Inter-branch Placement 
Limits to BMF were approved by the Loans Committee 'A' and 
by the Supervisory Committee. From 1979 to 1983, BMF 
frequently requested that the limits that overseas branches 
and Kuala Lumpur could lend to it should be increased.
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Without a detailed study of the needs of BMF, BBMB approved 
the requests (see Appendix 3.3a & 3.3b). BMF funding from 
the BBMB overseas branches was US$60 mil. in 1979, but grew 
rapidly to US$380 mil. in 1981, US$660 mil. in 1982 and 
US$950 mil. in 1983.
2.4. The external control of BMF
a. The Government
The Government has the role of regulating banking 
practices, through supervisory agencies or its central bank, 
to maintain public confidence in the financial institutions 
and the banking system.
b. Bank Negara, the central bank
In Part VI of the Banking Act, 1973, Bank Negara was 
given powers of supervision and control over banks carrying 
on business in Malaysia. These powers included mandatory 
provisions to investigate, under conditions of secrecy, the 
books, accounts and transactions of each licensed bank and 
of any branch, agency or office outside Malaysia opened by 
a licensed bank incorporated in Malaysia. It also empowered 
Bank Negara, in the event that a bank had informed Bank 
Negara of its inability to meet its obligations, to take all 
appropriate measures to direct its operations. This also 
included the power to assume control of the bank. The 
Banking Act also provided for every licensed bank 
incorporated in Malaysia to seek the prior approval of Bank 
Negara before amending any part of its memorandum or 
articles of association.
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BMF was under the indirect control of Bank Negara and 
had to abide by the rules of Bank Negara.
c. Deposit-taking Companies Ordinance of Hona Kona
Chapter 328, Section 22(1) of the Ordinance prohibited 
a deposit-taking company from granting loans or credit 
facilities to any one customer or group of customers in 
excess of 25% of its paid-up capital and reserves unless 
covered by a form of guarantee acceptable to the 
Commissioner of Deposit-taking Companies who was also the 
Commissioner of Banking. BMF had provided a "letter of 
comfort" from BBMB when it started its operation in Hong 
Kong, which was a confirmation that the parent bank would 
fully support the obligations of BMF. Bank Negara, the 
central bank, stated that it had no objections to the 
issuance of this letter. Thus, BMF was freed from the 25% 
restriction.
Section 20(1)(a) of the Deposit-taking Companies 
Ordinance also required all deposit-taking companies to 
submit Monthly Returns showing assets and liabilities at the 
end of every month to the Commissioner. This was to enable 
the Commissioner to monitor the liquidity position of the 
deposit-taking companies. The Commissioner also examined the 
books and records of the deposit-taking companies to check 
for adherence to the Ordinance. A review of the deposit- 
taking companies' loans and advances would also be made. 
However, in the case of BMF, it seemed that the Commissioner 
relied on the "letter of comfort" and did not review the 
loans and advances of BMF. The letter must have been deemed
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sufficient guarantee from the parent bank of BMF by the 
Commissioner.
3. Who is who in the BMF scandal
a. George Tan
George Tan was the master-mind behind the Carrian 
Group. He had been described in "The Carrian File” by 
Bowring and Cottrell (1984) as a "big talking salesman” who 
managed to 'sell' loan agreements to the bankers. He was a 
Singaporean national who left for Hong Kong in 1972. At that 
time, he was adjudged a bankrupt by the court in Singapore 
when his construction company, Gin Corporation, was wound up 
on a petition by Lee Wah Bank which claimed S$141,000. 
Legally, he should have been barred from engaging in any 
business during that period in Singapore or elsewhere. The 
bankruptcy order was rescinded in September 1980.
When his Singapore passport expired in 1974, he decided 
to remain in Hong Kong without the permission of the Hong 
Kong authorities. In 1983, the Hong Kong authorities stated 
that he had Paraguayan and Tongan passports in his 
possession. In March 1984, his Singapore citizenship was 
revoked. His fortune was reported to have been founded on 
buying cheap land in the New Territories during the 1974-75 
property slump. He had worked for Chung Ching-man, a 
property developer and hotel owner. Chung was firstly, 
George Tan's mentor, then partner and eventually his enemy.
George Tan managed to get to know the Board members of 
BMF very well. It was through the loans from BMF that the 
Carrian Group managed to grow, as the Enquiry Committee
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investigating the scandal said, "There might not have been 
Carrian without BMF" (Lim, 1986; 6).
It was reported by the Lorrain Osman Appeal Committee 
in Britain in 1992 that George Tan was acting as a private 
broker and financier for Tengku Razaleigh, the first 
Chairman of BBMB and then Finance Minister of Malaysia in 
1976. The Committee noted that in a letter dated 30 May 
1980, George Tan gave Razaleigh shares which were expected 
to be worth about HK$50 mil. within four years (LOAC, 1992; 
11-12). The Committee also claimed that this letter showed 
the authority for the loans to the Carrian Group came from 
Tengku Razaleigh (see Appendix 3.4a, 3.4b & 3.4c).
b. Kamarul. the Group Chairman of BBMB until 9 February 1982
Kamarul was educated as a lawyer in England. On his 
return to Malaysia, he set up his own law firm and was also 
active in UMNO politics. He was appointed Senator between 
1974 and 1980. When Tengku Razaleigh became the Finance 
Minister in 1976, Kamarul was made the new executive 
chairman of BBMB. During his tenure, large-scale lending to 
the Carrian Group began. He denied responsibility for loans 
made by BMF to Carrian as they were not discussed at the 
parent bank board meetings. He alleged that Bank Negara must 
have known and approved the loans made by BMF. He also 
alleged that the loans of the size given to Carrian 
"ordinarily required ministerial acquiescence" and warned 
that "three or four Carrian-1 ike problems are looming within 
Malaysia during the 1980s" (FEER, 27/10/1983). He claimed 
that he met George Tan outside work only at cocktail
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parties.
c. Ibrahim Jaafar. the General Manager of BMF until 31 
August 1984 and Chief Representative of BBMB until June 
1985
Ibrahim was in charge of day to day operations of BMF. 
He alleged that he was not on the board which made all major 
loan decisions of BMF. He first met George Tan in mid 1978. 
His relationship with George Tan was very close. In December 
1979, Ibrahim was appointed as General Manager of Knife & 
Dagger by the two directors of the company i.e. George Tan 
and Carrie Woo. The scripts of the issued shares were 
deposited with Ibrahim. Ibrahim also made a gift of a 
Mercedes Benz car to George Tan as a new year present paid 
from the funds of Knife & Dagger. Ibrahim was also given a 
Rolls Royce car for his personal use. One of the loans he 
received from Wing Lung Bank was guaranteed by Knife & 
Dagger. He introduced George Tan to his board members 
sometime in mid 1979.
d. Lorrain Osman, the Director of BBMB and BMF until 31 
October 1983
He was educated as a lawyer at Cambridge and was called 
to the Bar in England before returning to Malaysia to 
practise as a lawyer. He was particularly close to Tengku 
Razaleigh. He was appointed to the Board of BBMB in 1966. He 
had also been Chairman of Bumiputra Merchant Bankers and 
Bernama, the national news agency. He became Chairman of BMF 
in 1977. Beside these appointments, he had his own group of
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companies, the Aspatra Group, whose interests included motor 
cycles, food, textiles, orchids and oil industry equipment. 
He was addressed as "Uncle Lorrain” by George Tan instead of 
the usual formal address of "Mister Osman”. This signified 
that George Tan and Lorrain Osman were friends. Any requests 
for loans by George Tan were made directly to Lorrain Osman, 
Hashim, the other Director of BMF or Rais, the alternate 
Director, rather than through the management of BMF. Once a 
request was approved, George Tan would instruct Ibrahim to 
release the sum requested. The implication was that the 
relationship between Lorrain and George Tan was very close.
e. Hashim. the other Director of BBMB and BMF until 31
October 1983
Hashim was a former colleague of Tengku Razaleigh in 
Belfast University in the late 1950s. He was trained as an 
accountant and joined the bank when Tengku Razaleigh was the 
Chairman. He became the Executive Director the year Tengku 
Razaleigh became the Finance Minister in 1976. He was also 
a senior member of UMNO. He claimed that when Musa Hitam had 
beaten Tengku Razaleigh to the post of Deputy Prime Minister 
in 1981, Musa told him that he could stay in his job 
provided he did not oppose any loans proposed by Rais, the 
alternate Director of BMF, who was a personal friend of Musa 
(FEER, 29/1/1987).
He was introduced to George Tan by Ibrahim in mid 1979. 
The holding company of Hashim and his wife, Silver Present, 
dealt with shares on the Hong Kong market. One of the shares 
it dealt with substantially was shares of the Carrian
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Investments Limited (CIL). The deals were mainly between 
Silver Present and Knife & Dagger. These deals were also 
linked to another George Tan company called Perak Pioneer 
Limited. As stated above, requests for loans by George Tan 
were made directly to Hashim if Lorrain Osman was not 
available.
f. Rais, the Senior General Manager of the International 
Banking Division of BBMB and the alternate Director of 
BMF until 31 October 1983
The Inquiry Committee could not find Rais's appointment 
as alternate Director of BMF in any Board resolution or 
document. Rais replied that he was "orally appointed" by 
Hashim (NST 5/11/1984). He was introduced to George Tan by 
Ibrahim in mid 1979, just before BMF gave the first loan to 
the Carrian Group. The relationship between George Tan and 
Rais became very close by early January 1980. Rais relied on 
the advice of George Tan when investing in CIL shares 
through his holding company, Hi-heated. Rais gave a Daimler 
car costing HK$600,000 to George Tan from the proceeds of 
the sales. Requests of loans by George Tan were made 
directly to Rais when Lorrain and Hashim were not available.
g. Henrv Chin, the Assistant General Manager of BMF until 
31 October 1983
There were incidents to show that Henry Chin frequently 
complied with the requests made by George Tan. There was 
also evidence that George Tan was 'lending' CIL shares to 
Henry Chin for his use.
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h. Jalil Ibrahim, the Assistant General Manager of BMF 
until 18 July 1983
Jalil Ibrahim was the BBMB auditor, seconded to BMF in 
early 1983 to "put BMF in order", but who was murdered on 18 
July 1983. He was strangled with a belt and his body was 
found two days later in a banana grove. His death acted as 
a catalyst for enquiries into the BMF scandal.
i. Staff members of BMF
Between December 1981 and January 1982, George Tan gave 
one million CIL shares, followed by another million, to the 
staff members of BMF. George Tan was also giving tips to the 
staff members as to when to buy or sell CIL shares and Grand 
Marine Holdings shares. The relationship between George Tan 
and the staff members could be considered very close. Loans 
to the Carrian Group were not recorded or documented 
according to proper procedure as with the other loans.
j. Nawawi. the new Chairman of BBMB
Nawawi was appointed the new Chairman after the 
resignation of Kamarul on 9 February 1982. He was not 
implicated in any of the corrupt dealings with Carrian.
4. Highlights of the BMF case
The BMF scandal could be divided into three important 
phases:
1. The Concerted Plan - To inflate the share prices of the 
Carrian Group with the help of Mai Hon, a public-listed 
company and the acquisition of Gammon House;
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2. Furtherance of the Concerted Plan - The purchase of 
Grand Marine Holdings and the provision of cash flow 
for the Carrian Group;
3. Obtaining adequate securities by BMF for the loans to 
the Carrian Group and the restructuring scheme for 
Carrian when it was facing liquidity problems.
BMF began to give loans to the Carrian Group from 3 
July 1979 to 3 October 1983 (see Appendix 3.5a, 3.5b &
3. 5c) . No enquiries were ever made into the background of 
George Tan before these loans were given. At that time, 
George Tan was a bankrupt by order of the High Court of 
Singapore.
Most of the loans given to the Carrian Group had no 
proper documentation, board approval or collateral. 
Collateral could be just a personal guarantee from George 
Tan, post-dated cheques from the Carrian Group which, when 
expired, were reissued, or quoted and unquoted shares and 
warrants. Proper records were not kept. The records of BMF 
could also differ from those of the Carrian Group.
The funds for these loans were met by the BBMB head 
office in Kuala Lumpur as well as its international branches 
and borrowing from other banks.
The principal lenders of Hong Kong dollars were Malayan 
Banking Berhad (HK$42 mil.), Sanwa Bank (HK$15 mil.), Lloyds 
Bank (HK$15 mil.), Sumitomo Bank (HK$14 mil.) and Baring 
Brothers (HK$12 mil.). These five banks provided HK$98 mil. 
or 22% of BMF's Hong Kong dollars requirement.
BMF's American dollars requirement were largely met by
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other branches of BBMB i.e. BBMB New York (US$41 mil.) , BBMB 
Singapore (US$101 mil.), BBMB London (US$210 mil.), BBMB 
Kuala Lumpur (US$90 mil.) and BBMB Bahrain (US$98 mil.). 
These five branches together provided US$540 mil. or 69% of 
BMF's borrowing in the American dollars as at 31 October 
1982 (NST, 4/9/1986).
4.1. The Concerted Plan
4.1.1. Loans of US$292 mil. to Plessey Investments 
Limited from 19 December 1979 to 25 June 1980
Between 19 December 1979 to 25 June 1980, a sum of 
US$292 mil. (the largest loan ever given out by BMF and 
BBMB) was released to Plessey Investments Limited (PIL), a 
HK$2 company, i.e. a company registered with a paid-up 
capital of only HK$2 (Aliran Monthly, March/April 1986) . PIL 
was under the control of George Tan. PIL was incorporated to 
receive funds from BMF for the implementation of the 
"Concerted Plan”. The plan was to use funds from BBMB to 
make money in Hong Kong during the start of the property 
boom. This plan involved:
a. Take over of a company called Mai Hon
Once Mai Hon was taken over, the price of its shares 
was inflated on the Hong Kong stock market by the timely 
disposal of three Mai Hon assets to Carrian Holdings Limited 
(CHL) at high profits to Mai Hon and then by injecting five 
CHL assets into Mai Hon at a profit to CHL. For example, one 
of the Mai Hon assets bought was the Metropolitan Bank 
Building. The Metropolitan Bank Building was bought by Mai
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Hon for HK$64,308,940. Mai Hon then sold the Metropolitan 
Bank Building to Land's King, a subsidiary of CHL, for 
HK$268 mil.. Mai Hon made a loan of approximately HK$241.2 
mil. to CHL. CHL then made a loan of similar amount to 
Land's King. Land's King paid Mai Hon the balance of the 
purchase price. See Diagram 1.
Diagram 1
Mai Hon HK$241.2 m il.^  CHL HK$241.2 m il. Land's King 
_________________  HK$241.2 m il.
These transactions were all a matter of book entries. 
There were no cash movements for the sale and purchase of 
the Metropolitan Bank Building. Even so, a profit of 
HK$204,509,343 was recorded in the books of Mai Hon. These 
false representations helped to inflate the share prices of 
Mai Hon.
Between 30 November 1979 to 31 December 1979, share 
prices of Mai Hon rose from HK$1.52 to HK$5.60. After Mai 
Hon was taken over by CHL on 28 December 1979 and renamed 
Carrian Investments Limited (CIL), it went up to HK$6.50 on 
31 January 1980;
b. Buying and selling of Gammon House
Gammon House was bought by the Carrian Group when the 
Minister of Finance of Malaysia, Tengku Razaleigh, proposed 
the purchase of Gammon House as a centre to house the 
operation of various Malaysian agencies in Hong Kong.
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Carrian had claimed that it had agreed to act as agent for 
the Malaysian Government, on the authority of Tengku 
Razaleigh, for the purchase. It was bought through Extrawin, 
a HK$2 company. There was plan to sell Gammon House to the 
Malaysian Government at a quick profit of US$50 mil.. The 
plan, however, failed as the Malaysian Government eventually 
decided to purchase Lap Heng Building. It should be pointed 
out that the Lorrain Osman Appeal Committee found out that 
Lap Heng Building could also be purchased by the Carrian 
Group on behalf of the Malaysian Government. The Committee 
had received a copy of a letter by PIL which seemed to 
suggest so. A copy of this letter is enclosed in Appendix 
3.6. This letter suggested illegal agreement was involved;
c. To create an image for the Carrian Group
An image that the Carrian Group was always successful 
in making profits was created by the buying and selling of 
assets referred to in (a). This was done with the 
cooperation of Mai Hon which bought back the assets sold to 
CHL at a high profit to CHL. Mai Hon did not disclose that 
at the time of acquisition of the assets, it was already a 
subsidiary of CHL. George Tan and associates were eventually 
charged with conspiracy to defraud the shareholders before 
the High Court in Hong Kong.
The funds needed in the "Concerted Plan" were mainly 
financed by BMF. BMF received the funds from the head office 
of BBMB in Kuala Lumpur and its international branch 
network. On 16 June 1980, BMF, as lender, entered into a
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loan agreement with PIL and Extrawin, as borrowers. The 
US$292 mil. loan was broken up into two parts i.e. US$152 
mil. to Extrawin and US$140 mil. to PIL. The securities 
offered would be equitable mortgages over Gammon House and 
the Metropolitan Bank Building for US$140 mil. and US$152 
mil. respectively, followed by legal mortgages of the two 
buildings, the guarantee of George Tan, deposit of all share 
certificates and other marketable securities of Extrawin and 
PIL. However, the purchase of the Metropolitan Bank Building 
was only completed on 21 June 1980 and the purchase of 
Gammon House took place on 10 July 1980 i.e. after the loan 
agreement was completed on 16 June 1980. Thus, BMF actually 
had no legal mortgage of these properties before the 
purchase agreements were completed.
Extrawin was used to acquire Gammon House at a 
negotiated price of HK$998 mil. (approximately US$200 mil.) . 
It was to be resold to the Malaysian Government at US$250 
mil.. Extrawin did submit a loan application of US$140 mil. 
to BMF to finance the purchase of Gammon House on 10 January
1980. (This loan had already been approved on 16 December 
1979 i.e. before receiving the loan application). The Board 
of BMF met the following day. However, the Board approved 
not this loan application, but another loan application by 
Carrian Joint Venture Limited for a loan of US$32 mil. to 
part finance the purchase of Gammon House at the price of 
US$250 mil.. This was accomplished with the cooperation of 
the Board and management of BMF to let the Malaysian 
Government believed that Gammon House was purchased at the 
price of US$250 mil.. However, when the Malaysian Government
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eventually decided to purchase Lap Heng Building instead, 
Extrawin was left with the responsibility of completing the 
purchase of Gammon House. (As mentioned earlier on, Lap Heng 
Building could be purchased by PIL on behalf of the 
Malaysian Government). The financing of the purchase of 
Gammon House was done in a roundabout way by PIL. See 
Diagram 2.
Diagram 2
BMF v PIL v Max Entry . Extrawin
 7  ---- f  ---- 7--
Maximum Entry Limited (Max Entry), a HK$2 dormant 
company, was set up by George Tan to receive funds from PIL 
to on-lend to Extrawin. In the books of Extrawin, the funds 
it received were stated as loans from shareholders and Max 
Entry. Two possible reasons for this arrangement were: a) to 
cover-up the fact that such a large sum of money came from 
BMF to only one particular customer i.e. PIL or b) to 
disguise the true identity of the relevant principal which 
may be either PIL or persons having interest in PIL. At the 
Land Office and the Registry of Companies, Max Entry was 
shown as mortgagee of Gammon House.
When the utilizations of the US$292 mil. were traced, 
it was found that part of the money was used to invest in 
gold coins, to repay back interests on outstanding loans to 
BMF, to repay back loans of other subsidiaries and for 
investment in shares. Repayments of the Carrian debts could 
be seen to come from the money borrowed. It could be
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concluded that a lot of the transactions of the Carrian 
Group were by the manipulation of loans and accounts.
On 19 March 1981, a loan of HK$8 mil. to PIL was 
approved by Hashim. The money was remitted to United Asian 
Bank in Kuala Lumpur for the account of NETP, solicitors of 
Lorrain Osman. This was a case of corruption and was being 
investigated by the police in Malaysia and Hong Kong.
On 17 September 1984, BBMB filed a petition in the Hong 
Kong High Court to wind up PIL for non-payment of loans. 
George Tan contested the petition. One of George Tan's 
allegations on several occasions, in writing as well as 
under oath, was that BBMB was the major shareholder of PIL. 
There was no denial from BBMB of these allegations.
The Committee of Enquiry set up by BBMB submitted a 
memorandum to the Financial Secretary of Hong Kong on 5 
April 1985 to appoint an inspector to investigate the 
affairs of PIL as there was clear and sufficient evidence 
that the business of PIL was conducted with intent to 
defraud its creditors including BMF or for a fraudulent and 
unlawful purpose.
4.1.2. Purchase of two floors of Metropolitan Bank 
Building by BMF
On 31 December 1980, BMF went on to "window dress" its 
accounts to show a reduction of the outstanding loans to PIL 
and the Carrian Group by agreeing to purchase two floors of 
the Metropolitan Bank Building belonging to the Carrian 
Group for HK$200 mil.. The entire seventeen floors of the 
Metropolitan Bank Building was bought at a price of HK$268
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mil. half a year ago. These two floors were resold back to 
the Carrian Group which nominated two of its companies, 
Extragold and Extradollars (subsidiaries of CHL), as the 
purchasers at HK$200 mil. plus interest. This again was 
financed by BMF. As for securities, a first legal mortgage 
of the two floors of the Metropolitan Bank Building in 
favour of BMF was registered at the Land Office on 3 April 
1982. However, on 22 April 1983, another creditor of the 
Carrian Group, West LB Asia Limited also registered a first 
legal charge of the two floors at the Land Office as 
security for a loan of HK$100 mil. to CHL. This led to a 
legal dispute between West LB and BMF on 23 November 1983.
The rest of the Metropolitan Bank Building floors 
except the ninth floor were bought by other Carrian 
companies or Carrian associates. The resale of each floor 
was financed by BMF.
4.2. The warning of Touche Ross
With such a large amount of money being loaned out to 
the Carrian Group, it would be very surprising if the 
accountants of BMF did not notice something was amiss. 
Around June 1980, Touche Ross, the auditor of BMF, sent a 
letter to BMF on the overconcentration of loans to the 
Carrian Group, but was told that all these loans were given 
out on a secured basis and with full Board approval. 
Thereafter, Touche Ross refrained from commenting on these 
loans. However, Touche Ross alerted Hanafiah Raslan & 
Mohammad, the auditor of the parent bank, to this problem. 
According to an internal memorandum from Arthur Tse of
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Touche Ross to Mat Noor, a senior partner of Hanafiah Raslan 
& Mohammad, dated 13 April 1983, he stated M...we have 
refrained from commenting on the unduly large portion of 
loan portfolio to Carrian and associates. It is because we 
were politely told that it was a management matter, not 
really an audit matter. In view of the sensitiveness of the 
situation, we thought that the best course was to keep you 
informed* so as to let the parent bank monitoring the 
situation...” (Lim, 1986; 35).
Mat Noor then informed Kamarul, the Chairman of BBMB, 
that the total sum advanced to the Carrian Group as at 30 
June 1980 was HK$1,658 mil., equivalent to 78% of total 
advances to all customers. It was recommended that advances 
should be spread out and not concentrated on one customer, 
considering the risks involved. Kamarul was kept informed 
all the time by Mat Noor of the development and problems of 
BMF.
Mat Noor also informed Kamarul that on 17 May 1980, CHL 
filed with the Registrar of Companies in Hong Kong, a 
memorandum of deposit of security in favour of Bank of 
Communications Limited in respect of overdraft banking 
facilities granted to Ibrahim, the General Manager of BMF, 
by Bank of Communications for HK$1 mil.. Kamarul was asked 
to investigate the case as corruption might be involved. 
However, no action was taken.
Kamarul had never admitted that the alleged meeting 
took place between him and Mat Noor.
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4.3. US$580 mil. loan to further the "Concerted Plan"
Between 27 August 1981 to 12 December 1982, BMF 
continued to release a series of Term loans and Money Market 
loans totalling US$580 mil. to George Tan and the Carrian 
Group. Term loans were usually repaid in level amounts over 
the period of the loan, although often there might be a 
large final 'balloon' payment or just a single 'bullet' 
payment at maturity. The banks would accommodate repayment 
patterns to the anticipated cash flows of the borrowing firm 
(Brealey & Myers, 1991; 805-806). Money Market referred to 
the lending and borrowing of short-term funds involving debt 
or loan instruments up to one year's maturity. The terms of 
transaction were discussed and arranged by telephone, and 
supporting documents and payments were sent by mail 
(Ranlett, 1977; 243). Money market loans should be confined 
strictly to financial institutions.
The final series from the total US$580 mil. loan, a sum 
of US$37.5 mil., was released to CHL at the time when it was 
known in the financial community in Hong Kong that the 
Carrian Group was having liquidity problems. BMF should have 
been very cautious about lending money to the Carrian Group. 
This loan was also released at a period when BMF and the 
Carrian Group were trying to complete the October 4th 
Agreement (see sec. 4.9) where BMF tried to obtain adequate 
securities for its loans to the Carrian Group.
The total sum of US$580 mil. was used to further the 
"Concerted Plan". It involved:
a. the acquisition of Grand Marine Holdings Limited,
a shipping company, by Carrian Investments Limited
102
(CIL) at HK$800 mil. . This was to be resold to the 
Malaysian Government for HK$1,000 mil. i.e. at a 
profit of HK$200 mil.. Again, the plan failed when 
the Malaysian Government decided not to purchase 
it;
b. the provision of the necessary cash flow for the 
Carrian Group.
4.3.1. Acquisition of Grand Marine Holdings Limited
George Tan alleged that Grand Marine was acquired at 
the request of Rais, the alternate Director of BMF, on 
behalf of the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Musa Hitam. 
George Tan would then sell Grand Marine to the Malaysian 
Government at a profit of HK$200 mil., but the deal fell 
through. Again, the loan was given in a roundabout manner 
through seven HK$2 'shell' companies. Four of these seven 
'shell' companies were not set up yet when the loans were 
given out by BMF. The securities provided were the deposit 
of Hong Kong public quoted shares (which were later 
transferred back to the seven 'shell' companies at the 
request of CHL) accompanied by valid transfer forms and 
seven letters of guarantee by George Tan. The shares were 
received by BMF months after the full release of the sum of 
US$138 mil.. This sum was ultimately received by CHL. See 
Diagram 3.
Diagram 3
CHLBMF
Seven HK$2
Nominee
Companies
CIL
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When the Grand Marine deal was traced back, it was 
found that only approximately US$68 mil. was needed for the 
merger of CIL and Grand Marine. The loans, beside being used 
for the acquisition of Grand Marine, other shares and 
properties, repayment of loans and interests, were also used 
to purchase paintings, jewellery, Rolls Royce cars, 
decoration of personal residences and donations by George 
Tan, his family members and his close associates.
At the same Board meeting which approved the seven 
loans on 19 September 1981, it was noted that the 
outstanding loan of the Carrian Group had been reduced from 
US$355 mil. in 1980 to US$77.25 mil. as at 16 September
1981. This was not the case as part of the total loan had 
been 'reallocated' to show a reduction.
As at 31 December 1983, the balance including interest 
owing by the seven nominee companies to BMF was 
US$167,248,176. BMF filed seven writs against George Tan as 
guarantor for the seven loans. The writs were served, but 
were retracted on the decision of the management of the 
parent bank, BBMB. The writs were then allowed to lapse. 
Besides this, no other action was taken by BMF against the 
seven nominee companies. This raised doubts about BBMB's 
sincerity in recovering its loans. Rais, the alternate 
Director of BMF, who approved the loan of US$138 mil., 
repeatedly denied that he knew anything about the 
acquisition of Grand Marine.
On 3 January 1985, an order was made by the Hong Kong 
High Court to wind up Grand Marine.
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4.4. HK$230 mil. to Carrian Holdings Limited in December
1981
In December 1981, BMF assisted the Carrian Group in the 
purchase of a block of 48.82% of China Underwriters Life &
General Insurance Company Limited shares from Ayala
International Holdings Limited. BMF delivered a cheque for
HK$230,420,300 as a loan to CHL (see Diagram 4 below). This
loan was released by Ibrahim, the General Manager of BMF, as
Money Market loan with no Board's approval. CHL paid this
amount to CIL who then paid Ayala International Holdings. At
this time, China Underwriters was already under the control
of George Tan. China Underwriters then deposited HK$230 mil.
with BMF to secure the loan of HK$230 mil. from BMF to CHL.
On 29 December 1981, CHL repaid BMF HK$420,300 so that its
loan from BMF would be the same as China Underwriters
deposit with BMF i.e. HK$230 mil. This sum of HK$230 mil.
was recorded in BMF's book as a deposit from China
Underwriters.
Diagram 4
BMF HK$230,420,300 „ CHL HK$230,420,300 v CIL HK$230,420,300
-------------------- 1-----------------j ^ —  ----------------------------------------------7— ------------------------------------------------------7 .. .
HK$ 420,300
HK$230,420,300 Ayala In tern ation a l Holdings
HK$230 m il. - ___________________
China Underwriters
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This sum of HK$230 mil. was given out in such a roundabout 
way possibly due to Ibrahim's statement to George Tan that 
he had the authority without BMF Board's approval to 
authorise a loan of any amount if the loan was fully secured 
against cash. George Tan, then, made use of China 
Underwriters to receive the funds from BMF and deposited 
this fund in cash form with BMF to secure the loan for CHL.
The Hong Kong Crown Court charged George Tan, Bently Ho 
(George Tan's right hand man and Director of CHL) and the 
accountants of Price Waterhouse who were auditors to the 
Carrian Group with defrauding shareholders and potential 
shareholders of CIL. They were to stand trial in the Hong 
Kong High Court in January 1986.
4.5. Audit of BMF accounts for 1981
On 21 January 1982, Touche Ross, auditor of BMF, sent 
a telex to Hanafiah Raslan & Mohammad, auditor of BBMB, that 
it was unable to give audit clearance to the BMF account 
because there were problems with the adequacy of securities 
and lack of loan documentation. Total borrowing by the 
Carrian Group and its associates from BMF were approximately 
HK$2.2 bil., representing approximately 58% of the total 
assets at 31 December 1981.
On 15 March 1982, Touche Ross completed the audit for 
the year ended 31 December 1981. It sent BMF a draft copy of 
their letter of recommendation which commented on the 
security position of the Carrian loans, the irregularities 
and inefficiencies in recording of loans, the improper ways 
the loans were documented and the valuations of properties
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used as collateral for loans being done by the customers and 
not independent parties.
On the same day i.e. 15 March 1982, Rais, the alternate 
Director of BMF, signed a temporary letter of guarantee that 
BBMB, the parent bank, would assume all the liabilities, 
obligations and commitments of BMF. Rais cleared the matter 
with BBMB, in particular with Hashim, the Director of BBMB 
as well as BMF. A formal letter of guarantee would be 
substituted in future. The formal letter of guarantee was 
not issued eventually. With this temporary letter of 
guarantee, Touche Ross signed the audit of the accounts of 
BMF for the year ended 31 December 1981 without the 
submission of the letter of recommendation although the 
security position in relation to the Carrian loans was 
unsatisfactory. The letter of guarantee would protect Touche 
Ross from being sued by other financial institutions relying 
on the Annual Report. Touche Ross telexed Hanafiah Raslan & 
Mohammad to confirm the release of the accounts with the 
letter of guarantee from Rais. However, on 7 July 1982, 
Touche Ross decided to send a formal letter of 
recommendation to BMF. The contents of this letter were 
exactly the same as the draft letter of recommendation sent 
to BMF on 15 March 1982 as mentioned above.
Hanafiah Raslan & Mohammad was kept informed by Touche 
Ross on the problems with BMF. With the information from 
Touche Ross and the issuing of the letter of guarantee from 
Rais, the responsibility of making sure that the accounts of 
BMF and BBMB were in order shifted to Hanafiah Raslan & 
Mohammad.
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Peter Mark & Company, solicitors for BMF, had also 
repeatedly advised BMF that the outstanding loans were 
under-secured and the securities were of doubtful value. BMF 
did not do anything about it or direct its solicitors to do 
something. The warning from its solicitors did not deter BMF 
from continuing to release large sums of money to George Tan 
and the Carrian Group.
4.6. US$97 mil. to Carrian Investments Limited from 20 
January 1982 to 17 February 1982
This is another example of how loans were released in 
a roundabout way. See Diagram 5. BMF would draw a draft on 
its BBMB New York branch account made payable to CIL. CIL 
then endorsed the draft to West LB Asia Limited. West LB 
would return the draft to BMF requesting BMF to send the 
proceeds by Telegraphic Transfer to its account with Irving 
Trust Company in New York. BMF would then instruct its 
correspondent bank in New York, Wells Fargo, to pay by 
Telegraphic Transfer, the proceed of the draft to the 
account of West LB with Irving Trust Company in New York. 
West LB would finally make the payment to CIL in Hong Kong 
dollars.
Diagram 5
New York US$V CIL US$ v West LB US$ x BMF US $ v BMF1s accou n t_
Asia Ltd. w ith W ells
Fargo, New 
York
CIL HK$ West LB1s account w ith  
Irving Trust Co. in  > 
New York
Whenever each of the series of loans totalling US$97 
mil. was received by CIL, it would then be paid over to CHL 
on the same day. The loan was eventually transferred to the 
account of CHL at the request of Bently Ho, the Director of 
CHL, on 18 October 1982. This request was made eight days 
before CIL announced that it was facing liquidity problems. 
It should be noted that CIL was a public listed company and 
CHL was a privately held company with no published accounts. 
It would have been to BMF's disadvantage to have the loans 
transferred from a public listed company to a private 
company because the chances of securing the money loaned out 
to a private company that had collapsed would not be as good 
as that of a public listed company. There was no proper 
Board resolution from CIL, CHL or BMF authorising this 
transfer.
4.7. HK$100 mil. to Carrian Holdings Limited on 16 February
1982
On 16 February 1982, BMF gave a loan of HK$100 mil. to 
CHL. A portion of the loan plus interest was repaid on 10 
June 1982 and the balance outstanding was HK$80 mil.. George 
Tan requested that this outstanding sum be rolled over until 
8 October 1982 when payment would be made in full.
On the same day i.e. 10 June 1982, BMF wrote to CHL 
requesting CHL to issue five post-dated cheques of HK$13 
mil. each and one post-dated cheque of HK$15 mil. to expire 
between 12 July 1982 to 7 December 1982. This was for the 
half yearly closing audit of BMF. Upon completion of the 
audit, these cheques would be cancelled. Ibrahim confirmed
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that the outstanding loan of HK$80 mil. would be rolled over 
until 8 October 1982. This confirmed the very special 
relationship between BMF and George Tan. There was even 
mutual cooperation to mislead the auditor of BMF.
4.8. Inspection of Bank Negara
The central bank of Malaysia, Bank Negara, carried out 
an inspection of BMF in September 1982 when the accounts of 
BMF showed that the capital position of BMF and the 
securities for loans to the Carrian Group were not 
satisfactory. The inspection was completed on 30 September
1982. The inspection found serious defects in the management 
and control of BMF. The loans were concentrated on two main 
groups of companies i.e. the Carrian Group and the Kevin Hsu 
Group. Total lending of BMF on 30 June 1982 was HK$5.042 
bil.. The lending to the Carrian Group amounted to HK$3.246 
bil. which was approximately 64.4% of the total loans of 
BMF. The lending to the Kevin Hsu Group were HK$0.755 bil. 
which were approximately 15% of the total loans. Thus, 79.4% 
of the total loans of BMF was to these two groups.
Bank Negara also pointed out that there was no 
specified limit on the Money Market loans to the Carrian 
Group. Moreover, Money Market loans should have been 
confined strictly to financial institutions according to 
normal banking practice. Quoted shares were used as 
securities in a number of the loans and these could not be 
considered as adequate securities because, if the company 
went into liquidation, these shares would be useless.
The inspection team also discovered that the directors
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of BMF and the former Group Chairman of BBMB, Kamarul, were 
given consultancy fees on top of their normal directors' 
fees. This was not disclosed in the annual accounts of BMF. 
The fees paid amounted to HK$0.8 mil., HK$1.0 mil. and 
HK$1.4 mil. in 1979, 1980 and 1981 respectively (Karim,
1989; 119).
The Governor of Bank Negara had a discussion with 
Nawawi, the present chairman of BBMB, on 12 November 1982. 
Nawawi pointed out that BMF was under the control of the 
Director of Financial Services and Management Committee of 
BBMB. The monthly reports were examined by Rais, the senior 
General Manager International Banking Division of BBMB as 
well as alternate Director of BMF. Nawawi agreed to take 
steps to improve the situation. An internal audit team was 
sent to Hong Kong to examine the operations of BMF. The 
Governor also requested BMF to provide certain documents and 
information to clarify the matter.
The Governor briefed the Prime Minister on the BMF case 
on 16 November 1982 and 5 January 1983. He wrote a letter to 
the Prime Minister on 2 April 1983 to “provide a clearer 
picture on the BMF crisis" and also to ask the Prime 
Minister for an appointment to discuss how to present the 
annual accounts of the Bank Bumiputra Group (Aliran, 
April/May 1986). Nawawi was also in regular and direct 
contact with the Prime Minister.
At the board meeting of BBMB on 22 November 1982, 
Nawawi reported the discussion with the Governor of Bank 
Negara and that the Prime Minister had been informed on the 
situation of BMF. The initial step taken by the board to
111
improve the situation of BMF was to set up a Supervisory 
Committee in BBMB, with Nawawi as the chairman. The role of 
the Supervisory Committee was to deal with loan applications 
to BMF. It was decided no loans would be released without 
the approval of the Supervisory Committee. The table below 
shows the people in the BBMB, BMF and the Supervisory 
Committee Boards. It should be noted that the same people 
may appear in different Boards.
Table 3.2
BBMB
Nawawi
Hashim
Lorrain Osman
K. Munshir Ariff 
S.O.K. Ubaidulla 
Sulaiman Ninam Shah 
John K.D. Eu
BMF
Hashim
Lorrain Osman
Rais 
Ibrahim 
Henry Chin
Supervisory
Committee
Nawawi
Hashim
(Lorrain Osman - 
invited to attend)
Rais
Wong Aun Phui 
Radzi
Even with this Supervisory Committee, loans were still 
released without approval.
The internal audit team gave their report to Nawawi on 
10 December 1982. The findings were similar to that of the 
inspection team of the central bank. This report was 
circulated only to the members of the management committee 
of BBMB and members of the Board of BMF. Non-executive Board 
members were not given a copy of the report. In the meetings
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of both BMF and BBMB, this report was not given much 
attention. In fact no discussion of it was tabled. In the 
meeting of BMF, the General Manager, Ibrahim, was given a 
copy of the report and was asked to comply with all the 
recommendations.
On 8 January 1983, one of the members of the internal 
audit team, Jalil Ibrahim, was seconded to Hong Kong for two 
years as personal representative of Nawawi, to "put things 
in order". He was appointed the Assistant General Manager 
(credit) in BMF. The accounts section, the loans section and 
the computer section would be under his supervision. The 
administrative section, the Money Market and Foreign 
Exchange section and the Trade Financing section would be 
under Henry Chin, the other Assistant General Manager. Jalil 
reported daily to Nawawi. One of the main duties of Jalil 
was to improve the securities of BMF. Thus, with Jalil's 
presence in Hong Kong, BBMB should know all the business 
transactions of BMF.
4.9. BMF's attempts to obtain adequate securities and the
October 4th Agreements
On 18 August 1982, BMF wrote to George Tan that the 
total indebtedness of George Tan, the Carrian group and 
other borrowers introduced or associated with George Tan was 
US$500 mil. BMF now appeared serious in its intentions to 
improve its security position.
George Tan had often alleged that the US$500 mil. loan 
was not for the Carrian Group. It was used for the 
following:
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a. US$250 mil. (HK$1,358 mil.) used to bail out the
Eda Group in March 1982;
b. US$133 mil. (HK$800 mil.) used to acquire Grand
Marine Holdings Limited on behalf of the Malaysian
Government which eventually fell through;
c. US$116 mil. (HK$700 mil.) incurred by some
customers of BMF which the Carrian Group claimed 
to be introduced by them. When they did not repay 
the loans, the Carrian Group had taken up the 
liabilities.
George Tan alleged that CHL outstanding debts were only 
US$35 mil.. George Tan was asked to sign a personal 
guarantee as additional security to cover this sum of US$500 
mil.. He signed the guarantee on 18 August 1982 and BMF 
appeared to be satisfied with the existing securities after 
obtaining the guarantee.
On 19 August 1982, the day after George Tan had given 
his guarantee for the total loan of US$500 mil., BMF was 
requested by the Carrian Group to substitute the current 
securities held with a charge over the assets in the United 
States of America which were two properties i.e. the Oakland 
and Orlando properties. This event led to the signing of the 
October 4th Agreements where the charge over various Hong 
Kong assets of the Carrian Group was substituted with the 
United States assets of CIL. Once CIL took over the Hong 
Kong assets, it assumed the total debts that came with it of 
both the Carrian Group and the borrowers introduced by it to 
BMF. According to George Tan, these United States assets
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were valued at US$560 mil., but in actual fact, they were 
worth only US$76 mil.. BMF approved of the exchange without 
double-checking George Tan's words. Deacons, the solicitor 
of the Carrian Group, was employed to act for BMF. This 
placed Deacons in a conflict position. Before obtaining the 
United States assets as securities, the Carrian Group 
requested the release of the shares of CHL and China 
Underwriters held by BMF. This was approved by Hashim, one 
of the directors of BMF, on 1 October 1982, pending the 
completion of the October 4th Agreements. Before the 
Agreements were finalised, BMF had already started releasing 
one security after another.
On 23 October 1982, George Tan wrote a memo to the 
General Manager of the Carrian Group that he had no 
intention of handing over the United States assets.
On 26 October 1982, the Carrian Group announced that 
they were facing liquidity problems.
By mid November 1982, the documents for the October 4th 
Agreements were still not finalised. BMF was concerned that 
the agreement might amount to a fraudulent preference over 
other creditors because this agreement was a separate 
agreement executed when the Carrian Group was facing 
liquidity problems and its debts were being rescheduled.
On 30 March 1983, Jalil, the Assistant General Manager 
of BMF who was seconded from BBMB, informed Ibrahim, the 
General Manager, that George Tan had not provided Deacons 
with the essential documents. Without these documents, the 
Agreement was worthless. It should be noted that there were 
other problems with using the United States assets as
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securities. The properties had already been mortgaged. The 
Carrian Group interest in the Orlando property was less than 
50%. Thus, the Carrian Group would need permission from its 
partners which was most unlikely to be obtained. Moreover, 
in the United States, taking security by way of a charge 
over shares in a property owning company did not prevent the 
property owning company from selling or encumbering the 
property. No further action was taken by both parties 
concerned to either cancel or enforce the October 4th 
Agreements. The result of the October 4th Agreements was a 
loss to BMF which had surrendered its existing Hong Kong 
securities without taking securities over the United States 
assets.
As the validity of the October 4th Agreements was 
unclear, Lorrain Osman, the Director of BMF and Ibrahim, the 
General Manager, insisted that replacement securities be 
made to cover the outstanding loans of Perak Pioneer 
Limited, Plessey Investments Limited (PIL) and the seven 
borrower companies which were customers of BBMB introduced 
by George Tan. This led to the signing of the January 26th 
Agreements. This agreement, too, did not materialise.
It would seem that George Tan was trying to make BMF 
give up its existing securities for the United States 
assets. However, in the light of the events that followed, 
BMF seemed willing to do so. While trying to obtain adequate 
securities for the existing loans to the Carrian Group, BMF 
was still releasing substantial sums of money to the Group 
when they had announced that they were facing liquidity 
problems on 26 October 1982. One of the loans, a sum of
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US$30.2 mil. was released to Paris Ride, a company 
incorporated on 29 December 1982 by Deacons, solicitor of 
CHL, as a vehicle to channel funds to CHL as part of the 
restructuring scheme. Since Paris Ride was incorporated by 
Deacons and not part of CHL, its records and files were not 
made available to the liquidators. The manner in which this 
sum was disbursed was intended to keep BMF's involvement a 
secret from the financial advisers of the Carrian Group and 
the other creditors. These loans were released to keep the 
Carrian Group afloat.
4.10. The restructuring of the Carrian Group
Wardley, a merchant bank (which was a subsidiary of
Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, Carrian's second
largest creditor), was appointed to help prepare the 
restructuring scheme of CIL and CHL after the Carrian Group 
announced that they were facing liquidity problems on 26 
October 1982.
The financial advisers stated that the restructuring 
scheme of CHL and CIL would require;
a. the provision of funds for the continued running 
of the Carrian Group;
b. the disposal of assets by the Carrian Group which 
included the United States assets of CIL.
On 25 February 1983, Hambro was appointed to act 
jointly with Wardley as financial advisers for CIL for the 
restructuring scheme relating to a total debt of 
approximately HK$12 bil..
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4.10.1. The proposal to take 'good' overseas properties 
out of the Carrian Group
On 13 January 1983, BMF wrote to George Tan stating 
that BBMB was not pleased with the restructuring proposal as 
once it was implemented, it would be tightly controlled by 
committees. BMF would then be unable to protect its 
interests.
On 15 January 1983, George Tan replied that 'good' 
properties in United States, Singapore, Philippines and 
Thailand would be taken out of the Carrian Group's 
possession to protect BMF's interests. The properties could 
be sold at a low price without affecting the debt 
rescheduling scheme. Part of the proceeds from the sale 
would be deposited with BMF for interest payment.
4.10.2. The US$40 mil. for the continued running of the 
Carrian Group
Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, Hong Kong's 
largest bank and Carrian's second largest creditor, had 
agreed to participate in the restructuring scheme by 
granting a revolving credit facility up to HK$250 mil. if an 
equivalent HK$250 mil. was provided by Carrian Nominees 
Limited, the controlling shareholder of CIL. BMF provided 
the funds in a loan of US$40 mil. which was released by 
Ibrahim, the General Manager of BMF, on the instructions of 
the BMF Board, even though the Supervisory Committee had 
rejected the application of the loan. The sum was released 
in a roundabout manner between 4 February 1983 to 9 February 
1983 as BMF was unwilling to participate in the scheme
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openly. See Diagram 6.
On 4 February 1983, US$38.5 mil. was released to the 
Bank of Communications Limited which, in turn, released the 
sum on the instructions of Carrian Nominees Limited to BBMB 
for the account of Spartan which set up an escrow fund for 
CIL.
Diagram 6
BMF_______. Bank of ________vSpartan______ . CIL
Communications
Spartan was used as a funding agency for CHL and CIL. It was 
acquired after the announcement of liquidity problems by 
CIL. The securities given were the entire issued and paid up 
shares of Carrian Nominees Limited and the personal 
guarantee of George Tan. It should be noted that these 
shares had already been deposited with BMF as security for 
existing loans.
On 9 February 1983, BMF released the remaining of the 
US$40 mil. i.e. US$1.5 mil. to the Bank of Communications 
which, in turn, released the sum on the instructions of 
Carrian Nominees Limited to Paris Ride. It should be noted 
that Carrian Nominees Limited was already insolvent by end 
of 1981. Thus, the first of the two requirements of the 
restructuring scheme i.e. to provide funds for the continued 
running of the Carrian Group was met by BMF.
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4.10.3. Jalil Ibrahim and the sale of the United States 
assets to BMF
At the Supervisory Committee meeting on 8 May 1983, BMF 
had decided not to make any commitment openly to the 
restructuring scheme until its securities position was 
deemed satisfactory. This was because if BMF joined in the 
rescue plan, the proceeds of the sale of properties of the 
Carrian Group would go to the central pool rather than to 
BMF. The amount to be declared if BMF decided to participate 
in the scheme would be the loan of US$35 mil. to CHL i.e. 
omitting the US$500 mil. loan. At this meeting, it was also 
suggested that BBMB should finance a third party to acquire 
the United States assets of CIL which it did not get as 
securities when the October 4 th and the January 26th 
Agreements fell through. The United States assets would be 
bought for US$76 mil. They were valued at US$262.5 mil. by 
Debenham Tewson & Chinook, the firm of valuers appointed by 
BMF on the recommendation of Hanafiah Raslan & Mohammad, the 
auditor of BBMB, with the approval of the central bank (see 
Appendix 3.7 for a copy of the letter from Debenham Tewson 
& Chinook) . This deal was thought to be profitable. The 
Supervisory Committee noted that the purchase should be 
completed before BMF responded to the financial advisers of 
CHL and CIL in the restructuring scheme. BMF could then 
demand the return of the CIL shares which were released 
before the October 4th Agreements were completed and the 
documents of other securities because of the non­
implementation of the October 4th Agreements by CIL.
On 20 May 1983, the Board meeting of BBMB agreed with
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BMF to finance a third party to acquire the United States 
assets from CIL.. Thus, the second requirement of the 
restructuring scheme devised by Wardley i.e. the selling of 
assets by the Carrian Group was again met by BMF. The 
financing of the purchase was to be kept confidential on 
BBMB's instructions.
BBMB decided that Marmel Incorporated would be used as 
the company for taking a loan from BBMB and on-lend to the 
third party to acquire the United States assets. See Diagram
7. Yap Lim Sen, a Malaysian businessman, through Darton and 
Dragon Base (two 'shell' companies), was nominated as the 
third party. The agreement was signed on 15 July 1983.
Diagram 7
BBMB____________  Marmel   Darton &
Incorporated Dragon Base
On 7 June 1983, Jalil was informed by Anthony Neoh, 
BMF's lawyer, that Levanthol, a group of valuers valued the 
United States assets at below US$76 mil.. At that time, the 
sale and purchase agreement was still conditional and the 
contract could still be rescinded.
On 17 June 1983, the Transpacific trust was created to 
maintain the confidentiality of BBMB's involvement. This 
trust would be a shareholder of Darton. Darton was a 
Liberian company which appeared to be owned by Yap Lim Sen, 
but, in actual fact, was found in the investigation of the 
Committee of Enquiry to be owned and controlled by BBMB.
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On 18 June 1983, Anthony Neoh submitted to Hashim, the 
Director of BMF, a report by Perini, a land and development 
company, on the United States assets. The report showed that 
the market value at June 1983 was only US$59 mil. and that 
no American buyer would pay more than US$56 mil. for the 
properties.
However, the deal was carried out even though BBMB was 
paying too much for the assets.
In the books of BBMB, this sum of money was recorded as 
a loan to Marmel. A total of US$85 mil. was given to Marmel.
4.10.4. Purchase of shares of China Underwriters Life & 
General Insurance Company Limited and Union Bank 
Hong Kong Limited and the murder of Jalil
While BBMB was entering into the agreement to purchase 
the United States assets, a separate arrangement was taking 
place at the same time for a third party to acquire shares 
of China Underwriters and Union Bank (an associated company 
of CIL) . This arrangement, as with the purchase of the 
United States assets by BBMB, was to keep Carrian afloat. 
BMF financed the deal as a Money Market transaction through 
Fleuret, a nominee company incorporated in the Channel 
Islands on 5 April 1982. Fleuret was owned by the New World 
Trust Corporation whose beneficial owners were two Malaysian 
businessmen, Mohd. Hussain Mohd. Yusuf and his brother, 
Mohd. Ariffin Mohd. Yusuf. The terms of offer were over- 
generous to the Carrian Group. The sale and purchase 
agreement committed Fleuret to:
a. purchase China Underwriters shares for HK$171 mil.;
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b. purchase of CHL debt of HK$177 mil.;
c. be liable to discharge CIL from the Crocker loan of
US$19,219,009.36.
At that time, the valuation of China Underwriters 
showed a substantial deficit of shareholders' funds. This 
meant that the value of China Underwriters shares was nil. 
This valuation was not circulated. Otherwise, it would have 
resulted in an immediate investigation by the Insurance 
Registrar leading to the liquidation and closing down of 
China Underwriters, followed by liquidation of the Carrian 
Group itself. Lorrain Osman, the director of BMF, was fully 
informed on this matter.
On 14 July 1983, Fleuret paid a deposit of HK$6.3 mil. 
to Wardley as a shareholder. This was funded by BMF.
On 19 July 1983, a further sum of HK$18 mil. was paid 
to Wardley. This payment came from the funds of US$4 mil. 
provided by BMF to Fitarget for on-lending to Fleuret on 18 
July 1983. This loan was released by the director of BMF, 
Lorrain Osman, without getting the Supervisory Committee's 
approval. Jalil, the Assistant General Manager of BMF, who 
was seconded from BBMB, tried to stop this loan and was 
murdered. He was strangled with a belt in a room at the 
Regent Hotel in Kowloon. His body was packed in a suitcase 
and dumped in a banana grove near Taipo in Hong Kong's New 
Territories. It was found two days later. Jalil's murderer, 
Mak Foon Than, who was a Malaysian citizen, made a statement 
to the police stating that the murder was carried out by a 
Korean who was instructed by George Tan to do so as Jalil
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was obstructing a loan to Fitarget. He admitted that he did 
help dispose of Jalil's body. Mak also claimed that he had 
worked for several years for the Finance Minister of 
Malaysia, Tengku Razaleigh, and that he was in Hong Kong to 
collect money from businessmen on his behalf (Bowring & 
Cottrell, 1984; 139). Tengku Razaleigh vigorously denied
that he knew Mak and that there was a conspiracy to "defame 
and destroy" him. However, when on the witness stand, Mak 
denied making the above statement to the police. He said he 
had never worked for Tengku Razaleigh and that, "We all knew 
him (Tengku Razaleigh) to be a good, honest and trusted 
minister" (Bowring & Cottrell, 1984; 139). Mak was 
eventually convicted of murder.
During the investigation into Jalil's murder, an 
unfinished letter to his wife and children was found. In his 
letter, he referred to the purchase of the United States 
assets by the bank. He stated that if the sale went through, 
he might be asked to go to the United States to manage the 
project (Lim, 1986; 22) . Clearly, from his letter, there was 
something amiss about the whole deal and Jalil was very 
reluctant to be involved (see Appendix 3.8 for part of the 
letter reproduced in Lim's book, "BMF: Scandal of
Scandals").
The completion of the sale and purchase of China 
Underwriters was to take place on 9 September 1983. However, 
this was hindered by: a) certain conditions still had not 
been complied with and b) the outbreak of a typhoon caused 
the closure of all offices. The completion date was 
postponed to 30 September 1983.
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The sale and purchase did not take place as the Carrian 
Group had collapsed by then. The two payments made by 
Fleuret were forfeited to the Carrian Group. The total sum 
forfeited was HK$24.3 mil..
On 7 October 1983, the Registrar General of Insurance 
filed a petition in the Hong Kong High Court to wind up 
China Underwriters.
4.10.5. The outcome of the restructuring scheme
On 31 August 1983, CHL signed an Accession Agreement to 
the debt rescheduling scheme pending the signing of similar 
Accession Agreements by all eligible creditors by 8 
September 1983 which included Britain's Barclays Bank, 
Peking's Bank of Communications, Germany's Westdeutsche 
Landesbank and France's Banque Paribas. However, a 
substantial number of eligible creditors did not sign the 
agreements for some undisclosed reasons and the rescheduling 
scheme thereby lapsed.
On 10 September 1983, the Commercial Crime Department 
of the Police of Hong Kong conducted a search of the Carrian 
Group's offices because they had been accused of fraud. The 
raid was also understood to have been part of the probe into 
the murder of Jalil Ibrahim in July 1983 (FEER, 22/9/1983).
On 10 September 1983, the Commissioner of Securities 
convened a meeting of all interested parties to the 
restructuring of the Carrian Group. At the meeting, his 
memorandum dated 9 September 1983 was distributed. The main 
focus was the possible understatement of the debt owing by 
the Carrian Group to BMF. The Carrian Group was asked to
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respond to this point. The Carrian Group had been declaring 
to their financial advisers with the cooperation of BMF: a) 
nil indebtedness to BMF regarding loans to CIL and b) US$35 
mil. unsecured and HK$50 mil. secured loans to CHL.
On 23 September 1983, the Commissioner of Securities 
wrote to the Managing Director of the Carrian Group, John 
Marshall, requesting an explanation of the letter from 
George Tan to Lorrain Osman, the Director of BMF, dated 15 
January 1983 which elaborated upon the removal of all 'good' 
properties in United States, Singapore, Philippines and 
Thailand from the Carrian Group for the protection of BMF's 
interests (see sec. 4.10.1). The Commissioner advised John 
Marshall that the restructuring scheme would not be possible 
if there was a separate scheme for a particular creditor.
At the same time, there was a dispute between the 
Carrian Group and BMF as to the amount owed. There were 
differences in the figures between those appearing in the 
Carrian accounts and those in the BMF's accounts. This was 
in reference to the loan of US$500 mil. (see sec. 4.9). To 
resolve the dispute and to make the debt rescheduling scheme 
successful, George Tan proposed that he and his family 
companies would take up the disputed amount.
On 30 September 1983, BMF, in principle, accepted 
George Tan's proposal and agreed not to disclose the 
separate arrangements BMF had with George Tan to the 
financial advisers.
However, three days later i.e. 3 October 1983, George 
Tan and Bently Ho, George Tan's right hand man and Director 
of CHL, were arrested by the police together with some of
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their legal advisers and accountants. They were charged with 
offences under the territory's Theft Ordinance. It should be 
noted that one of the solicitors of Carrian, John Wimbush, 
committed suicide by drowning himself in his swimming pool 
on 13 April 1983, when the Commercial Crime Bureau of the 
Hong Kong Police requested to interview him concerning 
certain of Carrian's deals.
On 8 October 1983, a winding up petition for CIL was 
presented in the Hong Kong High Court by a creditor of CIL, 
Bankers Trust. On the same day, Wardley and Hambro, the 
financial advisers of CIL and CHL resigned from their 
appointments.
On 10 October 1983, BMF filed a petition with the Hong 
Kong High Court to wind up CHL. The understatement of the 
Carrian debts and the discovery of several irregularities in 
the records of the Carrian Group led to the failure of the 
restructuring scheme and the collapse of Carrian.
BMF itself had committed offences when it:
a. attempted to obtain assets of CIL and CHL as securities 
at the same time as the restructuring scheme. This was 
against the interest of and in fraud of the 
shareholders and creditors of CIL and CHL;
b. misled the financial advisers of CIL and CHL by 
providing wrong information on the debts owing to BMF 
by CIL and CHL;
c. tried to get a separate deal with the Carrian Group 
while the restructuring scheme was being carried out. 
This action was unethical and unlawful.
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The Board meeting of BBMB on 31 October 1983 revealed 
the true nature of the loan of US$40 mil., which was 
released without the approval of the Supervisory Committee 
to set up an escrow fund by Spartan for the restructuring of 
CIL. The loan was recorded in the books of BMF as a Money 
Market transaction given to the Bank of Communications and 
was reported as such by BMF to BBMB. It was agreed that an 
investigation should be carried out on the loan.
On the same day, Lorrain and Hashim, the Directors of 
BMF, resigned. The meeting of the Board of Directors of BBMB 
accepted the resignations. At the same meeting, a new Board 
of Directors was appointed. The first meeting of the new 
Board of BMF was held on 21 November 1983. It should be 
pointed out that the resignations were not valid as they 
could only be accepted by the Board of BMF if such a valid 
Board was in existence. If not, resignations could only be 
accepted by the shareholders of BMF. The appointments of the 
new members were also not valid. BBMB could not validly 
appoint directors to its subsidiaries. As Lorrain Osman and 
Hashim had resigned, only shareholders of BMF at a 
shareholders meeting could appoint new members.
On 15 December 1983, BMF commenced civil proceedings in 
Hong Kong against Carrian Nominees Limited as borrower and 
obtained summary judgement for the sum of US$40 mil. plus 
costs. A Mareva Injunction was also obtained on the same 
day.
On 30 December 1983, BMF commenced civil proceedings in 
Hong Kong against George Tan as guarantor for the US$40 mil. 
loan. George Tan contested the claim. According to George
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Tan, the loan of US$40 mil. was in fact investment of BMF 
in CIL using Carrian Nominees Limited to channel the funds 
as BMF wanted secrecy in this transaction. This was done 
pursuant to the scheme of financial restructuring being 
worked out by CIL's financial advisers. The investment was 
agreed at the same time when CIL's major banker, Hong Kong 
& Shanghai Banking Corporation agreed to contribute an 
equivalent sum in Hong Kong dollars. The financial 
restructuring scheme was altered and an escrow fund was set 
up. In implementing this scheme, the entire issued shares of 
Carrian Nominees Limited and Spartan were delivered to BMF. 
BMF did not answer the allegations made by George Tan. 
Instead BMF abandoned its application to the court to obtain 
Final Judgement against him.
On 17 July 1984, BMF obtained judgement against Carrian 
Nominees Limited for the total sum of US$40 mil..
On 28 September 1984, BMF filed a petition in the 
Supreme Court of Hong Kong to wind up Carrian Nominees
Limited on the ground that the judgement debt was not
settled.
On 26 January 1985, BMF and BBMB filed civil suits in 
Kuala Lumpur High Court against Lorrain Osman and Hashim, 
the Directors of BMF, Rais, the alternate Director and
Ibrahim, the General Manager to recover the sum of US$40 
mil. together with another sum of US$7.5 mil. which was 
released to Fitarget, as damages arising from the
mismanagement of BMF in granting these loans.
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5. Dealings of BMF Directors, General Manager and staff 
members and their holding companies in shares of
Carrian Investments Limited and Grand Marine Holdings
Limited
The Directors, General Manager and staff members of BMF 
and their holding companies had made huge profits by dealing 
vigorously in shares of CIL and Grand Marine. They were able 
to do so because George Tan usually signalled when to buy
and sell their shares in order to make a profit.
5.1. Lorrain Osman and Twincrest
Lorrain Osman was given power of attorney by Twincrest, 
a company incorporated on 14 August 1981 by Deacons, 
solicitors of CHL and CIL, to operate its bank account. 
Lorrain sold CIL shares and warrants purportedly on behalf 
of BBMB and Twincrest through Hoare Govett, a stock broker 
in Hong Kong. The proceeds from the sale of CIL shares and 
warrants were remitted in a roundabout way to NETP, 
solicitors of Lorrain Osman. Hoare Govett would remit the 
proceeds to BMF in Hong Kong dollars to purchase Malaysian 
dollars. BMF would then remit this sum in Malaysian dollars 
to BBMB for the account of NETP. See Diagram 8.
Diagram 8
Hoare Govett HK$ > BMF in  M$ account of NETP in  BBMB
Hong Kong in  Malaysia
Apart from this roundabout method of remitting sums of 
money, a sum of M$2,189,594.42 from the proceeds of the sale
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of CIL warrants was remitted by Hoare Govett directly to 
BBMB on Lorrain Osman's instructions. This sum was then paid 
out to NETP on 26 November 1981. Lorrain had also instructed 
Hoare Govett to sell a total of 239,000 Union Bank shares 
between 1 December 1981 to 4 December 1981 on behalf of 
Twincrest. The proceeds were converted into Malaysian 
dollars and remitted to United Asian Bank in Kuala Lumpur 
for the account of NETP.
5.2. Hashim and Silver Present
Together with his wife, Hashim had an investment 
company called Silver Present. Silver Present dealt 
extensively with CIL shares and warrants. In these dealings, 
Silver Present came into close contact with Knife & Dagger 
and Perak Pioneer Limited, companies of George Tan, through 
transfer of accounts and purchases and sales of CIL shares.
On 19 December 1981, CIL placed HK$6 mil. with BMF as 
a Call Deposit, a form of Demand Credit which was payable 
whenever the account holder demanded repayment from the 
bank. In the books of BMF, it was recorded as being placed 
by CHL.
On 28 December 1981, BMF bought one million Grand 
Marine shares with the HK$6 mil. on behalf of Silver 
Present.
On 31 March 1982, Silver Present recorded in its books 
that the sum of HK$6 mil. was paid by a director.
5.3. Rais and Hi-heated
Rais had an investment company called Hi-heated,
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together with his wife. The company was incorporated on 21 
December 1979 in Hong Kong, on the advice of George Tan. The 
principal activity of Hi-heated was trading of CIL shares 
and warrants. The decisions to purchase and sell shares were 
based on information supplied by George Tan. Rais made a 
profit of HK$1,332,000 from his dealings in CIL shares and 
warrants through his company. Grand Marine shares were also 
purchased by Rais, but, on a much smaller scale.
5.4. Ibrahim and Knife & Dagger and Some Gain
Ibrahim was made General Manager of Knife & Dagger, a 
company belonging to George Tan and his secretary, Carrie 
Woo, in December 1979. Knife & Dagger dealt extensively in 
CIL shares. Through these dealings, Knife & Dagger came into 
close contact with Silver Present, a company belonging to 
Hashim.
On 16 June 1981, Knife & Dagger was appointed director 
of Plessey Investment Limited (PIL).
Ibrahim was also the beneficial owner of Some Gain and 
Bell Engineering. On 10 December 1981, Some Gain was 
appointed director of Knife & Dagger. Some Gain was also a 
shareholder of Formasia Limited and Formasia was a 
shareholder of Asiavest and Sherridon. See Diagram 9.
Diagram 9
Knife & Dagger PIL
Ibrahim Some Gain Formasia
Limited
A siavest & 
Sherridon
B ell Engineering
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It could be seen that Ibrahim had very strong business 
connection with the Carrian Group which he did not declare 
to the Board of BMF and BBMB.
On 29 December 1981, CHL deposited a sum of HK$3 mil. 
with BMF. On the same day, BMF bought 500,000 shares and 
warrants of Grand Marine amounting to HK$3 mil. on behalf of 
Some Gain. In the books of BMF, the HK$3 mil. was recorded 
as being withdrawn whereas in the books of CHL, the HK$3 
mil. was written as being transferred to PIL.
5.5. Staff members of BMF and Heyren
Heyren was incorporated in Hong Kong in December 1981. 
The three original directors were:
a. Mansor Saat, the Chief Dealer of BMF;
b. Ng Kai Wong, the Senior Clerk of BMF with the Credit 
Department;
c. Leung Kwok Wing, the Senior Clerk of BMF with the Money 
Market Department.
The objective of Heyren was to hold CIL shares as a 
"pension fund" for the local staff members of BMF. The first 
one million CIL shares of Heyren was a 'gift', i.e. given 
without any payment in return, from George Tan in December 
1981 to all staff members of BMF. When the price of CIL 
shares dropped drastically, the one million CIL shares 
became worthless. George Tan made a further 'gift' of one 
million CIL shares to Heyren and again these shares were 
'lost'. Heyren actually incurred debts as a result of its 
dealings in the CIL shares.
133
The staff members of BMF also dealt with Grand Marine 
shares after being informed by George Tan that Grand Marine 
had been sold to the Malaysian Government at a huge profit 
to CIL. However, when the sale fell through, they lost money 
on the Grand Marine shares.
6. Loans to the Eda Group
Chung Ching Man was the ultimate controlling 
shareholder of Eda Investments Limited (EIL). Loans were 
given to Chung, without any evaluation, mainly because of 
the warm recommendation of George Tan. This was another 
confirmation of the very close relationship between George 
Tan and BMF.
On 25 August 1981, EIL made an application to BMF for 
a loan of US$60 mil. to be used as working capital to 
strengthen the liquidity position of the company. The 
securities offered were the personal guarantee of Chung and 
the deposit of EIL and CIL shares as shown below: 
167,370,040 EIL shares;
7,593,171 EIL registered warrants;
11.200.000 CIL shares;
5,327,287 CIL registered warrants;
10,886,855 EIL shares (known as the Etek shares);
27.079.000 EIL shares (known as the Street Named
shares).
A day before the loan was approved, two sums of HK$3.6 
mil. each were paid by Chung's wife to Silver Present, a 
company owned by Hashim and Knife & Dagger, a company where
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Ibrahim was in control.
On 21 May 1982, Chung wrote to Ibrahim that EIL noticed 
the Etek shares had been disposed of in the market and that 
BMF as mortgagee was not entitled to dispose of shares 
deposited as securities other than on exercise of BMF's 
power of sale. As with the Street Named shares, Chung 
alleged that BMF had short sold at least 19,500,000 of these 
shares in late 1981 without EIL's consent.
On 2 August 1982, the BMF Board noted a shortfall of 
US$3.55 mil. in value of EIL shares. The board decided that 
Touche Ross should investigate EIL's allegations. Touche 
Ross found faults in the control over customers' securities 
pledged with BMF, in particular the safekeeping of share 
certificates.
Chung alleged that Ibrahim had misappropriated EIL 
shares and reported him to the Independent Commission 
Against Corruption in Hong Kong on 23 August 1982 and 15 
August 983.
On 28 August 1982, EIL issued a writ with the Hong Kong 
High Court against BMF for the alleged disposal of EIL 
shares. BMF filed its defence on 21 September 1982. BMF also 
filed a writ against EIL for US$36 mil. and another writ 
against Chung as the guarantor. All these actions were 
stayed when EIL was wound up on 26 February 1983.
On 1 July 1983, BMF submitted a memorandum to the 
liquidators of EIL with the proof of debt and suggested a 
commercial settlement be reached on the dispute between BMF 
and EIL.
On 9 July 1985, the liquidators recommended action
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against BMF. One of the claims was that BMF fraudulently 
traded certain EIL shares held as securities in the open 
market in breach of the covenant of the Pledge Agreement 
entered into between EIL and BMF.
The Committee of Enquiry set up by BBMB after the 
collapse of the Carrian Group suspected that there was a 
private arrangement between Ibrahim and George Tan whereby 
BMF would lend 15,001,855 EIL shares to CHL.
7. Loans to the Kevin Hsu Group
On 2 August 1982, the Board of BMF noted that the Kevin 
Hsu Group had been adversely affected by the fall in 
property prices and the interests on outstanding loans had 
not been repaid. Even so, loans were still given to the 
Kevin Hsu Group.
As at 31 December 1983, the outstanding loans of the 
Kevin Hsu Group plus interests were HK$497,594,521.65 and 
US$82,679,190.49.
8. Loans to Asiavest And Sherridon
The people involved in these two companies were 
Malaysian businessmen and businesswomen as well as the 
Minister of Finance, Tengku Razaleigh and members of his 
family.
Ibrahim, the General Manager of BMF, had an interest of 
16.7% in Formasia which in turn was a shareholder in 
Asiavest and Sherridon. He did not declare his interest 
initially.
As at 31 May 1985, the loans outstanding was US$2 mil.
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from Asiavest and HK$3.575 mil. from Sherridon.
9. Payments and benefits to Malaysians And Malaysian
companies
These benefits were disputed by the named Malaysians. 
However, they did not supply any proof to exonerate 
themselves.
a. Payment of M$1.5 mil, to Siew Lam Koona Sendirian Berhad 
Siew Lam Koong Sendirian Berhad was incorporated in 
Malaysia on 8 September 1981, on the instructions of George 
Tan, as a vehicle for investment activities by George Tan in 
Malaysia. The paid-up capital of Siew Lam Koong was M$2. 
Skrine & Company acted for this acquisition. The two 
partners of Skrine & Company, James Joseph Puthucheary and 
Anathan Kasinather, became directors of Siew Lam Koong until 
16 August 1982. The company name was changed to Rudah (M) 
Senderian Berhad on 9 September 1982.
On 12 August 1982, George Tan instructed Jed Tan by 
telex to obtain a bank draft of M$1.5 mil. payable to Siew 
Lam Koong and to be delivered personally to Hashim, the 
Director of BMF. The funds were to be paid from Carrian 
Travel Services Singapore (Pte.) Limited. On 13 August 1982, 
the draft was delivered. On 17 August 1982, a sum of M$1.5 
mil. was paid out by Siew Lam Koong to AAY Holdings, a 
company incorporated on 26 November 1980, with an authorised 
capital of M$250,000 and a paid-up capital of M$2. The two 
shareholders of AAY were Mohd. Arif fin Mohd. Yusuf (see sec. 
4.10.4) and Abdul Latif Abdul Hameed.
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On 15 June 1983, Siew Lam Koong as lender and AAY 
Holdings as borrower, entered into a 'friendly' loan 
agreement (referring to the M$1.5 mil.) free of interest for 
the period of six years. Repayment was to be made from the 
fourth year onwards in three equal instalments.
The reason this loan was given by George Tan was 
believed to be to build up a business relationship and 
goodwill with a Bumiputra businessman as he had plans to 
invest in Arif fin's companies and other Malaysian companies.
b. HK$86.850 to Tencrku Razaleiah
Tengku Razaleigh was the Minister of Finance of 
Malaysia at that time. This piece of information was found 
in one of the files of Ibrahim, the General Manager of BMF. 
The sum of HK$86,850 was paid out from the funds of either 
Knife & Dagger or Silver Present for the purchase of 
travellers cheques for Tengku Razaleigh amounting to 
US$15,000.
c. Payment of M$0.5 mil, to Yunus Sudin
On 24 December 1981, CHL applied for a Bank Draft of 
M$0.5 mil. to be paid to Yunus. The remitter was stated to 
be Gain Point Investments Limited. In the books of CHL, this 
payment was debited to the account of Plessey Investments 
Limited.
d. Payment of M$950.000 to the Fleet Group
The Fleet Group is the investing arm of UMNO, the 
ruling party in Malaysia. A sum of M$950,000 was paid out to
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the Fleet Group from the funds of either Knife & Dagger or 
Silver Present. This piece of information was also found in 
one of the files of Ibrahim.
e. Pledge to oav US$1 mil, to Ibrahim
A pledge to pay US$1 mil. to Ibrahim was made by Haji 
Bustami Hj. Sharbani on 14 August 1979.
10. 1993 - What actions have taken place?
The legal proceedings against the Carrian Group and the 
Board of Directors of BMF began in Hong Kong in October 
1983.
Lorrain Osman and Hashim were arrested on 7 December 
1985 in London where they now lived and were held in custody 
following a magistrates court hearing on extradition 
warrants presented by the Hong Kong Government. Warrants 
were also issued against Rais, but he absconded to France 
and was outside the reach of extradition. The French 
Government refused to cooperate in the extradition order 
since there was no provision made for such an order between 
the French and the Hong Kong authorities. Lorrain Osman's 
counsel, Martin Thomas, said that, "The French Government on 
March 13, 1991, decided it would not allow Rais to be
extradited to Hong Kong for trial. One of the central 
concerns was the involvement of the Malaysian Government in 
this affair". (NST, 15/7/1992). Ibrahim was granted immunity 
from prosecution in Hong Kong as he was the major witness in 
the trials.
Hashim agreed to be extradited to Hong Kong to stand
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trial. He was found guilty and was sentenced to four and a 
half years jail by the Crown on 14 January 1987. On his 
appeal, his original sentence was doubled to ten years on 
bribery and fraud charges. He also agreed to repay more than 
M$120 mil. to BBMB (NST 28/3/1987) . He was released from 
Stanley Prison in July 1993 after serving seven years (South 
China Morning Post, 7/8/1993).
Lorrain Osman stayed on in London's Pentonville and 
Brixton Prisons for seven years to fight the extradition 
order on the ground that he feared for his life owing to 
close links with powerful figures in Malaysia (The 
Independent, 18/8/1993). His fears must have been real 
because he had not applied for bail despite his wealth. He 
had made seven habeas corpus application seeking release and 
a judicial review; all of which were turned down by the 
Courts. He became the longest-serving remand prisoner in 
Britain. In July 1992, the British Home Secretary, Kenneth 
Clarke, signed the order to extradite him to Hong Kong on 
the ground that he had produced no fresh evidence. The order 
came through in December 1992. Lorrain Osman was extradited 
suddenly without the knowledge of his wife, lawyers and 
supporters who included British Members of Parliament. One 
reason given was the fear of large-scale media attention at 
the airport (The Times, 17/12/1992). Another possible reason 
could have been to ensure his safety as he had often claimed 
that there were many who would seek to ensure that he never 
came to trial if extradited to Hong Kong; "Too many people 
have too much to lose. If I am allowed to prove my 
innocence, then their guilt will be obvious...! am prepared
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to remain a remand prisoner at Brixton for 50 years if the 
alternative is facing a show trial or worse in Hong Kong”
(The Times, 17/12/1992). His family members were not spared
either. Mrs. Osman said that she feared for her life and had 
to be accompanied by two bodyguards whenever she visited her 
husband in prison (The Times, 17/12/1992).
In Hong Kong, he made a plea bargain and admitted guilt 
to one count of conspiracy to defraud BMF, BBMB and the 
Malaysians of US$292 mil.. He was sentenced by the High 
Court in Hong Kong in June 1993 to one year jail (taking 
into consideration the seven years he served in Britain as
well as the handing back of Hong Kong in 1997 to China). As
for the remaining 15 fraud and corruption charges, the Court 
decided to drop them on 6 August 1993 (The Times, 7/8/1993 
& South China Morning Post, 11-12/9/1993). On 17 August 
1993, he was released after serving eight months of the one- 
year sentence. After being released, he returned to Britain. 
The Business Times claimed that he still had assets worth 
£40 mil. (Business Times, 23/11/1990). However, in the South 
China Morning Post International Weekly (11-12/9/1993), 
Lorrain Osman claimed that he was destitute and living off 
the charity of well-wishers. He also claimed that what 
little of his business empire remained in Malaysia was still 
frozen by the courts. The rest had been sold off over the 
years. He said his home in London was leased and he owned no 
property in the United Kingdom. His troubles are not over 
yet as the Malaysian Government is suing him for the US$600 
mil. it lost in the collapse of the property company while 
the Hong Kong authorities are chasing him for more than £1
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mil. in court costs (The Sunday Times, 13/3/1994).
On 15 September 1987, George Tan and associates were 
acquitted on a charge of conspiracy to defraud in Carrian's 
1981 accounts. The one and a half year trial cost the 
taxpayer HK$50 mil.. The Deputy Director of Public 
Prosecutions in this case and also head of the Commercial 
Crime Bureau, Warwick Reid, was sentenced to eight years 
jail for corruption in his job as a law officer. George Tan 
still had to face trial on charges brought by BMF. He was 
released on a record bail of HK$52 mil. in Hong Kong (NST, 
24/3/1992). Meanwhile, he had been an active member of the 
Hong Kong business community. He was involved in billion- 
dollar property deals with mainland firms and was linked 
with Hongkong Macau Holdings in the purchase of Nine Queen's 
Road Central (South China Morning Post, 8/7/1993).
Ibrahim Jaafar was granted criminal immunities from 
prosecution in June 1985 by the jailed prosecutor, Warwick 
Reid, in return for 'cooperation' (LOAC, 1992; 12). He was 
also granted parallel immunity from civil prosecution by the 
Malaysian authorities. At the trial in the Hong Kong High 
Court in 1987, he admitted lying to all the investigating 
authorities, lawyers and auditors in relation to the case. 
He also admitted taking US$21 mil. in bribes. He had broken 
all the terms of his immunities. However, Warwick Reid was 
still in charge and no action was taken against him. His 
immunities were also not revoked (LOAC, 1992; 12).
The Malaysian and Hong Kong police have started 
investigation again on the Carrian case. It would not be 
surprising if all charges against George Tan and associates,
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Lorrain Osman and Rais Saniman are dropped because in only 
three more years Hong Kong will be given back to China. 
Moreover, 65% of the key and supporting documents are lost 
or destroyed (LOAC, 1992; 40) and key witnesses may not be 
willing to give evidence to a case which has political 
involvement.
Conclusion
The BMF case centred on a subsidiary bank set up in 
Hong Kong in 1977. From the case study above, it seemed that 
the bank was set up from the very beginning to defraud its 
depositors money by its Board of Directors and General 
Manager with the collaboration of George Tan and his 
companies, the Carrian Group. Money was siphoned off from 
the bank in the forms of huge loans to the Carrian Group. 
The details of the BMF case outlined above were intended to 
give the reader a good idea of how big time frauds are 
perpetrated. It seemed that the internal control of the bank 
was very weak. The parent bank, BBMB, in Kuala Lumpur did 
not seem to monitor the operations of BMF. The central bank 
of Malaysia, Bank Negara, carried out an inspection of BMF 
in September 1982 and the inspection found serious defects 
in the management and control of BMF. However, instead of 
taking direct action himself, the Governor of Bank Negara 
had discussions with the Chairman of BBMB, the parent bank. 
The Governor also briefed the Prime Minister of Malaysia on 
the position of BMF. No significant action was taken to stop 
the loans to the Carrian Group. The whole case surfaced 
eventually with the murder of Jalil Ibrahim, a senior BBMB
143
auditor seconded to BMF. The initial reaction of the 
Malaysian Government was to proclaim that "there was no 
crisis" even though M$2.5 bil. had gone missing. The 
Government tried to cover-up the scandal as much as 
possible, for example, by not wanting to publish the 
findings of the Committee of Enquiry into the case. It also 
introduced a new Official Secrets Act to stop the public 
from probing into the case. This case also revealed the 
weaknesses of the police and the Anti-corruption Agency in 
Malaysia which did not take any action. The BMF case gave 
the strong impression that there was a conspiracy between 
the Government, the police and the Anti-corruption Agency to 
cover-up the case and it is plausible that the reason was 
that a few politicians were involved in the scandal. The BMF 
case seemed to suggest that the police and the Anti­
corruption Agency in Malaysia were not independent from the 
politicians.
The BMF case study generates the following questions
for analysis in the next chapter i.e.:
1. Why was the background of George Tan not investigated 
before dispensing the loans, especially when he was 
already a bankrupt by order of the High Court of
Singapore?
2. The parent bank of BMF, BBMB, should have been 
suspicious of the ways loans to the Carrian Group were 
documented and the collateral secured. Moreover, funds 
for these loans were met by BBMB as well as its 
international branches and borrowing from other banks.
3. Tengku Razaleigh, the then Finance Minister and Musa
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Hitam, the then Deputy Prime Minister, were said to be 
involved in some of the illegal dealings of the Carrian 
Group. Why was there no investigation on them?
4. Was the Malaysian Government involved in the BMF 
scandal? The purchase of Lap Heng Building as mentioned 
in section 4.1.1 seemed to suggest there was some sort 
of agreement between PIL and the Malaysian Government 
with Tengku Razaleigh as the middleman.
5. Certain allegations made by George Tan during his 
trial, for example, that BBMB was the major shareholder 
of PIL (section 4.1.1) were never refuted by BBMB. Why?
6. Why did BMF make major purchases that were priced too 
high from the Carrian Group, for example, the 
Metropolitan Bank Building for HK$200 mil. when the 
entire seventeen floors of the building were bought at 
a price of HK$268 mil. (section 4.1.2)?
7. What roles did the auditors and lawyers of BMF and BBMB 
play in the scandal?
8. Why did BMF still issue loans to the Carrian Group when 
the financial community in Hong Kong knew that it was 
having liquidity problems (section 4.3)?
9. What was the real purpose of the October 4th Agreements 
and the purchase of shares of China Underwriters and 
Union Bank (sections 4.9 & 4.10.4)? Was it to secure 
adequate collateral for the loans of the Carrian Group 
or was it to keep the Carrian Group afloat?
10. How was it that the Governor of the central bank had 
bypassed the Finance Minister on this problem (section 
4.8)? Instead, he went straight to the Prime Minister.
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11. How was it that BBMB never questioned the way loans 
were given in a roundabout manner to the Carrian Group?
12. Why were some members in the BMF Board allowed to be 
members of the BBMB Board as well as the Supervisory 
Committee Board (section 4.8)?
13. How was it that even with the presence of Jalil Ibrahim 
who was seconded from BBMB to BMF to put things in 
order, loans were still being released to the Carrian 
Group?
14. Why did BBMB agreed to the elaborate scheme of using 
shell companies to release funds for the restructuring 
of the Carrian Group?
15. What made the Government, the police and the Anti­
corruption Agency so complacent in their duties when 
the case surfaced? Moreover, why was the Government 
reluctant to let the public know the full story of the 
scandal?
16. How is it that the case is still pending after more 
than ten years of its occurrence and that some of the 
culprits are still roaming around freely?
The above questions will be the main focus of analysis
for the next chapter.
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Appendix 3.1
Differences between the Royal Commission of Inquiry and the 
Committee of Enquiry
Roval Commission Of Inquiry
Basis Of Existence;
Statutory - under the 
Commissions of Inquiry Act 
1950 (revised 1973).
Members Appointed Bv;
The King upon recommendation 
of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet or a state authority 
for state matters, save in 
Sabah and Sarawak.
Powers Of Investigations;
1. Summon any person in 
Malaysia to attend Commission 
meetings and examine him as a 
witness. (In case of state 
authorised commissions, 
pertains to anyone in that 
state).
2. Demand disclosure of 
evidence on oath, affirmation 
or by statutory declaration.
3. Procure all relevant 
documents.
In Case Of Non-compliance:
1. May issue a warrant of 
arrest to compel attendance 
and impose a fine of not more 
than M$50 for non-attendance.
2. May impose a fine of not 
more than M$50 for refusing 
to give evidence.
Degree Of Openness:
Inquiry proceedings open to 
public just like court 
hearings, save that 
commission empowered to use 
its discretion to admit or 
exclude the public and press 
from either a part of or the 
entire inquiry.
Committee Of Enquiry
Basis Of Existence; 
Administrative measure or 
under the articles of the 
company in question.
Members Appointed Bv;
1. Federal or state 
Governments or individual 
Government departments, if 
set up as an administrative 
measure.
2. The Board of Directors of 
a company if set up under 
company's articles of 
association.
Powers Of Investigations:
1. Investigations depend on 
the goodwill and cooperation 
of witnesses.
2. No power to call for 
witnesses.
3. No power to demand 
disclosure of evidence.
4. No power to obtain 
documents.
In Case Of Non-compliance:
1. No power of subpoena.
2. No power of extracting 
information if not given 
willingly.
Degree Of Openness: 
Investigation conducted 
quietly away from public 
scrutiny.
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Right To Own Defence:
Person(s) being investigated 
has right to defend himself 
and to legal representation.
Protection For Witnesses:
In giving evidence, witnesses 
protected from subsequent 
civil or criminal action, 
unless charged with giving 
false evidence.
Limitations Of Inquiry:
Need cooperation of foreign 
Governments to conduct
investigations outside 
Malaysia or to invite foreign 
nationals to inquiries 
conducted here.
Costs Met Bv:
Expenses incurred paid for 
from Consolidated Funds -
i.e. with Government money.
Reporting Of Findings; 
Proceedings conducted in 
public, findings reported
through the press. Report of
findings submitted to the 
King and is tabled in its 
entirety before both Houses 
of Parliament.
Right To Own Defence:
Right to own defence unknown 
as each committee determines 
own procedure.
Protection For Witnesses:
No protection against 
defamation suits if 
statements made during
enquiry are subsequently 
published in report of 
findings.
Limitations Of Inquiry;
Need cooperation of foreign 
Governments to conduct
investigations on all foreign 
nationals save those employed 
by committee's authorising 
body.
Costs Met Bv:
Expenses incurred paid for by 
whatever authority setting up 
committee.
Reporting Of Findings: 
Reports submitted to 
authority setting up the 
committee. Report need not be 
made public, either in part 
or in entirety.
Source: The Star 25/9/1984.
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fie authorised lending limits by 
BBMB to BMFLfrom 1979 to 1983
(in million US dollars)
200
110
30
3010
380
60
180
30
70
20
380
60
250
200
110
40
880
H
*sA«
410
250
150
100
30
10
950
APPENDIX A
press reports oa BMFL*s 
Involvement In granting 
loans to CO. B M F L f d U  
almost entirely on BBMB 
tojpnorvtde the required
Over 90% of BMW"* to- 
tel funds come from 
inter-work borrowings. 
In the first fan year of 
operation (OTS) BMFL  
relied on BBMB for only 
30% of its Interbank bor­
rowings. H owever. this 
reilance increased to *0% 
In 1070. end by 1981 It 
came to 99%. In 1992. tbe 
borrowings from BBMB 
increased to 19% and In 
1981 to 89%.
From our review of 
available reoords and in­
formation provided by of­
ficers of B B M B  and 
BMFL. we understand 
that the i 
of aU
of B BMB for lending to 
BMFL. are control led and 
determined by the Mana­
gement fiiwn»H«—  and 
the Board of BBMB. In­
creases in the authorised 
lending llmlta during the 
rear are authorised by 
the Management Com­
mittee from time to time 
at the request of BMFL. 
The following tablq
Appendix 3.2
Source: New 
Straits Times, 
3/11/1984.
shows the authorised 
lending fimtts by the var­
ious overseas branches of 
B B M B  to BMFL.. from 
1979tol98*-
A rrlgnmaat
On December U, 190. 
by a Deed of Assignment. 
B M F L  assigned to
totsiHngHKlMoFl mll- 
Hon W U T U  mflttoa). 
The assignment Included
the beneht of all securi­
ties held by B M F L
The effect of tbe as­
signment iS that «MH>  
has taken over the loans 
so ■■**[* *1 inefcxflngthe 
risks oi non-recovery. At 
tbe same time the Ba­
lance Sheet of B M FL  as 
at December XL 1988 ex­
cludes the loans so as­
signed, and consequently 
the advances made by 
BBMB to B MFL are ac­
cordingly reduced.
After the assignment.
IK #  Ia 9 m  m m a lw lw s r In
the books of BMFL as at 
December XI. 198X 
amounted to HK8U3S.7 
million (MgX49A mil­
lion). A  total provision of 
H K U M . l  million 
(M$148A million) has 
been set aside in the ac­
counts of B M F L  from 
1980 to 1988 to cover any 
bad and doubtful loans in­
cluding the Acceptances 
out standing mentioned In 
paragraph 11 above. This 
provision is made «u> as 
(shown) in TABLE D 
Subsequent and Final 
Reports
We are currently inter- 
_ the
past
ployees of B M F L  and 
BBMB. We intend to in­
terview all other ]
' who may be of i 
to us In carrying m *  our 
task In accordance with 
tbe terms of reference set 
out in Appendix A.
We are in contact with 
the relevant authorities 
in Malaysia and in Hong 
Kong and will endeavour 
to obtain access to docu-
as are available and of 
relevance to our enquiry.
We may at the appro­
priate time or -times re­
port further to BBMB. 
We will on completion of 
our enquiry submit our 
final report.
Signed: 
(Tan &rl Ahm ad 
N aerd la  Zakarta)rfcalwniH
(Ramil Bln Ibrahim) 
Member 
(Cbooi Man 8ou)
" Member
K uala  L um pur 
D ated 17th A ugust,
1984.
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THE terms of reference 
of the committee are as 
follows:
To determine and en­
quire into and report on/ 
the affairs of Bumiputru 
Malaysia Finance Lid 
(BMFL) with reference 
to the following:
(1) the management 
and control of its opera­
tions;
<11) whether there has 
been any misan-
plicatlon or misappro­
priation of any of Its
(lii) the extent and na­
ture of loans or credit fa­
cilities granted by B MF L  
toe (a) the Carrlaa Group 
of Companies and com­
panies * with
Mr George Tan. and (b) 
Eda Investments Ltd.
Civ) wbethor such
loans and credit facilities 
were approved in com- . 
pUanee wtth law and/or 
lending procedures of the
company and wore dis­
bursed la acordanee with
commercial practice;
(v) the person or per­
sons involved In process­
ing and approving such 
loans or credit facilities!;
(vi) whether such per­
son or persons and/or 
any director, officer or 
person, directly or indir­
ectly Involved wtth the 
administration of B M F L  
has by himself or by a 
member of his family or 
agent received or agreed 
to receive any benefit ta 
money or moneys worth 
or by whatever name 
called from: (a) B MFL in 
addition to his ordinary 
rsmunrrstlon; or (b) the 
borrowers or any nf 
them, and if be has. fads 
Identity and the idenUty 
or Identities of the bor-
stipulxted by the approv­
ing authority; and 
whether, in aU the cir­
cumstances. they worn 
made bona fide in the In­
terest of B M F L  and con­
sistent with normal pro-
the case may be;
(vii) any irregulari­
ties. brands or breaches 
of trust or action in disre­
gard to honest cnmmi 
dal practice or eonti 
vcation of any law in
f P H d H  r J  I K n  n ^ w i l n
tratioa and operations of 
B M F L  and 
• (will) the measur 
which in the optMoo of 
the committee are neo 
aary la order to enss 
'due and proper admin 
tratioa of B M F L  in the 
future.
APPENDIX B
LENDING AUTHORITY 
A P P R O V E D  B T  
B O A RD  OF  B MF L  ON 
JANUARY 1L1999. 
LENDING AUTHORITY 
Resolved: The Board re­
vised tbe llmlta and 
powers of the lending 
authorities of BMPaafd-
S e c a r e d  H K $8.000.000; 
L C /T R /B E P /L G /S G
(d) Individual Pis eve 
denary Limits
(1) Chairman: Uaso- 
curnd HKftftOO.999; Sa­
cs red HKgX.000.990; 
LC/TR/BEP/LG/SG
(a)
All loans or lines of cre­
dit in excess of the limits 
fixed for the Executive 
Committee must be ap­
proved by the Board of 
Directors.
(b) Executive Commit­
tee
(1) Composition —  any 
2 Directors and the Gene­
ral Manager.
(U) Quorum — 2.
(Ill) Frequency of 
Meetings —  as and when
( I D  Any
(iv) Approved limits: 
Unsecured HKf7.QOO.OOQ; 
Secured HK|10.000.000; 
L C /T R /B E P /L G /S G
HKHOjOQjOOO.
(c) Management Gam-
Single 
Member of Board of Mr- 
ectors: Unsecured 
HKgXftO.OOO; Secured 
HKgl.ftOO.OOO; 
LC/TR/BEP/LG/SGmfpssiMn 
. (lii) General Manager: 
Unsecured HK8190/MM; 
Secured HKftftOO.dOO; 
LC/TR/BEP/LG/SG 
HKgftOO/MO.
REVISED BY  B O AR D  
O F  B M F L  O N  J A N ­
U A R Y 24.1981 
LENDING AUTHORITY 
Resolved: The Board re­
vised the limits and 
powers of the lending 
authorities by increasing 
the Approved
M.n.»tn»n< Committee
for l£/IR/BEP/LG/SG 
from HK89.000.009 to 
HKIftjOOO/KV)
Nate:
LC ■ Letters of credit 
T R  * Trust receipt 
BEP - BUI of
—
8Q — Shipping guarantee
(i) Composition —
General Manager. Asst.
General Manager and 
Chief Dealer.
_ (II) Frequency of Meet­
ing —  as and when neces- 
sary.
(v) Approved Limits:
Unsecured HKftftOO/MO;
ORGANISATION CHART OF B M FL F O B  
TH E  YEARS 1980, 1381 AND 1982 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
L £ . Osman —  Chairm an 
D ato' Hashim ShausodcUn —  Director 
D r. Rais Sanuaan —  Ahem ate 
G en era l M an ag er 
Ibrahm  Jaafar 
A ssistant G enera] M a n ag er 
Henry O n  Chye Hin 
C h ie f D ealer 
Mansooc Soot
Appendix 3.3a
Authorised lending limits of various overseas branches of 
BBMB to BMF from 1979 to 1983
1979 1980
US$ US$
-Kuala Lumpur 40 200
-London 20 110
-Singapore - -
-Bahrain - 30
-Tokyo - 30
-New York - 10
-Los Angeles - -
Total 60 380
1981 1982 1983
US$ US$ US$
60 60 410
160 250 250
50 200 150
70 110 100
20
40 30
 10
360 660 950
Source: The Star, 3/11/1984
Appendix 3.3b
BMF's balance sheets at the end of 1979 to 1983
1979
HK$/000
1980
HK$'000
1981
HK$'000
1982
HK$'000
1983
HK$'000
Loans &
advances 796,179 
Others 45.611
1,685,847
336.650
3,738,148
177.240
5,510,396
144.210
7,666,906
56.880
Total
assets 841.790 2.022.497 3.915.388 5.654.606 7.723.786
Capital
& reserve 8,084 13,364 92,892 89,813 82,130
Borrowings
from
BBMB 437,487 1,137,904 1,905,475 4,096,395 6,946,524
Borrowings
from
market 376,908 
Others 19.311 
Total 
liabi­
lities 841.790
821,982
49.247
2.022.497
1,824,197
92.824
3 .915.388
1,365,794
102.604
5.654.606
547,431
147.701
7.723.786
Source: Lim, 1986; 51
151
Appendix 3.4a
< • ‘ :5
(cw bngroupl
carrian
Holdings Hmited 
tit *  4* W  *T M. «  *1
STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
The Hon Tengku Tan Sri Razaleigh Hamzah 
HALAYSIA
30 Hay 1980
Delivered BY HAND.
•: ;r
Dear Tengku,
As you are aware we are now completing a number of major developments.
I am confident that over the next 3 - 4  years C a r r i a n *  Investments Limited 
will become established as one of Hong Konga principal trading companies*
As agreed T w i l l  arrange for 25m Carrian Investment Limited shares to be made
availablj^g^uSnw^
----
I your backing for th. Carrian Group and I hop.
to be\abiis to^dtiHueltiE ftsaist you whenever possible*. ’X
I would would confirm receipt of thim letter by signing
and returninq l^Tilr TEtached duplicate*
Yours sincerely, ^  
CARRIAN HOLDINGS LIITED
;• vs-1
GEORGE 
Group Chairman*
*4->OX CkM*! R— d. C, K*-* TW. J-JWHTOw SX»3 CAJUA KX
(carrUn group!
carrian
holdings limited 
%  ftW *r «• «*!
Appendix 3 . 4 b
« { K I U I
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
Hon. Tengku Razaleigh 
Minister of Finance
MALAYSIA.
. v >
BY HAND * ^i"
Dear Tengku,
OoCM b er 12, .1919.
•*. .
. • < .*j-r v  • ••
V. ■'• .*• ! •• , • V*• »***••
•••. . i'll .*• •
• * * •
• •» * *
V 4
* * • 
i * «
As discussed 1 have arranged to purchase 3a Hal Hon shares for HK$3.00 **?>••>.
and will sell for not leas than HK$6.SO.•v
i'
Profit will be remitted as inatructed.
% • • ( *j____ •
• . I ,  I **•' s»,
• * I
I wish t° thank you for your support and confidence in the futifl^O^ the . . 
Carrian Croup.
Yours sincerely, . * % •‘•r.*
CARRIAN HOLDINGS LIMITED. * .*
• s 4’~*
(
leosgo.Tan
CHAIRMAN.
a
a
Appendix 3.4c
&
©
-Jv vC7 j 
5;
B U M I P U T R A  M A L A Y S I A  F D I A H C S
<1. (tncofpor«i«4lfiHQnQ|Canal V .; >* .,-5 v
16/F.. ADMIRALTY CENTRE. TOMER ONE. II HARCOURT RQAD, HONQ
TEL: 6-J?6257 TELEX; fUTRA MX 66079 v >
- r!-v
July 4, 1983
Ministry of Finance 
Kementeriaa Kewangan 
Jalan Duta 
Kuala Lumpur*
. . .•..4 • .*"AN *
• ’  f  ■»* . «* Y * - ' V
- ~Vu^£r V- '
Vi
• * -  •  .
.  »
V . *  ‘ -* • •  " . 
* -  - •  — £  *  .*
Attn; Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah
Minister of Finance
Dear Sir,
Ret Beneficial Owner*
• :•
• V
We would be extremely grateful if you could confirm whether pr 
not you are the beneficial owner of 25m Carrian'. Investment;*; ’ 
Limited shares* * ■*V •
Your a faithfully,
for BUMIPUTRA MALAYSIA FINANCE LTD.
l l v S —
"l * */ * *
vt*# •,.
JALIL HJ\ IBRAHIM 
Asst. General Manager.
• *■ • < ' '
• V f. V J i V ; ;
V :v. • •
•* *, */J • •
. .  S
I  * I  V ." M  ^  /
» q* mm hmnira h«unw hmm r. a. hi «n. wmnmw
COMER.
7*2
| ® N s 8 a p
;: ,v A 7 7
m m . *
o v>;fey;
EDA GROUP
Eda Investments Ltd US$40
CARRIAN GROUP
Carrian Development Ltd HK$ 10 
Carrian Finance HK$5 +  US$5
Carrain Holdings Ltd 
Carrian Investments Ltd 
George Ton
H K $218.295 +  US$84.5  
US$79
US$20 +  HK$100 OTHER CARRIAN COMPANIES
Carrian ltd
Carrian Travel Services Ltd 
Carrian Joint Venture Ltd 
Carrian Joirtt Venture Ltd & Son Lik 
Perfect Combination 
Plessey Investments Ltd 
Perak Pioneer Ud 
Knife & Dagger 
Outwit ltd. Pabulum Ltd,
Deciding Deeds ltd. Gold Come Ud. 
Special Prolit Ud, Take Way Co Ud. 
Homeway Co Ud 
Deren Metin Investments Ud,
Back Up Co Ud, Denex, Chic Light Ud 
Extrodollars Extrogold
KEVIN HSU GROUP
HK$10US$18 +  HK$85  
US$5 
HK$35 
HK$300  
US$14  
H K$20  
H K$30  
HK$8 +  Unspecified
Kevin Hsu Holdings Ltd 
Begeral 
Cincinnati 
Crescent Incestimate 
Begeral 
Versahy 
Sky Realty 
, Kevin Hsu Group
USST38
US$100
US$36
HK$3
HK$20
HK$10
San Uk Realty Co Ud 
Damaniar Ltd, Kenroy ltd
Damaniar Ud
• •- uA-.r.V. 
• Figures I*
>^14s'.4£
HK$11C 
U nspec ified
H K $ 5 
HK$60 
H K $ 5
US$292 +  * 3 ‘ *  +HKTit 
HK$30 .
Appendix 3.5a 
Source: Malaysian Business, 1/4/1986.
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Appendix 3.5b
Term loans (TL) and Money Market loans (MML) to the Carrian 
Group by BMF from Jun 1979 to March 1981 and from August 
1981 to October 1982
Date
29/6/79
4-16/8/79
24/8/79
27/9/79
25/10/79
26/10/79
6/11/79
7/11/79
20/11/79
29/11/79
2/1/80
19/12/79-
25/6/80
9-28/7/80
31/7/80
24-26/2/81
19/3/81
Loan type/Amount
TL No.1 
HK$5 mil.
TL No.2 
HK$50 mil.
TL No.3 
HK$10 mil.
TL No.4 
HK$5 mil.
TL No.5 
HK$5 mil.
TL No.6 
HK$15 mil.
MML No.1 
HK$5 mil.
TL No.7 
HK$5 mil.
MML No.2 
HK$40 mil.
MML No.3 
US$16 mil.
MML No.4 
US$5 mil.
MML No.5 
US$292 mil.
MML No.6 
US$20 mil.
MML No.7 
£3.8 mil.
MML No.8 
HK$60 mil.
MML No.9 
HK$8 mil.
Borrower
Carrian Development Ltd.
Carrian Joint Venture Ltd.
& San Lik
Carrian Joint Venture Ltd. 
& San Lik
Carrian Development Ltd.
Carrian Joint Venture Ltd.
Carrian Joint Venture Ltd. 
& San Lik
Carrian Finance Ltd. 
Perfect Combination 
Carrian Holdings Ltd. 
Carrian Holdings Ltd. 
Carrian Finance Ltd. 
Plessey Investments Ltd. 
Carrian Holdings Ltd. 
Plessey Investments Ltd. 
Plessey Investments Ltd. 
Plessey Investments Ltd.
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Date
24-25/3/81
27/8/81
23/9/81,
22/10/81,
1/12/81
6-19/11/81
1/12/81-
4/1/82
24/12/81
30/12/81
4/1/82
20/1/82
20/1/82,
5/2/82,
17/2/82
5/2/82
12/3/82
12/3/82
15/3/82,
2/4/82,
20/4/82
7/4/82
28/5/82
Loan type/Amount
MML No.10 
HK$10 mil.
MML No.11 
HK$50 mil.
TL No.8 
US$138 mil.
MML No.12 
US$37 mil. 
HK$24.295 mil
MML No.13 
US$100 mil.
MML No.14 
HK$230 mil
TL No.9 
US$36 mil.
MML No.15 
US$20 mil.
MML No.16 
HK$48 mil.
MML No.17 
US$79 mil.
Borrower
Carrian Holdings Ltd. 
Carrian Holdings Ltd.
Outwit Ltd., Pabulum Ltd., 
Deciding Deeds Ltd., Gold 
Come Ltd., Special Profit 
Ltd., Take Way Co. Ltd., 
Home Way Co. Ltd.
Carrian Holdings Ltd.
Denax, Deren Metin 
Investment Ltd., Back Up 
Co. Ltd., Chic Light Ltd,
Carrian Holdings Ltd.
Extradollars, Extragold
George Tan
Carrian Holdings Ltd.
Carrian Investments Ltd.
MML No.18 
HK$100 mil,
MML No.20 
HK$30 mil.
MML No.21 
HK$10 mil.
MML No.22 
HK$110 mil
George Tan 
Perak Pioneer Ltd, 
Knife & Dagger 
Carrian Ltd.
TL No.10 San Lik Realty Co. Ltd.
HK$3 mil.
MML No.2 3 Damaniar Ltd.,
HK$20 mil. Kenroy Ltd.
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Date
30/6/82
16/7/82
18/8/82-
12/10/82
Loan type/Amount
MML No.24 
HK$10 mil.
MML No.25 
HK$38 mil.
MML No.26 
US$37.5 mil.
Borrower 
Damaniar Ltd.
Carrian Travel Services Ltd,
Carrian Holdings Ltd.
Total Term loans and Money Market loans from 29/6/79 to 
8/8/85:
US$841.5 mil.
HK$857.295 mil.
£3.8 mil.
Source: Translated from the BMF White Paper 1986.
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Appendix 3.5c
The percentage of the Carrian Group loans and advances to 
BMF's and BBMB's share capital and reserves at the end of 
1979 to 1983
As at 31st December (in million)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
BMF's share
capital and -HK$ 8.1 13.4 92.9 89.8 82.1
reserves -M$ 3.7 5.8 36.7 32.1 24.1
BBMB's share 
capital and
reserves -M$ 158.9 356.2 580.8 620.9 1247.3
Total loans &
advances to -HK$ 258.9 1,063.9 2,198.8 3,939.8 5,828.1
Carrian Group -M$ 118.4 459.4 868.4 1,407.1 1,750.2
Carrian Group 
loans & advances 
to BMF's share 
capital &
reserves % 3,203 7,939 2,367 4,387 7,098
Carrian Group 
loans St advances 
to BBMB's share 
capital St
reserves % 75 129 150 227 140
Source: Lim, 1986; 50
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•Vcfif INVESTMENTS LIMITED
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*"** 7'-
^ .V^ rt.Y PWTVATg 1 CONFIDENTIAL : Deoember XT* X»7*
VaSukr* Mdlayelo rlwnca Ltd. 
iJol A » « f i c * n  l n t d r n « t l o n a i  T o w e r
* noAd
+0*1 *°n9
ilf." Ibrahim Jaafar
» *♦ i  #/ • •  "
‘W a Ip’S ir
Hcnq Dulidlnq. C l o u c o » t e r  Ro»d
. W l d  reference to the subsequent: s e t t i n g s  d a r i n g  the v i s i t  . *
* «4 the* M i n ister o f  P i n s n a e  o f  H a l e y * ! * *  we, as r e q u e s t e d *
■ *«e.aliltng to ‘s a c  a s  a n  a g e n t  f o r  the Hal ays la G o v e r n m e n t  
>.%• twrchase the c a p t i o n e d  p r o p e r t y  u n d e r  the n a m e  of o e p t i o n e d  
V  C— » >ny# Plessey I n v e s t m e n t  L i m i t e d .
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• •* Ocpoait to our a c c o u n t  s t a t e d  b e  l o w  t.
PLESSEY INVESTMENTS * LTD•
. ; W i n g  L u n g  B a n t  Ltd.*
H e a d  O f f i c e  
V- " . X c e o u n t  N u m b e r  0 0 2 - U 4 B-S
U :' • •* X
Y o u r s  faithfully#
P L B S S B Y  X M VSSTHSNTS L T D .
• •
Director *
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Private & Confidential 4 May 19 83
Dear Sirs,
You have requested our advice in relation to the 
recent valuations you have received of the various interests 
in the properties owned by Carrian Holdings Ltd. and its 
subsidiaries and charged to the Bank as security for its
loans to that Company.
The address of the properties and our understanding 
of the Company's interest in them axe set out in the attached 
schedule and our subsequent figures reflect only the borrowers'
interest in the portfolio.
We have inspected all the properties with the 
exception of that in Singapore, numbered 18 in the schedule, 
which has been inspected by our associate office in Singapore. 
We have obtained and assumed as correct such information as 
was available within the Bank or made available to us by the 
Company.
The time in which you have requested our advice 
has not permitted us to carry out a full survey and assemble 
all the facts which we would require in order to provide 
a current market valuation of the various interests.
However, on the basis of the data provided and our inspections, 
we have been able to form a view on the valuation reports 
you have received and a-.view of the portfolio in the market 
conditions now existing, if the Company were required to 
realise these assets at the present time.
.../2
Assocated ottees
A r ta la id *  h t lM n .  P w tt i K iu U  L u m p u r P a ra n g  T a n a a rlo *  H o n g  IC a n g
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Appendix 3.7(ii) I^ab^nham Tewaon St Chinnocks
sheet no. 2
As in western economies, the markets for property 
interests in Hong Kong and Singapore have in the recent past 
been adversely affected by the current world economic 
depression. in Hong Kong the political uncertainty 
surrounding its future has been an additional depressing 
factor. The USA has shared with other western economies 
che effect of world economic depression on property market 
activity. in such conditions it is, usually in the short 
term, the values of interests in land suitable for development 
or redevelopment that are subject to the greatest fluctuations.
It is lending secured against such interests which 
is the most vulnerable and the current position in Hong Kong 
and, to a lesser extent, in the USA and Singapore is similar 
to that experienced by the banking community in the UK in 
1974/75.
Whilst part of the Carrian portfolio comprises 
sites required for development, a substantial part is 
completed investments or existing buildings and, whilst 
affected by current market conditions, are more likely to 
weather the storm by reason of their being income producing.
We have seen the report dated 16 April 1983 of 
^  Mr. Garland but do not share the optimism reflected in his 
Total Preliminary Valuation of HK$4.626 million. Whilst it 
is not easy accurately to determine open market values in 
present conditions, we believe that, if the Company were 
now required to realise their assets, the portfolio would 
not produce suns reflecting Mr. Garland's figure.
We understand, however, that the Bank are 
considering the more practical approach of a moratorium 
with the Carrian Group in relation to the Company's debts 
to the Bank, including possibly the temporary waiving of 
interest charges due on current loans.
In current property market conditions, we share 
the Bank's view that there may be need for a moratorium 
and that it would not be financially sensible to seek 
liquidation of the Company * s portfolio now. Any moratorium 
agreement should assure that there is responsible management 
of the properties, the accurate monitoring of all income 
and the strict control of expenditure. Hie judicious 
funding of some - development would be likely to improve the 
security of loans and other debts, but, before being 
undertaken, needs most careful analysis.
If the moratorium were to be for a period of 
3 to 5 years and given the existing prospects of steady 
economic recovery, we would expect the value of the 
property portfolio to rise.
• . . /3
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Appendix 3.7(iii) .
Debenham Tewson 3t Chinnocks
sheet no. 3
The* ccxp.oiet.ed. developments in Hong Kong and the 
USA, given as security against the Bank's loans, will provide 
in the immediate future an annual net income in the region 
of H?:S66 million (HK$40 million in Hong Kong, HK$26 million 
in the USA). If current interest on the Bank's loan is 
to be waived during the moratorium, then this annual income 
(subject to tax, if any) could provide a figure of up to 
HKS300 million to reduce the overall loan and help to 
restore the security of loans against property values by 
the end of the moratorium period.
We have not however taken account of the liabilities 
inherent in the ownership of the leasehold interest in the 
properties held for development in Hong Kong. Such 
liabilities may have to be met during the moratorium period. 
These include the cost of acquiring, where necessary, 
improved development rights from the Crown, the cost of 
meeting development obligations under the existing Crown 
leases, and the balance of the purchase price for the 
Miramar Hotel project.
During a moratorium period of 3 to 5 years we would 
expect the value of these assets to rise to a figure in the
•region of HK$3,465 million. (HK$l,.335-:JBilliaifc^ inr.‘Bong Kong, US$262.5 million in USA and S$9 million in Singapore!.
The Hong Kong total assumes no appreciation in the modest 
figures we have currently put on the interests in sites 
for development in Hong Kong.
The present conversion rate adopted for US$1 
' is HK$6—5. Any further strengthening of the US dollar 
against the Hong Kong dollar would improve the security of 
US property values against the Hong Kong dollar loans.
Given a gradual recovery from the current 
economic depression and satisfactory management and control, 
the Bank may reasonable expect, in our opinion, to recover, 
or satisfactorily secure, most of its current lending.
Yours faithfully.
For attn. Muhamad Radzi, Esq., 
Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad, 
Menara Bumiputra,
PO Box 407,
Jalan Melaka,
Kuala Lumpur,
MALAYSIA.
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jam's Unfi Letter
■  p m s m s s m m m m i
con tri
noti ^ S ti^ ^ q M ip n /a n  d fin d a 7 & £  fyoifysbme, 
lessprohfein^ny,}ob. I t  seems to me that the reward 
for being a%o6dJ\vbfker is to load him with more 
and thoreproblems until he goes mad. Tfye.y^fu. 
problems in Hong Kong are not my making anW 
fromlti^Y^onwards, I  am 
and myn
Bank/the rate and d i^ o ih iti^ b e lu iiil rip.* U  those 
directors had though fohth'einterests o f  the bank, 
race and countryjfcist, they vMnlcBPfliave made all 
those blunders in thedgrj?tplace. I  have sacrificed 
enough and i f  I  am asked to make further Sacrifices, 
become another mad man by going to the USA, 
then I  w ill not lyesitai^t&give them a piece o f my 
mind. They^in recallr$e*to KL on^£hour notice -  
that's fine Basically theyStust know I
have had e
* & ,x
E :
;:y;r ■ ‘ 
Jun?
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164
Chapter 4 
Analysis Of The BMP Case
Introduction
This chapter will analyze the BMF case which was 
described in chapter 3. The first section will analyze the 
case at the micro level i.e. the organizational structure, 
policies and culture of the bank. As the case is very 
complicated and involved many factors, it will be dealt with 
as systematically as possible. The second part of the 
chapter will analyze the BMF case at the macro level i.e. 
relating the case to the Malaysian social and political 
environment. I would like to point out that the analysis 
given below is based on all the information I managed to 
gather. In an ideal world where accurate information could 
easily be gathered, I would be able to give a confident 
definition and analysis of any event. However, we are living 
in a world of "half-truth" where sensitive information is 
usually suppressed, I would try my best to verify my facts 
and give as accurate an analysis as possible1.
1. Problems of the BMF case at the micro level
1.1. The loan transactions between BMF and the Carrian Group
The description of the BMF case in chapter 3 showed 
that the way the loans were given out to the Carrian Group 
was not in accordance with prudent banking practices. This
}The opinions given in this chapter should not be taken 
as anti-Malaysian Government, but as constructive and well- 
meaning criticisms to be given some considerations in order 
to make Malaysia a even better and well respected place for 
her citizens.
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view was supported by Clive Nicholls, counsel opening the 
Hong Kong Government's case in London on 27 May 1986 for the 
extradition of Lorrain Osman and Hashim Shamsuddin (the 
Directors of BMF) from Britain, who pointed out that the 
manner in which they were released broke the rules set out 
in a banking manual to which Hashim himself had written the 
preface. For a start, the identity and creditworthiness of 
George Tan and the Carrian Group were not investigated 
thoroughly before the loans were approved by the Board of 
Directors, especially when the loans were unusually large. 
If BMF had done so, it would have found out that George Tan 
was a bankrupt when he first approached the bank for loans. 
There were also instances where the loans were approved 
before the applications were received from the Carrian Group 
or else the loans were given out before approval was given. 
At other times, loans were given out when interest payments 
on existing loans were not repaid at the dateline. There was 
also inadequate evaluation of the feasibility of the 
projects proposed by the Carrian Group. Likewise, collateral 
negotiated for the loans were not assessed and secured 
properly. In some loans, the collateral was just a guarantee 
from George Tan instead of from a third party, post-dated 
cheques which were given by George Tan or the Carrian Group 
which could be reissued when expired or quoted and unquoted 
shares which would be valueless if the company went into 
liquidation. When the loans were released, they were not 
properly recorded or documented, for example, who the 
borrower was, what was the purpose of the loans, the type of 
loans approved, etc.. The records of BMF and those of the
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Carrian Group could differ concerning the loans. Was this 
poor performance by the staff members of BMF due to their 
incompetence? The Committee of Enquiry had pointed out that 
the management of BMF was capable of managing other loans in 
a proper manner and in accordance with sound banking 
practices. Thus, it was not that the staff members of BMF 
were incompetent. Where the Carrian loans were concerned, 
all rules and guidelines seemed to be dispensed with and the 
General Manager and Directors appeared to use considerable 
personal discretion. According to the statement of facts 
agreed by the prosecution and Hashim during Hashim's trial 
in Hong Kong, all but one of a series of loans made by the 
management of BMF to Carrian were fraudulent. The exception 
was the very first loan of HK$50 mil. made in late 1979, 
shortly before Carrian made a bid for the property company, 
Mai Hon (FEER, 29/1/1987). The Carrian Group certainly 
enjoyed a very special relationship with the management of 
BMF that went well beyond the normal business-client 
relationship.
Could the management of BMF have been actually doing 
business with the Carrian Group in the beginning? The 
problems mentioned above could be overlooked because the 
management of BMF was too eager to take advantage of the 
property boom in Hong Kong to make a huge profit. After all, 
big established banks like the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, 
Barclays Bank of Britain, the Bank of Communications of 
China, Westdeutsche Landesbank of Germany and Paribas of 
France were also involved in giving loans to the Carrian 
Group during that period. The management of these banks,
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too, failed to assess Carrian's financial soundness and 
future prospects. Instead, they relied heavily on the 
prestigious assessment made by Vickers Da Costa, one of 
London's best known brokers with long established offices in 
Tokyo, Hong Kong and Singapore. The assessment showed that 
Carrian was in sound financial health and its potential 
growth was good. The Vickers report was substantiated by 
local reports (Gill, 1985; 48) . The speculation of local 
media on the 'favourable' developments of the Carrian Group 
might have also influenced the management of the banks in 
their decisions and thus escalated things for Carrian. Many 
investors and banks certainly did not foresee that when 
Britain and China began negotiation in September 1982 for 
the return of Hong Kong in 1997, the Hong Kong stock market 
Would plunge, causing property prices and the Hong Kong 
dollar to fall drastically. They became victims of the 
collapse of the Hong Kong property market like the Carrian 
Group. A few Hong Kong banks needed an emergency injection 
of capital from bigger established banks to survive. Did the 
management of BMF give loans to the Carrian Group, even when 
it was already facing liquidity problems, because it was 
hoping that if it could hang on long enough, the property 
prices would recover to enable Carrian to sell its assets to 
meet its obligations? Perhaps it might have worked if not 
for the murder of Jalil Ibrahim, the Assistant General 
Manager of BMF, which brought the scandal to the surface. 
Even so, the management of BMF should have realised that it 
was using "good money to chase bad money" and that it was 
taking a very big risk in giving the majority of its loans
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to one customer. In view of this fact, did the management of 
BMF make an imprudent judgement in its eagerness to make 
profits like the other established banks or were it out to 
defraud the bank? According to Kevin Cahill, a former 
financial systems supervisor of Gulf Oil in Britain from 
1976 to 1978, who is now a journalist and who campaigned to 
free Lorrain Osman from his imprisonment on remand for seven 
years, it was not unusual for the management of BMF to lend 
such large sums of money to the Carrian Group to make a 
profit, especially by Hong Kong standards. However, the way 
the loans were recorded and released was open to suspicion. 
The general belief was that the General Manager and 
Directors of BMF as well as some powerful political figures 
were defrauding the bank. Also, more loans were given out 
when the Carrian Group was facing liquidity problems to help 
push through the Carrian restructuring proposal so that the 
scandal could be covered up. The justification was that the 
money would have gone to pay off other creditors of Carrian 
and the money was only 8% of existing Carrian exposure and 
considered 'cheap' for keeping the situation at Carrian and 
BMF from coming fully into public view (FEER, 17/11/1983).
My own belief was that of the latter explanation i.e. 
the General Manager and Directors of BMF together with a few 
prominent politicians were out to defraud the bank and they 
had every opportunity to do so given their positions. I 
would like to discuss in detail why I came to that 
conclusion. There were a few significant factors that would 
justify my suspicions.
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1.1.1. Dealings of the management of BMF with the Carrian 
Group
Below is a list of queries about the dealings of the 
management of BMF with the Carrian Group:
1. After a few dealings with the Carrian Group, the 
management of BMF must have realised that the Carrian 
Empire was built on shady deals. From the report of the 
Committee of Enquiry, the Carrian image seemed to 
thrive on its schemes of buying and selling of assets 
between its different subsidiaries at fictitiously high 
profits. These schemes also helped to inflate its share 
prices;
2. The Carrian Group used, on most occasions, shell 
companies with paid up capital of HK$2 to receive funds 
from BMF. These shell companies tried to camouflage the 
identity of the original borrower i.e. the Carrian 
Group, for example Plessey Investments Limited (see 
section 4.1.1, chap.3) for the implementation of the 
"Concerted Plan” and the seven HK$2 'shell' companies 
for the purchase of Grand Marine Holdings which was to 
be resold to the Malaysian Government at a profit of 
HK$200 mil. (see sec.4.3.1, chap.3). Moreover, the 
loans were usually released in a roundabout manner to 
many destinations before they reached the intended 
place (see sec.4.6, chap.3) . The management of BMF must 
have known of these practices when they were given 
instructions to deposit the money. After all, the 
management committees of BMF and BBMB resorted to the 
same tactic i.e. using offshore nominee companies to
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hide their identity when they decided to buy the United 
States assets from Carrian when they could not obtain 
them as securities for the Carrian loans (see section 
4.10.3 & 4.10.4, chap.3);
3. In some of the transactions, the management of BMF was 
actually helping the Carrian Group to hide its identity 
as the borrower. Likewise, Carrian also concealed the 
fact that a big portion of its loans were from BMF. 
There was much secrecy and discrepancy in the dealings 
between the management of BMF and the Carrian Group. 
For example, at the time of the initial releases of the 
loan of US$292 mil. (see sec. 4.1.1, chap.3), the 
management of BMF held no securities from Carrian. It 
was not until after a large portion of the US$292 mil. 
had been released that mortgages were executed for the 
two Hong Kong properties i.e. Gammon House and the 
Metropolitan Bank Building. Maximum Entry Limited was 
then 'activated' for the sole purpose of taking a 
mortgage over Gammon House from Extrawin and be shown 
as the provider of the funds for the purchase of Gammon 
House "allegedly in order to conceal the fact that BMF 
was the real lender". The mortgage for the Metropolitan 
Bank Building was also deliberately never registered in 
the Companies Registry or the Land Registry and was 
void against a liquidator in the event of a winding up 
and was therefore not good security" (FEER, 12/6/1986) . 
Gammon House was bought with the intention of selling 
it to the Malaysian Government for US$250 mil. i.e. at 
a profit of US$50 mil.. It was bought at the price of
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approximately US$200 mil.. However, the management of 
BMF collaborated with the Carrian Group to deceive the 
Malaysian Government that it was bought at the price of 
US$250 mil. (see sec.4.1.1, chap.3).
1.1.2. Collaboration of the management of BMF to cover-up 
the accounts of the Carrian Group
The management of BMF also went to the extent of 
"window dressing" its accounts to show a reduction of the
outstanding loans to the Carrian Group by purchasing two
floors of the Metropolitan Bank Building at a phenomenal 
price of HK$200 mil. while the entire building of seventeen 
floors was only bought at the price of HK$268 mil.. These 
two floors were then sold back to Carrian at HK$200 mil. 
which was financed by BMF. The security was a first legal 
mortgage of the two floors of Metropolitan Bank Building. 
However, another creditor of Carrian, West LB Asia Limited 
also claimed these two floors as security for a loan of 
HK$100 mil. to Carrian (see sec.4.1.2, chap.3). Most of the 
seventeen floors of Carrian were bought back by its
subsidiaries or Carrian related companies and each sale was
financed by BMF. The impression one received at this point 
was that the management of BMF was using all means and ways 
to release money to the Carrian Group.
Besides, "window dressing” the accounts, the management 
of BMF also collaborated with the Carrian Group to show a 
reduction of loans by 'reallocating' the total loans (see 
sec.4.3.1, chap.3). Up to this point, one could not help 
having the impression that Carrian was more than just a
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client of BMF and BBMB.
In another instance, Ibrahim, the General Manager of 
BMF, cooperated with the Carrian Group to deceive the 
auditors of BMF in the half yearly closing audit of BMF (see 
sec .4.7, chap. 3) . The management of CHL was asked to issue 
five post-dated cheques as securities for the audit which 
would be cancelled once the audit was completed.
When the utilisation of the loans from BMF was traced, 
part of the money was used to invest in gold coins, to repay 
back interest on outstanding loans to BMF, to repay back 
loans of other subsidiaries, investments in shares, 
paintings, Rolls Royce cars, decorations of personal 
residences, donations as well as remittances into the 
accounts of the Directors of BMF. For example, HK$8 mil. was 
remitted into the account of the solicitors of Lorrain Osman 
(see sec.4.1.1, chap.3).
1.1.3. The insincerity of the implementation of the 
October 4 th Agreements and the January 26th 
Agreements
Was the management of BMF serious in trying to 
implement the October 4th Agreements and the January 26th 
Agreements when it tried to secure adequate securities for 
its existing loans to the Carrian Group (see sec.4.9, 
chap.3)? In the beginning of these Agreements, it would seem 
that George Tan was trying to trick the management of BMF 
into giving up its existing securities for the United States 
assets. However, in the events that followed, BMF seemed 
willing to part with the existing securities and not
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genuinely wanting to put its securities position over the 
loans to Carrian in order. Fraud seemed to be suggested 
because:
1. It did not evaluate properly the United States 
assets before agreeing to the exchange. It 
accepted George Tan's words that these United 
States assets were valued at US$560 mil., but in 
actual fact, they were worth only US$76 mil.;
2. Before obtaining the United States assets, the 
management of BMF was already releasing the 
existing securities it held at the request of 
Carrian;
3. It did not check that the United States assets had 
already been mortgaged and that Carrian owned less 
than 50% of the Orlando property which meant that 
permission of Carrian's partners would be needed;
4. While trying to secure its securities position, 
the management of BMF was still lending out large 
sums of money to the Carrian Group even when it 
had announced that it was facing liquidity 
problems;
5. One of the loans was released to Paris Ride, a 
company incorporated by Deacons, solicitors of 
CHL, to keep BMF's involvement in keeping Carrian 
afloat a secret from the financial advisers of 
Carrian and the other creditors. Its records and 
files would not be made available to the 
liquidators since the company is under Deacons;
6. The management of BMF would participate in the
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restructuring scheme by providing US$40 mil. for 
the revolving credit facility. However, it did not 
want its identity revealed and thus the money was 
released in a roundabout manner;
7. The management of BMF would under-declare the
amount of loans the Carrian Group had borrowed 
from it to Carrian's creditors and financial 
advisers. It would only declare US$35 mil. and 
omitting the other US$500 mil.;
8. The management of BMF eventually decided to buy
the United States assets instead of trying to 
secure them as securities from the Carrian Group 
at the price of US$76 mil. although it was valued 
at less;
9. The management of BMF also decided to purchase
shares of China Underwriters Life & General
Insurance Company Limited although the value at 
that time was nil.
All the nine factors above gave the impression that the 
management of BMF was actually trying to release money in 
whatever ways possible to the Carrian Group to keep it 
afloat, including taking up deals which it knew, in advance, 
would incur substantial loss. The plausible reason was that 
the management of BMF did not want the truth that it had 
'lost' a lot of money to the Carrian Group or perhaps even 
defrauded the money with the collaboration of Carrian. Once 
Carrian collapsed, the truth would inevitably surface. 
Carrian, on the other hand, kept to its bargain by
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concealing BMF's involvement. The management of BMF should 
also have realised that in doing all it could to keep 
Carrian afloat, it had broken a few rules i.e. defrauding 
shareholders and creditors of OIL and CHL and misleading the 
financial advisers of CIL and CHL.
1.1.4. Actions or no action taken by the management of 
BMF against the Carrian Group
During the trials of George Tan, he had alleged that 
BMF and BBMB were the major shareholders of some of the 
Carrian companies, for example PIL. The management 
committees of BMF and BBMB had never denied these 
allegations. George Tan also alleged that one of the loans 
of US$40 mil. was actually a secret investment of BMF in 
CIL. The management of BMF never answered the allegations. 
Instead, it withdrew the summons for Final Judgement against 
George Tan.
The management of BMF did not take any positive action 
against the Carrian Group immediately after its collapse. 
One of the actions taken to recover its loans after the 
collapse of the Carrian empire was filing seven writs 
against George Tan as guarantor for the seven loans to the 
seven shell companies used to purchase Grand Marine 
Holdings. The writs were served, but were retracted on the 
decision of the management of BBMB. The writs were then 
allowed to lapse. This action was very unbecoming of a 
government-owned financial institution.
It was pointed out by Lim Kit Siang, the leader of the 
opposition party, Democratic Action Party, that the
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Institute for Social Analysis found out that when Bently Ho, 
George Tan's right hand man and Executive Director of 
Carrian, was arrested on the same day as George Tan in Hong 
Kong, he was trying to board a flight to Malaysia (Lim, 
1983; 21). Why did he want to go to Malaysia? Was it because 
he knew that the Malaysian Government would protect him from 
any legal proceedings?
I have dealt with the transactions between BMF and the 
Carrian Group and pointed out that the management committee 
of BMF was certainly guilty of fraud and corruption. 
However, this case could not have been prolonged for a few 
years without the help of other agencies, the closest being 
the parent bank, BBMB. In the next section, I shall analyze 
the roles of the controlling agencies of BMF.
1.2. The roles of the controlling agencies of BMF
1.2.1. The parent bank, BBMB
The parent bank of BMF, BBMB, had denied initially that 
it knew of the illegal transactions between its subsidiary, 
BMF, and the Carrian Group. The problem, I believe, was not 
that the management of the parent bank did not know of these 
transactions. It was just not firm enough with BMF. The 
management of BBMB could not possibly have not known of 
these transactions as the management of BMF was required to 
submit regular reports to the BBMB head office in Kuala 
Lumpur. The BMF's 1982 annual report showed that its 
outstanding loans at the end of 1982 soared 145% from 
HK$2,032 mil. at the end of 1981 to HK$4,972 mil. at the end 
of 1982 and that the new lending was funded entirely by BBMB
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which pumped HK$2,282 mil. into BMF in 1982 (Lim, 1986; 
267) . The management of BBMB claimed that the Monthly 
Returns were only sent to Rais, the Senior General Manager 
of the International Banking Division of BBMB who was also 
the alternate Director of BMF, and to Lorrain Osman and 
Hashim, Directors of BMF until mid 1982. Thus, the other 
Board members of BBMB, who were not involved with the 
management of BMF, would not have known about these illegal 
transactions until July 1982 when a set of the Monthly 
Returns was then sent to the General Manager of the Funds 
Management Department. But, the Global Placement Limits, 
which were lending limits to customers that were placed on 
overseas branches of BBMB, were decided by the managing 
committee of BBMB and then approved by the Executive
Committee and the Board of Directors of BBMB. It was true
that in 1981, the management of BMF revised the lending 
authority of its Board members without getting the approval 
of the management of BBMB in 1982. However, the management 
of BBMB should have noted the drastic increase in its 
lending from 1981 to 1982. Moreover, the management of BBMB 
must also have known about the huge increase of BMF's Inter- 
Branch Placement Limit i.e. the limits that an overseas BBMB 
branch or Kuala Lumpur could lend to BMF, from US$60 mil. in 
1979 to US$380 mil. in 1981, US$660 mil. in 1982 and US$950 
mil. in 1983. These limits were determined every year by the 
managing committee of BBMB although there was no 
specification as to which committee should do the job. The 
management of BBMB did not question the increase in limits
requested by the management of BMF before it gave the
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approval. If that was not enough proof that the management 
of BBMB knew about the BMF scandal much earlier than it 
claimed, its auditors advice at that time would be another 
factor (see sec.4.2, chap.3).
1.2.2. The auditors of BMF
Touche Ross, the auditors of BMF became aware of the 
problem as early as June 1980 and warned the management of 
BMF about the overconcentration of loans to the Carrian 
Group and the inadequacy of securities. However, it was told 
all the loans were given out on a secured basis with full 
Board approval and that they were "a management matter and 
not really an audit matter" (see sec. 4.2, chap.3). Due to 
the xsensitiveness' of the issue, Touche Ross refrained from 
commenting, but alerted Hanafiah Raslan & Mohammad, auditors 
of BBMB. Hanafiah Raslan & Mohammad informed the then 
Chairman of BBMB, Kamarul, of BMF's problems and that there 
was also a possible case of corruption with the General 
Manager of BMF, Ibrahim (see sec.4.2, chap.3). The 
management of BBMB was alerted again by its auditors in 
1982, when Touche Ross was unable to give audit clearance to 
the BMF account because there were problems with the 
adequacy of securities and lack of loan documentations. 
However, the audit was cleared when Rais, the alternate 
Director of BMF, signed a temporary letter of guarantee that 
BBMB would assume all liabilities, obligations and 
commitments of BMF. The management of BBMB knew all along 
the troubles in BMF. Why was it not firm with BMF?
Were Touche Ross and Hanafiah Raslan & Mohammad, the
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auditors of BMF and BBMB respectively, wrong in giving audit 
clearance to the accounts of BMF although they knew of the 
problems involved and had notified BMF and BBMB? The fact 
that Touche Ross informed Hanafiah Raslan & Mohammad of 
BMF's problems indirectly passed the responsibilities of the 
accounts of BMF to the auditors of the parent bank. The 
letter of guarantee from Rais should have given some legal 
protection to both the auditors from being sued by other 
institutions relying on the reports. However, the letter of 
guarantee given by Rais on behalf of BBMB was not formally 
ratified by the main Board of BBMB. This letter of guarantee 
was also not disclosed in the accounts of BMF by Touche 
Ross. Thus, according to the Committee of Enquiry, the 
audited financial accounts of BMF as well as BBMB did not 
give a "true and fair view of the state of affairs of BBMB 
and the Group as at 31 December 1981" (Lim, 1986; 36). The 
auditors were liable for the losses incurred by their 
clients because of negligent or fraudulent auditing. 
Moreover, section 174 of the Companies Act requires every 
auditor to state whether, in his opinion, the balance sheet 
and the profit and loss account give a "true and fair view 
of the company's affair" and also whether the Directors' 
Report had complied with the requirements of the Act (Lim, 
1986; 279). The auditing guideline set out by the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England did stress that auditors 
were not responsible for preventing fraud, other 
irregularities or errors. The responsibility was on the 
management. However, if the auditor suspected a fraud was 
committed, he should inform senior management of his
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suspicions. If he suspected that management might be 
involved in, or was condoning, fraud or other
irregularities, he should report promptly to senior
management (provided the managers to whom he would report 
were not suspected of being involved) . Legal advice might be 
required if the auditor believed that senior management, 
including members of the Board of Directors, was involved, 
or if he believed that his report might not be acted upon, 
or if he was unsure as to the person to whom he should 
report. There might also be exceptional occasions when it
was necessary for the auditor to report direct to a third
party without the knowledge or consent of management (The 
Institute of Chartered Accountants, 1992; 573-574) . The fact 
that the auditors seemed to try to avoid or passed on the 
responsibilities whenever they could showed that they knew 
of the fraudulent acts that were going on in BMF. They tried 
to avoid the issue by getting a letter of guarantee from the 
bank. Should auditors be absolved from responsibilities with 
the letter of guarantee even though they knew of the illegal 
transactions that were going on in the bank? The auditors 
were clearly going against their audit guidelines. Although 
confidentiality was an implied term of an auditor's 
contract, it was not absolute. Auditors were not bound by 
their duty of confidence and could disclose matters to the 
proper authority in the public interest (Institute of 
Chartered Accountants, 1992; 575). If they were unsure of 
their actions, they could have sought out legal advice. The 
auditors of BMF and BBMB did not take any of the actions 
which they were supposed to do according to the Companies
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Act and the auditing guidelines.
1.2.3. The solicitors of BMF
What about the role of solicitors? BMF's solicitors, 
Peter Mark & Company, had also repeatedly advised the 
management of BMF that the outstanding loans were under­
secured and the securities were of doubtful values. But, it 
did not do anything more than that. Should lawyers be able 
to use the excuse of the confidentiality of the lawyer- 
client relationship to protect corrupt deals that went on in 
BMF? After all, they were paid to look after the business 
and welfare of their clients and the corrupt deals might be 
very profitable to them. According to "The Professional 
Conduct of Solicitors” issued by The Council of The Law 
Society, communications between solicitors and clients were 
not privileged where they were made the conscious or 
unconscious instrument of the criminal or fraudulent purpose 
of the client. However, it was not sufficient that there 
should be an allegation of crime or fraud. There must be 
prima facie evidence of crime or fraud. Moreover, if a 
solicitor found out that his or her client was about to 
perpetrate a fraud, there might be circumstances where it 
would be improper for him or her to keep silent, for 
example, where the client threatened to commit a serious 
crime which the solicitor thought he intended to commit (The 
Council of the Law Society, 1974; 51). Did this include
defrauding the public's money? It was also stated that, "Any 
conduct by a solicitor whether or not in his professional 
capacity towards members of the public which is fraudulent
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or contains any element of fraud or by which the solicitor 
uses his position as such to take an unfair advantage either 
for himself or another person over another party, especially 
where that other party is not independently represented, 
constitutes unbefitting conduct” (The Council of the Law 
Society, 1974; 77). The Professional Conduct of Solicitors 
clearly stated that solicitors should not implicate 
themselves directly or indirectly in any corrupt deals. 
Moreover, it was not professional and if they held back 
information which they knew was a cover-up of some corrupt 
deals, then they themselves would be the suspects. However, 
the guidelines for solicitors did not mention that it was a 
crime or against the professional conduct for solicitors not 
to reveal any fraudulent acts so long as they themselves 
were not involved. The guidelines merely stated that the 
actions might be 'improper' or 'unbefitting' .
In the BMF case, Peter Mark & Company seemed to have 
done their duties by advising BMF management that the loans 
were under-secured and the securities were of doubtful 
value. My opinion is that such a practice is not enough. It 
will allow fraud cases to go undetected. The Law Society, 
perhaps, should discipline solicitors who knew of the 
fraudulent acts, but did not inform the relevant authority. 
This would make more solicitors ”whistle-blow” on any 
fraudulent act by their clients.
1.2.4. Bank Negara, the central bank
When the management of Bank Negara, the central bank, 
came to know of the problems of BMF in September 1982 when
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its accounts showed that the capital position and the 
securities for loans to the Carrian Group were not 
satisfactory, it did not carry out its duty to eliminate or 
control the problems. In fact, the Governor of Bank Negara 
gave the impression that he was prevented from carrying out 
his duties. Section 33 of the Banking Act 1973 empowered the 
management of Bank Negara "from time to time to investigate 
under conditions of secrecy, the books, accounts and 
transactions of each licensed bank and of any branch, agency 
or office outside the Federation opened by a licensed bank 
incorporated in the Federation". If any bank was unable to 
meet obligations or conducting business to the detriment of 
depositors, the management of Bank Negara was able to carry 
out the following under section 39 of the Banking Act 1973:
a. prohibit the bank from extending any further 
advance, loan or credit facility for such period 
or periods as may be specified and subject to such 
exceptions if any and other conditions as the 
central bank may impose;
b. remove from office any of its directors or appoint 
any person as its director;
c. appoint a person to advise the bank in the proper 
conduct of its business;
d. assume control of and carry on, the business of 
the bank or appoint some other person to assume 
control of and carry on, the business of the bank.
The management of Bank Negara did nothing that was in 
its power for the BMF case. If the management of Bank Negara
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had carried out its duties i.e. taking vigorous actions to 
straighten out the bank, at least some money that went 
missing could have been salvaged. As the leader of the 
Committee of Enquiry, Ahmad Noordin, pointed out on 8 
December 1985, "about M$150 mil." could have been saved had 
officers responsible for BMF lending been replaced (FEER, 
19/12/1985).
Instead the Governor of Bank Negara alerted the 
Chairman of BBMB that the central bank realised the problems 
and that he should improve the situation. The Governor also 
wrote to the Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, to brief him 
on the problems of BMF. In one letter, he asked the Prime 
Minister for an appointment to discuss how the annual 
accounts of the Bank Bumiputra Group should be presented 
(see sec.4.8, chap.3). Within the few months that the 
Governor was briefing the Prime Minister, more loans were 
given out by BMF to Carrian. Why was the Governor %afraid' 
of taking actions when he had the duty to do so? Was he 
prevented by some higher authority from carrying out his 
duties? Why did he brief the Prime Minister instead of his 
immediate boss i.e. the Minister of Finance, Tengku 
Razaleigh, especially after the Prime Minister said that 
BBMB and BMF were under the control and charge of the 
Finance Minister in October 1983 (Lim, 1986; 28)? Why was 
Tengku Razaleigh bypassed? Was it because he was involved in 
the fraud as implicated in the report of the Committee of 
Enquiry? Why was the Prime Minister accepted by the Governor 
as the only person who should be consulted and hence, would 
be able to handle the situation?
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From the report of the Committee of Enquiry, newspapers 
and journal articles and the interviews I have carried out, 
there was a strong indication that Tengku Razaleigh was 
involved in the BMF scandal. It could be for this reason 
that the Governor had bypassed him. Moreover, Tengku 
Razaleigh was not only the Finance Minister, he was also a 
member of the Kelantan royal family. Besides Tengku 
Razaleigh, the Deputy Prime Minister, Musa Hitam was also 
implicated in the report of the Committee of Enquiry. The 
Governor, most probably, needed the advice of the Prime 
Minister on how to handle the situation. The Prime Minister, 
most probably, had asked him to report directly to him and 
not to take any action without consulting him, especially 
when two top political figures were involved.
When the management of BBMB was informed by the
management of Bank Negara to improve the situation of BMF,
its Chairman, Nawawi, also reported regularly and directly 
to the Prime Minister instead of the Governor which would 
have been the normal banking practice when a bank was facing 
problems. The Governor, in a way, had been bypassed in the 
entire affair. Could it be because, as the Governor
explained, the Government was the ultimate shareholder of
BBMB? Even so, BBMB was still a licensed bank in Malaysia 
and as with every other bank, it was bound by the Banking 
Act 1973. Thus, it was under the purview of the central 
bank. The power and role of the Governor of the Bank Negara 
had certainly been undermined in the BMF case.
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1.2.5. The Prime Minister
As the Prime Minister was the only one constantly 
briefed on the case, he must have known about the 
surreptitious manner in which money was loaned to the 
Carrian Group to keep it afloat i.e. the buying of the 
United States assets, the October 4th Agreements, etc.. Did 
the Prime Minister actually approve these schemes? This led 
to the suspicion that the BMF case is not a common everyday 
bank fraud. I believe there was some political involvement 
in the BMF case as the Governor of the central bank did not 
take any action which he was empowered to in normal banking 
practices. Why was there no action taken against Tengku 
Razaleigh, the Finance Minister and Musa Hitam, the Deputy 
Prime Minister? Three possible reasons have been given to me 
by one of my interviewees whom I have agreed not to name:
1. The Prime Minister had no concrete evidence of 
their involvement;
2. The Prime Minister was ashamed that he was fooled 
by his trusted colleagues;
3. The political party of the Prime Minister, United 
Malays National Organisation (UMNO), had received 
donations from George Tan.
Was the Prime Minister himself involved in any illegal 
dealings? It was reported in the "Far Eastern Economic 
Review" (FEER) that the counsel for Hashim claimed the Prime 
Minister had requested through the then BBMB Chairman, 
Kamarul Arif fin, that a US$400 mil. loan be made to an 
assetless company named Maminco for the purpose of buying
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tin to inflate the price of the commodity in the world 
market (FEER, 29/1/1987). The loan was made in a manner to 
conceal its nature. It was booked through BBMB's Bahrain 
branch, but had to be moved when auditors and authorities 
there objected. Eventually US$200 mil. was lost on the 
Maminco transaction.
1.2.6. The Chairman of BBMB and the Supervisory Committee
The initial steps taken by the management of BBMB, 
after being informed by the management of Bank Negara, were 
to send an internal audit team to examine the operations of 
BMF and to set up a Supervisory Committee. The role of the 
Supervisory Committee was to oversee the activities of BMF 
and no loans could be given out by BMF without the consent 
of this Committee. However, as shown in Chapter 3, loans 
were still released without the Supervisory Committee's 
approval. The Supervisory Committee was a farce in the first 
place because the members of the Executive Committee of BMF 
who had been breaking the rules from the very beginning of 
the BMF scandal were nominated into the Supervisory 
Committee (see sec. 4.8, chap. 3) i.e. Hashim, Rais and 
Lorrain Osman. These three members knew of the illegal 
releases of the loans and yet they did not report them at 
the Supervisory Committee's meetings. The Supervisory 
Committee should have consisted of independent candidates to 
ensure that there was no bias in the decision-making. The 
Chairman of BBMB, Nawawi, was also the Chairman of the 
Supervisory Committee and he was responsible for setting up 
the Committee. He knew of the problems of BMF and yet he had
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Rais, Hashim and Lorrain Osman on the Supervisory Committee. 
This raised the question of the role of Nawavi in the 
scandal. Since loans were still allowed to be released 
without the Committee's approval, the Committee had failed 
in its role. The Chairman of BBMB was also guilty in the BMF 
scandal for not carrying out his role as Chairman of the 
Supervisory Committee as well as BBMB.
1.2.7. Jalil Ibrahim
Another step taken by the management of BBMB was to 
second Jalil Ibrahim from the internal audit team to BMF as 
a personal representative of the Chairman of BBMB to "put 
things in order". He was made an Assistant General Manager 
of BMF. Even with Jalil's presence, all the illegal dealings 
were still being carried out. Why was Jalil unable to do 
anything? After all, he was the Assistant General Manager, 
with the blessing of the Chairman of BBMB, in charge of the 
accounts section, the loans section and the computer
section. There were three possible theories. He was either:
1. instructed by higher authorities to leave things 
alone as his presence was just for show;
2. he was involved in the illegal dealings himself;
3. as one of my interviewees told me, he had an 
extra-marital affair which was known by the 
management of BMF. The management of BMF must have 
used this piece of information to blackmail him.
Whichever theory was true, the fact was that Jalil 
finally had enough and wanted to stop the problem. In trying
189
to stop the loan of US$4 mil. from being released to the
Carrian Group, he was murdered. "Notes for personal file"
found after his murder were revealing:
"The bank has been used and commissioned to make money 
for political ends...the directors have been ignored 
except where they have political masters and agree to 
do their bidding...Why should the country suffer 
because of their greed...I have tried to tell some 
truth, what good it will do? More likely I will be 
without employment, but that may be preferable. The 
lies and falsehoods are too much. The directors may 
have been lazy, but the politicians have been corrupt. 
So much for the people, the race and the country. I am 
just a small part of the deception. I want no more to 
lie and betray the bank or my family".
(South China Morning Post, 4/7/1993)
In an official letter to Nawawi, Jalil stated, "Many 
blunders have been made by the directors and management, but 
such political influence makes it difficult to know what is 
intended to be the interests of the bank and the country" 
(South China Morning Post, 4/7/1993). He went on to say the 
roles of Tengku Razaleigh, the then Finance Minister and 
Musa Hitam, the then Deputy Prime Minister, and the actions 
of Ibrahim Jaafar, General Manager of BMF, made it 
impossible to take effective action to resolve BMF's 
problems.
Jalil's murderer, Mak Foon Than, initially said the 
murder was ordered by George Tan and that he had also worked 
for Tengku Razaleigh, the Finance Minister of Malaysia, for 
several years. He was in Hong Kong collecting money from 
businessmen on behalf of the Minister. He later denied 
making that statement to the police and that, "We all know 
him (Tengku Razaleigh) to be a good, honest and trusted 
minister" (see sec.4.10.4, chap.3). Tengku Razaleigh
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vigorously denied he knew Mak and asserted that there was a 
plot to ruin him politically which was locally hatched in 
time for the elections (FEER, 17/5/1984). The truth of who 
was behind the plot to murder Jalil and whether there was 
any political involvement was never found out. Mak's trial 
certainly left a big question mark over Jalil's murder. It 
certainly strengthened the suspicions that the BMF case was 
not just any ordinary fraud case.
1.2.8. Who was to blame for the BMF scandal?
When the whole scandal surfaced with the murder of 
Jalil Ibrahim in July 1983, the first thing that the people 
directly and indirectly involved in the running of BMF did 
was to disclaim responsibility. On 11 October 1983, the 
Prime Minister said that the management of Bank Negara was 
apparently unaware of the BMF affair earlier on (Lim, 1986; 
269) . The Prime Minister also mentioned that BBMB was under 
the Finance Ministry during the whole period of the BMF 
scandal. When the Finance Minister was questioned on the 
matter by the leader of the opposition party, the Democratic 
Action Party, the following day, Tengku Razaleigh replied 
that if the Prime Minister said he was in charge, then he 
was in charge. However, earlier on, in February, it was 
reported in the "Far Eastern Economic Review" that Tengku 
Razaleigh stressed that as a Government-owned agency, Bank 
Bumiputra answered directly to the Prime Minister's 
Department. He also said, "As Finance Minister, I am 
obviously not involved in the running of the banks...I left 
Bank Bumiputra in 1976 and have had no involvement in its
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operations since" (FEER, 21/4/1983) . There was confusion as 
to which Minister was in charge of BBMB and this was a 
disturbing sign of poor management and leadership by the 
Government. What was clear was that the bank was set up with 
public funds channelled through the Finance Ministry and was 
charged with helping Bumiputras (FEER, 21/4/1983). Kamarul 
Arrifin, the Chairman of BBMB until 9 February 1982, also 
denied that he had knowledge of the BMF loans to Carrian as 
they were never brought up at the Bank's Board meetings. He 
went on to say that while he was the bank Chairman, his 
policy was that no funds were to be given for loans overseas 
and he was not aware that any funds had been given to BMF by 
BBMB. His statement was contradicted by Mat Noor, a senior 
partner of Hanafiah Raslan & Mohammad, auditors of BBMB, who 
made a formal statement to the Committee of Enquiry that he 
had advised him not to concentrate the loans to one 
customer. Mat Noor also revealed to Kamarul that there could 
be a possible case of corruption as the Carrian Holdings 
Limited (CHL) had guaranteed an overdraft facility for HK$1 
mil. from Bank of Communications for Ibrahim.
On 12 October 1983, Kamarul revealed that owing to the 
size of the loans given out by the management of BMF, the 
management of Bank Negara must have known and approved of 
the BMF loans; "Bank Bumiputra Malaysia is no ordinary bank. 
Because of its ties with the Government, it has 
characteristics that other banks don't possess. No important 
decisions are taken without the agreement or knowledge of 
the Government or the central bank". He went on to stress 
that loans of the size given to Carrian would "ordinarily
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require ministerial acquiescence" (Chung, 1987; 34, NST, 
13/10/1983) . How could the Chairman and the Directors of 
BBMB know nothing about the billions of dollars given out to 
its subsidiary? How could the management of Bank Negara not 
know about the lending and allow such imprudent transactions 
to continue? The BMF Director's Report and Accounts in 1981 
clearly showed BMF owed the parent company, BBMB, HK$1,879 
mil. at the end of 1981 as compared to HK$1,088 mil. at the 
end of 1980. Furthermore, the published annual reports of 
BMF revealed that in 1980, its issued outstanding loans 
amounted to HK$1,250 mil. while in 1981, it was HK$2,032 
mil. (Lim, 1986; 267). The Chairman of BBMB and Bank Negara 
had been grossly negligent in their duties and they were 
trying to disclaim responsibility for the scandal. The Prime 
Minister and the Finance Minister, too, were trying to wash 
their hands of the case. The opposition party, the 
Democratic Action Party, said that one exhibit in the report 
of the Committee of Enquiry, a BBMB internal memo, which was 
originally omitted, showed in 1979 and 1980, BBMB had 
"excessive money" which it could lend out through foreign 
exchange and money market operations. In 1980, Petronas, the 
national oil company, was to deposit M$50 mil. a month with 
BBMB. This led to the problem of finding "an outlet to these 
excess funds" and BMF in Hong Kong was selected as a vehicle 
to channel part of the money (Lim, 1986; v) . Thus, it is 
highly unlikely that BBMB management in Kuala Lumpur and the 
political leaders were unaware of the BMF scandal from the 
very beginning as part of the BMF money used to finance the 
Carrian Group was Malaysia's 'petrol-dollar'. By claiming
ignorance, these people also showed they did not carry out 
their role and duties which they had agreed to do.
Perhaps, disclaiming responsibility for such a colossal 
scandal was a natural thing for them to do in the first 
instance. But, what was disheartening was the extent to 
which these people tried to hide the facts of the case from 
the public. There was a systematic cover-up of the case from 
the Malaysian public:
1. September 1982 - When the "Asian Wall Street
Journal" first published in detail the case, 
Nawawi denied the extent of involvement;
2. February 1983 - The Finance Minister said the 
loans were "nothing more than a normal business 
problem";
3. July 1983 - The murder of Jalil Ibrahim led to the
arrest of George Tan and the revelation in court 
of BMF involvement with the Carrian Group. Nawawi 
still claimed "there was no crisis". Kamarul, 
Lorrain, Hashim and Jaafar were made scapegoats 
concerning acceptance of HK$3.3 mil. consultancy 
fees, on top of their salaries, which they
received from BMF. However, the Prime Minister 
protected them by saying, "what they did was 
morally wrong although legally, it was within the 
law, we cannot take them to court";
4. March 1983 - the Finance Minister invoked the
Central Bank Ordinance 1958 and the Banking Act 
1973 to justify banking secrecy when questioned by 
the opposition party;
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5. 1983 - The scandal coincided with the
constitutional crisis over the power of the Malay 
Rulers and also the introduction of the new 
Official Secrets Act;
6. January 1984 - Public pressure to set up a Royal 
Commission which was rejected by the Government. 
Instead a limited Committee of Enquiry was set up;
7. January 1986 - Government reluctance to publish 
the report of the Enquiry. Due to public pressure, 
2,000 copies of the report were finally published 
at the price of M$250 (approximately £63) per set 
which was beyond the reach of many Malaysians;
8. March 1986 - the Government white paper was 
produced, but it left out many details reported by 
the Committee of Enquiry.
The Government of Malaysia would have succeeded in 
covering up the case had it not been for three factors 
beyond their control:
a. The scandal was in Hong Kong over which they did 
not have full influence;
b. The murder of Jalil Ibrahim which led to 
investigations by the Hong Kong authorities;
c. The collapse of the Hong Kong property market 
which led to the liquidation of the Carrian Group.
When the case surfaced with the murder of Jalil 
Ibrahim, Malaysian citizens, including members of the 
opposition parties and social pressure groups, appealed to
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the Government to set up a Royal Commission, but was 
surprised the Government was reluctant to do so. The Prime 
Minister even gave the excuse that a Royal Commission would 
only perpetrate a witch-hunt (Malaysian Business, 1/4/1986) . 
Eventually, due to pressure from the public, a limited 
Committee of Enquiry was set up. The Government was also 
very reluctant to answer questions from members of the 
opposition parties. The Finance Minister invoked the Central 
Bank of Malaysia Ordinance 1958 and the Banking Act 1973 to 
justify the secrecy of the case.
When the Committee had finished the report, which cost 
the Malaysian taxpayers M$1.8 mil., the Government was very 
reluctant to have it published so that the general public 
would have access to it; the reason being to protect the 
Government from possible cases of libel (see sec.l, chap.3). 
Even with protests from the public, the opposition parties 
and pressure groups, the Government was still reluctant to 
do so. Eventually, two members of the Committee, Ahmad 
Noordin and Chooi Mun Sou, agreed to take responsibility for 
any legal case arising. Instead of praising Ahmad Noordin 
for a colossal job well done under limited powers and terms 
of reference, the Prime Minister took Ahmad Noordin to task 
on several points, including the release to the press of the 
contents of his "personal and confidential” memorandum. The 
Prime Minister also informed Ahmad Noordin that if "damage 
is done to the credibility or creditworthiness of BBMB" as 
a result of publishing the report, "the bank will be fully 
justified in suing you for damages" (FEER, 30/1/1986). The 
Prime Minister also reprimanded him for seeking self­
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glorification and publicity, overstepping the terms of 
appointment and not following proper procedures in advising 
and informing the Government. As Karim said, "Basically, he 
was chided for not toeing the line" (Karim, 1989; 109). 
Instead of praising him for his honesty, integrity and hard 
work which should accord him immunity by the Government, he 
was criticised publicly. The culprits, as seen by the Prime 
Minister, were no longer to be blamed. Instead the critics, 
the opposition parties, social interest groups and 
newspapers were condemned for wanting justice and honesty in 
the country. The Prime Minister even accused these people of 
wanting to destroy BBMB. He further alleged that these 
people were also using the scandal to topple "the Malay 
leadership" (Aliran, 1988; 202). He had forgotten that the 
people who would destroy the bank and the Malays were the 
people who ran away with the M$2.5 bil.. Why was the Prime 
Minister so reluctant to let the public have access to the 
details of the case? The actions of the Prime Minister 
certainly raised the question of whether he was involved 
himself or what was he trying to hide. In the earlier 
section (sec.1.2.5) of this chapter, the Prime Minister was 
shown to be involved with the Maminco deal where loans of 
US$400 mil. from BBMB was used for inflating the price of 
tin in the world market. He was certainly involved in some 
illegal dealings with BBMB.
As discussed in chapter 3, the appointment of a 
Committee of Enquiry instead of a Royal Commission was not 
a satisfactory move as the Committee lacked the powers of a 
Royal Commission since it derived its authority from BBMB,
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it had no power to initiate legal actions. Its findings and 
recommendations could only form the basis for determining if 
civil or criminal proceedings should be instituted against 
those named in its report by BBMB. A Royal Commission, on 
the other hand, could direct the Public Prosecutor to 
investigate any matter relevant to the enquiry. Thus, 
through the Public Prosecutor, the Royal Commission could 
then initiate legal actions. As pointed out in Appendix 1 of 
chapter 3, the investigative members in the Committee as 
well as its witnesses were not protected by law against any 
libel or defamation suits against them unlike those 
appointed to the Royal Commission. Without the protection of 
the law, the media would also be reluctant to report the 
full findings of the Committee, especially controversial 
issues which implicated certain people. The media would be 
forced to report only on the Government white paper which 
was tabled after the publication of the Committee's report 
and deemed a 'whitewash' by the opposition party and 
pressure groups. Indeed, it was reported by Aliran, an 
informal movement in Malaysia for freedom, justice and 
solidarity, that the Director-General of Information 
Services had sent a circular to newspapers and those in the 
electronic media advising them not to veer from the 
Government White Paper in their news reports (Aliran, 1988; 
222) . The Government's choice of the Committee of Enquiry 
instead of a Royal Commission might be a deliberate attempt 
to prevent the public from knowing the truth of the BMF 
scandal.
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1.3. The roles of the regulating agencies
1.3.1. The Attorney-General
The then Attorney-General's attitude towards the BMF 
case was also open to suspicion. There was strong evidence 
that fraud and corruption had been committed from the 
investigations done by Bank Negara, BBMB as well as the 
Committee of Enquiry. Yet, the Attorney-General refused to 
take any action stating that, MNo evidence, no prosecution". 
The Committee of Enquiry had the Government's approval and 
yet its findings were not used by the Attorney-General 
because he claimed only police investigations would be taken 
into account. If that was so, the Attorney-General should 
have instructed his department to carry out its own 
investigation instead of waiting for evidence to "fall from 
the sky". He should have used evidence from the Committee of 
Enquiry like letters, documents, etc., as leads in the 
police investigation as these would save the police 
department time and money. The Attorney-General also gave 
the excuse that the BMF culprits could not be prosecuted in 
Malaysia for offences committed outside the country. The 
Attorney-General should have known that the Prevention of 
Corruption Act 1961 (section 27) provided extra-territorial 
powers to the Malaysian Courts to try corruption offences 
committed overseas. The various investigations certainly 
suggested corruption in their reports and the Attorney- 
General should have taken up the cases.
During the two years' investigation into the loss of 
M$2.5 bil., Lorrain Osman had been openly coming and going 
from Malaysia to London where he lived. Reliable Government
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sources had told "Far Eastern Economic Review" he had 
visited Malaysia several times during 1985 in an effort to 
divest assets without any hindrance (FEER, 19/12/1985). The 
Star newspaper also reported on 18 August 1985 that Lorrain 
Osman had a fake Portuguese passport in the name of Chong 
Toong Fatt which bore his photograph and was used a number 
of times. When the Attorney-General in Malaysia was 
questioned on the possibility of seizing the passports of 
certain prominent individuals, he replied, "Everyone is 
innocent until proven quilty and if they want to run away, 
I cannot stop them" (Star, 30/11/1984). It was evident that 
the Attorney-General was reluctant to charge anyone. Why did 
the Attorney-General not carry out his duties? Was he 
instructed to cover-up the scandal? It seemed to be so. The 
leader of the opposition party, the Democratic Action Party, 
correctly stated that, "The Prime Minister, the Attorney- 
General and the Government leaders agree that the BMF 
scandal is a "heinous crime", but they also seem to believe 
that there are no heinous criminals. The BMF scandal is now 
coming to be seven years old, but the Attorney-General has 
not prosecuted a single person for the BMF loans scandal" 
(Lim, 1986; 56).
1.3.2. The Anti-corruption Agency
The personnel of the Anti-Corruption Agency, which was 
supposed to be an independent body empowered to bring any 
corruption cases to justice, also did not take any action. 
The personnel of the Anti-corruption Agency must have been 
aware of the "Asian Wall Street Journal" of 18-19 March
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1983, which named certain individuals and their corrupt 
acts. It reported that Hashim Shamsuddin, the Director of 
BMF and BBMB, and his wife owned a Hong Kong company called 
Silver Present on 5 September 1981. Three days later, Silver 
Present received a HK$3.6 mil. cheque from Chung Ching Man's 
(Chairman of the Eda Group) wife. Two days after the cheque 
was issued, the management of BMF lent Eda Group US$40 mil.. 
On the same day that Silver Present received the HK$3.6 mil. 
cheque, another Hong Kong company, Knife & Dagger, whose 
shareholders were George Tan and his secretary and whose 
General Manager was Ibrahim Jaafar (General Manager of BMF), 
also received a cheque of HK$3.6 mil. from the account of 
Chung's wife. The Journal went on to report that at about 
the same time, Ibrahim also received HK$1 mil. facility from 
the Bank of Communications guaranteed by CHL. This was not 
the first time Ibrahim had loans guaranteed by the Carrian 
Group. Another time was in January 1980, when Knife & Dagger 
deposited HK$372,000 with Wing Lung Bank to guarantee a 
banking facility for Ibrahim (Lim, 1983; 10-11). This report 
from the "Asian Wall Street Journal" should have been enough 
to get the personnel of the Anti-corruption Agency into 
action.
On 27 May 1986, at London's Bow Street Magistrates 
Court, Clive Nicholls, counsel for the Hong Kong Government, 
claimed that Lorrain Osman collected corrupt payments 
amounting to almost HK$125 mil. while Hashim collected 
almost HK$20 mil.. These corrupt payments allegedly 
consisted of money payments, profits and dividends from the 
deposit or sale of shares and warrants, airline tickets for
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Hashim and his family, and his wife was given a £40,000 
Daimler car in London (FEER, 12/6/1986). The Anti-corruption 
Agency was supposed to be an independent and impartial body. 
It was well known in Malaysia for starting an investigation 
on anyone when there was a complaint as the Director-General 
of the agency under the Anti-corruption Agency Act 1982 had 
the powers of a Deputy Public Prosecutor under the Criminal 
Procedure Code and all the powers of an officer of the 
Agency. Also, according to the Act, an officer of the Agency 
should be deemed to be a police officer and should have all 
the powers and immunities of such officer appointed under 
the Police Act 1967 and the Criminal Procedure Code and any 
written law should be construed accordingly. This meant that 
section 21 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1961 would 
apply to officers of the Anti-corruption Agency which 
stated, "Whenever it appears to any officer of or above the 
rank of Inspector that there is reasonable cause to believe 
that in any place there is concealed or deposited any 
evidence of the commission of an offence under this Act, or 
of any prescribed offence, and the police officer has 
reasonable grounds for believing that by reason of the delay 
in obtaining a search warrant the object of the search is 
likely to be frustrated, he may exercise in and in respect 
of the place all the powers mentioned in subsection (1) in 
as full and ample a measure as if he is empowered to do so 
by warrant issued under the subsection". Section 23 of the 
Act also allowed the Public Prosecutor, under reasonable 
grounds of suspicion, to authorise the police to investigate 
any bank account, share account or purchase account, expense
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account or any other account, or any safe deposit box in any 
bank, and should be sufficient authority for the disclosure 
or production by any person of all or any information or 
accounts or documents or articles as may be required by the 
officer so authorized. With such wide powers, why the 
personnel of the Anti-corruption Agency did not, acting as 
its usual diligent self, start an investigation based on the 
reports of the "Asian Wall Street Journal", especially when 
none of the people accused by the Journal had taken legal 
action to sue the Journal for libel. In fact, at the height 
of the scandal, the personnel of Anti-corruption Agency kept 
a very low profile.
The Committee of Enquiry had said at the end of its 
Final Report that, "Irregularities and crimes such as we 
have recounted occur because of failings in the system or in 
the individuals who operate it. We do not consider that 
there were failings in the Malaysian banking system.
Conventional banking procedures and controls existed and 
were generally used satisfactorily by those concerned. But 
in the cases on which we reported the individuals, including 
some at the very top of the system, failed to take
appropriate control measures when they had discovered at 
least a part of what was going wrong. If they themselves 
disregarded or circumvented the controls which they had been 
charged to exercise, then, who else could ensure that the 
control system is effective?" (Lim, 1986; 47).
The final section of part one of this chapter will look
at the culprits in the BMF scandal.
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1.4. The culprits of BMF
One section of the BMF final report highlighted the 
conflict of interest of the Directors, the General Manager 
and the staff members of BMF. They were dealing extensively, 
in their personal capacity, in Carrian shares and warrants. 
In fact, they relied heavily on the advice of George Tan 
when buying and selling these shares (see sec.5, chap.3). 
George Tan even gave a present of two million shares to the 
staff members of BMF. As the leader of the opposition party, 
the Democratic Action Party, pointed out, Mit is up to 
anyone's imagination to visualise how much the Chairman, the 
Directors and the Managers of BMF would be worth if the 
staff are already worth two million CIL shares. When the 
first million shares was given in December 1981, the price 
of CIL shares was quoted on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange at 
the average price of HK$4.90 - making the first one million 
CIL shares worth about HK$4.9 million" (Lim, 1986; 39).
The General Manager of BMF, Ibrahim Jaafar, also had 
very strong business connections with the Carrian Group 
which he did not declare to the Board of BMF and BBMB. For 
example, he was made General Manager of Knife & Dagger, a 
company belonging to George Tan and his secretary. There was 
a definite conflict of interest between his positions as 
General Manager of BMF and General Manager of Knife and 
Dagger, a company of George Tan which had borrowed 
extensively from BMF. Ibrahim had also been accused by the 
Eda Group of lending their shares to CHL for their use.
The Committee of Enquiry also found that in addition to 
the normal directors' fees, BMF also paid consultancy fees
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for services rendered in negotiating and processing loans to 
its two directors, Lorrain Osman and Hashim Shamsuddin, the 
alternate director, Rais Saniman and the then Chairman of 
BBMB, Kamarul Ariffin. The fees amounted to HK$0.8 mil., 
HK$1.0 mil. and HK$1.4 mil. in 1979, 1980 and 1981
respectively. The consultancy fees were not disclosed in the 
annual accounts of BMF (Karim, 1989; 119).
There was definite collusion between the management of 
BMF and that of the Carrian Group to defraud BMF. No doubt 
there were legitimate businesses being carried out by the 
bank, but these were just a front to the illegitimate 
business that was going on behind. The M$2.5 bil. that was 
lost was definitely much more than the amount brought in by 
legitimate businesses. Why did the management of BMF want to 
defraud BMF when they were paid very well with many extra 
benefits? In 1980, the breakdown of the emoluments for the 
Bank Bumiputra Executive Chairman was: annual salary about 
M$90,000, allowance about M$100,000, bonus about M$100,000, 
fees about M$14,000. Apart from that, the Executive Chairman 
was also given a car and a chauffeur, Employees Provident 
Fund contribution of about 30%, a fully furnished house, 
free telephone, water and electricity, cook, gardener and a 
round-the-clock security officer, two months' paid leave and 
free passage and accommodation for his family and personal 
officer in Malaysia for journeys to any part of the world, 
the best medical and dental services in any part of the 
world plus the fare and personal accident insurance worth 
M$1 mil.. In 1977, the emoluments which Kamarul received 
from Bank Bumiputra were said to be about M$220,000, in 1979
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about M$250,000 and in 1980 about M$300,000. Hashim 
Shamsuddin received about M$167,000 in 1977 and M$220,000 
in 1980 (NST, 15/1/1984). There is no doubt the fraudsters 
were motivated by greed rather than need. How did these 
people get these high-ranking jobs with such good pay? Did 
they act in concert from the start? The following account in 
this section will show that the Board of Directors of BMF 
were close friends of some high ranking politicians who 
would be able to appoint them to these jobs. I believe that 
the management members of BMF were not the only guilty 
party. The case had strong hints of close political 
involvements. The case was clearly one of "differential 
association"2. It was possible that the management of BMF 
acted in concert with these corrupt politicians from the 
start.
The politicians implicated in the report of the 
Committee of Enquiry were high ranking officials of the 
ruling party. The two Ministers who were openly implicated 
were Tengku Razaleigh, the Minister of Finance, in 
connection with the purchase of Gammon House (see sec .4.1.1,
Sutherland proposed what became known as the theory of 
differential association i.e. "...criminal behaviour is 
learned in association with those who define such behaviour 
favourably and that in an appropriate situation engages in 
such criminal behaviour if and only if the weight of the 
favourable definitions exceed the weight of the unfavourable 
definitions..." (Sutherland, 1949; 234). Sutherland went on 
to contrast his theory with the theory of social 
disorganisation. "Differential association is a hypothetical 
explanation of crime from the point of view of the process 
by which a person is initiated into crime. Social 
disorganisation is a hypothetical explanation of crime from 
the point of view of the society. These two hypotheses are 
consistent with each other and one is the counterpart of the 
other. Both apply to ordinary crimes as well as to white 
collar crimes" (Sutherland, 1949; 253).
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chap.3) and Musa Hitam, the Deputy Prime Minister, in 
connection with the purchase of Grand Marine Holdings (see 
sec.4.3.1, chap.3). Tengku Razaleigh denied he was involved 
and claimed that there was a plot to topple him politically. 
Perhaps there was some truth in what he had said as the 
person who revealed his involvement was Rais Saniman, a good 
friend of Musa Hitam, the Deputy Prime Minister, to whom 
Tengku Razaleigh lost the post. However, based on the facts 
found by the Lorrain Osman Appeal Committee (see sec.3, 
chap.3), Tengku Razaleigh was not that innocent. I believe 
there were other politicians involved, too. It was hardly 
surprising as the fraud and deception were carried out in a 
very bold manner, for example, loans were made without 
proper paperwork or collateral. There must have been 
political connections for such bold actions to be carried 
out. The "who is who" in section 3 of chapter 3 showed that 
the Directors and General Manager of BMF and the Carrian 
people seem to mingle in the same crowd i.e. the Malaysian 
politicians and the upper class in social functions. The BMF 
scandal gave the impression that members of this elite group 
shared a very special relationship which allowed them the 
freedom to do whatever they wanted without the knowledge of 
anyone from outside this group. This was because the members 
of this elite group would cover-up for each other. This 
elite group also seemed to be powerful and wealthy enough to 
influence the law enforcement agencies in Malaysia like the 
police and the Anti-corruption Agency.
In the BMF case, it is not difficult to understand that 
the politicians would not want to cover-up a scandal if they
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were not involved themselves. At the height of the scandal, 
the opposition party even made the accusation that "the 
Carrian Empire was a mere house of cards and the BMF-Carrian 
tie-up was a massive joint operation of fraud and deception 
right from the beginning" (Lim, 1986; 44) . The report of the 
Committee of Enquiry pointed out, "There might not have been 
Carrian without BMF" because of:
a. the free-flowing funds provided by BMF to them;
b. BMF and BBMB tried to keep Carrian afloat when it 
was on the brink of collapse by releasing loans to 
Carrian in surreptitious ways and;
c. the purchase of Carrian assets at inflated prices.
The following accounts will give more detail of the 
strong political ties the members of the management 
committee of BMF had. With this close connection, it was not 
surprising at all if high ranking politicians were involved 
in the scandal (see Diagram 1 below).
Diagram 1
Kamarul (Executive Chairman of BBMB)
Hashim Shamsuddin 
D irector o f BBMB and 
BMF: Friend o f  
1. Tengku R azaleigh.
Kamarul was a practising lawyer when he was requested 
by the national leaders to serve as Executive Chairman of 
BBMB.
Lorrain Osman 
D irector of BBMB 
and BMF: Friend of
1. the former PM*, 
Tun Razak;
2. Finance M in ister, 
Tengku Razaleigh.
Rais Saniman 
Senior General Manager 
of BBMB and a ltern a te  
D irector of BMF: Friend 
of
1. the then Deputy PM, 
Musa Hitam.
*PM denotes Prime M inister
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Lorrain Osman had been Director of BBMB since the 
inception of the bank in 1965. He was regarded as the most 
influential and powerful Director of BBMB. His influence was 
not due to his seniority alone, but also to his close ties 
with national leaders such as the former Prime Minister, the 
late Tun Razak, who appointed him as BBMB Director, and 
Tengku Razaleigh, the first Chairman of BBMB. He was also a 
member of the Prime Minister's economic panel. His success 
in the business world was said to be due to his ties with 
political leaders and his liberalism in business ethics. He 
was said to be a strong advocate of free trade (laissez- 
faire) in whatever circumstances (NST, 15/1/1984).
Hashim joined the bank when Tengku Razaleigh, a college 
friend of his in Belfast University, became the first 
Chairman of BBMB. In 1972, he was made the Chief Assessment 
Officer and later appointed Secretary and Domestic Deputy 
General Manager. In 1975, he became a member of the Board of 
Management of BBMB. Kamarul appointed him as Executive 
Director in November 1976. Associates who knew him well 
regarded him as a competent banker (NST, 15/1/1984).
Before Rais Saniman became Director in the 
International Division of BBMB in 1976, he had served with 
the International Monetary Fund, Federal Reserve Bank 
America, Bank of America and Bank of England. It was 
reported in New Straits Times (NST) on 15 January 1984, that 
he was responsible for spreading the wings of BBMB abroad, 
making it an international bank. He was a respected banking 
personality at home and abroad because of his efforts and 
success. He claimed to be "orally appointed" as the
209
alternate Director of BMF by Hashim. However, Hashim 
revealed that the Deputy Prime Minister, Musa Hitam, had 
earlier told him that he could stay in his job provided he 
did not oppose any loans proposed by Rais.
It could be seen that each one of the members of the 
management committee of BMF had a patron or some political 
links. These political links must have been corrupt or else 
tolerant enough to give the management committee the 
confidence to defraud BMF at such a grand scale.
Kamarul's statement, when he defended himself, was 
that, "three or four more Carrian-like problems are looming 
within Malaysia in the 1980s" (Lim, 1986; 293). He also
said, "There will be another Carrian, perhaps affecting one 
of the high-fliers, even Permodalan Nasional (another public 
institution which originally held 70% controlling shares of 
BBMB before being taken over by Petronas, the national oil 
company) itself" (FEER, 27/10/1983). Was he implying that 
the same people involved in the BMF case would also be 
involved in these three or four other cases? Was he also 
implying that the same type of crisis as the BMF were also 
affecting other Government agencies like Permodalan 
Nasional? Was that why the Government was reluctant to have 
any publicity for the BMF case because it was afraid that 
the public might also discover these other cases when they 
started probing into the BMF scandal, for example, the 
involvement of the Prime Minister in the Maminco case of 
inflating the price of tin in the world market? Hashim had 
also claimed via his counsel that Petronas, the national oil 
company, had been made to appear to make a M$5 mil. (US$1.92
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mil.) loss on currency dealing to provide for a donation 
requested by "a high political authority which I am not 
permitted to name” (FEER, 29/1/1987). There were certainly 
other big scandals involving politicians after the BMF case 
which occurred along similar lines; one of which would be 
discussed in the next chapter.
After more than ten years, the BMF case was still not 
solved. There was still confusion as to who were involved. 
As the case dragged on, suspicions, too, increased as to who 
masterminded the scandal. The question still remained 
whether George Tan was the only mastermind and Lorrain 
Osman, Hashim Shamsuddin, Rais Saniman and Ibrahim Jaafar 
his collaborators. Was the Government involve in the 
scandal? The fact that the Gammon House and the Grand Marine 
deals fell through could imply that the Malaysian Government 
was not involved in the scandal. Moreover, it was also not 
wrong for George Tan to make a quick profit from the 
Malaysian Government as it could accept or reject the offer. 
However, if some politicians schemed with George Tan to make 
a profit, then there was definitely a corrupt deal. Perhaps 
the Government abandoned the two deals on purpose to use 
them as ploys to confuse the public as to whether the 
Government was involved. Moreover, any profits made from the 
two deals could be easily found out and questioned openly by 
critics whereas the other deals made surreptitiously with 
Carrian were too complicated to attract attention. The fact 
that George Tan sent a letter to Tengku Razaleigh, still 
acting as agent for the purchase of Lap Heng Building 
instead of Gammon House for the Government, which was not
211
disclosed in the report of the Committee of Enquiry raised 
the question that the Government may still be involved in 
the scandal (see sec.4.1.1, chap.3). The general belief was 
still that some other people, with power and position, must 
be involved, but nobody had enough information or proof to 
bring them to justice. In fact, George Tan was believed not 
to be the ring leader. He was just a puppet being used and 
Lorrain Osman, Hashim Shamsuddin, Rais Saniman and Ibrahim 
Jaafar were the scapegoats to be sacrificed. Will the truth 
ever be revealed? The case is about to be tried again in 
court. Hopefully, this time justice will be done.
2. Problems of the BMF case at the macro level
Section 2 of this chapter will analyze the problems of 
the BMF case in relation to the wider society i.e. in a 
macro way. I will begin with analysing the Malaysian 
political ideology i.e. communal politics and how the 
policies formulated under such a political ideology prove 
beneficial to corrupt politicians and politicians with other 
vested interests. I will then relate it to the BMF case as 
well as the other major fraud cases in Malaysia.
2.1. Malaysian political culture
2.1.1. New Economic Policy and the quota system
Politics in Malaysia, as explained in chapter 1, is 
communal or ethnic politics. Most politicians will project 
themselves as the protectors of the economic, political and 
cultural aspects of their own community. So long as 
politicians use communal sentiments in their campaigns, they
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will be guaranteed a large following.
The ruling party in Malaysia is the Barisan Nasional 
which comprises the coalition of the United Malay National 
Organisation (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association and 
the Malaysian Indian Congress. The main opposition parties 
are the Democratic Action Party, Semangat '46 and Partai 
Islam SeMalaysia. The racial riot of 1969 (as explained in 
chapter 1) led to the introduction of the New Economic 
Policy which aimed to attain national unity by 
redistributing the country's wealth so that it would be 
shared in a more equal manner among the different races as 
well as to eradicate poverty. However, the objectives of the 
New Economic Policy have been abused by politicians and 
other people with vested interests over the years. Instead 
of attaining national unity and eradicating poverty, there 
is disunity as ethnicity begins to play a very major role in 
Malaysian politics and a large proportion of the people are 
still living in poverty. Communal politics has become 
institutionalised over the years. In almost every sphere of 
public life i.e. in the economy, in politics, in culture and 
in education, policies have been formulated with ethnic 
characteristics and ethnic issues have become commonplace 
among the Malaysian citizens. I will discuss this point 
further to show how ethnicity has pervaded almost every 
aspect of life in Malaysia. My conclusion is that ethnic 
policies implemented to help the Bumiputras (the Malays and 
other indigenous people) actually benefitted only a small 
group. Finally, I will show how some politicians could use 
the New Economic Policy and communal politics for their own
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interests.
Public policies based on ethnic lines, which are 
formulated after the introduction of the New Economic 
Policy, have actually led to a deterioration in ethnic ties. 
When policies are implemented with privileges and quotas 
based on ethnic considerations which are going to affect the 
lives and basic rights of people, for example, in education, 
employment, housing, business and industry, it should not be 
surprising that it will widen ethnic segregation. This will 
be illustrated in the later part of this section. It is sad 
that in Malaysia, religion has also been used to promulgate 
this division. The Malays are Muslim, the Chinese are mainly 
either Buddhist, Taoist or Christian and the Indians are 
either Muslim, Hindu, Sikh or Christian. The basic religious 
division in Malaysia is seen as between the Muslims and the 
others. Malay nationalism is synonymous with Muslim 
nationalism. Once politics is mixed with religion, it 
becomes an even more powerful tool for the Government to 
dictate to its people because religious principles cannot be 
questioned, argued or compromised. Thus, with the emphasis 
of ethnicity through religion, it becomes even more 
difficult for the different ethnic groups to integrate. The 
colonial ways of "divide and rule” (see chap.l) have proved 
to be a useful tool for the post-Independence rulers and 
elites.
I am not, in any way, trying to criticise the 
objectives of the New Economic Policy. I am merely trying to 
show that the implementation of the New Economic Policy has 
been abused to the advantage of only a small group of
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people. In fact, the objectives of the New Economic Policy 
which were introduced to attain national unity by helping 
the poor Malays and other Bumiputras and "eventually 
eradicate poverty by raising income levels and increasing 
employment opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective of 
race...accelerating the process of restructuring Malaysian 
society to correct economic imbalance, so as to reduce and 
eliminate the identification of race with economic function" 
(see chapter 1), should be welcomed and encouraged by all 
Malaysian citizens. Unfortunately, the practice is something 
else. The Prime Minister of Malaysia once declared, "...in 
trying to redress the imbalance it will be - necessary to 
concentrate your effort on the Malays, to bring out more 
Malay entrepreneurs and to bring out and to make Malay 
millionaires, if you like, so that the number of Malays who 
are poor, equals the number of Chinese who are poor and the 
number of unemployed Malays equal the number of unemployed 
Chinese, then you can say that parity has been achieved". 
Thus, UMNO's (the ruling Malay party) determination is to 
strengthen the Malay economic position in commerce and 
industry. UMNO believes that the power of the Malays will 
increase with economic strength* The emphasis then is upon 
the creation of Bumiputra entrepreneurs, executives, 
managers and professionals. The introduction of the New 
Economic Policy has enabled the rapid expansion of a small 
group of Malay middle and upper classes in the last twenty 
years. A good example would be the distribution of the 
Amanah Saham Nasional shares among the Bumiputras. At the 
end of December 1985, 10% of the top investors in the Amanah
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Saham Nasional schemes accounted for 40% of the shares while 
the remaining 90% of investors owned only 60% of shares. 
This showed that a small Bumiputra elite owned and
controlled wealth allocated to the entire community
(Muzaffar, 1989; 80). Liow, in his article "Malaysia's New 
Economic Policy and the restructuring of commercial banks, 
1971-1983", noted that each time a commercial bank was 
restructured to meet the New Economic Policy requirement, 
there were at least four groups of Bumiputras who would like 
to benefit from it, namely:
1. The Bumiputra management and staff of the particular 
bank;
2. The few Bumiputra individuals who had strong 
connections and influence with the Government or 
members of the royalty;
3. The Bumiputra institutions with large numbers of
participants, for example, the Armed Forces Fund, 
Pilgrims Fund, Police Co-operative and the FELDA 
Settlers' Co-operative; and
4. The emerging and self-made Bumiputra professionals such 
as lawyers, accountants and architects who had 
benefitted from the educational and other opportunities 
of the New Economic Policy.
(Liow, 1986; 22-23)
"However, it would appear that Bumiputras who had powerful 
connections with the right officials in the Government were 
most successful in establishing or increasing their 
interests. In fact, they were aware of opportunities even
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before transactions were put to the Foreign Investment 
Committee” (Liow, 1986; 23). Further illustration of this 
inequality will be given in the later part of this section.
As the Malay middle and upper classes become more and 
more powerful, UMNO also becomes stronger and stronger. 
However, a large proportion of the Malays are still living 
in poverty as the data below will show. As Chandra Muzaffar, 
the ex-President of Aliran, an informal movement in Malaysia 
for freedom, justice and solidarity, correctly questioned, 
"How could a deliberate creation of a number of capitalists 
help a few million impoverished, exploited rural Malays?" 
(Muzaffar, 1989; 9). Also, will the creation of Malay
millionaires and capitalists help to achieve national unity? 
What the Prime Minister said is totally out of the context 
of the New Economic Policy. The data below will show that 
only a small group of elites has actually benefitted from 
the New Economic Policy.
The Third Malaysia Plan 1976-1980 claimed that poverty 
had been reduced, after the introduction of the New Economic 
Policy, in some of the poverty groups. However, Muzaffar 
reported that there was actually an overall increase in 
poverty among the main poverty groups. Among rubber 
smallholder the incidence of poverty from 1970 to 1975 
increased by about 7,400. There was a drop in the incidence 
of poverty in the paddy sector in Peninsula Malaysia by 11% 
in 1975 from 88% in 1970 while the number of households in 
poverty was reduced by over 9,000. The Malays constituted 
the majority in both these sectors. But, among the fishing 
community of the east coast of Peninsula Malaysia where
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Malays preponderated, "the incidence of poverty remained at 
a high level of 90%". The estate workers, 32% of whom were 
Malays, showed an actual increase in the incidence of 
poverty during 1971-75 while "the absolute number of non- 
agricultural households in poverty expanded by 23% during 
the same period, reflecting perhaps an upsurge of poor, 
urban families where a large proportion are Malays" 
(Muzaffar, 1989; 27).
The Mid-Term Review in 1983 stated that the overall 
incidence of poverty which had dropped from 49.3% in 1970 to 
43.9% in 1975 and 29.2% in 1980, had increased slightly to 
30.3% in 1983 (Lim. 1986; 378). In 1984, the overall 
incidence of poverty was 20.7%. It declined to 19.3% in 1987 
(Mid-term Review of the Fifth Malaysia Plan, 1986-1990). 
Official poverty rate in Malaysia is measured on "the basis 
of a minimum expenditure level or the poverty line income to 
separate the poor from the non-poor. The expenditure 
reflects the absolute poverty level which is determined 
relative to the prevailing standard of living of the 
country. The poverty line income essentially consists of 
three major components that include food, clothing and 
footwear, and the non-food items such as rent, fuel and 
power, transport and communications, health, education and 
recreation. The poverty line income is updated annually 
using the Consumer Price Index to reflect changes in price 
levels. For 1987, the poverty line income is about M$350 
(approximately £883) per month for a household of 5.14 
persons in Peninsula Malaysia, M$429 per month for a
31994 exchange rate.
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household of 5.24 in Sarawak and M$533 per month for a 
household of 5.36 in Sabah” (Mid-term Review of the Fifth 
Malaysia Plan, 1986-1990).
However, a survey by the Socio-Economic Research Unit 
of the Prime Minister's Department in 1982, based on a 
poverty line of M$384 for a five-member household, found 
42.8% of the population below the poverty line. The 
differences in the poverty figures for the various socio­
economic groups (which are the main poverty groups) between 
the Mid-Term Review in 1983 and the survey by the Socio- 
Economic Research Unit are even more prominent as shown 
below.
Table 4.1
*FMP 1980 MTR 1983 SERU 1982
Rubber smallholder 41.3% 61.1% 69.2%
Oil Palm smallholder 7.7% 1.5% 56.3%
Coconut smallholder 38.9% 32.7% 77.6%
Paddy farmers 52.7% 54.0% 76.2%
Fishermen 45.3% 44.7% 72.8%
♦Fourth Malaysian Plan 1981-1985 
Source: Lim, 1986; 379.
As with the education situation, taking only enrolments 
in local universities and colleges, the Malay proportion had 
increased from 49.7% in 1970 to 65.1% in 1975 while the 
percentage for the Chinese had dropped from 42.7% in 1970 to 
31.1% in 1975 and in the case of the Indians it was 5.1% in
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1970 and 3.3% in 1975. In the five local universities, the 
Malay percentage had increased from 39.7% to 57.2% in 1975 
while the Chinese percentage had dropped from 49.2% in 1970 
to 36.6% in 1975 and with the Indians from 7.3% in 1970 to 
5.2% in 1975 (Muzaffar, 1989; 28 & 32). Between 1970 to 
1983, the percentage of Malays in domestic tertiary 
institutions funded by the Government had increased from 
53.7% to 73% in contrast to the enrolment of non-Bumiputra 
students which had declined from 46.3% to 27% (Lim, 1986; 
387) . Higher education in Malaysia is considered a ready 
passport for entry into the elite society and therefore the 
increase in opportunities for the Malays has meant the 
possibility of more Malays entering into the professional, 
commercial and industrial world. However, the truth is that 
only certain privileged Malays gained from the increase in 
students' placing. Based on a study on students with 
government scholarships reported by Muzaffar, a student from 
a rich Malay family has 21 chances of getting a government 
scholarship compared to just one chance for a student from 
a poor Malay family (Muzaffar, 1989; 77). A student from a 
rich Chinese family has 13 chances of getting a government 
scholarship compared to one chance for someone from a poor 
Chinese household (Muzaffar, 1989; 85). According to a 1983 
study, only 14.2% of university scholarships awarded to 
Malays went to poor Malay households (Muzaffar, 1989; 80). 
This should be food for thought for the Malaysian 
politicians and citizens who are playing communal politics 
without realising what the consequences are to the nation. 
They fight for a quota system without realising that it is
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benefitting only the elites. The poor Malays do not benefit 
from the quota system of allocating scholarships in tertiary 
education although in theory, it is meant for them. Neither 
do the poor Chinese students. In fact, ethnic quotas in 
scholarships do not reveal the inequalities and injustice in 
Government policies for Malays and other Bumiputras 
(Muzaffar, 1989; 80). As Muzaffar argued, "This is then one 
of the terrible injustices perpetrated by ethnic quotas, 
ethnic percentages and most ethnic-based programmes. They 
tend to hide the truth - the truth about who really wins and 
who really loses within a particular community. It is mainly 
for this reason that we have always regarded the ethnic 
approach in economic planning as unjust to the poor and the 
powerless, the deprived and the disadvantaged" (Muzaffar, 
1989; 81). Thus, a quota system when abused will generate 
inequality in income distribution and promote the welfare of 
the elites. When the politicians and citizens of Malaysia 
fight for the quotas for their communities to be increased, 
they should think again as asking for better quotas may not 
be the solution in Malaysia since the reality of poverty and 
deprivation confronting all the ethnic groups have been 
ignored. In fact, the quota system will generate ill- 
feelings among the different ethnic groups instead of 
integrating them as some deserving people will be left out 
in the system.
Malaysians have laid too much emphasis on inter-ethnic 
income inequality when in fact this accounted for only 10% 
of the overall inequality. Some 90% of the inequality has 
been due to large variations in income within each ethnic
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group (Muzaffar, 1989; 77). The non-Chinese community has 
put too much emphasis on the idea that the Chinese community 
holds a lot of economic power. Statistics has shown that 
those who hold the economic power constitute only a small 
group. In 1957/8, the top 25% of Chinese households received 
65.2% of income within the community. By 1973, the top 25% 
received 67.4% of income. On the other hand, the bottom 40% 
in 1957/8, received 18.1% of income while in 1973, it 
received only 15.9% of income within the community
(Muzaffar, 1989; 178).
The ownership of corporate assets is also highly skewed 
within both the Chinese and Indian communities. Although a 
large proportion of the top 797 stock-owners in 1983 were 
Chinese, only 1% of these owners accounted for 32.23% of the 
number of shares, whereas the bottom 50% accounted for only 
1.92% (Muzaffar, 1989; 84). This unequal distribution of 
wealth will even be worse with the coalition parties, i.e. 
UMNO, the Malaysian Chinese Association and the Malaysian 
Indian Congress, establishing their own companies openly 
(which will be discussed below).
The above data shows that the problem in Malaysia is
not one of inter-ethnic economic disparity, but one of
intra-ethnic economic disparity. This fact is supported by 
studies done by academics like Jomo (1983) and Mehmet
(1986). In the absence of more definitive indicators, they 
compared the mean and median incomes of the different ethnic 
groups in Peninsula Malaysia between 1970 and 1979 and found 
that the ratios increased over the years with the exception 
of the Indian community (see Appendix 4.1 of this chapter).
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This indicated that the upper income group had more and more 
income while the lower income group might have seen their 
income stagnate or diminish.
With the way the New Economic Policy has been 
mismanaged, there will be even greater concentration of 
wealth in the hands of a few. For example, the comparative 
allocations of the Second (1971-1975), Third (1976-1980) and 
Fourth (1981-1985) Malaysia Plans indicated bias towards the 
Malay rich in contrast to the Malay poor. ”In the three 
plans, M$9,319 mil. was allocated for eradication of poverty 
programmes, which affected some 50% of households in 
Peninsula Malaysia, while a total of M$4,397 mil. was 
allocated in the same period for restructuring which would 
benefit some 5% of the Malays to become instant 
'millionaires' or the 'instant rich/M (Lim, 1986; 381).
Moreover, the manipulation of the problem by politicians and 
people with vested interests into a racial problem, even 
greater disunity will generate among the different ethnic 
groups. The objectives of the New Economic Policy have been 
defeated. National unity will not be achieved with the 
present policies. The different ethnic groups in Malaysia 
will still be segregated and suspicious of each other. 
Relative deprivation will still be felt by all ethnic groups 
because of the quota system. Muzaffar pointed out that the 
New Economic Policy had been misinterpreted and abused as "a 
passport to accumulate wealth and to be instant 
millionaires” (Aliran, July/August 1986). Thus, the New 
Economic Policy had unintentionally become a 'partner' in 
these scandals through abuse and misinterpretation. The New
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Straits Times, although owned by UMNO through Fleet 
Holdings, actually accused those involved in the BMF scandal 
of betraying national aspirations and particularly those of 
Bumiputras. It also remarked that, "It is perhaps a measure 
of the success of the New Economic Policy itself that some 
Bumiputras have become adept financial crooks comparable 
with the best in the world" (FEER, 17/11/1983) . The 
newspapers asked whether the New Economic Policy had been 
intended only to make a few Bumiputras rich and provided 
them additional opportunities for getting richer by fair 
means or foul. Ethnic or communal politics gives corrupt 
officials ample opportunities to accumulate wealth both 
legitimately and illegitimately. For other politicians, 
communal politics helps them to gain votes without them 
realising the inherent dangers in this type of politics. 
Most of the ordinary citizens of Malaysia are brainwashed 
into believing that their only survival in a multi-ethnic 
society in Malaysia is to fight for their own communities. 
They are so blinded by this ideology that they do not 
realise that cunning politicians are using this for their 
own ends, for example, if any politician brings out a racial 
issue, they will support him or her without any hesitation 
as to whether the issue is valid. Any politician who defends 
the rights of his or her community is considered a good 
politician. The real problem in the country is intra-ethnic 
income disparity. A high percentage of poverty looms in 
every ethnic group and an ethnic solution is not needed to 
help this group of poverty stricken people. Ethnic policies 
are not needed to improve the standard of living of these
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people. These people need better wages, employment 
opportunities and working conditions, proper housing, 
education and health services, which are the basic rights of 
every citizens in Malaysia. Every poor person deserves to be 
helped regardless of his or her race as was the original 
objective of the New Economic Policy. As has been shown so 
far, when economic policies in Malaysia are ethnic based, 
they are prone to political manipulation by politicians who 
are interested in acquisition and power. These politicians 
have no interest in trying to integrate the people of 
Malaysia or help the poverty-stricken. If the original aim 
of the New Economic Policy was to be carried out in a just 
manner and without any ethnic connotation, i.e. eradication 
of poverty regardless of race, national unity would 
definitely be achieved.
2.1.2. New Economic Policy and public corporations
Under Malaysia's New Economic Policy, a large number of 
public bodies and corporations set up to promote Bumiputras' 
participation in the economy, which Mehmet termed 
"trusteeship", legitimised the growth of a large bureaucracy 
within a short period of time (Mehmet, 1986; 9). At the end 
of December 1974 (four years after the implementation of the 
New Economic Policy) , there were 45 public enterprises owned 
by the federal Government in addition to 37 state-owned 
public enterprises. By the end of the 1970s, there were 91 
federal public enterprises and 56 state statutory bodies 
(Mehmet, 1986; 11). In 1987, Sieh reported that there
existed more than 900 Government companies and statutory
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organisations in various activities and operations (Sieh,
1987; 17). Sieh also said the Government had provided loans
worth M$2.5 bil. to Government-owned companies and M$14 bil.
to statutory organisations. The Government was also
guarantor for loans amounting to M$12 bil. taken out by such
corporations and organisations (Sieh, 1987; 17). Means
pointed out that these public bodies were managed mainly by
unsuitably qualified people;
"Most of the officers of these Bumiputra bodies were 
young Malay graduates often with degrees in Malay 
Studies, Islamic Studies or Arts subjects. Almost none 
of these officials had any previous experience of 
financial management of funds involving their own 
business or personal assets. Instead, they were made 
financial managers of large sums of institutional money 
provided from public revenues and were instructed to 
meet certain policy objectives while also maximising 
profits. For the banking and savings institutions, 
large sums of money also came from private savings and 
investments, often involving the meagre private savings 
of Malay peasants through the savings society, Amanah 
Saham Nasional, that invested its funds through Bank 
Bumiputra. In any case, the total money transactions 
for these agencies were enormous and the management 
style of those responsible appeared to throw caution to 
the winds and proceed with an air of unreality in their 
search for high-profit ventures and their lack of 
concern for potential risks or the prospect of default 
on loans and investments" (Means, 1991; 120).
Moreover, the lack of control over these public bodies by 
the Government and inadequate accountability on the part of 
these trustees had encouraged abuse of the system as Mehmet 
put it, "The trustees have taken advantage of their 
privileged status, access to information and power over the 
decision-making process" (Mehmet, 1986; 124). As for the BMF 
case, the problem was not because of inexperienced and 
unqualified management members. It is more because of the 
latter reason i.e. lack of control by the authority and
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inadequate accountability on the part of the trustees.
Moreover, if these corporations are not profitable, the 
Government will keep pumping money into them. The 
justification is that it is necessary in order to achieve 
the equity goals of the New Economic Policy. The Prime 
Minister himself had personally assessed information 
collected under the Prime Minister's Department of these 
state ventures and found many state companies suffered heavy 
losses and mismanagement leading to their closure (Halim, 
1990; 77) . The Deputy Finance Minister said at least half of 
the 1,000 odd non-financial public enterprises had been 
identified to be sold or revamped. He also said that half of 
those identified would have to be wound up if there were no 
takers to turn them round (Halim, 1990; 77) . These
corporations have opened up vast opportunities to make money 
illegally. Perhaps this is the scheme of some unscrupulous 
politicians. By employing these unqualified people, the 
Government would firstly, please the Malay community as they 
were now being given positions with power and secondly, the 
unqualified people would not be able to question any complex 
fraud or deception as they were not in a position to do so 
with their limited knowledge.
The New Economic Policy could be seen to be helping 
only the rich or the comfortably well-off, both legitimately 
and illegitimately. The BMF scandal had shown how a bank 
which was set up to help the Malays to improve their 
economic position in keeping with the objectives of the New 
Economic Policy was actually swindled by the politicians and 
administrators who were selected by the people to help them.
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As Chung commented, "The list of people named in the report 
(of the Committee of Enquiry) read like a who's who in 
Malaysia" (Chung, 1987; 35). The money of the poor Malays 
had been taken by the well-to-do to acquire more wealth. 
When I interviewed Ahmad Noordin, the then Auditor-General 
leading the Committee of Enquiry in the BMF case, and 
Chandra Muzaffar, the then leader of Aliran, they said the 
best reason they could give as to why the well-to-do 
defrauded the poor was greed. To all Malaysians, BBMB, as a 
Government-owned bank, should have set an example of 
excellent leadership in banking and financial ethics for 
other banks and financial institutions to follow. It was a 
let down that the Government-managed bank was not infallible 
after all.
The victims of the major financial scandals with 
political involvement in Malaysia are definitely the poor. 
It deprived them of basic amenities in their houses such as 
piped water, electricity, schools and clinics which some 
still do not have. The M$2.5 bil. that was lost through the 
BMF case could have been used for the following:
1. Start off 100 universities based on the M$27 mil. 
grant to the International Islamic University;
2. Build 125,000 low-cost housing units at M$20,000 
per unit;
3. Develop 150,000 hectares of land to settle at 
least 30,000 settlers.
(Lim, 1986; 292)
The above discussion has shown how ethnic policies,
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implemented in the name of the New Economic Policy, have 
actually benefited only a small group of elites. This group, 
no doubt, will be only too happy to keep on adopting 
communal policies for their own advantage. This will be the 
discussion for the following section.
2.1.3. Communal politics
Communal politics has been practised in Malaysia ever 
since it was formed in 1963. As explained in chapter one, 
Malaysia consists of three dominant ethnic groups; the 
Malays and the aborigines who are the Bumiputras (the 
indigenous people), the Chinese and the Indians. Although 
the Bumiputras are the majority, they were economically 
lagging behind the Chinese when Malaysia was formed. This 
created a lot of tension and distrust among the Bumiputras 
and the Chinese. Communal issues are highly sensitive 
because of the distrust among the different ethnic groups. 
Policies are scrutinised carefully by everyone so that no 
ethnic group will have an advantage over the others. This 
form of communal politics has generated the bad habit of 
reducing almost every social problem into an ethnic problem. 
The BMF case was one example. It was seen as a Malay problem 
although the culprits were from the Chinese ethnic group, 
too. In fact the Prime Minister himself was guilty of using 
communal politics for the BMF case. In October 1984, he made 
a statement accusing those who demanded an open inquiry into 
the BMF scandal as motivated by the desire to destroy the 
Malay political leadership (see sec.1.2.8 of this chapter). 
As the leader of the opposition party, the Democratic Action
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Party, replied to the Prime Minister's statement, "If there 
is anyone who is trying to destroy the Malay political 
leadership, then it is those who are responsible for the 
"heinous crime" of the M$2.5 bil. BMF loans scandal. 
Unfortunately, the government seems to have lost its moral 
sense of right and wrong, regarding the critics of the BMF
loans scandal as greater enemies of the state than the
perpetrators of the BMF loans scandal" (Lim, 1986; 350). The 
culprits of the BMF case were Malays as well as non-Malays. 
Those who demanded a Royal Commission were from the Malay 
and non-Malay communities. The BMF scandal was definitely 
not a racial problem. The reason why communal politics is 
favoured by corrupt politicians is that when a problem is 
considered as an ethnic one, it will not be discussed in 
depth and in public by the particular ethnic group because 
it is "washing dirty linen in public", "disloyal to one's 
race" or even "anti-establishment" as the dignity of the
race is at stake. Shaming has always been used by
politicians to deter the public from speaking against 
politicians from their own ethnic groups. It is also used to 
deter open discussions on issues which would be detrimental 
to the image of the different ethnic groups. As Braithwaite 
said in his book, "Crime, Shame and Reintegration", "Shaming 
is a dangerous game. Done oppressively, it can be used for 
thought control and stultification of human diversity. Not 
done much at all, it unleashes a war of all against all, the 
maximally repressive state, and tolerance of a situation 
where some citizens trample on the rights of others" 
(Braithwaite, 1989; 12). He also said, "Shaming can become
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the principal weapon of the tyranny of the majority [in the 
Malaysian case, it is the Government and politicians] .. .When 
shaming is used to oppress a minority who think the 
standards are wrong, however, and where those standards have 
nothing to do with guaranteeing the freedom of all, the 
majority can be truly tyrannical (Braithwaite, 1989; 158).
When members of one ethnic group have problems, the 
other ethnic groups would usually be diplomatic about the 
problems so as not to create ill-feelings. The person who 
•'washes dirty linen”, especially when it involves a corrupt 
official or politician, will not be tolerated. The over­
concern for the image of the ethnic group has clouded the 
rational judgement of the people. As Chandra Muzaffar put 
it, "Surely, the culprit is not the person who washes the 
dirty linen; it is he who dirties the linen in the first 
instance” (Muzaffar, 1989; 126) . A corrupt official or
politician is only too happy to exploit and encourage this 
attitude as it protects his or her vested interests from 
being exposed. A paper titled, "Corruption and the Malaysian 
situation” presented at the Aliran seminar in Kuala Lumpur 
on 2 November 1980 by Azmi Khalid and Harun Rasip, made the 
following observation, "Ethnic relationships in our ethnic­
conscious society have only served to exacerbate and 
complicate the problem of corruption, especially when 
emotive appeals help to justify acts of corruption in racial 
terms. The inter-ethnic competition for power and influence 
has seen to it that even religious values can be clouded by 
racial prejudices. It has been said that it is alright to 
indulge in corruption for the benefit of one's own
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community”. Thus, communal or ethnic politics prevents the 
truth from being revealed. Social problems like corruption 
and fraud fail to get the attention they deserve as they are 
not examined critically. Without critical judgement, the 
development of a thinking society is also prevented.
2.1.4. The mixing of politics and business
Another distinguishing feature of the political system 
in Malaysia is that politics and business are mixed 
together. Political parties in Malaysia, especially the 
ruling coalition party, Barisan Nasional, set up companies 
which participate in a variety of economic ventures. The 
major companies of UMNO are Hatibudi and the Fleet Group; 
for the Malaysian Chinese Association, it is Multi-Purpose 
Holdings; and for the Malaysian Indian Congress, it is Maika 
Holdings. These companies have been around for some years. 
Conflict of interest is bound to take place when politics is 
mixed with business, even if the business deals are done 
legally and in a fair manner. For example, in the late 
1980s, the Barisan Nasional Government awarded the North- 
South Highway project to a virtually bankrupt company, 
United Engineers Malaysia, which was bought by Hatibudi, an 
investment arm of UMNO, just before the award. The conflict 
of interest was so obvious. UMNO leaders were definitely 
involved in the decision-making process and for such a huge 
project to be awarded to a company owned by their own 
political party was bound to generate suspicions and ill- 
feelings. Moreover, by getting involved in business, 
political parties would develop ties and relationships
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within the business network. When political parties or the 
individual politicians are involved in businesses, they have 
to deal with other private business people. This will expose 
the political parties to the temptation of "money politics" 
which Loh and Kahn defined as covering "a range of practices 
whereby the benefits of State economic sponsorship and 
protection are channelled to individuals, groups and private 
companies associated with the ruling political parties, in 
particular UMNO" (Kahn & Loh, 1992; 2). I would define
"money politics" as money used to 'buy' supporters and it is 
usually given by big businessmen or rich people with vested 
interests to politicians for their political career in 
return for securing favours, especially business favours. 
Whatever the definition is, it is clear that bribery and 
corruption are involved. The way the money is obtained is 
even worse than the political parties accepting donations 
openly from companies. The money is needed because political 
campaigns in Malaysia are very expensive. The following 
example will give an idea of how expensive it is to be a 
politician in Malaysia. When the then Vice-Presidents of 
UMNO, Musa Hitam and Tengku Razaleigh vied for the post of 
Deputy Prime Minister in 1981, each took blocks of rooms at 
leading hotels in Kuala Lumpur for the last few days before 
the party assembly and filled them with state delegates and 
supporters, all expenses paid. Musa won, but had to go 
through the same contest again in 1984. When he resigned as 
Deputy Prime Minister in 1986, he told the Prime Minister he 
had not wanted to contest again in 1984 because he "could 
not afford it" (FEER, 2/4/1987). Aspiring politicians with
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no money of their own are forced to play the game by the 
same rules when they compete with their opponents. If he has 
no money, he must have friends or a 'godfather' who does. It 
is not surprising that politicians will be tempted to accept 
'donations' for their career in whatever ways they are 
given. Once they win the election, they will be in a 
position to repay the favours and make a lot of money 
themselves. It was reported by Karim that some of the funds 
missing from the BMF scandal could have ended up with UMNO; 
"There was also widespread rumours that profits from BMF 
loans were to be syphoned back for the UMNO headquarters 
building fund has at least some basis in fact. After all, 
Hashim Shamsuddin was the then Treasurer of the UMNO 
headquarters building fund committee, of which Tengku 
Razaleigh was Chairman" (Karim, 1989; 106). In the micro 
section of this chapter, one of the reasons given by one of 
my interviewees as to why the Prime Minister did not take 
any action against Tengku Razaleigh was because George Tan 
had given donations to UMNO (see sec.1.2.5).
The Economist on 6 November 1993 said that "money 
politics" has become rampant in Malaysia. The article ended 
with a quote from Tengku Razaleigh, the ex-Finance Minister 
of Malaysia who is now the leader of the opposition party, 
Semangat '46, "Everything is on offer there (UMNO) - money, 
women, shares, company directorships. It's corrupt to the 
core" (The Economists, 6/11/1993).
Many politicians in Malaysia hold the roles of 
entrepreneurs in the course of their political career. In 
being entrepreneurs as well as taking part in the decision-
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making process of the country, the opportunities, both legal 
and illegal, which are opened to the politicians are 
extensive. For example, the then Finance Minister, Daim 
Zainuddin, had acquired control of the country's third 
largest bank, the United Malayan Banking Corporation, to the 
detriment of the state-owned investment corporation, Pernas. 
An article in the "Asian Wall Street Journal" on 30 April 
1986 showed the investment companies of the then Finance 
Minister, Daim Zainuddin, and his family completed the 
acquisition of a co-dominant stake in the United Malayan 
Banking Corporation months after he held the post (Aliran, 
1988; 224). It also showed how in mid 1985, the "companies 
quietly took outright control of the United Malayan Banking 
Corporation in a move that never has been publicly 
disclosed". The transaction suggested that the Minister had 
abused his official position. There was also evidence that 
he used his authority to make changes to Bank Negara's 
policies and banking laws in order to protect his family's 
takeover of the United Malayan Banking Corporation. Bank 
Negara announced a new policy prohibiting individuals or 
family-owned companies from owning more than 10% of the 
equity in a local bank only after the takeover, with Daim's 
companies becoming the major shareholder with 50.38% 
(Aliran, 1988; 226). The takeover by Daim's companies
resulted in Pernas, a State-owned corporation, losing its 
co-controlling interest in the United Malayan Banking 
Corporation. The takeover generated a lot of criticism as 
the interest of a State-owned corporation had been 
sacrificed for an individual.
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However, in October 1986, Aliran reported that Pernas 
had decided to acquire an 80% stake in the United Malayan 
Banking Corporation which was 50% more than what its 
original holding (Aliran; 1988; 248). Pernas did declare
much earlier on in June 1976 that one of its objectives was 
to have a commercial bank in its portfolio when it first 
acquired a 30% stake in the United Malayan Banking 
Corporation. If that was its objective, the question was why 
Pernas did not buy the United Malayan Banking Corporation 
shares when they were up for sale at a lower price in mid 
1985. Instead the Finance Minister's family companies bought 
them. Was it possible that Pernas was helping to bale out 
the family holding companies of the Finance Minister which 
were reported to be facing financial problems? If that was 
the reason, then there was a clear case of conflict of 
interest and abuse of power.
With the introduction of the New Economic Policy where 
the Government tried to upgrade the living standard of the 
Bumiputras as well as to eradicate poverty, funds allocated 
for projects created many opportunities for politicians and 
their cliques to make money. These opportunities benefit not 
only the Malays and other Bumiputras, but also non- 
Bumiputras, especially the politicians and the well- 
connected, in an indirect manner. As Ahmad Noordin, the 
leader of the Committee of Enquiry into the BMF case said 
during my interview with him, "Politics in Malaysia is the 
art of possible”. The BMF case is one good example where 
there was collaboration between Malays and non-Malays to 
defraud the bank.
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With the Malaysian Government presently undertaking the 
strategy of privatisation of public enterprises, there is a 
greater need to be vigilant over Government actions. The 
privatisation policy is certainly going to favour the rich 
and powerful. Mehmet had already warned that the new 
entrepreneurs of the privatised enterprises were selected by 
ruling elites preferentially, first and foremost on 
political grounds. For example, the award of a license to 
launch a commercial television network, TV3, in August 1983, 
was given to the Fleet Group, the chief investment arm of 
UMNO. Its parent company, Fleet Holdings, was headed by the 
then new Minister of Finance who was a close friend of the 
Prime Minister (Mehmet, 1986; 147). It is unfortunate
Malaysia does not seem to have any rule about conflict of 
interest. The result of privatisation is that the rich will 
get richer not through merit or fair competition, but by 
patronage and collusion with the Government. Public 
resources are channelled into projects which are said to be 
for wealth restructuring and eradication of poverty. 
However, many of these projects have been abused for self- 
enrichment which led to the widening of inequalities between 
as well as within ethnic groups.
Finally, it was an even bigger disappointment when 
Aliran reported on 30 June 1986 that the then Attorney- 
General, Abu Talib Othman, was made chairman of the 
Malaysian Building Society, a prominent financial 
institution controlled by the Government (Aliran, 1988; 
181) . Has the Attorney-General become an active member of 
the commercial world, too? Was that why he was so reluctant
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to handle the BMF case when it was his duty to do so because 
those people involved were politicians and business 
colleagues of his? Conflict of interest would no doubt occur 
and it is highly improper of the highest legal officer in 
the country to be involved in the commercial enterprise. 
Moreover, he should devote his time solely to his job which 
was a full time highly important one and to the Malaysian 
people instead of dividing his time for commercial 
purposes.
The above illustrations seek to show that there are 
vast opportunities to make money from the New Economic 
Policy by politicians and the communal politics practised in 
Malaysia can be used to help them cover-up their illegal 
dealings. Section 2.2 will discuss how political leaders can 
make use of certain 'tools' like legislations to cover-up 
their corrupt deals.
2.2. 'Tools' of the Government
2.2.1. Deflecting the attention of the public
The ruling political leaders of Malaysia have many 
tools to help them carry out their plans and policies. These 
tools also prove to be useful to politicians with vested 
interest. When the BMF case made headlines in 1983, the 
Government tried to deflect the attention of the public, for 
the simple reason that a few politicians were involved, by 
playing up the constitutional crisis over the powers of the 
Malay Rulers as explained in section 1 of chapter 3. The 
Government proposed to take away the privileges and 
immunities enjoyed by the Malaysian royal families. This
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issue obviously would attract a lot of attention from the 
public as the tradition of the Malay society is to give 
unquestioning allegiance to the monarch. Thus, the attention 
of the public was divided between the BMF case and the Malay 
Rulers crisis.
In early 1993, when Lorrain Osman was extradited to 
Hong Kong to stand trial for the BMF scandal, after being on 
remand at Pentonville and Brixton prisons in England for 
seven years, the issue of the privileges and immunities of 
the Malay royal families was brought up again. Is this 
coincidental or planned? The way the Government tried to 
cover-up the BMF case, by not taking any action, by refusing 
to establish a Royal Commission and refusing to publish the 
findings of the Committee of Enquiry, points to the fact 
that there might have been a conspiracy to deflect the 
attention of the public from the scandal by using the 
constitutional crisis issue (see sec.l, chap.3). The abuse 
of privileges and immunities by members of the royal 
families took priority in the local mass media while the 
trial of Lorrain Osman received minimum coverage. The local 
newspapers and other mass media cannot be blamed fully for 
the minimum coverage of the BMF case although M$2.5 bil. is 
still missing after ten years because dissenting news can be 
censored by the Government. Moreover, newspapers like Utusan 
Malaysia, Berita Harian, the New Straits Times and the 
television station, TV3, are owned by UMNO (Muzaffar, 1989; 
45) and Radio and Television Malaysia is owned by the 
Government.
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2.2.2. Publications Act and Printing Press Act
In early December 1987, the already restrictive 
Publications Act was further amended. The new Act gave the 
Minister of Home Affairs the right to determine what sort of 
news would ’'alarm public opinion”. The Act also prohibited 
the Judiciary from reviewing Government decisions on 
publication and printing licenses (Muzaffar, 1989; 73).
Malaysia also has the Printing Press Act which allows 
the Government to revoke the licenses of printing press at 
any time (Muzaffar, 1989; 515) . The Publications Act and the 
Printing Press Act, no doubt, will deter the publication of 
any dissenting view; one of these is the financial scandals 
of high ranking politicians.
2.2.3. Official Secrets Act
Besides the Printing Press Act and the Publications 
Act, there is also the Official Secrets Act which prevents 
vital information from getting to the public. In 1983, 
amendments to the Official Secrets Act (OSA) 1972 were 
introduced. These amendments coincided with the publication 
of detailed analysis of the BMF scandal by some regional 
journals like the "Asian Wall Street Journal" and the "Far 
Eastern Economic Review". The Act was amended again in 1986 
after more financial scandals were unearthed by regional 
publications. The Act replaced fines for offenders with a 
mandatory jail term ranging from one year to 14 years as 
penalties for those leaking official secrets. The "official 
secret" could be "any document specified in the Schedule and 
any information and material relating thereto and includes
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in any official document, information and material as may be 
classified as 'Top Secret', 'Secret', 'Confidential' or 
'Restricted', as the case may be, by a Minister, the Chief 
Minister of a State or such public officer appointed under 
section 2B". Section 2A goes on to say that, MThe Minister 
may, from time to time, by order, published in the Gazette, 
add to, delete from or amend any provisions of the Schedule 
hereto”. Thus, as Muzaffar pointed out, the classification 
could take place even after the data of that document had 
appeared in some magazine or newspaper (Muzaffar, 1989; 
132) . What is classified as "official secrets" is vague and 
extensive. People, especially civil servants, are so unsure 
of what information comes under the OSA that they tend to be 
over cautious and a lot of useful information has been 
withheld from the public. This was what I experienced when 
I tried to get data of employee fraud from the Malaysian 
Police Headquarters. The officer I was recommended to speak 
to refused to help me, going so far as to tell me not to let 
anyone know he had spoken to me. That delayed my field work 
as I had to obtain permission from the head of the 
Commercial Crime Department to have certain data released to 
me. The data that I needed were not under the OSA, but the 
officer I saw was over cautious. In a way, I could 
understand his predicament because section 7A of the OSA 
states that any person caught supplying information 
classified as "official secrets" to another person without 
reporting to a police officer of the rank of Inspector or 
above or the head of the department if he or she is a civil 
servant, could be guilty of an offence punishable with
imprisonment for a term not less than one year and not 
exceeding five years. Usually information that will give a 
bad image to the Government and its policies is used as a 
yardstick by the public as to what is an official secret.
Scandals like the BMF are brought to the attention of 
the public largely through investigative journalism. 
Investigative journalism is only possible if the freedom to 
investigate is there. The OSA will deny journalists that 
freedom. Some journalists had already been put behind bars 
under the OSA. For example, James Clad, the "Far Eastern 
Economic Review" Kuala Lumpur bureau Chief and Sabry Sharif 
of the New Straits Times were arrested under the OSA in 
1985. Sabry wrote an article on the Royal Malaysian Air 
Force's proposal to purchase four AWACS aircraft, based upon 
a purportedly secret document entitled "The RMAF Force 
Structure Study 1984" (Aliran, 1988; 103-104). The
Government can now dictate what is news to the public by 
screening out opposition viewpoints and promoting the image 
of national leaders in its own media, Radio Television 
Malaysia and, to a great extent, in the 'independent' press.
The amendments of the OSA in 1986 raised a lot of 
questions in the minds of the public. Why was it introduced 
at the time when financial scandals were rampant? What were 
the purposes of these changes in the Act? The majority of 
the public perceived that the wide coverage of the BMF 
scandal by the mass media was one of the main reasons for 
the amendments to the OSA. The amendments were attempts to 
cover-up any financial scandals which might tarnish the 
image of the Government and the upper class.
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Another reason that was given was that the Government 
was trying to take away some of the powers of the legal 
system. The Minister's certification of what is an "official 
secret” cannot be challenged in any Court of Law. Although 
the Judiciary would be unable to question the 
classification, it would still have to impose the mandatory 
jail term. The authority of the Judiciary has been weakened 
in this way and there is a fear that the trend would 
continue to take away the powers of the legal system.
When the public protested against the amendments of the 
OSA, certain politicians turned the protest into an ethnic 
issue. The Utusan Malaysia reported that on 26 November 
1986, the Barisan Nasional member of Parliament for Pulai, 
Mohamed Rahmat, cautioned the Malays to be wary of attempts 
by certain people to exploit the OSA issue with the aim of 
creating doubts about the "Malay Government”. He also said, 
"considering that the leadership of Government is Malay and 
the strength of the Government is derived from the Malays, 
any opposition to the OSA amendments can be viewed as a 
manoeuvre to challenge the Malay leadership and the Malays 
themselves” (Aliran, 1988; 133). The issue of the OSA is 
certainly not an ethnic issue, but there were unscrupulous 
politicians who would use it to their advantage, perhaps to 
gain more popularity with their people. The OSA affects both 
Malays and non-Malays. Protest against the OSA was from both 
the Malays and non-Malays. The OSA affects the people's 
right to know the truth, the public accountability of the 
Government, the increasing threat to the legal system and 
the increasing power of the Government. It has nothing to do
243
with ethnicity.
2.2.4. Sedition Act
Another Act that was amended was the Sedition Act 1948. 
It was amended in 1971 to protect the publication of 
material on four sensitive issues i.e. the sovereignty of 
the Malay Sultans, the "special rights" of the Malays, 
conditions of citizenship of the non-Malays and the position 
of Malay as the national language. Amendment to the Act on 
these sensitive issues was extended to cover members of 
Parliament and state legislatures, who previously had 
enjoyed special immunity from legal injunctions, for 
statements made during legislative sessions. This amendment 
was used to stop certain members of the opposition parties, 
most notably Lim Kit Siang and Fan Yew Teng of the
Democratic Action Party from questioning ethnic policies. 
Under the Sedition Act, sedition can be committed by
inciting disaffection against any ruler or government, 
inciting unlawful changes to any lawful matter, inciting 
contempt for the administration of justice, raising
discontent among the people, promoting ill-will between 
races and classes and questioning any of the sensitive
issues (Lent, 1984; 455).
2.2.5. Internal Security Act and the creation of racial 
tension
Another powerful tool of the Government to prevent 
dissident views is the infamous Internal Security Act (ISA) 
1960. The ISA allows the State to detain people without
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trial for any length of time. The ISA could give the 
Government unlimited powers to rule by decree without any 
restraint imposed on these powers. The amendment to Article 
150 empowered the King to make declarations of "emergency 
even before the actual occurrence of an event if he was 
satisfied there was imminent danger of it taking place". 
Police and security forces are given wide ranging powers of 
search and arrest, based on hearsay and suspicion and the 
detention of persons in the first 60 days for investigation. 
This can be followed by a confirmed two-year detention, 
based on allegations extracted from investigations without 
any trial in court and further extension of detention every 
two years at the discretion of the Minister of Home Affairs, 
on the recommendation of the Advisory Board and the Special 
Branch. The original aim of the Act was to check communist 
subversion during the colonial period. But, over the years, 
it has also been employed to detain non-communist opponents 
of the government. The surveillance is now not only on the 
political opponents, but also on public interest groups, 
professional associations, trade unions, academics and vocal 
Government critics. This Act has instilled fears among the 
public to voice out their opinions and dissatisfactions.
According to Amnesty International, "The Malaysian 
political system has been characterised by a marked 
inflexibility and intolerance towards political parties and 
groupings who have tried to organise themselves on a non- 
communal basis, or who have threatened the political 
monopoly of UMNO, the Malaysian Chinese Association or the 
Malaysian Indian Congress within their respective
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communities. Although there are some very small non-communal 
parties within the National Front (Barisan Nasional) 
Government, these are of almost no significance in the 
political life of the country” (Lent, 1984; 448).
In the 1960s, the multi-racial, left-wing Labour Party 
was hard hit by arrests of hundreds of its members, some of 
whom (at least 22) were still in detention in the late 
1970s. In 1969, the Labour Party boycotted the elections in 
protest against the arrest and detention of its members. By 
the early 1970s, the party ceased to exist, partly as a 
result of the arrests it suffered. In the 1970s, leading 
members of Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaya (Malaya People's 
Socialist Party) were detained under the ISA, among them, 
two state assemblymen were arrested after boycotting a visit 
to the state of Pahang by the then Prime Minister, Tun 
Razak. One served nearly four years in detention and the 
other, nine months. In November 1974, Syed Husin Ali, a 
University of Malaya anthropologist, was detained, followed 
in November 1976, by the Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaya's 
chairman, Kassim Ahmad and the Muslim youth leader, Anwar 
Ibrahim. Local leaders of the Muslim opposition party, 
Partai Islam SeMalaysia, were detained after peasant 
demonstrations in Kedah in 1980 and leaders of the Airlines 
Employees Union were arrested after industrial action taken 
by workers of the Malaysian Airline System in 1978-79. The 
Secretary-General of the opposition party (Democratic Action 
Party) , Lim Kit Siang and members of Parliament, Chan Kok 
Kit and Chian Heng Kai, have been arrested under the ISA. 
Even members of the Government were not exempted as two
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deputy ministers, Abdullah Ahmad and Abdullah Majid, 
together with the editor of the New Straits Times, Samad 
Ismail, discovered when they found themselves on the wrong 
side in a factional struggle in 1976 (Crouch, 1992; 24).
Between 1960 and 1981, more than 3,000 people were 
detained under the ISA although most were eventually 
released. In the late 1970s, there were some 900 detainees, 
but the number fell to 586 when Mahathir Mohamad became 
Prime Minister in 1981. Under Mahathir the number fell 
rapidly to only 40 at the end of 1986 (Crouch, 1992; 23). 
However, on 27 October 1987, the ISA was used extensively 
again by the Government. By mid November, at least 106 
leaders and members of political parties, public interest 
groups, academics, cultural organizations, trade unions, 
environmental group as well as religious associations were 
behind bars. The Government's justification for the mass 
arrests was that those detained were creating ethnic 
tensions which could jeopardise national security and ethnic 
harmony. At the same time, three popular newspapers, the 
Star, Wat an and Sin Chew Jit Poh were suspended by the 
Minister of Home Affairs who was also the Prime Minister of 
Malaysia. Their publishing licenses were suspended on 28 
October 1987 for almost five months (Muzaffar, 1989; 178). 
The three newspapers were suspended because they were 
playing up ethnic issues. However, some members of the 
ruling party, who played a major role in creating the racial 
tension, were not detained.
How did this ethnic tension happen? There were a few 
issues which were interpreted as communal issues causing the
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Among them were: 
the Melaka Government introduced a development 
plan for the Chinese burial ground on Bukit Cina 
or Chinese Hills. This was taken by the Chinese 
community as a threat to its culture and heritage; 
whether the Government should rescue the Deposit- 
Taking Co-operatives (which will be discussed in 
Chapter 5) which went broke and where many low 
income Chinese invested their money; 
the placing of non-Mandarin speaking Chinese 
administrators in Chinese primary schools was seen 
as an attempt to annihilate the Chinese language 
and Chinese education. Moreover, if this 
emplacement took place, it was feared that in 
future, Malay administrators might be selected 
instead of Chinese ones;
the reported Christianisation of the Malays who 
were Muslims by missionary activities. There was 
no proof of this allegation, but it did create an 
uproar among the Malays;
Islamic deviationist groups and Parti Islam 
SeMalaysia, the opposition party, had established 
a clandestine organisation called Jundullah which 
meant Allah's army on 29 August 1987. Its purpose 
was "to set up an Islamic administration in 
Malaysia through militant action. It was also to 
be the saviour of the Muslims should racial riots 
break out" (Muzaffar,1989; 172). 
the Indians were unhappy over the change in the
composition of courses offered in their mother 
tongue, Tamil, at the local University;
7. the existence of a Marxist or Communist group 
which propagated anti-Government views. There was 
no proof as to the existence of this group.
These issues created a lot of tension among the 
different ethnic groups in the country. Gatherings by 
different ethnic groups were held, without any restraint 
from the police, to air communal sentiments. The situation 
became very tense when the coalition parties in power, i.e. 
the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the 
Malaysian Chinese Association and the Malaysian Indian 
Congress, began to attack each other openly regarding these 
issues. UMNO and its youth wing organised a large rally 
where banners and posters, which had derogatory remarks 
aimed at a particular race and a particular leader, were 
used, leading to the eventual removal of the title of 
'Datuk' (equivalent to the British title of 'Sir') from a 
Chinese party leader by the Sultan of Selangor. All these 
incidents escalated the tensions which were already 
simmering and the general public feared that another May 13 
racial riot (see chapter 1) might break out. The Government 
leaders must have known that such gatherings would only 
aggravate the already tense situation and yet, they did not 
do anything to stop them. They did not try to calm down the 
situation, allay the fears of the people or even ban racial 
gatherings. As Muzaffar pointed out, "perhaps certain 
individuals wanted the situation to develop in a certain
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direction. It gave them the excuse to arrest a whole array 
of individuals - which is exactly what happened on Oct 27" 
(Muzaffar, 1989; 213) . The main reason given by Muzaffar why 
these individuals wanted racial tension to occur was to 
deflect the attention of the public from corruption scandals 
among the high ranking politicians. The use of the ISA was 
to instill fear among Malaysian citizens so that they would 
not question and pry into the actions of these politicians. 
Muzaffar's argument cannot be dismissed lightly. If the 
whole issue is analyzed carefully and critically, there is 
plausibility in the statement he made.
Firstly, most major financial scandals in Malaysia were 
exposed or pursued by journalists, political opponents, 
public interest groups, academics and social critics. The 
local newspapers, too, were playing their role by keeping 
the public informed of major scandals in Malaysia and some 
even carried out their own investigations and analysis of 
these scandals. The coverage of the BMF case in the early 
1980s would testify to that. As discussed in section 1 of 
Chapter 3 and section 1.2.8 of this chapter, the Government 
did not want the public to know of the existence of the 
scandal. It went to considerable lengths to conceal the 
truth as high ranking politicians were involved. When the 
"Asian Wall Street Journal" first published the scandal, the 
Government still denied that anything was wrong. However, 
the truth could not always be concealed. The Government 
finally decided to set up a limited Committee of Enquiry to 
investigate the case instead of a Royal Commission which the 
general public called for. When the Committee of Enquiry had
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finished its investigation, the Government was still trying 
to be difficult by not publishing the report so that the 
general public would know the truth. The Government's 
actions were really suspicious. Why was it so afraid that 
the public would know the truth? What was it trying to hide? 
The simple reason was that prominent public figures were 
involved in the scandal. The then Finance Minster and Deputy 
Prime Minister were implicated in the report. That was why 
the Government took a very authoritarian stand by invoking 
the Official Secrets Act (OSA) . The OSA might not allow 
vital information from getting to the public, but it could 
not stop journalists, political opponents, public interest 
groups, academics and social critics from voicing their 
discontent. The other alternative would be to use to ISA to 
frighten these people into keeping their mouth shut or else, 
lock them up.
Secondly, racial tension could be created by 
politicians to deflect the truth concerning politicians' 
involvement in major financial scandals from the public. The 
events leading to the October 27 clampdown occurred at the 
same time as major financial scandals involving politicians 
of the different ethnic groups were rampant, for example, 
the BMF, Pan-El, Deposit-Taking Cooperatives, United Malayan 
Banking Corporation, EPF-Makuwasa, Sports Toto, United 
Engineers and Fleet properties (Muzaffar, 1989; 42). If the 
racial issues, discussed earlier, which created the racial 
tension, were to be analyzed, a few discrepancies could be 
found. How was it that these issues were not discussed at 
grassroots level first i.e. between representatives of the
251
different ethnic groups instead of just declaring them 
publicly when the idea cropped up, for example, the issue 
relating to the Chinese burial ground? The State authority 
must have realised that development of the burial ground 
without consulting the Chinese community was really asking 
for trouble. It was equivalent to taking over the sacred 
burial grounds of the Red Indian communities in America. It 
was a blatantly insensitive thing to do. Perhaps it was done 
deliberately to create some discontent, but with no actual 
intention to implement the plan. If that was the case, they 
certainly did a good job. The Chinese community was 
extremely upset over the plan as ancestor worship is a very 
important feature in their culture.
Moreover, accusations made by the Government about the 
Christianisation of the Malays and the existence of Marxist 
or Communist groups were groundless. This leads one to think 
that these issues were created rather than real. Again, the 
Government did a good job in inciting racial sentiments with 
these accusations. Was Muzaffar right then in his theory 
that racial sentiments were played up to deflect issues of 
financial scandals? The question is whether the Government 
would have been prepared to risk a racial riot to cover-up 
financial scandals? I believe the answer is unfortunately 
yes. Of course not all politicians are corrupt or will play 
on racial sentiments for vested interests. Unfortunately, 
there are a few who will and who are powerful enough to do 
that to save their own skin. They have been cunning enough 
and manipulative enough to play on the sentiments of the 
majority of the general public. They will take advantage of
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the historical development of the political situation in 
Malaysia i.e. communal politics and will try to preserve 
this development for their own interest. As long as these 
people are around, communal politics will always exist in 
Malaysia and the different ethnic groups will never be 
united. The October 27 incident shows clearly the power of 
ethnic arguments to move the sentiments of the public. The 
issue could be anything so long as it is communal. The 
October 27 clampdown also reveals to the public the powerful 
tool the Government has in the form of the ISA in order to 
curb dissents. It is so easy for the Government to create 
ethnic tension and then use the ISA to control the public. 
As the ex-leader of Aliran, an informal movement for 
freedom, justice and solidarity, Muzaffar, put it, "If the 
growth of democratic awareness threatens someone's power, 
the ethnic argument can be pushed to the forefront to curb 
all debate and dissent. If some of the malpractice and 
wrongdoing of the elite are about to be exposed, all that a 
Machiavellian politician has to do is to engineer an ethnic 
crisis in order to keep his group in power. If a leader's 
position is threatened by competing cliques and factions, he 
can always attempt to consolidate his power by manipulating 
ethnic apprehensions to his advantage" (Muzaffar, 1989; 
159) .
Of course, I am not denying the fact that the public 
have to be blamed, too, for allowing themselves to be 
manipulated easily by dishonest politicians with the 
communal issues. Other politicians, who may not be involved 
in any financial scandals, may still take advantage of the
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situation for their political career as they hope they will 
be seen as their communities' champions and defenders of 
their rights.
The OSA which was amended in 1983 i.e. after the BMF 
scandal was uncovered and the implementation of the ISA in 
1987 discouraged Malaysian citizens from seeking the truth 
and justice. In fact, it has instilled fear in the people 
about discussing "sensitive issues", including political 
corruption and fraud. Even today, the truth of the BMF case 
is not known and even more disappointing is that the 
Malaysian public either do not want to discuss it or else 
they have forgotten that M$2.5 bil. of their money is still 
missing.
The Police Act was also amended in December 1987, i.e. 
after the October 27 clampdown, which curbed the freedom of 
assembly as police licenses would now be required for all 
manner of assemblies.
2.2.6. The Anti-corruption Agency
One more tool which politicians have to instill fear in 
somebody is, sadly, the Anti-corruption Agency, an agency 
with supposedly independent power, set up to control 
corruption in the country. Its role is similar to that of 
the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) of Hong 
Kong. It can choose to act on complaints, including 
anonymous ones, made by the public. If a person wants to 
discredit another person, he or she could inform the Anti­
corruption Agency to start an investigation of that person. 
Whether the person is guilty or not is not the issue. The
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purpose is to discredit and intimidate him or her. The 
misuse of the Anti-corruption Agency is quite blatant as 
even honest academics who have spoken out have been visited 
by the Anti-corruption Agency, for example, Syed Hussein 
Alatas, the ex-Vice Chancellor of University of Malaya. The 
Anti-corruption Agency does not seem to realise that its 
power has been misused or does it? Perhaps it is not that 
independent after all. Perhaps that was why it did not 
involve itself with the BMF case when the report of the 
Committee of Enquiry and the article in the "Asian Wall 
Street Journal” clearly showed certain individuals to be 
corrupted. As Lim Kit Siang, the leader of the opposition 
party, the Democratic Action Party, commented, the Anti­
corruption Agency had been used as "a shield to protect 
corruption.. .in high places” (FEER, 9/9/1993) . The effort of 
the Anti-corruption Agency has clearly been misdirected. It 
should not just concentrate on the small fish, it should 
also concentrate on the big ones. As the saying goes, "Big 
or small, catch them all”.
3. Conclusion
In conclusion, political opponents, public interest 
groups, professional associations, trade unions, academics, 
vocal Government critics and to a certain extent the 
Judiciary will not be able to play their role with integrity 
with the existence of all the above Government tools of 
repression, especially the OSA and the ISA. There is a joke 
among the Malaysian academics i.e. "you are free to talk, 
but once you talk, you are not free any more". The
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newspapers will also not be able to publish any dissident 
views freely as their circulations depend very much on the 
powers of the Government. The consequence to Malaysian 
citizens is that truth and justice will not always prevail. 
Moreover, with the decline in dissident views, the ruling 
elite will become even more powerful and authoritarian. The 
ruling elite seems to dictate what the citizens of Malaysia 
should know. Thus, the Malaysian citizens will never be able 
to know, in depth, what the Government has done, whether it 
is right or wrong and whether it is beneficial or 
destructive to the country. The tools provide a shield for 
inefficiency, negligence, maladministration, corruption and 
fraud by politicians and Government officials. Public 
accountability by the Government in the true sense of the 
word is lost. Democracy cannot be safeguarded if vital 
information is kept within the confines of the Government. 
The truth of the matter is that the Malaysian Government 
seems to tolerate corruption and fraud in the country. The 
Government has never seemed to really be concerned with the 
eradication of corruption and fraud in the country even 
though the country has lost billions of Malaysian dollars 
through large financial scandals. One plausible reason is 
that some of the top Government officials are corrupt and 
have been defrauding the public. The slogans of "a clean, 
efficient and trustworthy government" and "leadership by 
example", adopted by the present ruling party during the 
1982 elections, were not practised over the years. The most 
obvious example is the way the BMF case has been handled. 
The Government actually tried to prevent the public from
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knowing the details of the case. Sadly, the Government was 
backed by the Attorney-General of Malaysia who could be a 
business colleagues of these unscrupulous businessmen and 
politicians (see chapter 3).
The above facts are more than enough to justify the 
conclusion that there was a cover-up for the BMF case 
involving high ranking politicians. On 5 March 1992, the 
"Far Eastern Economic Review" (FEER) reported that Lorrain 
Osman's counsel, Martin Thomas, claimed in the High Court in 
London that charges brought against Lorrain Osman were part 
of a cover-up organised by the Hong Kong, Malaysian and 
British Governments to deflect attention from those really 
responsible for the BMF affair. He claimed that documents 
had been "locked in a safe" and withheld from him and his 
defence team. One of the document was a minute of meeting 
held between Chooi Mun Sou (a member of the Committee of 
Enquiry) with Hong Kong's then financial secretary, John 
Brembridge. The minute written by Chooi and obtained from 
the Malaysian Courts stated that Brembridge had said bluntly 
(which he denied) that, "a cover-up was going on in 
Malaysia". The document referred to the then Minister of 
Finance, Tengku Razaleigh. It also mentioned an 
"intervention to stop the use of documents of BMF in the 
Lorrain Osman's trials by another Malaysian minister through 
London" (FEER, 5/3/1992) . The fact that Martin Thomas 
claimed it did not mean he believed it or that it had 
substance. It should be noted that the defence counsel does 
not have to believe the truth of the allegations he or she 
put forward on behalf of his or her client. However, there
is independent evidence to support this allegation. This 
allegation was supported by "The Lorrain Osman Appeal 
Committee in Britain" which reported that, at the heights of 
the BMF scandal, the Malaysian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
"ask[ed] or demand[ed], that the United Kingdom authorities 
instruct the Hong Kong authorities to limit the scope of the 
evidence in the murder trial, and end any investigation of 
BMF, the subsidiary in Hong Kong" (LOAC, 1992; 12). This 
fact was found in a letter dated 1 September 1983, written 
by Ibrahim, the General Manager of BMF, in which an account 
of a meeting between the United Kingdom High Commissioner in 
Malaysia and the Malaysian Minister for Foreign Affairs was 
given (see Appendix 4.2) . The Lorrain Osman Appeal Committee 
also said that the file on BMF was then closed and at the 
murder trial of Jalil Ibrahim, certain portions of one of 
the confessions made by the murderer, 24 pages in all, never 
appeared (LOAC, 1992; 12). Martin Thomas also made the same 
allegation that 24 pages of statements made by the convicted 
murderer Mak Foon Than and Jalil's (the murdered BBMB 
auditor) letters and notes were withheld (FEER, 5/3/1992).
The then Foreign Minister, Ghazali Shafie, had admitted 
he had in July 1983 given "friendly advice" to the British 
Government not to use BMF documents which were procured 
during the investigation of the murder of Jalil Ibrahim, the 
Assistant General Manager of BMF, for the investigation into 
the Carrian affair (Lim, 1983; 21).
Why would the Government of the United Kingdom and Hong 
Kong agree to the request of the Malaysian Government not to 
release these documents? These documents were 150 telexes
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sent between the British, Hong Kong and Malaysian 
Governments. They were never produced in court because two 
Ministers, Lord Caithness and Francis Maude, signed the 
Public Interest Immunity orders whereby these documents 
could not be circulated outside Parliament without breaching 
the immunity (Daily Mail, 3/2/1994). The Times also alleged 
that Douglas Hurd, the Foreign Secretary, also signed the 
order (The Times, 25/2/1994) . This was the first time the 
British Government had used such certificates to prevent 
disclosure of Government documents in the case (Financial 
Times, 5-6/2/1994; The Sunday Times, 13/3/1994). The recent 
Pergau Dam affair (1994) between the British Government and 
the Malaysian Government has thrown some light into the 
case. The history of the Pergau Dam issue began in the early 
1980s when the Malaysian Government decided to implement the 
"Buy British Last” policy after the British Government 
decided to raise the fees of Malaysian students to the 
status of overseas fees. Margaret Thatcher, the then Prime 
Minister of Britain, wanted this policy to end and resume a 
trading relationship with Malaysia. In September 1988, she 
went to Malaysia to have a meeting with Mahathir Mohamad, 
Prime Minister of Malaysia. A memorandum of understanding on 
£1 bil. of British arms sales was agreed and the "Buy 
British Last" policy was ended. One of the conditions of the 
understanding was alleged to be the giving of £234 mil. in 
aid for the building of the Pergau dam in Malaysia which led 
to an outcry by the British public, press and opposition 
parties that aid should not be linked to arms deals (The 
Times, The Sunday Times, The Independent, the Daily Mail,
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February-March, 1994). Another condition was alleged to be 
linked to the BMF case i.e. the suppression of the 150 
telexes mentioned above. This allegation was brought up by 
Alex Carlile, the Liberal Democrat Member of Parliament for 
Montgomery (The Sunday Times, 13/3/1994), Robert Parry, 
Labour Member of Parliament for Liverpool Riverside 
(Financial Times, 5-6/2/1994), Lorrain Osman (The Sunday 
Times, 13/3/1994), Kua Kia Soong, an opposition leader in 
the Malaysian Parliament (Daily Mail, 3/2/1994) and the 
Lorrain Osman Appeal Committee (LOAC, 1992). Documents 
obtained by the Sunday Times (13/3/1994) supported the 
allegation that Lorrain Osman was the victim of a cover-up 
designed to disguise the involvement of Malaysian 
politicians. These documents also suggested that British 
officials realised what was going on, but were under 
pressure not to jeopardise relations with Malaysia. (I have 
access to some of these documents. However, I am not allowed 
to enclose them in my thesis. These documents will be shown 
to my examiners on the day of my viva voce.) One of the 
telexes was from David Gillmore, the then High Commissioner 
to Malaysia and now head of the diplomatic service, who told 
the Foreign Office that a legal team from Hong Kong had 
arrived to interview witnesses and that "we have briefed 
them on some of the political background” (The Sunday Times, 
13/3/1994) . Another one was from Edward Youde, the then 
Governor of Hong Kong, who warned of a visit to London by 
Malaysian officials in relation to the Lorrain Osman case. 
He stated that given the pressures they must be under in 
their own country, it could not be assumed it was "only the
interests of justice” they had in mind (The Sunday Times, 
13/3/1994). The Pergau Dam affair has thrown some light 
into the question of why the British Government were so 
willing to suppress the documents which could have freed 
Lorrain Osman. The reason was purely monetary i.e multi­
million or billion pounds of deals were at stake for the 
British Government and British industries. The question that 
was always asked was whether all the three authorities of 
Malaysia, Hong Kong and the United Kingdom knew the facts 
and truths of the BMF scandal. The answer has to be 'yes' 
after the Pergau Dam affair.
This turn of events is worrying as there seems to be an 
international conspiracy to suppress the truth. It should 
not be forgotten that even the French Government refused to 
cooperate by extraditing Rais Saniman, the alternate 
Director of BMF. If such measures could be taken by the 
Government at an international level, then a conspiracy to 
defraud the people with the cooperation of different 
Governments in future is also possible at an international 
level for their own personal monetary gain. With the 
sophistication of technology these days allowing different 
countries to have closer and more frequent contacts with 
each other, a higher level type of fraud is possible and 
could increase. I would call these frauds "global frauds” 
i.e. frauds taken on an international perspective with the 
cooperations of people including Governments from different 
countries. This could also lead to what I will call 
"imperialism in international fraud" i.e. when a few 
Governments cooperate to defraud other Governments. This is
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a thought which is not within the scope of this thesis, but 
nevertheless, it is a worrying phenomenon and should be 
pointed out so that research could be carried out in the 
near future.
The events recounted in chapter four have given a lot 
of food for thought to all Malaysian citizens. Perhaps also 
for people from countries with similar political background. 
I hope Malaysians reading this thesis will use this as an 
academic exercise and not to be misconstrued as criticising 
any particular race. I also wish that Malaysians who have 
read this thesis will start to analyze and be critical of 
governmental policies. It is high time we reflect openly 
whether the existing policies have really been beneficial to 
the country as a whole. It is one of the intentions of this 
thesis to make the Malaysian citizens more aware and 
interested in the underlying intentions of the Government 
policies and not just accept them at face value. If we are 
not careful, we may end up with a very authoritarian 
Government. The threat is real enough when the Prime 
Minister could sack the Lord President (Chief Justice) in 
July 1988. The reason behind this was that the judiciary had 
delivered judgements unfavourable to the Government. For 
example, in 1986, an attempt to expel journalists from the 
"Asian Wall Street Journal" was disallowed and in 1987, a 
judge found that the Home Affairs ministry had erred in 
refusing to allow the critical journal, Aliran, to publish 
in Malay. The Prime Minister was particularly outraged when 
a judge ordered the release of the opposition party 
(Democratic Action Party) leader detained under the ISA on
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the ground that the detention order was "made without proper 
care, caution and a proper sense of responsibility” (Crouch, 
1992; 27). In March 1988, the Prime Minister decided to 
amend the constitution with the intention, as he put it, 
"judges apply the law made by Parliament and not make their 
own laws as is happening now” (Crouch, 1992; 26). Then, in 
May 1988, the Yang di-Pertuan Agung (King of Malaysia) 
together with the Prime Minister laid charges of "gross 
misconduct” against the Lord President who was dismissed in 
July following a judicial inquiry. Similar charges were also 
brought against five Supreme Court judges resulting in the 
dismissal of two (Crouch, 1992; 26). The power of the
judiciary in Malaysia has greatly weakened. If the trend 
continues, Malaysia is definitely heading towards an 
authoritarian Government, especially when it has the 'tools' 
to help it stay in power.
In conclusion, I believe that one of the pre-conditions 
of eradicating corruption and fraud in Malaysia, especially 
at the political level, is to get rid of communal politics 
and ideology. People of Malaysia should be re-educated to be 
non-communal in their outlook. Malaysia also needs highly 
ethical leaders to implement just policies in the country 
and also with the courage to eradicate corruption and fraud. 
Muzaffar argued that, "If unethical professionals, 
executives and entrepreneurs can flourish, it is partly 
because our political leadership lacks the will to deal with 
them effectively... More than that, there is even the 
suspicion that some of our leaders are unable to act against 
those involved in the various scandals because they are not
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entirely free from blemish either. It is a truism that to 
root out corruption in any social system the crusaders 
against the scrouge must not be tainted in any way” 
(Muzaffar, 1989; 158) • There had been widespread speculation 
among the public during the BMF case why the Prime Minister 
did not use the opportunity to bring down Tengku Razaleigh 
(who was implicated in the report of the Committee of 
Enquiry) who had become the leader of the new opposition 
party, Semangat '46,? Could it be related to what Muzaffar 
had said i.e. the Prime Minister himself was guilty, too? 
With this unanswered question, I conclude chapter four.
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Appendix 4.1
PENINSULAR MALAYSIA:
RATIO OF MEAN AND MEDIUM INCOMES, 1070-79 
($ per household per month)
m constant 1970 prices ; In eurrent prices
1970 1973 1976 1979
Annual
growth
rate,
1971-9
(%) 1973 1976 1979
Annual
growth
rate,
1971-9
(%)
Annual growth 
rate (1971-9) 
mean Income 
of bottom 4% 
(%)
Malay mean 172 • 209 237 309 6.7 242 346 613 12.9 10.6
Median 120 141 160 200 6.8 163 233 332 .12.0
ratio 1.43 1.48 1.48 1.65 1.16 1.08
Chinese mean 394 461 . 640 669 6.9 634 787 1,094 12.0 8.4
median 268 29Q 329 383 4.1 343 480 636 10.1
ratio 1.47 1.66 1.64 1.72 1.44 1.19
Indian mean 304 362 369 467 4.9 408 638 778 11.0 0.9
median 194 .239 247 314 6.6 277 360 522 11.6
ratio 1.67 1.47 1.49 1.49 0.89 0.96
Others mean 813 1,121 870 1,132 3.8 1,299 1,268 1,881 9.8 14.8
median 260 306 270 331 3.2 3*6 394 660 0.2
ratio 3.26 3.66 3.22 3.42 1.19 1.07
All mean 264 313 363 469 6.3 362 614 763 12.6 10.6
median 166 196 216 270 6.6 227 313 449 11.7
ratio 1.69 1.60 1.64 1.70 1.13 1.07
Urban mean 428 492 669 675 612 670 830 1,121 11.3
median 266 297 340 368 3.7 346 495 611 9.7
ratio 1.62 1.66 1-.67 1.83 1.41 1.16
Rural mean 200 233 269 365 6.6 269 392 690 12.8
median 130 169 180 230 6.8 184 262 382 11.9
ratio 1.44 1.47 1.49 1.64 1.14 1.08
Source: 4MP: p. 37 Table 3.3
p. 06, Tabla 3.9
Derived from Post Enumeration Survey of 1970 Population and Housing Centui, Houithold Income Survey 1973, Labour Force 
Survey 1974 (referenoe 1973), Agriculture Cemui 1977 (referenoe 1976) end Labour Force Survey 1960 {reference 1079)
Source: Jomo, 1983; 53.
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Our R e f .  J716 PRIVATE fc CONFIDENTIAL
September 1, 1983 ^   V-
U r .  Wong Aun Pbui  
Ad viso r
Bank Bumiputra  M a la y s ia  Berbad  
Head O f f i c e
Kuala  Lumpur. c . c .  U r .  L .E .  Osman
Y .B .  D a to '  Hashim Shamsudia
Dear Mr. Wong,
On th e  30th  August 1983. I r e c e iv e d  a phone c a l l  from th e  
ICAC, i . e .  Independent Commission A g a in s t  C o r r u p t io n ,  and 
was asked co r e t u r n  c a l l  to  them u r g e n t ly  l a t e s t  5 .0 0  p .m . on
t h a t  day o r  a t  9 .0 0  a.m. th e  f o l lo w in g  m orn ing .
On 3 0 s t  August 1983 I  c a l l e d  to  th e  ICAC h ea d q u a rte rs  a t
1 0 .3 0  a.m. and t h i s  t ime I  took a lon g  my i n s t r u c t i n g  s o l i c i t o r ,
Mr. M ich ae l Yeung and ny J u n io r  C o un se l ,  U r .  Anthony Neoh.
The in t e r v ie w  la s te d  u n t i l  1 2 .3 0  p.m. in  th e  a f te rn o o n  as 
I had a lunch appointm ent w i t h  th e  M a lays ian  Commissioner in  
Hong Kong. The i n t e r v ie w  was req ues ted  to  end a t  t h a t  t im e  
in  o rd e r  f o r  me to  keep my appointm ent w i t h  th e  M a la y s ia n  
Commissioner. I went back t o g e th e r  w i th  th e  o t h e r  two peop le  
to  th e  ICAC h ead qu arte rs  a t  3 p.m. and th e  whole i n t e r v i e w  
la s te d  u n t i l " 5 .3 0  p.m. in  th e  a f te r n o o n .  T h is  i n t e r v i e w  
concerned a loan we had g iven  to  Mr. T r e v o r  Bedford  and s in c e  
the ICAC f e l t  t h a t  I cou ld  a s s is t  them in  t h e i r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  
o f  Mr. Bedford and as a c c o r d in g ly  adv ised  by th e  l e g a l  counse l  
I had to  co o pera te  and to  in fo rm  the  ICAC a l l  I  knew about  
th a t  loan and s in c e  I had to  t a k e  an o a th  o r  an a f f i r m a t i o n  t h e r e  
was no way th a t  I could  r e s e r v e  my r i g h t  but  a l l  q ues t io ns  
had to  be answered under t h a t  p ro v is io n . .  In  case I d id  not  
do so I cou ld  be sentenced  to  one years  imprisonm ent and f i n e  o f  
HK$20 ,0 0 0 .0 0 .
As t h i s  loan was s e t t l e d  in  e a r l y  1981 t h e r e  was a problem o f  
remembering the d e t a i l s  b u t  p h o to s ta t  d e t a i l s  were sub seq u ent ly  
g iv e n  to  me by th e  ICAC, hence r e c o l l e c t i o n  o f  d e t a i l s  was 
f i n a l l y  o b ta in e d  as a r e s u l t  o f  th e  p ro d u c t io n  o f  documents  
I n o t ic e d ,  which I brought to  th e  c o u n s e l ’ s a t t e n t i o n ,  t h a t  th e  
p h o to s ta t  copies  o f  c e r t a i n  documents o f  t h i s  loan had th e  
Commercial Crime B ureau ’ s chop on them and a ls o  the  compliment  
s l i p  from the Commissioner o f  S e c u r i t i e s .  T h is  con firm ed  my 
e a r l i e r  re p o r t  to  you whereby I  had Suggested , even though th e  
p o l i c e  had re -a s s u r e d  o ur  counsel t h a t  the  f i l e s  a re  to  be 
c o n f i d e n t i a l l y  kept  by them, i t  was obvious from here  t h a t  th e  
Hong Kong p o l ic e  had been d i s t r i b u t i n g  photo cop ies  o f  our  
documents d e f i n i t e l y  to  a t  l e a s t  two government departm ents
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( 1 )  The Commissioner o f S e c u r i t i e s  and ( 2 )  the ICAC, and the  
way th e  Cocraissioner of B an k in g 's  in s p e c to rs  were as k in g  q u e s t io n s ,  
i t  was obvious t h a t  the p o l i c e  had a lso  s e n t  c e r t a i n  documents  
to  th e  Commissioner of Banking.
Du rin g  my lunch w i th  the M alays ian  Commissioner in  Hong Kong 
1 was in fo rm ed  t h a t  the M alays ian  government through o u r  
M i n i s t e r  o f  E x t e r n a l  A f f a i r s  had summoned the  B r i t i s h  H igh  
Commissioner in  M alays ian  and in form ed him o f  th e  M a la y s ia n  
governm ent's  d is p le a s u re  on the way the Hong Kong government  
departm ents  were h an d l in g  t h is  murder case and th e  way o u r  
employees in  Hcng Kong had s u f f e r e d  as a r e s u l t .  I  was a ls o  
in form ed t h a t  the M i n i s t e r  of E x te r n a l  A f f a i r s  had t o l d  th e  
B r i t i s h  High Commissioner in  M a la y s ia  to  la y  o f f  t h i s  harassm ent  
o f  o u r  s t a f f  and o ur  o f f i c e  in  Hongkong. Subsequent to  t h a t ,  
the  B r i t i s h  High Commission in M a la y s ia  had p a id  a n o th e r  v i s i t  
to  o ur M i n i s t e r  o f  E x t e r n a l  A f f a i r s  to  r e p o r t  t h a t  c e r t a i n  
measure were taken in  o r d e r  not to  g iv e  us too much problem in  
Hongkong. The f i r s t  m eeting  between the  M i n i s t e r  o f  E x t e r n a l  
A f f a i r s  and th e  B r i t i s h  High Commission too k  p la c e  on 1 5 th  
August 1983, but from th e  way t h in g s  were moving a f t e r  th e  
15th August 1983, i t  gave me the  im p ress ion  t h a t  the  B r i t i s h  
government had not beer, responding  too w e l l  to  th e  M a la y s ia n  
government's  d i r e c t i v e .
I t  i s  s u r p r is in g  to  hear from the  M alays ian  Commissioner in  
Hong Kong t h a t  c e r t a i n  Hongkong government o f f i c i a l s  had been 
in d ic a t in g  to  him t h a t  our t o t a l  exposure to  the  C a r r ia n  Group 
and o th e r  customers were a c t u a l l y  much more than what th e  
papers had r e p o r te d  so f a r .  T h is  had become a w orry  to  me 
p e r s o n a l ly  and ! was more than sure  to  say th a t  a l l  th e s e  
leakages were as a r e s u l t  o f  the p o l i c e  s e iz u r e  o l  our f i l e s  
during  t h e i r  v a r io u s  r a id s  a t  v a r io u s  t im es  in  o u r  o f f i c e .
I had b r i e f e d  the M alays ian  Commissioner in  Hong Kong o f  the  
v a r io u s  occasions whereby we exper ien ced  harassment b o th  by 
the  p o l ic e ,  th e  ICAC, the Commissioner o f  S e c u r i t i e s  and th e  
Commissioner o f  Banking, e t c .  He had taken  note and p o s s ib ly  
would re p o r t  aga in  to  the M i n i s t e r  o f  E x te r n a l  A f f a i r s  i n  
M a la y s ia .  I had a ls o  in d ic a te d  to  the  M alays ian  Commissioner  
in  Hong Kong I  had re p o r te d  e v e ry th in g  in  d e t a i l s  t o  Head 
O f f i c e  and in  case Wisna P u t ra  wanted to  know f u r t h e r  d e t a i l s  
to  ge t  in  touch w i th  you.
Today I would be having  a m eeting  w i th  our c o u n s e l ,  may be a lso  
to  in c lu d e  th e  S e n io r  Counsel to  ge t  ad v ice  on what a c t io n  are  
to  be taken a g a in s t  the p o l i c e  f o r  these v a r io u s  le a ka g e s  t h a t  
we had so f a r  d is c o v ere d .  I would r e p o r t  a t  a l a t e r  t im e  o f  t h i s  
m e e t in g .
K ind re g a rd s .
Yours s i n c e r e l y .
f o r  BUMIPUTRA MALAYSIA FINANCE LTD.
i i /r a h i m  UAAFAR . . . / 3
| ■ '■ I* OW'fl ••****••• • » «. «*. m m  hmu ujm »» ««. wunu.
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Chapter 5 
Comparative Case Studies
In section 1 of this chapter, two other major fraud 
cases which have attracted a lot of attention in Malaysia 
will be briefly described to enable a comparison to be made 
with the BMF case and to enhance my analytical deductions in 
chapter 4. The first case, the Bank Rakyat case, took place 
in the 1970s, before the BMF case. The second case is the 
Deposit-taking Co-operatives case which took place in the 
late 1980s, after the BMF case had taken place. With the 
help of these two cases, I hope to illustrate my main point 
that some politicians in Malaysia are taking advantage of 
the New Economic Policy through fraud to make huge profits 
for themselves. The summaries of these cases are obtained 
mainly from the White Papers issued by the Malaysian 
Government and newspaper reports.
Section 2 tries to compare the fraud and corruption 
trends in Malaysia with those of other countries of 
different social and political systems, and economic 
situation. I hope to illustrate that the Malaysian case is 
not a unique one.
1.1. The Bank Rakyat Case
Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Berhad (Bank Rakyat) was 
a co-operative society established in 1954 under the Co­
operative Societies Ordinance of Malaysia 1948. By 1975, it 
had 17 branches. The Chairman of Bank Rakyat at that time, 
Haji Harun Haji Idris, was also the Chief Minister of the
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State of Selangor, President of the Youth Movement of the 
United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) which is the 
leading Malay political party in the country, Vice-President 
of UMNO, and Chairman of the Selangor Barisan Nasional (the 
ruling coalition party). The Managing Director of Bank 
Rakyat at that time was Abu Mansor Basir. He was responsible 
to the Board of Directors for the daily management of the 
bank. The Board of Directors was in turn responsible to the 
members for the proper conduct of the bank's business. The 
Registrar-General of Co-operatives was responsible for 
ensuring that Bank Rakyat's operations conformed to the 
provisions of the Co-operative Societies Ordinance 1948 and 
the bank's by-laws. Finally, the external auditor had the 
legal and professional responsibility of reporting and 
explaining the actual financial position of the bank to 
members and to the relevant authorities.
Section 52(ii) of the Bank Rakyat's by-laws stipulated 
that the Board of Directors must be diligent and prudent as 
ordinary businessmen and that they were liable for any loss 
incurred by the bank due to any omission or contravention of 
the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Ordinance 1948 
and the bank's by-laws.
Bank Rakyat's paid up capital increased from M$3.307 
mil. at the end of 1970 to M$15.907 mil. at the end of 1975. 
It had 1,011 co-operative societies and 23,463 individual 
members at the end of 1975. At that time, the savings and 
fixed deposits with the bank was M$171.021 mil.. Its primary 
objective was to uplift the economic status of its members, 
who were mainly poor farmers, fishermen, petty traders and
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lower grade civil servants, through various activities in 
the field of finance, industry, agriculture and commerce in 
both the urban and rural areas. With the implementation of 
the New Economic Policy in 1970, it was expected that there 
would be an increase in Bumiputras' (Malays and other 
indigenous people) participation in the field of finance and 
commerce. Unfortunately, in the 1970s, the bank faced acute 
financial problems which resulted in it having an 
accumulated loss of M$65.233 mil. in 1975. Its debts and 
liabilities amounted to M$190.653 mil. and its assets were 
only M$142.657 mil.. Since its debts and liabilities 
exceeded its assets by M$47.996 mil., the bank was in a 
state of insolvency.
On 6 September 1975, Bank Rakyat held its nineteenth 
Annual General Meeting. The accounts for 1973 and 1974 were 
tabled. However, these accounts had no prior approval from 
the Registrar-General of Co-operatives which gave rise to 
suspicions and a lack of confidence among the members in the 
management of the bank. Due to the circumstances, the 
Registrar-General of Co-operatives held an inquiry under 
section 37(1) of the Co-operative Societies Ordinance 1948 
into the constitution, administration and financial position 
of the bank. The inquiry revealed serious irregularities in 
the management of the bank. The police also conducted an 
investigation into the affairs of the bank and certain 
members of the top management. In order to prevent panic 
among its customers, the Federal Government issued a 
guarantee on 12 March 1976 that the deposits in the bank 
were secured.
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The Government led by the then Prime Minister, Tun 
Hussein Onn, had taken positive measures in the Bank Rakyat 
case, unlike the BMF case, which included the replacement of 
the top management of the bank, the termination of services 
of officers and staff found grossly lacking in efficiency 
and integrity, the conviction of the Director as well as the 
other executive members involved in the malpractice, the 
enforcement of the Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Berhad Act 
1978 which enabled the Government to supervise and control 
the management and administration of the bank and providing 
it with substantial and immediate financial assistance in 
the form of a loan, the formulation of new policies on 
investments, loans and finance, the reorganisation of the 
management structure and the introduction of new operational 
systems which included annual budgeting and long term 
planning to ensure that the affairs of the bank and its 
subsidiaries could be properly managed. A white paper, which 
was issued in June 1979 to reveal the true nature of the 
case, was also published extensively to enable the public to 
have access to the details.
In the Bank Rakyat case, investigators from Price 
Waterhouse were appointed to examine and investigate the 
financial position of the bank as at 31 December 1975. The 
investigators noted that the bank was facing acute liquidity 
problems and estimated that between M$100 mil. to M$155 mil. 
was needed for it to continue to function.
Price Waterhouse investigators began their 
investigation in June 1976 and completed in early 1979. The 
investigators found that the accumulated losses of M$65.233
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mil. incurred by Bank Rakyat could be divided into: a)
M$37.948 mil. on expansion of the bank's activities through 
its subsidiaries and b) M$27.285 mil. on its own banking 
operations. The accounts also showed that the management of 
the bank did not maintain the minimum liquidity ratio 
required. Its liquid assets in the form of cash and short 
term funds were only M$14.586 mil. as against savings and 
fixed deposits of M$171.021 mil., resulting in a liquidity 
ratio of 8.5% which was well below the 20% minimum liquidity 
requirement stipulated in section 63(ii) of the laws of Bank 
Rakyat.
The problems of Bank Rakyat, when analyzed through the 
report of Price Waterhouse, strongly resemble the BMF case. 
The losses suffered by Bank Rakyat were caused primarily by 
malpractice by the Director, Managing Director and a few 
officers of the bank. The management of the bank failed to 
comply with some of the requirements of the Co-operative 
Societies Ordinance 1948 and also some of its own by-laws. 
The investigators of Price Waterhouse summed up the problems 
as:
a. Lack of proper planning and evaluation of 
operations and expansion of activities;
b. Weaknesses in the system and poor control over 
lending activities;
c. Dishonesty and lack of responsibility in
particular of the Chairman and the Managing 
Director;
d. Poor supervision and control.
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As with the BMF case, the management of Bank Rakyat did 
not maintain proper records of its investments purchased and 
sold. Information was usually insufficient. Many decisions 
for these investments were made by the Managing Director, 
Abu Mansor Basir, without proper Board approval. These 
investments were usually not registered in the name of the 
bank, but of third parties accompanied by blank transfers 
resulting in dividends and bonus issues of shares being paid 
to the registered shareholders instead of to the bank. The 
investigators of Price Waterhouse revealed that investments 
in shares alone, paid by the bank, which were missing 
amounted to M$3,296,168 excluding dividends and increase in 
value since the time of purchase.
With regards to the funding and lending policies, the 
existing rules and procedures were not followed closely 
although the Executive Committee of the bank had set up a 
committee on 14 August 1974 which had the power to approve 
loan applications between M$100,000 and M$500,000 and its 
members were the Chairman or Vice-Chairman, the Managing 
Director, the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, the 
Treasury representative and one other person. On 26 March 
1975, the Board of Directors of the bank also appointed an 
Investment and Loan Committee consisting of the Chairman, 
the Vice-Chairman, the Managing Director, the Registrar of 
Co-operative Societies and the Treasury representative with 
powers to approve loans exceeding M$100,000 to members. 
However, there was no evidence that these committees had 
ever met. There were instances where the loan procedures 
were not followed and loans were approved by individual
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officers. Sometimes, approval was given to loans which were 
beyond the level of the officers' authorities. As with the 
problems of BMF, there were no proper evaluations of the 
creditworthiness of some of the customers, loans were not 
processed properly, securities for loans were not properly 
valued and follow up actions on loans in arrears were non­
existent. There were also instances where loans were 
released prior to approval. The extreme practice was where 
loans were released without their applications being 
processed nor secured by any collateral. Although the 
majority of collateral securities were charges on land, 
other types of securities with dubious values in the form of 
quoted and unquoted shares, life policies, motor vehicles, 
machinery and even post-dated cheques were accepted. Some of 
the land collateral were released prior to settlement of the 
loans. Loans were also given to non-members which was not 
permitted by the Co-operative Societies Ordinance 1948. 
There was certainly lack of internal control and supervision 
over loan operations. The situation was made worse by weak 
internal auditing. The Managing Director, the Credit 
Controller and several officers of the bank managed the bank 
according to their own rules and discretion and usually 
beyond their authority. These weaknesses were exploited by 
other employees of the bank. For example, its branch 
managers and bank officers issued a number of letters of 
guarantee without following procedures. The existence of 
these blatant forms of malpractice, fraud and corruption was 
not surprising because the Director of the bank was a high 
ranking politician (as explained at the beginning of this
section) who condoned and practised these offences himself. 
This was not to say that there were no legitimate 
transactions that took place in the bank at that time. There 
were legitimate transactions being carried out for ordinary 
members by officers of the bank. There was no doubt that 
Bank Rakyat was a legitimate corporation set up with the 
good intention of helping the poor Bumiputras. However, it 
was transactions involving big sums of money approved by 
high ranking officials that were problematic. These 
officials were aware from the very beginning of the legal 
and illegal opportunities opened to them to make lots of 
money. They took advantage of both. These officials, who 
were also politicians and senior and educated members of 
this developing country, were given complete trust, 
especially by the poor Bumiputras, to carry out the 
objectives of the bank which were formulated in line with 
the New Economic Policy. Unfortunately, some of them had 
betrayed that trust under the guise of the New Economic 
Policy by defrauding the bank for their own benefits.
The poor loan recovery system, which was part and 
parcel of the fraud scheme, was a major factor contributing 
to the financial problems faced by Bank Rakyat. Most of the 
loans outstanding were substantially in arrears while some 
had not been paid at all. Among the more prominent debtors 
were the Melaka Chief Minister, Mohd. Adib Hj. Mohd. Adam, 
who had a debt balance of M$357,839 on 31 December 1975 
which increased to M$414,826 in June 1977; the Kedah 
Executive Councillor, Zainol Abidin Johari, who took a loan 
of M$800,000 in March 1975 to be repaid in 18 months, but by
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June 1977, he had paid neither the loan nor the interest of 
the loan; and the former UMNO Kedah Assemblyman, Hj. Sapirol 
Hj. Hashim, who took a loan of M$170,000 for a period of one 
year which was still outstanding at M$128,820 on 30 July 
1977 (Lim, 1982; 263) . Recovery of the money was doubtful as 
most of the borrowers of the loans were not creditworthy in 
the first place, according to the normal lending procedures 
of the bank. In some cases, recovery was hindered by missing 
loan files. There were also cases where actions to recover 
certain loans were discontinued on the instruction of the 
Managing Director.
The accounts of Bank Rakyat for the years 1972, 1973 
and 1974 were not approved by the Registrar-General of Co­
operative Societies and in accordance to the Co-operative 
Societies Rules 1949, no dividends should have been paid 
out. However, between 1972 and 1974, a total of M$2,148,082 
was paid out as dividends.
As at 31 December 1975, Bank Rakyat had lost 
M$37,947,757 on its subsidiaries in the forms of equity, 
loans and advances as all the subsidiaries had accumulated 
losses at the end of 1975. Its investments in some of its 
subsidiaries proved imprudent and without proper long term 
planning and evaluation. In some cases, projects were 
started, but never finished. The investments in the 
subsidiaries and loans to them were funded almost entirely 
from depositors' money. This practice of using short term 
funds to finance long term projects was against good banking 
practice. Branches, too, were opened on an ad hoc basis 
without proper study as to their viability, resulting in
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losses. Between 1972 to 1975, its branches increased from 
eight to seventeen. The management of Bank Rakyat had also 
embarked on a number of building projects for the bank 
itself without prior determination of their long term 
funding sources. This was not surprising as at that time, 
the initial introduction of the New Economic Policy had 
spurred on many activities to improve the economic status of 
the Bumiputras. Amongst these well-intentioned activities, 
there were some spurred on by vested interests. Some of the 
activities of Bank Rakyat would fit into the latter group.
The investigators of Price Waterhouse also pointed out 
that malpractice in the bank took place as a result of the 
Board of Directors not discharging their responsibilities 
properly. For example, on 29 August 1975, the Board of 
Directors increased the sitting allowances from M$200 to 
M$500 per meeting for each director. The meeting also 
decided to back-date the allowances to cover 1973 and 1974. 
Although the sitting allowances were more than adequate, the 
directors also made claims on accommodation and other 
expenses. However, the blame was placed mainly on the 
Chairman, the Managing Director and certain officers of the 
bank who sometimes made important policy decisions without 
reference to the Board of Directors. Where reference was 
made, the assumption was that their decisions would be 
readily endorsed by the Board. The Chairman, Managing 
Director, the Credit Controller whose duty was to appraise 
loans for approval and to follow up repayments and a few 
officers of Bank Rakyat, managed the bank as if it was their 
own company, using their own discretion. A large number of
277
deals were carried out for the benefit of Bank RaKyat's 
customers who were usually somebody they knew and a lc?ss to 
the bank. Dishonesty and lack of responsibility werd also 
connected with the loan operations of the bank. For example, 
on 1 July 1975, a world heavyweight championship fight 
between Muhammad Ali and Joe Bugner was held in Kuala Lumpur 
and promoted by Tinju Dunia Sendirian Berhad. The promoters, 
however, did not have funds to stage the bout. Abu Mansor, 
the Managing Director of Bank Rakyat, was also Director of 
Tinju Dunia. He applied to First National City Bank* (now 
Citibank) for a letter of credit not exceeding M$6.5 mil.. 
However, the management of Citibank required adequate 
collateral for the facility. Tinju Dunia was not in a 
position to meet this requirement. To overcome the problem, 
the Chairman, Managing Director and Secretary of Bank iSakyat 
forged minutes of the bank's Investment and Loan Commi-ttee, 
allowing the bank's 3,000,000 shares in Dunlop Estates 
Berhad and M$1,000,000 debenture stock of Kuala Luimpur- 
Kepong Amalgamated Limited, all costing M$8,022,475 t^o be 
pledged to Citibank. They were charged in court for forgery 
and criminal breach of trust and all three defendants’* were 
found guilty.
Another example is given when, in September 1974, Bank 
Rakyat paid M$82,500 to UMNO Selangor. The amount 
represented additional interest at the rate of half percent 
on fixed deposits of M$26,500,000 lodged with the baink by 
the State Government of Selangor. There was no pjroper 
approval of this extra interest. According to Molhamad 
Ghazally Shahabudin, an employee of Bank Rakyat, this textra
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interest was verbally agreed by Harun, the Chairman of Bank 
Rakyat who was also the Vice-President of UMNO, and Abu 
Mansor, the Managing Director. Ghazally received verbal 
instructions from Abu Mansor to pay the interest to UMNO. 
UMNO Selangor claimed that this sum was received in good 
faith as a donation and would not refund the money. Even so, 
this sum represented an unauthorised donation to a political 
party by the bank.
The Price Waterhouse investigation also revealed that 
stocks and shares for which the bank paid M$3,296,000 were 
missing. Abu Mansor himself misappropriated 800,000 shares 
in Kuala Lumpur-Kepong Amalgamated Limited bought earlier by 
Bank Rakyat which amounted to M$1.3 mil.. Abu Mansor pleaded 
guilty in court to misappropriating these shares. The loss 
of the other investments was reported to the police.
A number of the bank's officers had also been found to 
use the names of members dishonestly on loan applications. 
For example, a total sum of M$20,373 was supposedly loaned 
to Haji Abdul Rahman. The payment voucher was signed by 
Basharuddin Sulaiman. Haji Abdul Rahman denied receiving the 
loan payment. The cheques signed by Basharuddin and Mohamed 
Baba were not crossed when issued. Further investigations 
revealed that the cheques were paid into the current account 
of Basharuddin at Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad, Kampung 
Baru branch.
As at 31 December 1975, several members of the Board 
and their immediate families had loans outstanding with Bank 
Rakyat amounting to M$l,130,944. Out of this amount, 
M$l,015,138 was in arrears. A few did not make any repayment
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at all on their loans.
Finally, the Price Waterhouse investigation found that 
Kassim, Chan & Co., the auditors of Bank Rakyat, did not 
carry out its duties properly regarding the 1973 and 1974 
accounts. In particular, they did not comment on:
a. the maintenance of proper accounting records;
b. the provision for doubtful loans;
c. the valuation of investments in stocks and shares 
when the market price was substantially below 
cost.
There was also conflict of interest as Mohd. Kassim 
Sulong, an auditor of Kassim, Chan & Co. took a M$100,000 
loan from the Kuala Lumpur branch of Bank Rakyat on 31 
January 1974. Although the loan was to be repaid in three 
years, there was not a single repayment in 1975. As at 30 
June 1977, the balance outstanding on this loan was 
M$146,485.
The Bank Rakyat case which took place before the BMF 
case had similar "micro” and "macro" problems to those of 
BMF i.e. the loans problems and corruption by the management 
who were also politicians or having strong political 
connections. The Chairman of Bank Rakyat, Harun, who was a 
very prominent politician with the ruling party, seemed to 
run the bank as if it belonged to him. As he was a senior 
Government official at that time, the people around him had 
the confidence to abuse the system of Bank Rakyat as long as 
they got his backing. From the few examples above, it could 
be seen that some of the politicians treated the bank as if
280
it was their own private bank where they could take money 
out any time they wanted without paying back. The Bank 
Rakyat case is similar to the BMF case in this aspect. The 
only difference is that the then Prime Minister, Tun Hussein 
Onn, was a very determined and honest politician and he made 
it very clear that he wanted the truth to be exposed to the 
public. He also condemned openly the culprits in the case 
who were all charged in the courts. The Malaysian public 
were quite satisfied with the handling of the Bank Rakyat 
case by the Government unlike the BMF case.
However, even with the introduction of stringent 
policies after the case, it was still possible for a more 
colossal case to take place in the form of the BMF case 
which had many similarities to the Bank Rakyat case. The 
possibility was there because there were politicians 
involved who were able to bend the rules they created. They 
were also able to use the existing laws and racial excuses 
for their own ends as explained in chapter 4. They were able 
to get away with it because they were the minority of better 
educated citizens who commanded vast respect and loyalty 
from the majority of the poor, uneducated and unquestioning 
citizens. The politicians who were nominated to uphold the 
New Economic Policy to help eradicate poverty, especially 
among the Bumiputras, had betrayed the trust placed in them 
by the public. They were the better educated and more 
privileged citizens of Malaysia who had robbed the poorer 
and less privileged citizens.
The next case to be discussed briefly is the Deposit- 
taking Co-operatives case which took place after the BMF
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case. After the BMF case, more rules and regulations were 
introduced to prevent another major fraud scandal. However, 
these rules were all broken in the Deposit-taking Co­
operatives case which also had strong political 
involvements. The similarities in these three cases are very 
obvious. One could wonder how this could be possible if the 
Management Committees of financial institutions and the 
Government officials claimed to have learnt a lesson each 
time one of these cases took place and that better rules and 
regulations were introduced to prevent another financial 
scandal. The irony was that all these three cases had 
political involvements and they were the leading financial 
scandals in Malaysia. It was politicians who made the rules 
and it was their members who, later on, went on to bend or 
ignore them.
1.2. The Deposit-taking Co-operatives Case
As introduced earlier on in the Bank Rakyat case, the 
co-operative movement was introduced in Malaysia to assist 
farmers, fishermen and other low income groups in solving 
their socio-economic problems. Its function involved the 
pooling of the capital resources of its members to enter 
into ventures for the mutual benefit of members. The fruits 
of these ventures, which also included losses, were shared 
by members in the true spirit of the co-operatives. The Co­
operative Societies Act was enacted in 1948 to facilitate 
the growth of the co-operatives. Prior to the 1970s, the co­
operatives movement tended to be in-house co-operatives i.e. 
branches engaged in mutual help activities such as consumer
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loans. The finance came from deposits of members and non­
members provided that their by-laws permitted such 
activities and subject to the approval of the Registrar- 
General of the Department of Co-operatives Development. The 
Co-operative Societies Act was further amended in 1976 to 
enable urban co-operatives to invest their surplus funds in 
trade and industries. This prompted many businessmen to use 
the opportunity to set up co-operatives and established 
branches to fund their businesses. Some, with vested 
interests, exploited the situation which led to the loss of 
a huge amount of public funds.
The Deposit-taking Co-operatives case involved a group 
of 35 co-operatives whose members were mainly Chinese low- 
income earners. The management were also predominantly 
Chinese which included some prominent politicians and 
businessmen. As the Government had set up different types of 
public enterprises and institutions, in accordance with the 
New Economic Policy, to help the Bumiputras, these Chinese 
politicians and businessmen, too, decided that they must do 
something for their own community. Thus, the co-operatives 
were set up to help Chinese low income earners in line with 
those like Bank Rakyat. The Chinese low income earners 
welcomed this initiative taken by their politicians and they 
put their trust on them to help better their economic 
situation.
The problems of the Deposit-taking Co-operatives 
movement surfaced when one of the thirty-five co-operatives 
was unable to meet its deposit liabilities due to heavy 
withdrawals by its members. The Government empowered Bank
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Negara Malaysia, the central bank, under the Essential 
(Protection of Depositors) Regulations 1986 to freeze the 
assets of the co-operative and its key management for 
investigation. This prompted heavy withdrawals on the 
deposits of other co-operatives. At the request of the 
Boards of Directors of several large co-operatives, the 
Government froze the assets of twenty-three other co­
operatives and those of their Directors and principal office 
bearers on 8 August 1986. The passports of various Directors 
and office bearers were also impounded to ensure that they 
would remain in the country while investigations were being 
carried out. Seventeen firms of accountants were appointed 
to assist Bank Negara in its investigations.
The preliminary reports on the activities and financial 
position of the co-operatives were received on 17 August 
1986. It was found that the data submitted by the co­
operatives to the Registrar-General were generally 
incomplete, out of date and not very reliable. The twenty- 
four co-operatives had a total of 588,000 members and 
522,000 accounts, involving M$1.5 bil. in deposits collected 
from 630 branches. However, the net assets of the twenty- 
four co-operatives amounted to M$890 mil. which was 
insufficient to meet total deposit liabilities of M$1.5 
bil.. The problems found were:
1. gross mismanagement of funds, due to lack of 
expertise or professionalism, lack of internal 
control or through imprudent management and in 
some cases, corruption was involved. Some 
investments and loans were made without the prior
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approval or against the specific disapproval of 
the Registrar-General;
although the Registrar-General's guidelines to 
section 33 of the Co-operative Societies Act 1948 
provided that surplus funds should be invested in 
bank deposits and Government securities or 
purchase of land, subject to the approval of the 
Registrar-General, the co-operatives invested 
heavily in shares which incurred heavy losses as 
a result of the collapse of the share market; 
over investment in land and property, with almost 
20% of assets in housing development projects and 
fixed assets, some of which were purchased at the 
height of the property market;
over-commitment in loss-making or non-income 
generating subsidiaries and related companies. 
Some of these subsidiaries were opened without the 
approval of the Department of Co-operatives 
Development;
incidence of negligence, fraudulent activities and 
conflicts of interest in certain co-operatives 
which led to imprudent lending of funds, including 
interest free lending, to Directors of the co­
operatives, Director-controlled companies and 
parties which had connections with the Directors. 
Six cases of possible fraudulent conduct and 
thirteen cases of conflict of interest were being 
investigated. The amount extended as loans were 
20% of total assets;
6. some co-operatives invested in assets or projects 
without . the approval of the Department of Co­
operatives Development;
7. some co-operatives which needed to borrow funds 
from other financial institutions did not have 
borrowing powers granted by.the Department of Co­
operatives Development. Seven out of ten co­
operatives which had borrowing powers exceeded 
their limits;
8. Many did not maintain adequate liquid assets in 
contravention of the minimum liquidity ratio of 
25% of deposits. As a result, many of them did not 
have the cash to meet depositors' withdrawals;
9. as the majority of the co-operatives assets were 
in long term assets which yield low or nil income, 
there was insufficient income to meet interest 
payments.
Some specific instances will be elaborated below, 
especially on the fraudulent practices of some of the 
Directors of the co-operatives to show the similarity they 
have with the BMF case and the Bank Rakyat case. The names 
of the co-operatives are in their acronyms or initials.
Kosmopolitan
Kosmopolitan had over 300 loan accounts with a balance 
of M$71.2 mil.. Of these, 31 were made to Directors and 48 
to staff. The repayment history of the loans was poor. Three 
loans with a total of M$4 mil. were secured against ten
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acres of rubber land which was not properly evaluated.
Kosmopolitan used shares which were pledged to it as 
collateral to raise M$2.7 mil. to meet withdrawals by 
members in July 1986 without obtaining approval from the 
Registrar-General. This was clearly a case of criminal 
breach of trust.
Estimated profits which had not yet taken place were 
written down in the accounts as if they had already been 
obtained.
Korakvat
The directors engaged in activities which would derive 
personal benefits such as selling of land at inflated prices 
to the co-operative and using co-operative assets to charge 
against loans for their own purposes.
Fortiss
Loans in units of M$100,000 were apparently extended to 
311 members, repayable on maturity after five years. 
However, the interest repayments were found to be from two 
bank accounts in the name of an employee of a company 
connected with one of the Directors. Shares in Emtex 
Corporation purported to be held as collateral for these 
loans had been used to pledge as security against loans to 
a group of companies controlled by the Directors. There was 
clearly misappropriation of funds. Directors of the co­
operative were also Directors and shareholders of Emtex in 
which Fortiss owns 1.8 mil. shares.
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KGE
A sum of M$480,000 was made to a company which is 80% 
owned by a Director of KGE for the company's services in 
securing the necessary approvals and documents for the 
development of a piece of land and the assignment of the 
company's joint-venture agreement with the landowner to KGE. 
This payment was not in accordance with the terms of the 
joint-venture agreement, which stipulated that the payment 
was to be made to the landowner in the form of developed 
housing units.
KGE also made payment of M$420,000 to another company 
which is also 80% owned by the above mentioned Director for 
the company's services in securing the necessary approvals 
for conversion and sub-division of a piece of land. These 
payments were noted to be excessive.
Loans were made to the Directors of KGE and companies 
where one of them had an interest without any approval. They 
were also made without any form of collateral, documented 
guarantee or fixed term of repayments.
KGE made payments of M$l,768,179 to a company which is 
100% owned by an ex-employee for ’’development costs". 
Payments of M$976,772 were also made to another company 
which is 50% owned by the same ex-employee for 
'renovations', printing, stationary and goodwill. Apart from 
official receipts, there were no detailed supporting 
invoices.
As at 8 August 1986, KGE's total borrowing from 
deposits and banks amounted to M$52.2 mil.. However, KGE's 
approved borrowing limit by the Registrar-General was only
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M$4.7 mil.
The investigators also noted that the qualifications of 
the management members of KGE were generally restricted to 
school levels and many of them held positions of 
responsibilities which did not commensurate with their 
educational background.
Kotena
Payments of honoraria with effect from 1 May 1985 were 
made to the Deputy Chairman and Treasurer at M$5,000 and 
M$2,000 per month, respectively, despite the accounts 
showing operating losses. This was against Section 34(3) of 
the Co-operative Societies Act 1948.
Seoadu
A loan of M$1 mil. was extended to the sister of 
Sepadu's Chairman to purchase shares in Dayapi. Sepadu's 
Chairman was also chairman of Dayapi. In May 1986, the loan 
was converted into investment of Sepadu in 581,000 shares in 
Dayapi at the price initially paid for by the Chairman/s 
sister. This resulted in Sepadu's cost being in excess of 
the market value at 31 May 1986.
Loans of M$3,760,000 were also given to three 
individuals who were connected with the Chairman of Sepadu. 
The funds were used to purchase shares in Australia. The 
funds were transferred to Australia without getting approval 
from Bank Negara Malaysia, the central bank, as required by 
the foreign exchange regulations.
Advances of M$2 mil. were also made to Star Rock
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Products which had only a M$2 paid-up share capital. Star 
Rock was a quarry company which had not commenced operation. 
The advances would be converted to 50% investment by Sepadu 
in Star Rock.
The investigation led by the central bank on the 
Deposit-taking Co-operatives case led to the prosecution of 
twelve Directors of six deposit-taking co-operatives in 
court. One of them, Tee An Chuan, the chairman of Kosatu and 
the then President of the People's Progressive Party (a 
component of the ruling coalition party), pleaded guilty 
while the others claimed trial. Of these eleven who claimed 
trial, they included a Deputy Minister, Wang Choon Wing, a 
former Deputy Minister, Tan Tiong Hong, the Youth leader of 
the Malaysian Chinese Association (a component of the ruling 
coalition party), Kee Yong Wee and a prominent businessman, 
Yap Peng (Khor, 1987; 98).
After the Bank Rakyat case and the BMF case, the 
Deposit-taking case followed within a few years. The same 
methods to obtain by fraud the large sum of money were 
employed in the Deposit-taking case. In this case, it was 
revealed that the Department of Co-operatives Development 
was also to be blamed for not carrying out its role 
efficiently. For example, Kojasa had made several 
applications to the Registrar-General for approval of its 
deposit-taking limits, but no reply had been received. The 
other groups of people that were blamed were the Management 
Committees of the co-operatives which had a few prominent 
Chinese politicians and businessmen as their members. From
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the examples given above, it could be seen that many of the 
members of these Management Committees had the intention of 
using the co-operatives that they managed to make money for 
themselves. They gave a large portion of the loans to 
business tycoons, politicians and community leaders (Khor, 
1987; 98) whom they knew. It was also with the collaboration 
of these people that they managed to swindle their clients' 
hard-earned money. It could be said that the rich Chinese 
were helping themselves to get richer at the expense of the 
poor Chinese. This fraud scandal also gives support to my 
point that there is increasing income disparity within the 
different ethnic groups and not between them. The New 
Economic Policy, when not implemented properly, will only 
have the situation become worse. Within the Bumiputra 
community, the setting up of public institutions by the 
Government to help promote their welfare were used as 
vehicles by unscrupulous politicians to make huge profits 
for themselves. Within the Chinese community, unscrupulous 
Chinese politicians used the excuse that the lower income 
Chinese group needed help and protection from them as the 
public institutions set up by the Government were only for 
the Bumiputras. The lower income Chinese group, where a huge 
number had little or no education, welcomed the initiative 
because they thought the politicians were genuinely 
concerned about their welfare. They trusted them to help 
them have a better living standard, especially when these 
politicians were also businessmen who seemed to be doing 
very well financially.
It should be pointed out that in developing countries,
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the politicians were usually accepted by the poor and lower 
income public, with little or no education, as intelligent, 
capable and efficient people who would be able to turn the 
country into a rich and developed place for them. Whatever 
the politicians did was usually not questioned by the 
public. With this trust, these unscrupulous politicians and 
businessmen devised schemes supposedly to prevent the poor 
Chinese community from being left behind economically. In 
actual fact, these schemes had helped them to become rich 
illegally at the expense of the poor Chinese.
In conclusion to this section, I would not accuse all 
politicians and big businessmen of corruption. There were 
many who were genuinely concerned about the welfare of their 
people. They did initiate projects which were legitimate and 
beneficial to their community. However, once these projects 
were initiated, some of their unscrupulous members took the 
opportunities to make some illegal profits for themselves. 
The reason for such unscrupulous action given by Ahmad 
Noordin (whom I interviewed), the then Auditor-General 
leading the Committee of Enquiry in the BMF case, was greed. 
I do not have a definite answer as to why these people 
commit such offences or how they explain their own actions 
to themselves and to others. However, I do believe that they 
indulged in self-exculpation.
As can be seen from the three case studies, the methods 
of defrauding the poor employed by both unscrupulous Chinese 
and Bumiputra politicians were identical. Projects were 
undertaken with good intentions which were later taken 
advantage of by unscrupulous politicians and businessmen.
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Both groups also made use of racial politics to further 
their base intentions as explained in chapter 4. Thus, the 
New Economic Policy, when misused, would have benefitted by 
not only the corrupt Bumiputra politicians, but also 
politicians from the other ethnic groups.
The case studies in this section aim to strengthen my 
conclusion that the methods of defrauding the Malaysian 
people by some of their unscrupulous politicians are similar 
throughout the history of Malaysia. As explained earlier, 
Malaysia is a relatively young developing country and the 
economic opportunities are vast. In the name of development, 
many projects and public institutions, which required vast 
sums of money, were launched. The setting up of these 
projects and public institutions were also guided by racial 
policies due to the nature of the history of Malaysia; the 
main racial policy being the New Economic Policy. The New 
Economic Policy had created ample economic opportunities for 
unscrupulous politicians to take advantage of. This fraud 
and corruption trend may not be an unusual phenomenon for 
developing countries as will be discussed below. However, 
the Malaysian politicians have an extra tool in their hands 
for their corrupt actions i.e. the racial sentiments of the 
people as explained in chapter 4. In all three of the 
scandals I have discussed above, racial elements were 
attached to every case. It has come to a point where the 
destructive racial sentiment of the people has become a 
constructive tool for unscrupulous politicians.
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2. Fraud and corruption trends in other countries
In this section, I will briefly discuss fraud and 
corruption in other parts of the world. I hope to illustrate 
that the Malaysian case is not a unique one. The trend of 
fraud and corruption among unscrupulous politicians is quite 
similar in the majority of developing countries. Before I 
begin, I would like to point out that the fraud and
corruption carried out by unscrupulous politicians were 
condoned and in some instances ' helped' in a direct or
indirect manner by some leaders from the developed
countries. This point is very important as it shows how much 
hypocrisy there is among world leaders. I will begin with a 
discussion of Ferdinand Marcos from the Philippines.
When Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines was ousted 
from his presidential position after being in power for 20 
years from 1965 to 1986, the subsequent Government, under 
President Corazon Aquino, set up the Presidential Commission 
On Good Government to recover the Marcos' 'ill-gotten' 
wealth. Marcos and his wife had been accused of looting and 
plundering the Philippine economy of at least US$5 bil. 
(Sunday Times magazine, 13/3/1994). The former Solicitor- 
General of the Philippines, Francisco Chavez, and his 
colleagues were able to track the flight of the money from 
the Philippines to Hong Kong, Switzerland, the Middle East, 
the Bahamas and New York. The amount that was located, 
totalling US$356 mil., was lodged in Swiss bank accounts 
under the names of 17 foundations; the first was set up as 
early as 1967 and the last as late as 1986 (Sunday Times 
magazine, 13/3/1994) . The Marcos family also owned extensive
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property all over the world, bought through nominee 
companies as well as paintings by well-known artists. The 
members of the Presidential Commission found that 155 
paintings, including works by Michelangelo, Rubens, El 
Greco, Goya, Monet, Renoir and Picasso, which were 
supposedly bought for the Metropolitan Museum in Manila, 
were missing. The extravagant lifestyle of the Marcos family 
was revealed when the Malacanang Palace where they lived was 
opened to the public. The ex-First Lady, Imelda Marcos, 
indulged in excesses that included 3,000 pairs of shoes, 
2,000 ball gowns, 500 black bras, 200 Marks & Spencer black 
girdles, 35 racks of furs, 1,000 unopened packets of tights 
and five shelves of unused Gucci handbags with price tags 
still attached (Sunday Times magazine, 13/3/1994). These 
excesses were really shameful acts of greed when the per 
capita income of the Philippines was barely US$200 a year, 
and with 30% of Filipinos who could barely afford basic 
necessities such as food, shelter, clothing and medicine. 
Six and a half million Filipinos lived in dilapidated houses 
and six million out-of-school youths in rural areas could 
not find work (Pedrosa, 1987; 154). The Food and Nutrition 
Research Institute of the Philippines estimated that 70% of 
the population were malnourished (Noble, 1986; 104). In
1980, the top 12.9% of the population received 22.1% of 
total income while the bottom 11% received 16.6%. By 1983, 
the top 12.9% of the population received 45.5% of total 
income, while the bottom 11% received only 6.4% (McDougald, 
1987; 276).
A large amount of Marcos' wealth came from huge
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development loans sponsored by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. Another source of Marcos' 
wealth came from illegal contributions received in return 
for his 'sponsorship' of Chinese businessmen seeking 
valuable import licenses in contravention of official 
Government efforts to encourage sales of locally made goods 
(Pedrosa, 1987; 76). He also rewarded his relatives and 
friends who supported him generously with important official 
positions and Government contracts. This group of people was 
called "The Grand Coalition" (McDougald, 1987; 188). The 
Grand Coalition practically controlled the economy in the 
Philippines. Bernie Villegas coined the term "crony 
capitalism" to explain the phenomenon of so much of the 
economy being taken over by friends and relatives of Marcos 
and Imelda (McDougald, 1987; 191). Marcos also created
powerful roles linking to the development of the country for 
his wife. Through these roles, especially for culture and 
social welfare, she amassed their fortune. Their corrupt 
actions were 'helped' by the American Government. President 
Johnson, who called Marcos "his right arm in Asia", was 
eager to offer generous grants and loans supposedly for the 
Philippine people, but eventually the bulk of it ended up in 
Marcos' pocket (Pedrosa, 1987; 109). With support from the 
United States, other developed countries and international 
banks were eager to give aids and loans to finance 
'development' in the Philippines although they knew Marcos 
was corrupt to the core. This was because of the belief that 
a country could never go bankrupt and with development going 
on in the Philippines, they would eventually reap huge
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profits themselves.
When Marcos was barred from running for a third term in 
1972, he declared martial law. His justification was to stop 
the threat of "invasion, insurrection or rebellion" 
(Pedrosa, 1987; 128) especially from the communist faction 
and the Muslims. The country was said to be in a state of 
anarchy and lawlessness. It was revealed in Noble's article 
that Marcos had ordered the staging of bombing and 
kidnapping incidents to justify his actions. This was later 
admitted by his then Defence Secretary, Juan Ponce Enrile 
(Noble, 1986; 83-84) . Under martial law, Marcos had absolute 
political control over his country. When martial law was 
initially declared, all newspapers, except one which was 
owned by his 'crony', was placed under military guard. Six 
of the city's major television stations and nine radio 
stations were shut. Only one radio and one television 
station which were linked to Marcos were free to operate. 
Hundreds of opposition leaders and critics were arrested. 
Filipinos were prohibited from leaving the country. The 
death penalty was imposed for the illegal possession of 
firearms. Public demonstrations, rallies and strikes were 
banned and military commanders in the provinces were ordered 
to assume local Government powers. The implementation of 
martial law in the Philippines had the support of the United 
States Government even though they knew Marcos was a corrupt 
dictator (Pedrosa, 1987; 135-137).
Marcos also had hopes to form a dynasty. He elected 
Imelda to high ranking posts so that she could take over if 
anything happened to him. Imelda held posts like the
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Governor of Metro Manila, a territory encompassing four 
cities and thirteen towns, Minister of Human Settlements, a 
ministry which functioned like a Government within a 
Government with access, but no accountability, to the funds 
of all other Government departments and a member of the 
Executive Committee which would take over in the event of 
Marcos' death or disability. Her power was second to the 
President. Her personal wealth rose from US$250 mil. a year 
after the declaration of martial law in 1972 to US$1.6 bil. 
by the end of their rule in 1986 (Pedrosa, 1987; 153).
Marcos' 'cronies' also defrauded a lot of money from 
the banks in the Philippines, which loaned them the money 
because of their connections with him, causing big financial 
scandals. For example, Dewey Dee1 absconded with US$84.7 
mil. (McDougald, 1987; 212). McDougald claimed that
corruption was a way of life in the Philippines during 
Marcos era and that it permeated every level of the 
Government (McDougald, 1987; 222). Crony capitalism resulted 
in lost bailout funds totalling more than US$3 bil.
(McDougald, 1987; 223).
In its 35 civil cases filed against Marcos, the 
Presidential Commission On Good Government had put the ex- 
President's worth at a total of US$97.5 bil. in cash and 
assets (Kesavan, 1991; 115). Under Marcos' regime, a huge
JDewey Dee is a Chinese Filipino whose family was 
prominent in the Philippine business community. His 
Continental Manufacturing Corporation had once controlled 
about 80% of the acrylic yarn used in the export trade. He 
was also a banking entrepreneur with a reputation as a 
financial genius of sorts. He was a friend of Marcos
(McDougald, 1987; 212).
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gap was created between the rich and the poor.
President Suharto of Indonesia has always been accused 
by the media that he, together with his family members and 
business associates, acquired a vast fortune during his time 
in office. The First Lady, Siti Tien Hartinah is reportedly 
known as "Madame Tien Percent" for the ' commission' she gets 
from business deals or even 'Fifi' for fifty percent 
(Glickman, 1991; 25) . Many of Indonesia's most essential and 
profitable monopolies are controlled by Suharto's three 
sons. Suharto himself is not accused of outright theft from 
the public treasury, but cash payments and items like land, 
etc. have been 'contributed' to him (Glickman, 1991; 25). 
Business monopolies and Government contracts of all sorts 
have been given to Suharto's family members and friends. 
They have easy access to credit due to their connections 
with the President and are bailed out when their firms are 
in deep financial trouble.
The Indonesian political system is based on so-called 
"Pancasila democracy". Its principles are monotheism, 
humanitarianism, national unity, democracy and social 
justice. These principles are intended to hold together the 
ethnically diverse Indonesian society. However, Pancasila 
has also become Suharto's weapon of control. Under the Anti- 
Subversion Act, any criticism of the Government can be 
interpreted as 'anti-Pancasila' (Glickman, 1991; 27).
Legislations, such as the Broad Outlines of State Policy, 
require that the press be 'responsible'. A responsible press 
is said to be one which will protect the good name and 
authority of national leaders instead of slandering them and
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their families. If the press is 'irresponsible', it will 
have its license revoked and its parent company will be 
penalised. The Penal Code also provides a maximum of six 
years' imprisonment for any statement made that is 
•• deliberately intended to disparage the President or Vice- 
President". The television station is Government controlled. 
The sole private station is owned by Suharto's son 
(Glickman, 1991; 28) . There are a large number of private 
radio stations, but they are only allowed to broadcast news 
prepared by the Government-owned radio network. Foreign 
journals and books that carry unfavourable information about 
the President or official policies are usually banned. 
Political protests in any form are not tolerated. For 
example, in 1978, when students protested on the ground that 
the ruling elite was promoting a culture of corruption by 
example and that Suharto was not a suitable candidate for 
re-election as President, Suharto sent troops, helicopters 
and armoured cars to university campuses in response. More 
than 200 student leaders were arrested and convicted at 
show-trials. Seven newspapers were banned for covering the 
students' protest. In 1994, the Government banned two weekly 
magazines, Tempo and Editor, and a weekly tabloid, Detik, 
for implicating senior Government officials in Indonesia's 
biggest banking scandal and criticising B.J. Habibie, 
Research and Technology Minister and a close friend of 
Suharto, over a former fleet of East German naval vessels 
purchased for the Indonesian navy. The reason given for the 
ban was that journalists on the magazines were putting 
"national unity and stability at risk" (The Times,
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4/7/1994). The Indonesian court also sentenced to fines or 
jail twenty people among some 350 journalists, artists, 
students and human rights activists, who protested against 
the ban (International Herald Tribune, 29/6/1994).
Under the Moi regime in Kenya, corruption is rampant 
among top level politicians. The President's wealth is 
estimated to be from one hundred million to several billion 
American dollars (Glickman, 1991; 1) . Moi's Mgreed for
power” led to constitutional amendment outlawing all 
political parties except his own. The independence and power 
of the Attorney-General and the Auditor-General were curbed. 
When the media questioned Moi's policies, political 
crackdowns or corruption, he resorted to censorship, bans 
and arrest of editors.
In the southern regions of Nigeria, Wraith and Simpkins 
said the local Government had reached the point of being a 
'conspiracy' against the public so riddled was it with 
bribery, nepotism, politics and corruption (Wraith & 
Simpkins, 1963; 19).
The Romanian dictator, Nicolae Ceausescu, who was 
executed by his own fellow countrymen, built himself the 
House of the Republic which was three times larger than 
Versailles in France. It had more than 1,000 rooms outfitted 
with ceilings of gold and floors, staircases and walls of 
marble. Galleries and salons had grand and expensive 
chandeliers. The chandelier in the plenary hall alone was 
believed to weigh as much as five tons. Over US$1 bil. was 
spent on the building which consumed a huge amount of 
electricity, even as the state restricted apartments of the
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local inhabitants to one 60-watt light bulb per room and 
when the quota was exceeded, electricity to an entire 
village could be cut off (Glickman, 1991; 3) . Food was
scarce and the Government regularly severed power during 
winter, leaving millions of people hungry and freezing in 
dark apartments.
In China, the ruling elite enjoys a wide variety of 
privileges and their children, known as the Red Princes, 
make huge profits through business deals allocated to them. 
The lower rank party cadres, especially in the countryside, 
are also known to embezzle public funds, pocket profits or 
to keep supplies for themselves.
Political fraud and corruption are by no means 
concentrated only in developing countries. In Italy, the 
former Christian Democratic Party collapsed because 
corruption was too rampant. In Britain, the '‘arms for aids" 
issue, also known as the "Pergau Dam affair11, surfaced in 
1994 involving giving monetary aids to developing countries 
by Britain in return for arms deals. It also revealed the 
undisclosed fact that the Tory Government had allocated 
business deals to British companies, namely Balfour Beatty 
and Cementation, which contributed heavily to the Tory Party 
funds. In Spain, in 1994, Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez was 
asked to resign when the former head of the Spanish Civil 
Guard, Luis Roldan managed to flee arrest while being 
investigated for embezzling £2.5 mil. by manipulating 
accounts at the Interior Ministry and taking bribes. This 
issue took place at the same time as the investigation into 
allegations of tax fraud and insider trading against Mariano
302
Rubio, a former Governor of the Bank of Spain.
The list of political fraud and corruption that is 
happening around the world is inexhaustible. The Malaysian 
case is definitely not a unique one.
In conclusion, the problems of fraud and corruption 
exist in all economic situations i.e. underdeveloped, 
developing or developed economies, in all social and 
cultural settings, among all age groups, among both sexes, 
at all classes of society, at every decision-making level 
within all organisations, and at all times and era, whether 
there is war or peace. They affect all social systems; 
feudalism, capitalism, communism and socialism. Fraud and 
corruption are elements that do not discriminate. The only 
difference between fraud and corruption in different 
societies is the different combinations of the social, 
economic and political conditions which give rise to 
different types of opportunities conducive to their 
occurrences. The intensity of corruption fluctuates with 
these different combinations.
The analytical deductions I have made in this thesis 
are for major fraud cases with political involvement. These 
deductions do not apply to ordinary everyday fraud cases. As 
I could not obtain any data on only fraud cases with 
political involvement, I would like to look briefly at the 
overall fraud, criminal breach of trusts and commercial 
offences in Malaysia from 1980 to 1992 in my next chapter 
before I introduce the chapter on preventing and combating 
fraud.
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Chapter 6
General Commercial Crime Rate In Malaysia
This chapter will discuss the overall fraud, criminal 
breach of trust, corruption and commercial offences in 
Malaysia. These data were obtained from the police 
headquarters and the Anti-corruption Agency in Malaysia. I 
would like to point out that it was not easy for me to try 
to get these data. I had to go through the head of the 
Commercial Crime Division at the police headquarters before 
any of its officers would see me. In fact, one of these 
officers was so afraid of breaching the Official Secrets Act 
1972 (amended in 1983 and 1986) that he told me not even to 
reveal I had spoken to him. Eventually after pleading with 
the head of the Commercial Crime Division to help me, he 
directed one of his officers to assist me. I must admit I 
was fortunate enough to be able to use my sponsor's name
i.e. Universiti Utara Malaysia to get the assistance I 
needed. It is a sad fact that the police in Malaysia are not 
helpful to students researching commercial crime. Also, the 
data are never up to date. I had to give a month's notice 
for them to get the data ready. There was no proper 
prospectus on the role and work of the police force in 
Malaysia which I requested.
The Anti-corruption Agency was more helpful. The 
Director-General of the agency actually gave me the data 
personally and he even gave me permission to use the 
agency's library. There was a proper prospectus on the role 
and work of the agency. The Director-General was very 
generous to me, giving me whatever papers he or the
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personnel of the agency had written to help me in my work. 
The data the agency had were also very up-to-date and were 
given to me on the day I visited the agency.
As with the data on reported fraud cases involving 
financial institutions in Malaysia, it was sent to me via my 
sponsor by Bank Negara, the central bank of Malaysia. My 
sponsor had to intervene by writing a letter on my behalf 
before Bank Negara would release any information. This was 
because much of the information held by Bank Negara was 
considered to be official secrets under the Official Secrets 
Act 1972 which has already been explained in chapter 4, 
section 2.2.. The personnel of Bank Negara had to be doubly 
sure that the information they released was not within the 
definition of official secrets and that it would not be 
misused.
This chapter will give a brief explanation of all the 
data collected before an analysis is made of them. But, 
before I begin the discussion on the data, it is important 
to give a brief outline of how they were collected by the 
police, the personnel of the Anti-corruption Agency and the 
central bank of Malaysia. The information in this chapter is 
taken mainly from papers published and presented by the 
Chief of Police, the Director-General of the Anti-corruption 
Agency and the personnel of Bank Negara as well as from 
interviews with the Director-General and also inspectors 
from the Commercial Crime Division of the police 
headquarters.
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l. Collection of data by the police and the personnel of 
the Anti-corruption Agency
1.1. The police
According to the Chief of Police in Malaysia, there is 
no legal definition of "commercial crime" found in the 
various Acts of Parliament in Malaysia (Omar, 1990; 2). The 
officers of the Commercial Crime Division deal with the 
following activities under the heading of commercial crimes:
1. Advance fee fraud - dishonestly/fraudulently 
requesting advance fees in contemplation of future 
commercial dealings;
2. Donation fraud - dishonestly collecting donations 
on the pretext of charitable causes;
3. Management fraud, which may include credit 
facility fraud, corruption, ultra vires decisions 
for personal advantages, etc.;
4. Exchange control violations such as prohibited 
fund transfer;
5. Wilful tax evasion such as:
a. omitting to submit a return on tax matters;
b. making a false statement or entry on tax 
matters;
c. falsifying or authorising the falsification of 
books of accounts or other records relating to tax 
matters;
6. Securities fraud such as dealing in lost or stolen 
share certificates, insider trading, forgeries, 
etc.;
7. Market and trading abuses such as illegal
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restrictive practices, hoarding and price 
manipulation;
8. Franchise fraud which may include unauthorised use 
of famous trademarks, ingredients and names of 
reputable businesses;
9. Fraudulent insurance claims which may include 
false claims, inflated claims, collusion with 
adjuster, etc.;
10. False accounting;
11. Criminal banking which may include running a bank 
without a license, illegal money lending and 
illegal deposit taking;
12. Futures market fraud which may include 
manipulation of markets, unauthorised dealing with 
marketing of currencies, unregistered dealers, 
etc.;
13. Social security and welfare fraud which may 
include fraudulent manipulation of welfare claims 
and illegal withdrawal of funds from Employees 
Provident Fund, etc..
(Omar, 1990; 3)
These commercial crimes are regulated by laws which 
help to create a stable commercial environment in Malaysia. 
Examples of these laws are the Penal Code, the Companies Act 
1965, the Commodities Trading Act 1985, the Banking and 
Financial Institutions Act 1989, the Societies Act 1966, the 
Co-operative Societies Act 1948 and the Securities 
Industries Act 1983.
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Commercial offences in Malaysia fall under the purview 
of the Commercial Crime Division of the Criminal 
Investigation Department of the Police Force. The Division 
has been divided into four broad categories according to 
economic activities:
1. Banking and financial institutions;
2. Deposit-Taking Co-operatives/Institutions and 
Insurance;
3. Corporations and companies;
4. Forgeries, counterfeit, credit cards, securities 
industry, etc..
The Commercial Crime Division recruits qualified and 
experienced police officers to investigate and/or prosecute 
any commercial offence. Some of them have degrees in law, 
business studies, accounting, computer science or finance. 
On 11 August 1990, it was reported that the Government had 
approved the increase in the number of officers from 20 to 
85 in 1989 (NST, 11/8/1990). The division has also started 
an educational scheme to send its officers for further 
education, both locally and abroad. According to the Chief 
of Police, officers of the Commercial Crime Division also 
carry out proactive investigations as well as the usual 
reactive investigations. This activity is stipulated by the 
Criminal Procedure Code. For example:
Section 103 - Every police officer may interpose for
the purpose of preventing and shall to 
the best of his ability using all 
lawful means prevent the commission of
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any seizable offence.
Section 105 - A police officer knowing of a design to 
commit any seizable offence may arrest 
without orders from a Magistrate and 
without a warrant the person so 
designing if it appears to such officer 
that the commission of the offence 
cannot otherwise be prevented.
Thus, with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure 
Code, police officers have a legal as well as a moral duty 
to fight commercial crime. However, the public has no such 
legal duty to do so. Any reporting of a commercial crime or 
"whistle-blowing” is up to the individual, but, according to 
an officer at the Commercial Crime Division, this lay 
reporting contributes to a large extent the data concerning 
commercial crime. Unfortunately, the officer has no idea 
what percentage of commercial crime is reported by the 
public. I presume there is no way one could know. Thus, 
investigations by officers of the Commercial Crime Division 
depend largely on reporting by the public. This will 
directly affect the annual data on commercial crimes in 
Malaysia. Although the data rely heavily on reporting and 
thus are not without problems for analysis, they at least 
give us the opportunity to compare the attitude of the 
public towards commercial crimes every year.
1.2. The Anti-corruption Agency
The Anti-corruption Agency was established in 1967 as
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an independent investigation agency consisting of officers 
who are trained to enquire and investigate cases of bribery 
and corruption. Its officers are also expected to keep 
constant vigilance on any corrupt practices by Government 
officials. Other functions of its officers are the carrying 
out of studies and research into possible causes and related 
problems and the introduction of means to alleviate 
corruption. They also conduct surveys and appraisals of the 
management system of the various ministries, statutory 
bodies, Government agencies and Government departments from 
time to time to expose the weaknesses and shortcomings in 
their operations.
The Anti-corruption Agency is an organisation under the 
Prime Minister's department. It is headed by a Director- 
General who is appointed by His Majesty the King on the 
advice of the Prime Minister. The Anti-corruption Agency has 
six divisions with their own functions and divisions i.e. 
the Prosecution, Investigation, Intelligence, Prevention, 
Training and the General Management (commonly called the 
Administration) Division. Each division is headed by its own 
Director. All the divisions, with the exception of the 
Training Division, have their own sub-units in all the 13 
states in Malaysia to carry out their activities more 
efficiently.
When the Anti-corruption Agency started its operation, 
there were 94 officers who were originally police officers 
(Anti-corruption Agency, 1992; 53). By 1977, the figure rose 
to 449 (Anti-corruption Agency, 1992; 61). In 1981, the
Government approved the intake of the Anti-corruption Agency
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officers to reach the number of 1,092 (Anti-corruption 
Agency, 1992; 67).
On 1 January 1981, a Communication and Publishing 
branch was also established at the Anti-corruption Agency 
headquarters to educate the public, from school children to 
the nation's top management, on the ill effects of 
corruption. Campaigns on the eradication of corruption were 
launched through school debates, school oratorical contests, 
seminars, exhibitions, public speeches and lectures and the 
mass media. These awareness programmes also encourage the 
public to cooperate with the Anti-corruption Agency to 
prevent and combat corruption. The number of activities 
carried out by the Anti-corruption Agency from 1987 to early 
1993 is listed below.
Number of corruption awareness activities carried out by the 
Anti-corruption Agency
Table 6.1
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
(April)
1. Speeches, 
lectures or 
dialogues
195 297 302 289 281 256 134
2. Seminars and 
workshops 2 3 11 2 3 1
3. Exhibitions 3 8 9 11 7 1
4. Official visits 
of ACA officers
to Department 31 48 167 134 170 171 61
heads
Source: Anti-corruption Agency, Malaysia
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As explained in chapter 4, the Anti-corruption Agency 
is empowered by the Anti-corruption Agency Act of 1982 which 
provides the officers of the agency with all the powers 
prescribed for police officers in the Prevention of 
Corruption Act 1961 and the Police Act 1967. The Act also 
provides the officers of the agency with all the powers of 
custom officers under the Customs Act 1967 and powers as 
provided under the various Criminal Procedure Code. These 
legal powers vested in officers of the Anti-corruption 
Agency enable them to carry out their duties which include 
investigating, arresting and prosecuting.
The Anti-corruption Agency headquarters and its sub­
units receive information or reports from various sources 
which include the following:
1. Anonymous letters/mass media and phone calls;
2. Individual official letters;
3. Sources developed and nurtured by the Anti­
corruption Agency officers;
4. Public Complaints Bureau;
5. Police Authorities;
6. Official letters from Ministries/Government 
departments;
7. Telephone calls;
8. Personal contacts with the Anti-corruption Agency 
officers;
9. Lodging complaints at the Anti-corruption Agency 
offices.
(Anti-corruption Agency, Malaysia)
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According to information I have obtained during my 
visit to the Anti-corruption Agency, the most common form of 
complaints about corruption received by them was anonymous 
letters which made up about 47% (or 16,678 letters) of the 
total information or complaints received between 1985 and 
1989. This meant that 3,336 anonymous letters were sent per 
year. This figure was rather high and it showed that the 
public were concerned about corruption and they would rather 
report anonymously to prevent a backlash on themselves. The 
second most popular way was through individual official 
letters which made up about 26% (or 9,162 letters). Only 
about 19% of the total information received was gathered by 
officers of the Anti-corruption Agency through their 
informers or sources. The personnel of the Anti-corruption 
Agency always make it very clear to the public that the 
identity of the informer is protected. Thus, it can be seen 
that the Anti-corruption Agency, like the police, rely 
heavily on the public or civil servants to report any case 
of corruption. The officers of the Anti-corruption Agency 
investigate all cases referred to them including the 
anonymous ones. The position or status of the accused and 
how big or small the case may be are irrelevant. Every piece 
of information received will be given due consideration and 
attention. If the evidence is strong enough, the Anti­
corruption Agency would proceed to initiate court action. 
Otherwise, the suspect would be referred to his department 
or ministry to face disciplinary action. A report would also 
be prepared by the officers of the Anti-corruption Agency.
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1.3 Bank Negara, the central bank of Malaysia
The role of Bank Negara is to ensure that the banking 
institutions and other financial institutions comply with 
regulations set up under the Banking Act 1973, the Banking 
and Financial Institutions Act 1989 and the Central Bank of 
Malaysia Ordinance 1958. These regulations were introduced 
to ensure the continuance of high standards of banking and 
finance in the country. Under section 69 of the Banking and 
Financial Institutions Act 1989, the central bank has the 
power to examine, without prior notice, the books or other 
documents, accounts and transactions of each licensed 
financial institution and of any office outside Malaysia of 
a licensed local institution. If any financial institution 
breaks any regulation, the Bank is empowered under these 
Acts to take certain courses of action which it deems 
relevant to the particular institution. Likewise, if any 
financial institution is facing a crisis, for example if it 
is facing a liquidity problem, it can request the help of 
the central bank. Under Section 54 of the Central Bank 
Ordinance 1958, Bank Negara may also, with the approval of 
the Minister of Finance, make regulations for the better 
carrying out of the objectives and purposes of the 
Ordinance. Thus, the role of Bank Negara is like a guardian 
to all the financial institutions in Malaysia.
The data I have from Bank Negara are on reported fraud 
cases involving financial institutions. As the title 
suggests, the data depend heavily on the willingness of the 
personnel of the financial institutions to report fraud 
committed against them. As officers of Bank Negara have the
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authority to check on these institutions, the data also 
depend on the discovery of fraud offences in these 
institutions by the central bank.
In the next section, I will explain the data which I 
have collected from the police headquarters, the Anti­
corruption Agency and Bank Negara before I analyze them in 
the last section of this chapter. As stated above, these 
data are based mainly on reports and complaints by the 
public and civil servants.
2. Commercial crime
From Table 6.2, Table 6.3, Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2, 
it can be seen that commercial crimes in Malaysia were 
increasing between 1980 and 1988 and decreasing slightly 
from 1989 to 1991. In 1980, the number of reported cases was 
2,794. By 1988, the figure had increased by 180% i.e. by 
5,047 cases and by 1991, it went down to just over 156% i.e. 
4,350 cases. In less than a decade, commercial crimes in 
Malaysia had almost doubled. It is interesting to note that 
the highest number of reported cases was between 1985 and 
1988 i.e. the period immediately after the BMF scandal. 
However, the number of cases where the offenders were caught 
from the total number of cases reported was not very 
encouraging i.e. an average of 24% between 1980 and 1989 
(see Table 6.2 for details). From Table 6.3, Figure 2.1 and 
Figure 2.2, it could be seen that the percentage for the 
number of cases settled was even less encouraging i.e. an 
average of 22.25% between 1980 and 1991. The percentage was 
relatively high for 1984 and 1985 i.e. 29% and 34%
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Table 6.2
Commercial Crime in Malaysia from 1980 to 1989
Year No. of cases Loss Amount Received Caught/r5o?*of
cases
Charged 
(No. of cases] Sett.led/^o?^ofcases
1980 2,794
M|
US I
21,348,898.67
78,920.00
M| 492,327.69 
US| 78,920.00 772 (28Z) 624 577 (21Z)
1981 3,016
Ml
US!
20,587,349.57
7,200.00
M| 600,828.29 
US| 7,200.00 880 (29Z) 755 898 (30Z)
1982 3,166
Ml
US|
64,951,721.12
115,150.00
M| 1,249,765.40 
US| 115,150.00 843 (27Z) 840 745 (24Z)
1983 4,269
Ml
US!
56,239,319.99
55,660.00
M| 896,452.77 
US| 55,680.00 989 (23Z) 822 858 (20Z)
1984 4,491
M|
RP
us!
67,310,053.99
44,760,000.00
86,400.00
M| 4,500,919.09 
RP 44,760,000.00 
US! 86,400.00
1,126 (25Z) 821 1,291 (29Z)
1985 5,026
Ml
us|
RP
si
85,923,039.02
72,990.00
1,890,000.00
50.00
M| 3,633,070.58 
US| 72,990.00 
RP 1,890,000.00 
S| 50.00
1,209 (24Z) 835 1,691 (34Z)
1986 5,043
Ml
us|
RP
168,717,852.93
7,100.00
490,000.00
M| 1,286,053.23 
US| 7,100.00 
RP 490,000.00
1,122 (22Z) 763 640 (13Z)
1987 4,748
Ml
us!
RP
HK|
172,734,775.27
130,420.00
12,090.00
1,000.00
M| 4,314,152.12 
US| 130,420.00 
RP 12,090.00 
HK| 1,000.00
1,102 (23Z) 696 819 (I7Z)
1988, 5,047
Ml
US|
SI
139,006,966.91 
12,400.00 
: 200.00
Ml 1,293,488.40 
US! 12,400.00 
S| 200.00 1,142 (22Z) 503 863 (17Z)
1989 4,591
Ml
us!
Yen
SI
Baht
BR
130,833,493.60 
1,480i 704.84 
3,000^000.00 
26,050.00 
8,500.00 
! 60.00
M| 3,607,717.50 
US| 40,200.00
793 (17Z) 323 594 (13Z)
Source: Haniff Omar, 1990
Table 6.3
Reported cases of commercial crimes, 1980 to 1991
Year Cases Solved* Unsolved/Pending
1980 2,794 577 (21%) 2,217
1981 3,016 898 (30%) 2,118
1982 3,166 745 (24%) 2,421
1983 4,269 858 (20%) 3,411
1984 4,491 1,291 (29%) 3,200
1985 5,026 1,691 (34%) 3,335
1986 5,043 640 (13%) 4,403
1987 4,748 819 (17%) 3,929
1988 5,048 863 (17%) 4,184
1989 4,591 594 (13%) 3,997
1990 4,388 1,054 (24%) 3,334
1991 4,350 1,103 (25%) 3,247
* solved means the case has been settled 
Source: Malaysian Royal Police.
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Figure 2.1
Reported cites of commercial crime in Malaysia from 1980 to 1991
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Reported cases of commercial crime in Malaysia from 1980 to 1991
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respectively, the period when the publicity for the BMF 
scandal was at its peak. After this period, the average 
percentage for the number of cases settled dropped 
drastically low between 1986 and 1989 i.e. 15%. The amount 
of loss through commercial crime in Malaysia was reported in 
different currencies and this shows that there must be some 
international involvement. The amount lost increased from 
tens of million Malaysian dollars in 1980 to hundreds of 
million Malaysian dollars in 1989 (please refer to Table 
6.2) .
3. Criminal breach of trust
From Table 6.4 and Figure 3.1, there was a definite 
increase in criminal breach of trust cases in Malaysia from 
1985 to 1990 i.e. from 1,290 cases to 4,388 cases, an 
increase of 340%. However, between 1985 and 1987, there was 
a slight drop in the number of cases, i.e. from 1,290 cases 
to 1,035 cases. The number increased again in 1988 to 1,335 
cases. However, with no viable explanation except for the 
actions of the public and the ways the cases were reported 
by the police, there was a sudden drop in 1989 to 870 cases 
and a sudden increase to 4,388 cases the next year, i.e. 
1990. With this sudden increase of 3,518 cases within a 
year, there is some doubt to the validity of the data. It 
should be pointed out that this sudden increase might be a 
sign of increase public trust in the enforcement 
institutions.
The amount lost through this crime, as shown in Figure 
3.2, increased from M$65.9 mil. in 1985 to M$94.4 mil. in
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Table 6.4
Criminal Breach of Trust in Malaysia from 1985 to 1990
Caught Occupation of Accused Victims/Place of Crimu
Year No. of Cases
1.0S8
[Mil.$) Total
Mala
Chinet
ndiai 
e <ither
)irecto
i
:
Lawyer
lusines
-man
3 Civil 
Servant
Company
Employ*
Joblei
c
s 1 
Qlheu
ndividt al
Bonk
Company Govern
Office
1985 1,290 65.9
963
(75%)
M M M M
93
(10Z)
19
(2.1Z)
79
(8.5Z)
12
(1.3Z)
584
(63Z)
95
T T
44
27'“ '
498
(39Z)
37
(2.9Z)
745
(58Z)
10
(0.8Z)
395 427 99 18
F F F F
6 15 3 -
1986 1,275 94.4
674
<53%)
M M M M
80
(8.5Z)
11
(1.2Z)
85
(9X)
23
(2.4Z)
611
(65Z)
6l 44 509
(40Z)
30
(2.4%)
718
C56.3Z)
18
(1.4Z)
331 196 86 31
F F F F (i:• 9Z)
8 17 5 -
1987 1,035 92.8
993
(96X)
M M M M
64
(6.4Z)
18
(1.8Z)
79
(8X)
41
(4.1Z)
673
(68Z)
64 i-- 54 421 
(40.7Z)
22
(2.1Z)
557 
(53.8Z
35
(3.4Z)
471 397 78 22
F F F F ( U • 9X)
13 9 3 _
1988 1,335 81.7
930
(70Z)
M M M M
73
(5.9Z)
14
(1.1X)
54
(4.4Z)
27
(2.2Z)
982
(80Z) 5fr e ?
467
(351)
24
(1.8Z)
821 
(61.5Z]
22
(1.6Z)
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Figure 3.1
Criminal breach of trust cases in Malaysia from 1985 to 1990
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Loss through criminal breach of trust in Malaysia
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Figure 3.3
Sex of offenders in criminal breach of trust cases
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Figure 3.4
Occupations of accused in criminal breach of trust in Malaysia from 1985 to 1990
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Figure 3.5
Victims of criminal breach of trust in Malaysia from 19S5 to 1990
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1986. After 1986, it started to decrease to M$45.7 mil. in 
1989 and then suddenly increased to M$117.6 mil. in 1990.
Figure 3.3 shows that the majority of the criminal 
breach of trust offenders caught were males. On average the 
female offenders made up only 3.7% of the total offenders 
caught between 1985 to 1989. It should be noted that the 
number of cases where the offenders were caught was quite 
high from 1985 to 1989 i.e. 75%, 53%, 96%, 70% and 75%
respectively of the total number of cases reported. Thus, on 
average, 74% of the number of cases being reported was 
caught.
Figure 3.4 shows the occupations of the accused. 
Company employees made up the bulk of the offenders every 
year from 1985 to 1990. On average, company employees made 
up 61% of the total accused between 1985 to 1990. The second 
highest came from the "jobless and others" group which made 
up an average of 17%. It should be noted that there was a 
sudden increase in this group in 1990 and the figure was the 
same as company employees. In that year, "jobless and 
others" as well as company employees made up 43% each of the 
total number of accused for 1990. Directors and businessmen 
shared the third position. Each made up, on average, 9% of 
the total number of accused. Civil servants made up 3% while 
lawyers made up 1% of the total number of accused between 
1985 to 1990.
A majority of the victims of criminal breach of trust 
in Malaysia seemed to be companies as shown in Figure 3.5. 
Between 1985 to 1989, companies, on average, made up 58% of 
the total victims. The next largest group of victims was
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individuals who made up on average 37% while the banks and 
Government offices made up 2% each.
4. Reported fraud cases involving financial institutions
From Table 6.5 and Figure 4.1, the reported fraud cases 
involving financial institutions were on the increase from 
1978 to 1991. In 1978, there was only one reported case. By 
1991, there were 14,199 reported cases. The increase between 
1978 and 1986 had been rather steady i.e. from 1 to 92 
cases. In 1987 (after the peak period of publicity of the 
BMF case), there was a sudden increase to 256 cases. The 
following year i.e. 1988, the number of cases dropped to 
138. It increased suddenly again in 1989 to 676 cases. This 
was the year after Bank Negara, the central bank, introduced 
a formal code of ethics and also the year a new Banking and 
Financial Institutions bill was tabled before Parliament 
which gave the central bank more power to deal with all 
sectors of the financial system. There was also a very 
drastic increase from 1990 to 1991 i.e. from 778 cases to 
14,199 cases. Within a year the number had increased by 
about eighteen times. As with the data on criminal breach of 
trust discussed in section 3 above, this sudden drastic 
increase by 1,825% makes the validity of the data 
questionable. This drastic increase was also matched by a 
drastic increase in the amount lost through fraud cases as 
shown by Figure 4.2. Although the amount had been increasing 
steadily throughout the years from 1978 to 1989 i.e. from 
M$0.96 mil. to M$18.16 mil., there was a sudden increase 
from M$22.56 mil. to M$614.79 mil. between 1990 and 1991.
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Table 6.5
Reported Fraud Cases Involving Financial Institutions
Year fraud 
occurred
Number of cases Amount involved in millions (M$)
Commercial
bank
Finance
company
Merchant
bank
Total Commercial
bank
Finance
company
Merchant
bank
Total
1978 1 0 0 1 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.96
1979 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1980 4 0 0 4 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.20
1981 19 0 0 19 2.50 0.00 0.00 2.50
1982 27 0 0 27 2.80 0.00 0.00 2.80
1983 35 1 0 36 4.80 4.88 0.00 9.68
1984 36 11 1 48 1.70 0.99 2.30 4.99
1985 51 28 0 79 6.60 4.38 0.00 10.98
1986 87 4 1 92 6.60 1 .80 3.30 11 .70
1987 245 10 1 256 21.92 2.92 0.00 24.84
1988 120 17 1 138 23.67 0.50 0.13 24.30
1989 624 51 1 676 10.98 7.13 0.05 18.16
1990 769 9 0 778 22.42 0.14 0.00 22.56
1991 14,181 18 0 14,199 610.7 4.09 0.00 614.79
Total 16,199 149 5 16,353 715.85 26.83 5.78 748.46
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia (the Central Bank)
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Reported fraud cases involving financial institutions from 1978 to 1991
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Figure 4.2
Amount lost by financial institutions in reported fraud cases from 197$ to 1991
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Figure 4.3
Amount lost by financial institutions in reported fraud cases from 197$ to 1986
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Figure 4.4
Amount lost by financial institutions in reported fraud cases from 1987 to 1991
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Commercial banks made up the largest group of victims. 
Out of a total of 16,353 cases reported between 1978 to 
1991, 16,199 cases involved commercial banks which made up 
about 99.06% of the total number of reported cases (see 
Table 6.5). The next largest group of victims was the 
finance company which made up only 0.91% of the total 
reported cases. The last group of victims was the merchant 
banks which made up only 0.03% of the total reported cases. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the commercial banks 
lost the most money through fraud cases as shown by Figures
4.3 and 4.4. However, there was one year, i.e. 1983, where 
the amount lost by 35 commercial banks was equivalent to the 
loss by one finance company. The amounts were M$4.8 mil. and 
M$4.88 mil. respectively. In 1984 and 1986, the loss 
incurred by two merchant banks was greater than the loss by 
15 finance companies i.e. M$5.6 mil. and M$2.79 mil. 
respectively. The total amount lost by all financial 
institutions from 1978 to 1991 came up to M$748.46 mil. 
(about £187 mil. at 1994 rate).
5. Corruption
The data for corruption cases reported to the Anti­
corruption Agency from 1968 to 1992 are divided into Tables 
6.6 and 6.6.1 because of the way they were recorded. From 
these two tables and Figure 5.2, it can be seen that between 
1968 and 1992, the total number of reports received varies 
every year with the highest number in 1982 (before the BMF 
scandal was publicised widely). It fell steadily between 
1982 to 1988 i.e. from 10,983 to 6,791. It increased again
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Table 6.6
Reports received, number of people caught and number of 
disciplinary reports on civil servants made by the Anti­
corruption Agency from 1968 to 1986
Year Reports Caught Disciplinary
received Public CS* Total reports
1968 6,155 157 59 216 3.5%) 68
1969 3,895 99 156 255 6.5%) 88
1970 6,376 115 67 182 2.9%) 87
1971 4,550 151 57 208 4.6%) 27
1972 3,422 131 50 181 5.3%) 33
1973 3,399 132 62 194 5.7%) 18
1974 3,544 101 70 171 4.8%) 30
1975 4,457 45 78 123 2.8%) 23
1976 5,912 47 102 149 2.5%) 35
1977 5,587 23 62 85 1.5%) 30
1978 6,139 64 81 145 2.4%) 67
1979 8,462 42 86 128 1.5%) 56
1980 6,827 43 76 119 1.7%) 68
1981 7,394 82 157 239 3.2%) 93
1982 10,983 102 155 257 2.3%) 143
1983 8,434 96 124 220 2.6%) 149
1984 7,769 143 214 357 4.6%) 84
1985 6,790 79 183 262 3.9%) 91
1986 6,666 96 174 270 4.1%) 151
* Civil servants
Source: The Anti-corruption Agency, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
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Table 6.6.1
Information received and actions taken by the Anti 
corruption Agency in Malaysia from 1987 to 1992
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
1. Information and
complaints received 6968 6791 8217 7387 6789 7890
1.1 Investigations 3101 3110 3445 3243 3407 3617
taken (45%) (46%) (42%) (44%) (50%) (46%)
1.2 Notice sent to 
respective depts. 
for further
actions 2310 2284 3220 1381 1168 1256
1.3 No basis for
further action 1453 1406 1549 1435 1226 1735
2. Caught 291 321 255 239 226 332
(4.2%)(4.7%)(3.1%)(3.2%)(3.3%)(4.2%)
2.1 Civil servants 156 179 154 151 118 191
2.2 General public & 
private sector
employees 134 139 101 87 103 140
2.3 Politicians 1 3 - 1 5 1
Source: Anti-corruption Agency, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
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Figure 5.2
Complaints received by the ACA and die nnmber of cases canght
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Table 6.6.2
Disciplinary reports prepared by the Anti-corruption Agency 
for civil servants in Malaysia from 1987-1992
Year Categories of Civil Servants Total
A B C D
1987 18 12 23 32 85
1988 39 14 58 39 150
1989 12 4 36 48 100
1990 31 25 66 73 195
1991 13 8 25 59 105
1992 24 19 28 57 128
Source: Anti-corruption Agency, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
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quite significantly the following year i.e. 1989 to 8,217 
complaints. This was during the period when the Anti­
corruption Agency held more awareness of corruption 
activities for the public.
Table 6.6.1 shows that the investigations carried out 
by the Anti-corruption Agency were relatively high which 
varies between 42% to 50% of total complaints between 1987 
and 1992. Although the reports received were high, the 
actual number of offenders caught was quite low. The 
percentage caught was on average only 3.6% of the total 
number of reports received. The total number of civil 
servants caught between 1968 to 1992 was higher than the 
public i.e. 2,962 cases for the former group and 2,452 cases 
for the latter group. Between 1987 and 1992, 11 politicians 
were also recorded in the total number of offenders.
The Anti-corruption Agency also sent disciplinary 
reports on civil servants who were suspected of corruption 
as well as notices for all others who were under suspicion 
to their respective departments for further action to be 
taken (see Tables 6.6 and 6.6.1). Between 1987 to 1992, out 
of the total number of reports received, the percentage of 
notices sent to the respective departments was 33.2%, 33.6%, 
39.2%, 18.7%, 17.2% and 15.9% respectively. It should be 
noted that although the percentage was relatively high per 
year, it declined steadily between 1987 to 1992. The average 
percentage of notices sent to the respective departments 
between 1987 to 1992 was 26.3%. From Table 6.6.2, it could 
be seen that disciplinary reports prepared by the Anti­
corruption Agency for civil servants for further action to
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be taken were mainly for lower rank civil servants i.e. 
categories C and D. Fewer disciplinary reports were 
submitted for categories A and B civil servants who were of 
higher ranks.
6. Interpretation of data
From the data and information given above, how can they 
be interpreted? In Field's work on "Trends in crime and 
their interpretation”, a Home Office research study on post 
war England and Wales published in 1990, it was found that 
economic factors had a major influence on trends in both 
property and personal crime. His definition of property 
crime included fraud cases. On the issue of property crime, 
he said, "'Real' (after inflation) annual growth in personal 
consumption was found to be inversely related to growth in 
recorded property crime. Thus, in years when people are 
increasing their spending very little - or even reducing it, 
property crime tends to grow relatively quickly, whereas 
during years when people are rapidly increasing their 
expenditure, property crime tends to grow less rapidly or 
even fall” (Field, 1990; 5) . He went on to say that economic 
factors in general and consumption growth in particular 
appeared to be among the most important determinants of 
fluctuations in the growth of property crime in 
industrialised countries although he did not dispute that 
there were many other factors which played a part, too. For 
example, he argued that involvement in crime was more common 
among young males than among women or older men (Field, 
1990; 40) . He compared his findings in Wales and England
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with those in the United States, France, West Germany, Japan 
and Sweden. He found a similar pattern emerging in England, 
Wales, the United States, Japan and France over the same 
period. However, a different pattern was obtained in West 
Germany and Sweden, although some relationship between 
consumption and crime was evident. The conclusion was that 
there was a strong inverse relationship between the annual 
growth rate of personal consumption and the annual growth 
rate of property crime, especially in industrialised 
countries, but this was not universal. Field did not give 
any concrete reason why there was such a relationship 
between personal consumption growth and property crime. The 
inference to his analysis could be that property crime is 
consumption by other means. He also noted that his study 
should not bear directly on explanations of the level of 
crime, but rather for the forecasting of future levels of 
crime on the basis of a combination of predicted future 
economic and demographic circumstances.
Basing myself on Field's study, I would like to see 
whether similar trends can be attributed to the Malaysian 
case1. The next section will be a brief discussion on the 
economy of Malaysia with particular reference to its private 
or personal consumption growth. After that, a comparison 
will be made with the data on commercial crime, criminal
lI have contacted Simon Field personally at the Home 
Office in London to enquire if his study would be applicable 
to the type of data I have. He found no reason why his study 
could not be applicable to my data although it dealt mainly 
with theft and burglary. He noted that perhaps the 
occupations of the people and the age group involved in 
fraud might be different from the main issue he was looking 
at.
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breach of trust, fraud in financial institutions and 
corruption as discussed above.
During the period when Malaysia achieved its 
independence in 1957 to 1969, the gross national product in 
Peninsula Malaysia or West Malaysia had increased by 86%. 
The actual rate of growth for this period was 5.3% per annum 
(Cho, 1990; 17) . This growth was considered to be one of the 
better ones in South-east Asia and among the developing 
countries. During the 1970s, with the introduction of the 
New Economic Policy, as discussed in earlier chapters, the 
growth rate was 7.8% per annum (Ariff, 1991; 1). In the 
1980s, the average rate of growth decreased from 7.9% to 
5.6% between 1980 and 1982, rising steadily to 7.6% in 1984, 
but falling sharply to 2.8% in 1985 (Cho, 1990; 18).
Malaysia entered into a deep recession in the mid 1980s. The 
fall in growth rate was due to weak world demand for 
commodities. However, the economy picked up again in the 
late 1980s with high gross domestic product growth rates of 
5.4%, 8.9% and 8.8% in 1987, 1988 and 1989 respectively. In 
1990, gross domestic product growth exceeded 10% (Ariff, 
1991; 1). As with private consumption, the trend is as
listed below.
Table 6.7
Percentage of average annual growth rate of private 
consumption; 1970 constant prices
1965-1970 1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985* 1986-1990* 1991-5
(target)
5.3 5.7 9.7 3.7 6.4 6.4
* 1978 constant prices
Source: Economic Planning Unit, Second, Fourth and Sixth
Malaysia Plan.
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From the table above and Figure 6, it could be seen 
that private consumption was at its peak in Malaysia in the 
late 1970s. It began to decline in the early 1980s when 
Malaysia was affected by the world wide recession. It began 
to increase again in the late 1980s. If Field's study is to 
be a basis of comparison, the property crime rate should be 
down in the late 1970s and increase again in the early 
1980s. It should decrease in the late 1980s and should 
continue to do so in the early 1990s because of the economic 
boom that Malaysia is facing.
From the limited data I have obtained as compiled in 
Figure 6.1, it can be seen that corruption, commercial crime 
and fraud in financial institutions were down in the late 
1970s. They began to accelerate in the early 1980s. This 
trend seems to confirm Field's findings. However, his 
findings cannot be applied for the late 1980s and early 
1990s. According to Field's study, the period of late 1980s 
to early 1990s should see a decline in property crime rate. 
But, in the Malaysian case, there was a rapid increase in 
the rate of fraud in financial institutions and criminal 
breach of trust cases. However, I would be cautious in 
dismissing Field's findings because the data I obtained are 
questionable as explained in the earlier sections of this 
chapter. This is in relation to the drastic increase in 
fraud cases in financial institutions between 1990 and 1991 
(Table 6.5) i.e. from 778 cases to 14,199 cases, an increase 
of 1,825% within a year. The increase in criminal breach of 
trust cases between 1989 and 1990 (Table 6.4) was also too 
drastic i.e. from 870 cases to 4,388 cases, an increase of
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Figure 6
Growth rate of private/personal consumption in Malaysia
11
10
9
7
6
5
4
3
1966 196S 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993
year
,  average annual growth rate of personal consumption
344
Figure 6.1
Commercial crime, criminal breach of trust, fraud and corruption in Malaysia
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504% within a year. There could be problems with the 
reporting of these cases.
As for corruption cases, the rate decreased in the late 
1980s. It started to increase slightly again in the early 
1990s. There is no conclusive evidence to dismiss Field's 
study.
As for the commercial crime cases, the figures were low 
in late 1970s. They began to accelerate in the early 1980s. 
They reached a peak in mid 1980s. In the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, they began to decrease. Field's study seems to 
fit the commercial crime picture.
In conclusion, Field's study has some implications for 
the Malaysian property crime scene i.e. there is an inverse 
relationship between personal or private consumption with 
certain property crime. However, if the reporting of fraud 
cases in financial institutions and criminal breach of trust 
cases is without problems, we would expect an increase in 
property crime in the early 1990s, contrary to Field's 
study. As stated above, I am not able to dismiss Field's 
theory because there is doubt on the data I have obtained.
If Field's study is to be used to predict the future of 
the property crime rate in Malaysia, we should contemplate 
a fall in property crime in the 1990s as the country is
enjoying an economic boom at the moment and is predicted to
do so throughout the 1990s. The Malaysian Government has 
planned to achieve the status of "Newly Industrialised
Country" by the year 2020. This goal is commonly referred to
as "Vision 2020". Policies planned for this goal are geared 
towards greater economic progress. With greater economic
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progress, the private consumption growth rate is predicted 
to increase. Thus, the property crime rate should go down in 
the next couple of decades. Malaysia should have fewer 
property crime problems in the near future. However, 
contrary to this prediction, the data seem to suggest an 
increase of fraud cases in financial institutions, criminal 
breach of trust and corruption. There are three possible 
reasons for this trend. Firstly, the height of the BMF 
scandal was in the mid 1980s when the public were outraged 
at the large amount of money that went missing. This might 
have prompted all institutions to be more vigilant and 
careful in their dealings. In doing so, more offences were 
uncovered. Secondly, Bank Negara, the central bank, played 
a more active role after the BMF scandal by issuing a formal 
code of ethics in October 1988. A new Banking and Financial 
Institutions Bill was also tabled before Parliament in June 
1989 which gave Bank Negara the power to act quickly in 
future instances of financial distress in all sectors of the 
financial system. Lastly, in the late 1980s, the Anti­
corruption Agency played an active role in holding 
activities to educate the public on the ill effects of 
corruption as noted in section 1.2 of this chapter. These 
three reasons may have a considerable impact on the increase 
in the rate of fraud cases in financial institutions, 
criminal breach of trust and corruption in Malaysia.
The next chapter will be on preventing and combating 
fraud. In this chapter, I will try to give some suggestions 
of what can be done to help lessen employees fraud.
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Chapter 7 
Combating And Preventing Fraud
Introduction
In 1979, at the United Malay National Organisation 
(UMNO - the dominant ruling coalition party in Malaysia) 
General Assembly, the then Prime Minister, Tun Hussein Onn, 
said, "a country will be destroyed if its leaders are 
dishonest, untrustworthy and corrupt” and expressed the hope 
that the Bank Rakyat fiasco (see chapter 5) would be a 
"bitter lesson to other Government institutions and agencies 
including companies and subsidiaries set up by the 
Government" (Lim, 1986; 41). Ironically, at the time he was 
warning the country against fraud and corruption and the 
ruin they could bring to the nation, the BMF scandal, which 
was twenty times bigger than the Bank Rakyat scandal, was 
just about to take place. After the BMF case, the Deposit- 
taking Co-operatives scandal broke out. One would assume 
that with the introduction of new and amended laws and 
procedures subsequent to these scandals, the problem would 
have been minimised or controlled. Unfortunately, they are 
not the last we shall hear of major financial scandals in 
Malaysia.
On 6 October 1989, Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad 
(BBMB) announced a M$1.22 bil. increase in bad-debt 
provisions for loans made prior to 1985. The huge provision 
turned a M$168 mil. operating profit for the year ended 31 
March 1989 into a loss of M$1.06 bil.. While BBMB did not 
disclose any detail, analysts said that roughly half of the
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amount provided was probably related to two major Kuala 
Lumpur property developments:
1. the Putra World Trade Centre, an UMNO-owned 
convention centre and office complex in Kuala 
Lumpur. In September 1983, BBMB lent M$200 mil. 
for the project and since that time, according to 
documents released in a legal suit, UMNO had 
neither repaid any principal nor made interest 
payments;
2. the Shahzan Tower, a Kuala Lumpur office block 
owned until October 1989 by the Pahang State royal 
family. Analysts said that unpaid debts resulting 
from a M$50 mil. loan for the project early in the 
1980s now amount to roughly M$120 mil..
(FEER, 19/10/1989)
On 19 October 1989, it was reported in the "Far Eastern 
Economic Review" that, for the second time in five years, 
the entire shareholder capital of BBMB had been wiped out as 
a result of imprudent property lending earlier in the decade 
(FEER, 19/10/1989). These lendings were domestic lendings, 
including loans associated with UMNO Baru, the dominant 
party in Malaysia's ruling coalition. Critics of BBMB said 
that its loans had been made chiefly to politically 
connected individuals. Many of these individuals had 
indirect links to the Prime Minister's UMNO (FEER, 
31/1/1991) . Bankers said that BBMB's lending abuses appeared 
to increase under Basir Ismail's leadership, a corporate 
scion of the ruling party who had long been identified with
349
the then Finance Minister, Daim Zainuddin, and other 
powerful people in Malaysia. As with the BMF scandal, 
Petronas, the national oil company, had again to bail BBMB 
out of this problem.
In October 1989, financial analysts pointed out that 
Petronas had to bail out BBMB a second time with a M$982 
mil. injection after the bank was forced to record the 
M$l.06 bil. loss resulting from late interest payments on 
property loans made from 1985-86 (FEER, 31/1/1991). The 
financial strain wiped out BBMB's shareholders' funds and 
led to the acquisition by Petronas of most of the bank's 
shares that the oil company did not already own. Some 
bankers and financial analysts believed that the bank's 
overall financial position had not improved despite the 
Government-sponsored rescue efforts. Petronas' association 
with BBMB had cost the oil company about M$1 bil. when the 
difference between the amount it injected into the bank as 
fresh equity and the value of the share transaction with the 
Government was taken into account (FEER, 31/1/1991).
The banking and financial system seems particularly 
prone to fraud. The obvious reason is that the institutions 
deal directly with a highly irresistible and liquid 
commodity, i.e. money. Moreover, their transactions 
involving financial assets and liabilities are just a matter 
of book entries or the information is stored in a computer 
rather than the exchange of physical assets. It is not 
difficult to put in a wrong entry with the stroke of a pen 
or a key of the computer. Transactions become complicated 
when they are of an international nature involving foreign
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currencies. In these international transactions, there are 
again no actual physical movements of funds as they are 
recorded like the local transactions. International 
transactions can take place 24 hours a day and seven days a 
week. These factors make things more complicated and thus 
increase the difficulty of controlling fraud.
The French economist and Nobel prize winner, Maurice 
Allais noted in 1989 that more than US$400 bil. was 
exchanged every day on the foreign exchange market while the 
flow of commercial transactions was only about US$12 bil. 
(Calavita & Pontell, 1992; 254). Allais named the finance 
industry in the United States the "casino economy”.
The FBI figures in the United States indicated that 
bank losses due to fraud were five times greater than losses 
through robberies and violence (Lee, 1992; 4).
From the case studies in the earlier chapters as well 
as those we read in the newspapers every day, the conclusion 
must be that there is no system or procedure which can 
eradicate fraud and corruption totally in any organisation. 
The only alternative is to try to control and minimise them. 
Fraud and corruption will occur as long as there is the 
opportunity to commit them. Opportunities present themselves 
when the chances of detection are remote, the control or 
supervision system is inadequate and where moral stigma is 
absent. The opportunities are also greater higher up the 
political or social and economic order where the chances of 
detection are fewer. As the Inspector General of Police in 
Malaysia said, "Commercial crime is a crime of opportunity 
because their positions in business, profession or
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employment afford them the opportunities (Omar, 1990; 19).
There is thus a need to identify the weaknesses in the
structure of the institutions and society which created the
opportunities and temptations for fraud and corruption to
occur. As Goldstock put it,
"Corruption, like disease, is not monolithic. There is 
no one cure. We need to look at individual maladies, or 
individual types of corruption. Indeed, in each case, 
there should be a three part process in searching for 
means of control. First, the identification and 
description of symptoms. Second, the analysis of the 
mechanisms through which the integrity of the system is 
compromised. Finally, based upon that analysis, the 
development and implementation of a program of 
treatment using appropriate remedies. Ultimately, the 
treatment program may require a combination of 
preventive, structural and/or institutional 
measures."
(Goldstock, 1989; 71)
Huntington observed that the branches and subsidiaries 
of major organisations which had a strong central control 
had a low risk of fraud while autonomous operations remote 
from a weak central authority had a high risk. The risk 
increased with the complexity of an organisation and with 
the geographical spread of its subsidiaries and branches and 
their physical and cultural distance from head office. He 
also suggested that the opportunities for concealment of 
fraud engineered from the centre were increased if a network 
of branches, subsidiaries and related entities existed. 
These autonomous branches or subsidiaries could, for 
example, be used by directors or top management to 
circumvent management control at operating level 
(Huntington, 1992; 6). Thus, in order for opportunities to 
be minimised, the following must be present:
a. an effective internal control system;
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b. an efficient and honest management group which 
would enforce this internal control system.
The two factors are important and they go hand in hand 
because an effective control system will be rendered useless 
if not enforced properly by the management group.
The two factors above are applicable to fraud at the 
organisational level. What about large scale fraud at the 
national and international level with the involvement of 
politicians and members of the higher class? To fight this 
type of fraud effectively, the following set of factors must 
be present: firstly, there must be some knowledge of who is 
corrupt and who is not. Secondly, there must be cooperation 
among the members of society at all levels. These include 
the legislators, the law enforcement professionals, the 
auditors, the directors, the management and staff, the 
general public as well as the politicians and elite members. 
Thirdly, changes are needed at both the political and social 
order. Fraud and corruption must be seen as wrong and 
damaging by all members of the society and there is a 
genuine effort to try to prevent them by making relevant 
changes to the political and social system. It is not enough 
just to get rid of politicians who are corrupted when they 
are caught in a financial scandal and replace them with 
other people who, in turn, may be convicted of the same 
offence in future because the opportunities and the corrupt 
system are still there. Fourthly, there must be freedom from 
fear of reprisal and lastly, there must be a belief that 
actions will be taken following complaints.
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The conditions conducive for fraud to take place can be 
divided into two groups, the internal or individual factors 
and the external or social factors. "Internal factor" refers 
to the personality of the individual or personal reasons, 
for example, financial problems, family commitments, etc. 
"External factor" refers to factors which are outside the 
individual personality and which made it possible and 
conducive for fraud and corruption to take place. Some 
writers called these factors the "environmental factors". 
Examples of these environmental factors are the structure of 
the organisation or society, the cultural institution, the 
political system, the legal system, etc..
In chapter 4, the external factors for the problems of 
fraud in Malaysia were divided into micro factors and macro 
factors. In this chapter, the factors which prevent fraud 
will also be divided into micro and macro factors. The micro 
factors refer to the conditions inside the organisation 
which will prevent fraud and the macro factors relate to the 
Malaysian social and political environment. The next section 
of this chapter will be a discussion of the micro preventive 
factors of fraud and corruption. It should be noted that the 
preventive measures here are suggested with banking and 
financial institutions in mind. However, there is no reason 
why these measures cannot be adopted for other institutions.
1. Micro-level of prevention
Before discussing the preventive measures in detail, I 
would like to look briefly again into the problems of fraud. 
These problems are summed up clearly by two well qualified
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persons in the area of fraud prevention.
According to Ishak Tadin, the Auditor-General of 
Malaysia, the failures of some of the Malaysian public 
companies and agencies had been due to:
1. Lapses in their management;
2. Lapses in their systems of control in general;
3. Blatant disregard of moral and corporate ethics. 
The Auditor-General defined corporate ethics here 
as professional standards of conduct of the people 
in an organisation which ranged from personal 
behaviour and morality to managerial 
accountability in the stewardship of funds 
entrusted to an authorised person.
(Tadin, 1990; 1-2)
Lee, Manager of the Examination Department II in Bank 
Negara Malaysia (the central bank), in his review of the 
fraud cases reported to the central bank, disclosed that 
frauds were mainly caused by the following:
a. Non-compliance of internal procedures by officers 
and staff;
b. Negligence of officers authorising transactions;
c. Lack of dual control or non-segregation of duties;
d. Lack of supervision by supervisory staff;
e. Staff and officers were not subjected to job 
rotation or required to take leave;
f. Laxity of control over security documents and 
important records;
g. Laxity of control over dormant accounts;
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h. Inadequate audit coverage or absence of internal 
audit functions on sensitive areas of operations;
i. Registers were not kept or poorly maintained;
j . Infrequent reconciliation or non-reconciliation of 
bank accounts;
k. Surprise checks were not conducted on cash 
holdings and other valuables.
(Lee, 1992; 7)
In any organisation, an efficient internal control 
system seems to be the most important safeguard against 
fraud. Thus, any system of internal control should consider 
the following:
l.l. Efficient, accurate and accountable reporting system
A proper accounting system can exist only when the 
records of transactions are properly kept. From his 
experience in auditing Government's and statutory bodies' 
accounts, the Auditor-General of Malaysia observed that 
those which were prone to malpractice had the problems of 
inadequate disclosure of correct and factual information and 
an inadequate internal control system (Tadin, 1990). 
Transactions should be made and recorded in accordance with 
specified procedures. There should be no allowance for any 
discretionary transactions to be made outside these 
procedures unless it has been brought to the attention of 
the relevant decision-making committee. This is particularly 
important where the dispensing of loans in financial 
institutions is concerned. The members in this decision­
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making committee must be independent members i.e. they are 
not members from the Executive Board to whom the loan 
application is given or any member whose opinion may 
interfere with the exercise of independent judgement, for 
example, a family member. The financial background of the 
applicants, especially where large sums of money are 
involved, should be checked thoroughly. It should be a 
policy of the organisation not to conduct business with 
customers who fail to provide evidence of their identity. 
There should be proper lending guidelines to ensure that 
loans are not concentrated on one person or organisation. 
Collateral involved in the transactions should also be 
properly secured before dispensing these loans. The records 
should be maintained in sufficient detail in order to 
reflect the nature of the transactions. How the transaction 
decision was made and who was in charge should also be 
recorded for the purpose of accountability.
All these measures are meant to safeguard the true 
financial position of the financial institutions as well as 
to expose any irregularities.
1.2. Segregation of duties
Key functions like the authorising, recording, 
accounting and custody of assets should be segregated. This 
is to prevent one person dominating a transaction from 
beginning to end. If this is allowed, the opportunity for 
committing and concealing a fraud is great. The segregation 
of duties will provide checks and balances whereby the work 
of one person can be verified by a second person. Moreover,
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this will also ensure accountability by all sections and 
levels of the organisation as there is no diffusion of 
responsibilities. This also prevents the passing on of 
responsibilities and 'scapegoating' when things go wrong. As 
Croall pointed out, there were classic instances of serious 
corporate offending which revealed a complex web of 
interlocking responsibilities and cover-ups at all levels 
which combined to conceal where responsibility ultimately 
lay (Croall, 1992; 63). Clinard argued that the immensity, 
the diffusion of responsibility and the hierarchical 
structure of large corporations all foster conditions 
conducive to organisational deviance (Clinard, 1983; 17).
1.3. Effective, sensible and regular supervision
Financial scandals are costly affairs. From the BMF 
case, it can be seen that fraud of a financial nature 
usually occurs in a round about manner. The money acquired 
from loans usually passes from one destination to another 
before coming back to where it started. By checking and 
double checking and making sure that all sections of the 
organisation are accountable for their actions, the problem 
can be traced at the early stages. As the saying goes, 
"Prevention is better than cure". Thus, the management 
members should keep reasonably close, regular and effective 
checks and supervision on the overall operations of the 
institution. This is to ensure that the proper procedures 
have been carried out throughout the firm and also to detect 
problems and irregularities arising. If the organisation has 
branches and subsidiaries in other parts of the country or
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even in other parts of the world, the management members at 
the head office should ensure that they know all the 
operations that are taking place at the other end. They 
should also make sure the management members at the branches 
or subsidiaries are following the procedures set out and 
that everything is in order. However, these checks and 
supervision should be carried out sensibly so as not to be 
antagonistic to the employees.
On top of making independent checks and supervision 
over the performance of employees, management members should 
also:
1. monitor, sometimes on a month-to-month basis and 
in certain operations, on a daily basis, the 
profit and loss account of the financial 
institution in order to pin-point financial 
problems and risks faced by the institution;
2. conduct regular management review on the 
effectiveness of its policies and procedures;
3. set up an independent audit and examination 
committee consisting of non-executive directors;
4. ensure that the internal auditors have access to 
the audit committee and to top management so that 
they could report any problem that is found.
1.4. Sound personnel policies
After the BMF case, various amendments were made, 
especially to the Banking Act and the Companies Act, to 
prevent future fraud. However, these amendments did not 
prevent abuse and mismanagement from taking place again. As
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the Committee of Enquiry members concluded, "Controls do not 
in themselves ensure healthy business climate and public 
confidence in corporate management, but even more important 
is the personal quality and integrity of persons entrusted 
with the responsibility of controlling and managing 
corporations on behalf of the shareholders and depositors" 
(Committee of Enquiry, 1986; 942).
A good internal control system will work even better if 
the employees are competent and honest. Although there are 
no hard and fast rules to determine which applicant for a 
particular position is honest and efficient, certain 
measures could be taken at the recruitment stage to weed out 
potentially unsuitable applicants. For example, due 
attention should be given to character references and past 
employment records. Once recruited, Lee suggested that 
management members should also keep a vigilant watch on 
their employees for vices, such as drug addiction, gambling 
or a penchant for luxuries beyond a person's means as 
failure to observe these was as good as leaving the door 
open to theft (Lee, 1992; 42). Levi suggested that fraud 
prevention measures might involve educating colleagues and 
internal security to watch out for and enquire into the 
circumstances of employees who were living in a style far in 
excess of their salaries. Several defrauded firms had 
allowed employees on modest salaries to go on driving new 
Porsche cars and taking expensive holidays without 
conducting any enquiry or more than superficial one into how 
they could afford this (Levi, 1988; 13).
In order to encourage employees to blow the whistle on
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their colleagues if they find any malpractice, the authority 
in the organisation must reassure them that their job will 
be secure. It will encourage them further if they are to be 
given an additional reward or promotion. Their evidence 
would be followed up and an investigation would be carried 
out by the proper authority in the organisation. Great care 
should be taken not to reveal the identity of the whistle­
blower in order to protect his or her life. Of course there 
is always the possibility that there may be malicious 
allegations. The possibility will be slim because of the 
danger inherent to the whistle-blower's life. Moreover, the 
whistle-blower's identity is known to the authority in the 
organisation.
If the identity of the whistle-blower is revealed, the 
organisation must also offer him or her whatever protection 
is possible against any threat to his or her life. If the 
organisation gives a positive image towards whistle-blowing, 
then employees would not fear reporting any malpractice on 
the part of their colleagues. Ultimately, the organisation 
will benefit from the whistle-blowing as a lot of money 
would be saved. At the moment, whistle-blowing seems to be 
discouraged as those who have done it generally end up 
badly. For example, on 8 June 1994, it was reported in The 
Times that a British banker, Alan Crabtree, was left 
destitute after blowing the whistle on a £66 mil. fraud by 
colleagues at the Trust Bank of Africa in South Africa. A 
series of death threats forced him and his family to abandon 
their home and savings. They had to leave South Africa 
within a week. His attempts to get a job in the financial
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world in London were largely fruitless. One of the reasons 
was that employers were nervous about his whistle-blowing. 
Why should they feel nervous when the potential employee had 
helped save his previous company from losing more money? 
They should be grateful to have such a loyal employee in 
their company although it is often the case that people do 
find it difficult to work with the conspicuous virtuous. At 
the moment, it seems that it does not pay to whistle-blow. 
Decent and honest organisations which really want to prevent 
fraud must give their employees more incentive to whistle- 
blow on any malpractice by their colleagues.
The social and cultural environment within which an 
organisation operates is also very important. There should 
be a fixed and clear personnel policy covering the 
selection, training, promotion and remuneration of officers 
and employees. Tadin, the Auditor-General of Malaysia, said 
that a competent group of employees was also the product of 
proper effective training, sensible evaluation and promotion 
practices and a work environment which provided reasonable 
incentive for good performance (Tadin, 1990; 6). This is to 
prevent favouritism, nepotism and ill-feelings among the 
employees. Lee also suggested that key or sensitive 
positions should be filled by personnel on a rotational 
basis (Lee, 1992; 41). This is to prevent one person from 
getting too familiar with that particular position, 
especially if it is a high ranking one which is exposed to 
opportunities for fraud.
Lastly, the key to healthy financial institutions 
depends fundamentally on good quality management. Improved
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internal controls and procedures, penalties against breaches 
of the law and code of ethics are insufficient to deter 
fraud and malpractice. Competent and trustworthy management 
members are the order of the day. Any management member who 
does not fit the bill has to be replaced as soon as 
possible. "When wrong doings are discovered, firm and 
positive actions should be taken to remedy the situation. 
Those responsible should be removed from positions of 
management and not be permitted to continue as in the case 
of BMF" (Committee of Enquiry, 1986; 942). Those in the 
management of BMF were not removed because top politicians 
were involved and no one from within the organisation dared 
to exercise effective control without consulting the Prime 
Minister. As the matter was left to the Prime Minister, he 
should have taken firm and positive actions to remedy the 
situation.
l.S. Technological improvement and retraining of management
members
The control system of the organisation has to evolve 
with the times. As technology improves at the operational 
level to compete with, other organisations, the control 
system, too, has to keep pace and be familiar with this 
improvement in order to reduce the opportunities for fraud. 
This means regular retraining of management members. Also, 
with the rapid advancement into international business 
dealings, there is a need to revise the internal control 
system to take into consideration overseas branches and 
subsidiaries.
363
1.6. Roles of professionals
Leigh argued that the normal audit might not always 
pick up frauds and irregularities, especially if, as 
sometimes happened, directors were determined to conceal the 
truth (Leigh, 1986; 91). He also said that audit systems 
sometimes failed to perform satisfactorily for any of the 
following reasons: incompetence, failure to observe
recognised accounting standards, fear of pressing clients 
too hard for explanation lest they lost clients and finally 
the client's needs having grown beyond the point where the 
auditors could do an adequate job for them (Leigh, 1986; 
91) . Auditors should be reminded that their responsibilities 
are not only to their clients who pay their fees, but also 
to everybody who relies on their reports, for example, 
creditors, shareholders, prospective investors, regulatory 
agencies of Governments and so on. As Nordin, the Chairman 
of the Malaysian Institute of Accountants pointed out, "In 
a real sense he has a moral duty to the public as a whole, 
which can be discharged only by the exercise of the most 
resolute independence" (Nordin, 1990; 3). They must not
permit their responsibilities to their clients to override 
their obligations to the public as well as to maintain their 
independence, integrity and objectivity. They must exercise 
due care, diligence, fairness, honesty and independence 
during the course of an audit in accordance with approved 
auditing standards. If any proceeding for negligence in the 
conduct of an audit does arise, they are in a better 
position to defend themselves. If auditors failed to follow 
the proper procedures, strict actions should be taken
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against them by the professional board.
The International Auditing Guideline 11 on Fraud and 
Error requires the auditor to plan his audit so that he has 
a reasonable expectation of detecting material misstatements 
in the financial information resulting from fraud or error 
(Nordin, 1990; 6). If an illegal act is discovered, the 
auditor should report the circumstances to the client's 
organisation at the relevant level of authority so that 
appropriate action can be taken by the client. In the 1986 
amendments to the Companies Acts 1965 and the Banking and 
Financial Institutions Act 1989 in Malaysia, the auditors 
are required, in certain circumstances, to report the 
details of such incidents, when discovered, to the 
respective authorities other than the client's organisation 
(Nordin, 1990; 10) . This action is needed, especially if the 
offence is committed by the management members or the 
Executive Board members themselves. Accountants are 
constantly facing difficult situations where their duties to 
their employers conflicts with their professional 
obligations.
In England and Wales, the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants operates the Industrial Members Advisory 
Committee On Ethics which provides counselling services by 
senior members to other members who are under personal 
pressure on matters which conflict with their ethical 
conscience.
Accountants should never point to the demands of the 
accountant-client relationship in order not to report a 
fraud case to the relevant authority. If they cover up the
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fraud, they themselves are open to suspicion. If they are 
found to be holding back evidence, they themselves can be 
charged. They will also be subjected to disciplinary actions 
by their professional board. The professional board must 
constantly encourage accountants to inform whenever they 
come across malpractice.
Lastly, accountants must also be up to date with 
changes in the technological system, especially in 
information technology, so that they will be fully equipped 
to face the challenges arising from these changes. Likewise, 
the auditing techniques, too, must keep pace with these 
changes. If accountants and their accounting system are not 
aware of these changes, they will be ill equipped to detect 
any fraud or malpractice. The Chairman of the Malaysian 
Institute of Accountants suggested the system of compulsory 
continuous professional education for all accountants so 
that they would be constantly kept up to date with the 
developments in their profession (Nordin, 1990; 8).
The above statements are also applicable to the 
lawyers.
1.7. Auditing of public enterprises and the role of the
Auditor-General
Where the auditing of public enterprises was concerned, 
Ahmad Noordin, the leader of the Committee of Enquiry for 
the BMF case, said that there was provision for the 
Government to ask the Auditor-General to undertake the audit 
(Star, 18/1/1985). The role of the Auditor-General and his 
department is to ensure that proper accounts are kept by the
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Ministries, Government departments, statutory boards and all 
public enterprises. This means that the accounts of all 
Government departments and offices by right should be 
reported to and audited by him. This procedure should be 
safeguarded. The company lavs in India actually provide that 
all companies owned by the Government should have their 
accounts audited by the Auditor-General. The Auditor-General 
should be given the role of financial watchdog for the 
Government.
In Malaysia, the Auditor-General is supposed to report 
to the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament any 
malpractice as well as any weakness in the existing 
accounting procedures and the relevant measures that should 
be taken. The Public Accounts Committee would then call up 
all erring department heads to explain any discrepancy. The 
Chief Secretary to the Government usually has to put things 
right by issuing circulars to tighten existing procedures. 
If any case needs to be investigated, the Cabinet Committee 
on malpractice would refer them to the Anti-corruption 
Agency (Kesavan, 1991; 163). This procedure is too lengthy 
and time consuming. Perhaps the Auditor-General should be 
given the power to call up all erring department heads as 
well as to initiate investigations together with the Anti­
corruption Agency or the Police if there is a need to do so. 
The Auditor-General should then report his or her actions to 
the Public Accounts Committee at the Parliamentary level. 
The Public Accounts Committee should act as advisor to the 
Auditor-General.
Ahmad Noordin suggested that the Government could also
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establish a commission or a board of audit for auditing 
public enterprises. This commission would consist of members 
drawn from partners of accounting firms. The commission, 
headed by the Auditor-General, would review the audits of 
the accounts of the public enterprises and report to the 
Parliament. This was supposed to be a sort of review body, 
whereas the actual auditing should be done by accounting 
firms appointed by the commission. The audit office and the 
firms of accountants could work together to ensure that the 
standard of audit was complied with (Star, 18/1/1985) .
The Auditor-General of Malaysia, Ishak Tadin, said that 
the audited statement of accounts and the related Auditor- 
General 's report on the Government statutory bodies were 
required, under statute, to be tabled in Parliament (Tadin, 
1990; 3). However, he also revealed that in Malaysia, a
number of State and Federal Statutory Bodies did not 
disclose in full their audit report. They printed only the 
certificate which expressed the opinion on the audit, but 
not the auditor's observations and comments. This practice 
was said to be inconsistent with the professional ethics of 
responsibility to clients (Tadin, 1990; 3). The accounts of 
all public enterprises should be required to comply with the 
law. Published details of their accounts will also force 
these public enterprises to be more accountable.
Government agencies in control of national resources 
should also be made accountable to Parliament. For example, 
Petronas, the Malaysian oil company which had been used to 
bail out ailing public enterprises, should reveal its 
accounts. There should also be greater disclosure on the
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part of public companies about their share-holdings and 
major deals that they have undertaken. Publications of these 
will ensure accountability and control on public 
enterprises.
1.8. Secrecy in banking and other Government departments and
agencies
There must be secrecy in banking in order to earn the 
trust of customers, but if there is a criminal 
investigation, then banks, especially the central bank, 
should cooperate with the relevant authorities in supplying 
information and relevant documents. In my interviews with 
the two members of the Committee of Enquiry in the BMF case, 
they commented that the Board of BMF and the management of 
the parent bank, BBMB, had not cooperated during their 
investigation. A few members of staff gave limited 
cooperation because they needed clearance from the top 
management before replying or providing information or 
documents requested by the Committee. This had hampered and 
delayed the work of the Committee. Banking secrecy should 
not stand in the way of criminal investigations undertaken 
to expose and punish criminals as in the BMF scandal. If 
fraudsters or criminals know that they will be protected by 
banking or information secrecy, it will encourage instead of 
discourage malpractice. Moreover, tax payers have every 
right to know what has happened to their money.
Likewise, Government departments and agencies, too, 
should cooperate with the investigators of any criminal 
investigation by supplying the relevant information and
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documents of the criminals and their activities, for 
example, the department of inland revenue, etc..
Financial institutions, the central bank and Government 
agencies should also be helpful to researchers undertaking 
researches into the control and prevention of fraud and 
malpractice. These researches will ultimately be beneficial 
to them.
1.9. Bank Negara, the central bank
After the occurrence of a few major financial scandals 
in Malaysia, Bank Negara issued a formal Code of Ethics in 
October 1988 in consultation with the financial institutions 
themselves to combat fraud and other malpractice. The Code 
covers six core principles pertaining to desirable practices
i.e.:
1. To avoid conflict of interest which relates to the 
outside commercial interests of employees, the 
appointments of staffs to management board outside the 
firm and the acceptance of 'gifts';
2. To avoid misuse of position in relation to borrowing of 
funds from customers or give preferential treatment by 
customers in their business;
3. To prevent misuse of information gained through the 
financial institution's operations, either for personal 
gain or for any purpose other than that intended by the 
financial institution;
4. To ensure completeness and accuracy of relevant 
records;
5. To ensure confidentiality of communication and
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transactions between the financial institution and its 
customers and;
6. To ensure fair and equitable treatment of all customers 
and others who rely on or who are associated with the 
financial institution.
(Ahmad, 1990; 5-8)
In June 1989, a new Banking and Financial Institutions 
Bill was also tabled before Parliament. One of the issues 
raised was giving the central bank the power to act quickly 
in future instances of financial distress in all sectors of 
the financial system. The central bank officers may now be 
appointed as investigators or prosecutors to deal with the 
various offences under the Act. The enhanced powers given to 
the central bank's investigative officers are akin to police 
powers, which include powers of entry, search (including 
search of persons), seizure, detention and examination of 
suspects. These powers complement their powers to prosecute 
by allowing them to gather the necessary evidence. The 
police may request or the central bank may hand over the 
evidence to the police for them to make use of in their 
prosecution. The penalties under the Act have also been 
enhanced so that they are commensurate with the severity of 
the offences and abuses of powers (Lee, 1992; 46).
Bank Negara is making an effort to try to prevent 
another major scandal from taking place. However, even with 
these new regulations being introduced, Bank Negara will 
still fail to prevent malpractice if its members do not 
carry out their duties efficiently. The BMF scandal was
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partly due to the failure of Bank Negara to discharge its 
role effectively, i.e. to supervise, check and monitor the 
activities of the bank. Bank Negara is also expected to show 
a good example to the other financial and banking 
institutions. If Bank Negara cannot give a good example, 
then it cannot lead the other banking and financial 
institutions. For example, in April 1994, Bank Negara had 
lost M$5.7 bil. (£1.43 bil.) on betting in world currency 
markets (The Independent, 1/4/1994). The bank had also lost 
M$9.3 bil. in 1992 from currency operations. The bank has 
built a formidable reputation as an aggressive speculator in 
international currency markets. This is not the reputation 
a central bank should adopt. Bank Negara should stick to its 
role of regulating monetary policy and managing the economy 
instead of betting ferociously in the international currency 
markets.
Laws and regulations of banking and financial 
institutions must also be reviewed and changed with the 
times. Moreover, with greater internationalization in the 
financial industries, regulatory supervision has to be 
coordinated within the economy as well as internationally.
1.10. Anti-corruption Agency and the police
In the BMF case, the Anti-corruption Agency and the 
police did not carry out their duties in investigating and 
bringing the culprits to book. This is a sign of the 
custodian of the law not being accountable to the public. 
The problem is that in Malaysia, the Anti-corruption Agency 
is under the Prime Minister's office or under the Home
372
Affairs Ministry. It can be dictated to by the Prime 
Minister as well as the Home Affairs Minister (in Malaysia, 
the Prime Minister is also the Home Affairs Minister). As 
long as the Anti-corruption Agency is not a fully and truly 
independent investigative and prosecuting body, it will 
remain ineffective because it could be misused and 
misdirected to cover up the misdeeds of corrupt politicians, 
bureaucrats and the elite members. The Anti-corruption
i
Agency should be accountable only to the Parliament so that 
it could carry out its duties without fear or favour.
Likewise, the police and other law enforcement 
agencies, too, should be independent and accountable only to 
Parliament so that they could bring corrupt politicians, 
elite members or bureaucrats to book.
Another problem with the Anti-corruption Agency and the 
police is the shortage of trained staff members to 
investigate fraud and corruption because scandals like the 
BMF case are highly technical. Suggestions have been put 
forward to recruit professionals. However, it has not been 
easy trying to recruit professionals into the Anti­
corruption Agency or police because of better earning 
prospects in the private sector. Perhaps it is more 
realistic to get these professionals to be involved in the 
investigations or as advisors as part of national service to 
the country whenever the need arises. Thus every 
professional will be called for duty whenever necessary. 
Their employers will have to release their staff members 
with full pay. If the investigation takes a longer time, 
perhaps the professionals or their employers could be
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compensated with a nominal amount of money.
1.11. Investigative committees appointed by the authority
The findings of any legitimate investigative committee 
appointed by the Government should be allowed to be used as 
evidence in court. This point is made with reference to the 
investigation findings of the members of the Committee of 
Enquiry of the BMF case which the then Attorney-General 
refused to accept as legitimate facts for the prosecution of 
the culprits. The findings were gathered through laborious 
hard work involving a lot of the tax-payers' money and yet, 
they were dismissed by the police authority. If the police 
authority felt that the findings might not be concrete, they 
should have double-checked for their own purpose. This would 
save them the time and cost to start from afresh.
1.12. Declaration of businesses and assets
Heads and management members of law enforcement 
agencies like the Attorney-General, the Director of the 
Anti-corruption Agency and the Chief Inspector of Police 
should not be involved in any business venture as this is in 
conflict with their duties. If other employees in these 
establishments intend to be involved in businesses, they 
should notify their department heads and obtain the 
necessary permission to do so. Their business ventures 
should then be recorded.
Ideally, politicians should not be involved in any 
business venture. However, the practice in Malaysia is such 
that politicians can also be businessmen. In such
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circumstances, politicians must declare their business 
ventures, share-holdings and any other commercial interest.
Likewise, business activities of Directors and
management members, especially those in the public 
enterprises and financial institutions must be declared.
In addition to business ventures, the following assets 
should also be declared:
1. Shares owned by employees and Directors or heads, 
especially in the financial institutions and 
public enterprises;
2. Assets like properties owned by them both locally 
and abroad.
1.13. Other points of law
Sanctions imposed on offenders may entail criminal, 
civil or administrative penalties whether singly or in 
combination. Grabosky said sanctions served four goals. The 
first of these was deterrence. Perpetrators of fraud should 
be discouraged from reoffending and others should be 
deterred from following in their footsteps. The second was 
restitution. The third was rehabilitation to prevent 
recidivism. The fourth was denunciation. The act or acts of 
fraud were subjected to formal condemnation which had as its 
goal education as well as denunciation (Grabosky, 1991; 10).
The penalties meted out to white collar offenders so 
far have included longer terms of imprisonment and heavy 
fines which have already been implemented in a few 
countries. These measures are not enough to deter further 
offending as they or their families can still enjoy the
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fruits of the offences. Assets accumulated by the offender 
through fraud should also be confiscated or frozen. 
Likewise, assets of offenders abroad should also be frozen 
with the help of overseas authorities. Moreover, properties 
or resources in the possession of relatives, friends, 
trustees and any other person, who are keeping them on the 
criminal's behalf or as gifts bought with the ill-gotten 
gains must be confiscated. If the offender claims that they 
are not acquired with the ill-gotten gains, then the onus is 
on them to prove otherwise. Persons found guilty of fraud 
should also be barred from holding any public office. 
According to Levi, in England, "In addition to the 
traditional ban on bankrupts engaging in trade, under the 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, the court may 
forbid a person from acting as a Director on conviction for 
an indictable offence 'in connection with the promotion, 
formation, management or liquidation of a company'" (Levi, 
1988; 12).
Passports of offenders should be impounded as soon as 
they are caught not only to prevent them from absconding to 
another country, but also to prevent them from divesting 
their assets to another country.
Present investigations of fraud offences are time 
consuming and costly. This is due to the difficulties in 
getting the facts of the case. These difficulties involved 
may actually encourage fraud. The potential offender may 
think that he can get away with it. The time wasted between 
the initial charge and the final inquiry which may be years 
may be used by the offender to destroy all evidences.
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Moreover, witnesses may also not be able to recollect the 
case during the trial after such a long time. The 
investigative methods into fraud cases should be revised and 
improved so that the length of time taken for each 
investigation will be drastically shortened.
The cost of the Carrian trial on fraud against its 
shareholders came to roughly HK$100 mil. (US$12.8 mil.) in 
legal fees and costs, a committal hearing and a trial 
lasting 281 days (FEER, 1/10/1987). The Carrian trial had 
been costly to the taxpayers and 281 days was a lengthy 
period. Perhaps the facts established in the Carrian trial 
and also Hashim's trial which were relevant to try Lorrain 
Osman could be used to save time and cost. The Criminal 
Investigation Director in Malaysia, Zaman Khan, said the 
police had proposed to the Home and Law Minister that white- 
collar criminals should be made to pay the costs of court 
action and compensation to the victims (NST, 26/5/1993). He 
also spoke of the need for deterrent sentences and laws to 
seize the properties of a criminal to pay compensation to 
his victims. This was in view of the fact that, "many 
bankrupts (offenders) are still going around in expensive 
Mercedes Benz cars. People will only realise crime does not 
pay if the sentences are adequate and not just a day's jail 
sentence" (NST, 26/5/1993).
In Malaysia, the administration of the courts is being 
severely strained, especially in the capital where it is 
nearing the breaking point. Some of the reasons are:
1. Shortage of Judges and magistrates;
2. Shortage of court buildings;
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3. The support staff, both administrative and
clerical, are inadequate in numbers and in some 
cases, in calibre.
(Chooi, 1987; 23)
With the shortage of judges and magistrates, there is 
further reason to shorten the trials of white collar crimes. 
Trials are usually conducted before a jury who will be 
subjected to both oral and documentary evidence. The problem 
here is whether the jury can comprehend fully the complexity 
of the case. This problem also applies to trial judges who 
are not well versed in the complexity of commercial
enterprises. Under such circumstances, how could the jury or 
the judge be able to assess, for example, whether the
directors were dishonest or trying their best to save their
ailing companies? As Leigh rightly put it, "there will 
remain questions concerning how effectively a conventional 
jury, chosen at random, will be able to master bulky and 
technical cases" (Leigh, 1986; 98). Perhaps, special judges 
with business educational background should be chosen to 
preside in such cases. Juries, too, should be picked only 
from the law, accounting and other relevant professions.
Finally, there should be cooperation between different 
countries, especially where extradition of offenders is 
concerned. At the moment, some countries have no extradition 
facility and they become a safe haven for offenders. For 
example, Rais Saniman, one of the offenders in the BMF case, 
is a free man in France because the French authorities 
refuse to extradite him to Hong Kong or Malaysia to stand
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trial. Thus, any offender will try to escape to another 
country where there is no extradition law to escape 
prosecution and at the same time enjoy the fruits of their 
corrupt act. This is an encouragement to potential 
offenders.
There are also problems of getting witnesses to testify 
if the offence took place in another country. Witnesses will 
be reluctant to fly to another country to give their 
evidences. Perhaps written evidences from these witnesses, 
telephone conferences, videotapes or even satellite pictures 
of the witnesses abroad should be allowed in courts. In 
England, the Criminal Justice Act 1988 made provisions for 
the admittance of evidence obtained on letters rogatory. The 
Act also provides for giving evidences through a live 
television link. These methods should be adopted by the 
criminal justice system of all countries, including 
Malaysia. These methods will definitely save time and cost. 
In this aspect, the cooperation of the law enforcement 
agencies of other countries is needed, for example, to get 
the testimony of these witnesses in their country.
In the next section, I will discuss the prevention of 
fraud at the macro-level.
2. Macro-level of prevention
The introduction of the New Economic Policy (as 
explained in chapter 1 and 4) had led to the creation of 
many Government agencies and enterprises to help the Malays 
to achieve a better position in the local economy compared 
to the other races. By 1990, the Government had equity
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interests of between 10% to 100% in about 1,000 Government 
companies and agencies. Out of the total paid up capital of 
M$18.6 bil., M$14 bil. represented Federal Government's 
share (Tadin, 1990; 2). The aim of the New Economic Policy 
was laudable i.e. eradication of poverty regardless of race. 
However, in practice, it has also created many opportunities 
for fraud, corruption and other malpractice. As long as the 
opportunities are there, there will never be a shortage of 
offenders. Scandals like the BMF, Bank Rakyat and Deposit- 
taking Co-operatives took place partly because of the greed 
of certain corrupt elites and politicians who accumulated 
their ill-gotten wealth directly or indirectly under the 
guise of the New Economic Policy and also because the 
national leaders had failed to act against these criminals. 
As Muzaffar, the leader of Aliran, an informal movement for 
freedom, justice and solidarity in Malaysia, pointed out, 
"To expose their misdemeanours would be to expose the New 
Economic Policy's not so subtly concealed agenda of creating 
Malay capitalists, whatever the costs and the consequences. 
Ethics have to be set aside for the time being - so it has 
been argued in certain official circles - to facilitate the 
rapid growth of a Malay capitalist class. If there is one 
thing that must be emphasised in Malaysia's economic policy 
in the nineties and beyond, it is ethics. Only if the 
ethical foundation of society is firmly established, would 
it be possible to combat corruption and curb abuse of power" 
(Muzaffar, 1989; 99).
The following sections of this chapter will look at the 
weaknesses and possible preventive measures in the
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political, social and cultural systems of Malaysia which are 
conducive to fraud.
2.1. The public
The Malaysian public generally avoid talking about 
fraud and corruption at the higher levels because:
a. anybody doing so would be accused of being
disloyal to the country because he or she is 
washing dirty linen in public. For example, when 
Malaysians wanted the BMF Committee of Enquiry 
report to be made public, the Prime Minister 
accused them of trying to topple the Malay
leadership (see sec.1.2.8, chap.4);
b. the existing draconian laws like the Official
Secrets Act and the Internal Security Act 
described in chapter 4, muzzle the critics. As 
critics of the Government could be put behind bars 
at any time, Malaysians generally choose not to 
bring up the wrong doings of politicians or the 
elite members.
Some Malaysians have also become nervous about the 
possibility of the Government tapping their telephones or 
planting spies in society to clamp down on Government 
critics. Malaysians generally do not discuss politics on the 
telephone or in public areas. When a major scandal surfaces, 
the reactions of Malaysians could be said to be one of 
expectation and indifference. Sadly, the scandal will be 
generally forgotten as time goes by. The one scandal that
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had the most attention was the BMF case. However, that case 
is now generally forgotten even though the trial is not 
over. The people who were held responsible are forgotten as 
Malaysians become preoccupied with other main and current 
issues. Malaysian society has become a passive one, highly 
tolerant of corruption and fraud. With the economic boom 
taking place at the moment in the country, it is not 
surprising that Malaysians in general are now more 
interested in making money than be concerned with the future 
of the political and social environment in the country. As 
one Malaysian put it, "We are not interested in politics 
when there is money to be made". Riches and materialism is 
the order of the day. The danger is that when wealth and 
riches made through unethical means are rewarded or 
recognised as deserving of titles awarded by the royal 
families, then the society will encourage even more 
unethical practices (Idid, 1990; 6).
As public opinion stigmatizes the offenders so lightly 
in Malaysia, it is not surprising they are not deterred from 
wrong-doing. As Douglas (1952) said, "The relationship 
between political leaders and people is a reciprocal one. 
The standard of the people influence those of the public 
officials and it is hard to develop honest official in a 
corrupt society. But, it is equally true that high standards 
on the part of the officials and public leaders raise the 
level of the whole community" (Monteiro, 1966; 66).
The control of corruption in any society will require 
ethical leaders as well as citizens who are alert, 
confident, politically aware and of high moral standards who
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will "blow the whistle" and condemn malpractice. As Peter 
Drucker said, "Business ethics may be good politics or good 
electioneering. But, that is all. For ethics deals with the 
right action by individuals. And thus, it is society that 
must stress the ethics of prudence and self-development. It 
must expect its managers, executives and professionals to 
demand of themselves that they shun behaviour they would not 
respect in others and act instead in ways appropriate to the 
sort of person they would want to see in the mirror in the 
morning" (Idid, 1990; 6).
The public should be encouraged to condemn fraud and 
corruption openly and to report to the relevant authorities 
if they suspect any illegal activity going on, especially 
involving the leaders of the country. They should also be 
given the assurance that their reports are strictly 
confidential so that they will have the confidence to come 
forward. Likewise, the state must be sufficiently open to 
allow such protest.
In order to encourage the public to "whistle-blow" or 
condemn any fraudulent or corrupt act, they have to be made 
constantly aware by politicians, the media, etc. of the ill 
effects of fraud and corruption and also the erosion of 
society's moral base, especially one which is materialistic. 
Politicians, too, should ensure the public that they will 
not be persecuted if they voice their opinions on fraud and 
corruption. As the Indian social reformer, Jayaprakash 
Narayan stressed in the context of his own country, "the 
public must realize that without moral fibre a nation cannot 
survive. Having realised that, they must be prepared to
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act...Of course, those of us who hope to develop this moral 
consciousness among the public must make sure that what we 
preach is also what we practice” (Muzaffar, 1989; 160).
Moreover, the public must be taught that loyalty to 
principles is far more important than loyalty to the 
Government.
2.2. Leaders of the society
"Corruption in another sense is political: its success, 
even locally, is a manifestation of power. This power is 
manifested negatively.. .Corruption involves the diversion of 
public funds into private hands, and inefficiency in the use 
of manpower and resources. Not only does it lead to the 
enrichment, often to grotesque levels, of those who find or 
get themselves into positions where they can exercise 
corrupt influence, but it involves the exclusion of those 
unable to participate in paying for corruptly given favours. 
Its essential objective is to eliminate competition, to 
create a charmed circle, an inside track" (Clarke, 1983; xv- 
xvi) . This is what is generally happening in Malaysia at the 
moment. Top posts in the public sector are usually connected 
to or under the patronage of politicians. In order to get 
these posts, the applicant must be connected to some 
officials. Also, in order to get certain things done, you 
must know somebody at the top. Likewise, to get out of an 
'uncomfortable' position, one must again know some high 
ranking officials. The trend has become somewhat 
institutionalised. As Ward said, "Although there is some 
evidence within city power and servicing agencies to suggest
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that Weberian-type rationale play an increasingly important 
role in the allocation of urban resources to the poor, it is 
also the case that most cities have agencies whose covert 
rationale has little to do with helping and more to do with 
controlling. In such cases the art, perhaps, is to 
differentiate between the two types of bureaucracy” (Ward, 
1989; 4).
In Malaysia, there are three 'covert7 ways of 
allocating resources, i.e. through corruption, nepotism and 
patron-clientelism. In the case of corruption, it is open to 
anyone who can afford to bribe the corrupt politicians. 
Nepotism and patron-clientelism are for more exclusive 
groups. Nepotism depends on the blood tie between the 
corrupt politician and the person seeking his or her favour. 
Patron-clientelism involves, "a voluntary reciprocal 
relationship between social unequals in which loyalty is 
traded by the weaker in exchange for resources from the 
stronger. Patrons disburse resources on a selective basis; 
the beneficiaries may be kin, but usually the networks link 
individuals of different social standing who are not 
related” (Lowder, 1989; 126). All three ways are used
rampantly by corrupt politicians in Malaysia. This trend has 
prevented the maximum utilisation of human resources as 
better qualified people are not given the chance to make use 
of their talents. This has created a lot of 'wastage7 in the 
society. As a result, the growth and development of the 
country are slowed down. The misery of the poor and the 
poverty-stricken in the country will also be prolonged. This 
is a very unhealthy trend.
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Leaders of any institution or society must carry out 
the vows they made when they took office to be competent, 
qualified, honest, ethical and fair in their judgement. The 
downfall of some Asian countries is mainly due to unethical, 
corrupted and inefficient leaders and administrators. For 
example, in China, one of the major causes of the downfall 
of the emperors in its history was a lack of capable, 
efficient and honest officials in their administrations. "If 
the leaders are corrupted, the other officials cannot be 
subjected to strict control. Corruption will spread from top 
to the bottom. It started with them, then spread to their 
officials" (Alatas, 1990; 102). Even if the leader himself 
is not corrupted, corrupt officials in his administration 
will still bring about his downfall.
As Lord Shang (d. 338 B.C.), a strong exponent of
legalism and severe punishment of the Chin period in China 
said, rulers and ministers who indulged in their selfish 
desires were like woodworm that made the wood snap and 
eventually caused the wall to collapse (Alatas, 1990; 50).
In the Western societies, the emphasis is on the rule 
of law to overcome fraud and corruption. But, for it to 
work, there must be sufficient good and honest leaders and 
administrators to implement and support them whole-heartedly 
and honestly. The leaders must be able to exhibit good 
examples for their people to follow. They should uphold the 
laws and refrain from committing the offences themselves. In 
other words, a high standard of morality should be 
maintained to get rid of the common complaint that the men 
at the top are corrupted. This high standard of morality
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should be laid down clearly in the form of codes of ethics 
and procedures. Ultimately, the society as a whole will come 
to accept this high standard of morality.
In 1978, Quah mentioned that Singapore is known to have 
the cleanest Government in the world (Quah, 1978; 20). The 
success of controlling the problem of corruption in 
Singapore was attributed to the high morality of the 
Government and its efficiency and dedication to eliminate 
the problem.
It must be stressed that corruption among minor
officials cannot be combated if it is not stamped out at the
higher level first. Thus, values and attitudes, especially
within the leadership stratum of society, will have to
change. Leaders must develop a detached attitude towards
both power and self-interest. As Quah said,
"The fact that corruption is incidental and not 
institutionalised in Singapore is not an accident, but 
the result of the determination of the PAP (People's 
Action Party) Government in general and Prime Minister 
Lee Kuan Yew in particular to eliminate the 'disease' 
of corruption in the country. In other words, the major 
reason for Singapore's success in controlling the 
problem of corruption is the quality of her political 
leaders and their commitments towards the elimination 
of corruption both within and outside the public 
bureaucracy. In order to eradicate the problem of 
bureaucratic corruption in any country, comprehensive 
administrative reforms are needed. And such reforms can 
only succeed if the political leaders concerned lend 
their support and sponsorship. In other words, they 
must set an example by refraining from corrupt 
behaviour themselves" (Quah, 1978; 20).
The political leaders must also be clear-cut and 
forthright in their decisions and actions to deal with 
political, bureaucratic and private sector fraud and 
corruption in the country. Culprits must be made accountable
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for their actions. It is precisely the failure of the 
political leaders to take firm action that allowed the BMF 
trials to drag on for years. The cover-up by the Government 
and the delay and excuses given for the investigation and 
publication of the BMF case had allowed some politicians and 
culprits like Rais Saniman (who had absconded to France) to 
evade punishment. With such examples given by the 
Government, it is not surprising that other fraud cases in 
the public sector will follow. If the Government cannot 
uphold the law of the country, then it cannot expect the 
people to do so.
2.3. Leaders and business
In Malaysia, as has been explained in chapter 4 as well 
as in section 1.12 of this chapter, politics do mix with 
business. Political parties as well as individual 
politicians are allowed to own businesses. This close 
relationship may generate fraud and corruption.
Firstly, rich businessmen are able to contribute to the 
coffers of the political party, especially for campaigns 
during an election. The large amount of money contributed is 
irresistible to politicians who love power and who will do 
anything to retain it. Acceptance of these large sums of 
money comes with obligations. Big businessmen do not donate 
large sums of money for free. Politicians are expected to do 
favours for them, sometimes leading to fraud and other 
malpractice, whenever they are needed. In this case, the 
rich will get richer. As Monteiro pointed out, "It is for 
the political leaders and administrators wielding power
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today to realise that unless they can successfully rise 
above their obligations to big business and dedicate 
themselves to the service of the common men with the same 
spirit of ardour with which they once led the battle for 
freedom, they will not only damage the very fruits of 
freedom, but will have to go down in history with the curse 
of the very people who enthroned them in the leadership" 
(Monteiro, 1966; 104). Business activities by political
parties should be prohibited by law to prevent conflict of 
interest and money politics. The law should require all 
political parties to declare publicly the donations and 
contributions they received. This is the best safeguard 
against corruption by political parties as well as by 
business people who are tempted to use their wealth to 
influence Government decisions. This is also one way of 
making political parties accountable for their future 
actions, especially in their dealings with their donors. 
Expensive campaigns should also be discouraged as it invites 
business people, with their large donations, who hope that 
their requests would be met if the party wins the election. 
Eventually, "money politics" will become the order of the 
day. Muzaffar suggested that a Election Commission, which is 
constitutionally an independent body, should take over the 
basic financing of elections (Muzaffar, 1989; 52). The
Commission will allocate a certain sum of money to each 
candidate to finance his or her election. Rules will be set 
out on how the money should be used and each candidate will 
be required to submit detailed accounts of his or her 
electoral expenditure. Such a system will prevent the growth
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of money politics and ensures that no candidate would be 
able to outdo its opponents by having lavish campaigns.
Secondly, political parties and politicians who have 
their own business ventures will definitely have the 
advantage over other businessmen as shown in chapter 4. This 
is an unfair advantage as they will have much better chances 
than other people to make money, especially where Government 
contracts involving large sums of money are concerned. Once 
they get the contract, the opportunity to bring the cost of 
the project to a phenomenal level is there. Political 
parties and politicians should be prohibited from getting 
involved in business, especially in developing countries 
like Malaysia. It is unethical for any politician to abuse 
his or her powers to make money at the expense of state 
enterprises, especially when they are set up to help the 
Bumiputras. If politicians are allowed to carry out 
businesses of their own or to have investments, they should 
do so in their personal capacity and not mix them with their 
official roles. Their businesses should be treated on equal 
terms with other businesses. If they are vying for public 
contracts, an independent group of people should be on the 
board for allocating these contracts in a fair manner. 
Business and politics should never mix. Unfortunately, they 
always do.
2.4. Media
Jeremy Bentham once declared, "Publicity is the very 
soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to exertion and the 
surest of all guards against improbity” (Monteiro, 1966;
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106). The role of the mass media, especially the press, is 
crucial here. Freedom of press and expression is the basis 
of a democratic society. It is only with this freedom that 
political fraud and corruption can be exposed. The majority 
of political malpractice so far has been uncovered through 
investigative journalism. Moreover, the media can also 
educate the masses about the evil of fraud and corruption 
and at the same time encourages them to take actions against 
these problems. The press will also become the medium of 
complaint as well as watchdog to any political malpractice. 
Without this crucial role, democracy cannot be fulfilled.
If the press makes a wrong accusation against the 
Government or any politician, legal actions, for example 
defamation, could be taken against that particular press. An 
upright Government or a politician should have no fear of 
any action taken. Moreover, if the Government or politician 
is right, the public themselves will condemn the newspaper. 
The newspaper should not be banned because it should be 
given the freedom to report. The legal actions taken against 
it will make it be more responsible in its future reporting. 
In this aspect, the British Government gives a good example. 
When the Pergau Dam affair surfaced in 1994 involving giving 
monetary aids to Malaysia by Britain in return for arms 
deals, the British press, especially The Times and Sunday 
Times, accused some Malaysian politicians including the 
Prime Minister of accepting bribes from British firms. The 
Malaysian Government strongly denied the allegation. There 
was a lot of tension between the British press and the 
Malaysian Government which led to a total ban on Malaysian
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Government purchases from Britain. The implication was that 
the British Government should take some actions against its 
press. However, the British Government did not do anything 
because it believed that freedom of the press must be upheld 
in a democratic society. It is willing to upheld such 
freedom in spite of the ban on British goods and services 
imposed on it by the Malaysian Government. The Malaysian 
Government should not have gone to such lengths. If it was 
not happy with the allegations of the British press, it 
should have taken action (for example defamation) against 
it. If the British press was wrong, the truth would 
exonerate the Malaysian Government. However, the Malaysian 
Government took no action against the British press. By not 
doing so, it only confirms the allegation. The example of 
the British Government in upholding the freedom of press 
should be followed.
In Malaysia, so far, powerful laws like the Printing 
Press Act, the Official Secrets Act and the Internal 
Security Act have prevented the freedom of press and 
expression. For example, in the mid 1980s, the Minister of 
Home Affairs suspended three local newspapers (see chapter 
4) because they were said to be playing up racial issues. In 
actual fact, they were only reporting racial issues played 
up by unscrupulous politicians who were trying to cover up 
fraudulent offences committed by themselves or their 
colleagues. As Glickman observed correctly, "Indeed, of all 
the rationales for censorship advanced by governments around 
the world...national security, protection of public morals, 
curbing racial and ethnic hatred, etc...assuring self­
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protection by preventing exposure of corruption is perhaps 
the predominant real reason" (Glickman, 1991; 1). "There is 
a tendency in some parts of the world to pay lip service to 
freedom of expression, suggesting that it is an esoteric or 
abstract concept which must take a back seat to economic 
development. The fallacy of this view is underscored by the 
experience of the countries...where top officials plunder 
the public treasury because the press is not free to bring 
the story to public light" (Glickman, 1991; 6). There should 
not be any law that will take away the freedom of the press. 
Of course, as I mentioned earlier on, the press should be 
responsible in their reporting. Responsible reporting in 
Malaysia means that the media must not be used by 
unscrupulous politicians in an irresponsible way to promote 
their own self interest. This is very important in Malaysia, 
a multicultural society, where sensitive racial issues could 
destabilise the country when the sentiment of the public is 
aroused. The press should be responsible enough where 
reporting sensitive issues is concerned so as not to create 
any tension among the different races. In fact, they should 
allay the fear and sentiment of the public rather than doing 
exactly what the unscrupulous politicians want them to do 
i.e. to create racial tension to cover up their corrupt 
acts.
2.5. Racial excuses
A paper titled "Corruption and the Malaysian situation" 
presented at the Aliran seminar in Kuala Lumpur on 2 
November 1980 by Azmi Khalid and Harun Halim Rasip had made
393
the following observation, "Ethnic relationships in our 
ethnic-conscious society have only served to exacerbate and 
complicate the problem of corruption, especially when 
emotive appeals help to justify acts of corruption in racial 
terms. The inter-ethnic competition for power and influence 
has seen to it that even religious values can be clouded by 
racial prejudices. It has been said that it is alright to 
indulge in corruption for the benefit of one's own 
community". This observation gives support to the fact that 
some politicians in Malaysia would use racial sentiments for 
their own ends. This includes creating racial issues to 
deflect attention away from their own or their colleagues 
corrupt offences as explained in chapter 4 or to get more 
votes from their community. Malaysians should now be more 
critical of racial issues created by unscrupulous 
politicians rather than just accepting them with blinded 
emotions. All races in Malaysia generally get along well 
with each other. Malaysians do not need such politicians to 
stir up trouble from time to time and create uneasiness in 
the society. Any racial issue should be discussed in a 
rational rather than emotional way. They should question 
whether these issues are justified and what are the 
intentions of these politicians in raising them. They should 
also realise that if they are not affected by these racial 
issues, the politicians would not be able to use this ticket 
in their campaigns to gain votes. Politicians would then be 
judged on their merits and capabilities. At the moment, 
voting in Malaysia is very much based on which politicians 
can defend their own communities' rights rather than which
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politicians are capable of running the country. With such 
racial sentiments around, it is not surprising that some 
shrewd and cunning politicians will make full use of this 
fact for their own ends. This is where the role of a 
responsible press is important. The press could influence 
the public by questioning and analysing the motives of the 
politicians who raised certain racial issues. In this way, 
the press could also help build a harmonious environment 
among the different races in Malaysia.
2.6. Official Secrets Act and the Internal Security Act
The Official Secrets Act has limited access to many 
public documents. Thus, many public businesses are conducted 
in secrecy. The public has been constantly kept in ignorance 
of things they ought to know about, especially when they 
involved tax payers' money. This is not a healthy practice 
because it creates opportunities for fraud and malpractice. 
The likelihood that a fraud will be detected is reduced if 
the flow of information in the public enterprises is 
restricted to only a small number of individuals. The 
Government should be more open and accountable to the 
public. Confidential matters should be limited. Moreover, 
because of the unclear definition of what is considered 
official secrets and the draconian way in which it is 
implemented, many Government officials choose to be silent 
when the public ask them for information or else they will 
pass the enquirers from one department to another.
The Internal Security Act (ISA) is an even more 
draconian law because people can be jailed by the Minister
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of Home Affairs under the ISA at any time without being 
given a valid reason or trial. This Act was originally used 
to curb communist activities during the colonial period. 
But, Malaysia had already been declared a "white area”, i.e. 
free of communist activities, in the mid 1980s. The Act has 
not been amended and could be used to curb dissident views 
by the Government as explained in chapter 4. This Act has 
made the public afraid to voice their dissatisfaction 
against the Government or even to express truths like some 
politicians are corrupted. I do not have any evidence, but 
I do believe Malaysians generally tend to avoid 
controversial issues because of this Act and they have 
become a very passive society. This gives the Government 
even more power to do what they want. Dishonest politicians 
will use this powerful tool for their own ends.
The ISA has not only been used to clamp down on the 
critics of the Government, it has also been used to take 
away the freedom of the press as explained in chapter 4. 
Without freedom of press, what is left of democracy? The 
freedom of press and expression, as I have mentioned earlier 
in this chapter, is the basis of democracy. If the 
Government or any politician is not happy with something 
that is said about them, there is the legal option that 
could be taken against the newspaper or the person who made 
that comment. Accountability in statements made is then 
ensured both ways.
For the Malaysian case, the ISA is the most powerful 
weapon to prevent the control of fraud and corruption among 
political leaders and the elite members. With the presence
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of such Act, the public is deterred from questioning the 
Government. This draconian Act should be abolished.
2.7. Accountability
The Official Secrets Act, as discussed above, has also 
lessened the accountability of members of Government and 
public administrators over their actions. Since they cannot 
reveal all sorts of information to the public because of the 
unclear definition of what is an official secret, they can 
make use of this fact so that they do not have to be 
accountable to the public. If these people are not made 
accountable for their actions, culprits of fraud and 
corruption will be difficult to catch. Likewise, fraud and 
corruption will also be difficult to prevent.
The inaction and delay of the Government in dealing 
with fraud and corruption offences, especially in high 
places as in the BMF case, also points to a Government that 
is refusing to be accountable. We have the relevant laws, 
but the custodian of the laws refuses to uphold them. Is 
this a good and efficient Government?
2.8. International cooperation
International cooperation has been mentioned in the 
micro section. However, it should be stressed again that 
there is a real need to maintain contact and cooperation 
among the law enforcement agencies of the different 
countries. The need is for combating the activities of 
international fraudsters and criminals and not to suppress 
evidences as in the case of BMF whereby 150 telexes sent
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between the British, Hong Kong and Malaysian Government, 
which could throw light into the case, were not allowed to 
be produced in court (see sec.3, chap.4). This was because 
three British Ministers, i.e. Lord Caithness, Francis Maude 
and Douglas Hurd had signed the Public Interest Immunity 
order whereby these documents could not be circulated 
outside Parliament without breaching the immunity. 
International cooperation means helping another country to 
catch the culprits and not cover-up for them.
Lastly, the setting up of a universal data bank on all 
fraud and corruption cases could also help to furnish 
information for law enforcement agencies around the world as 
well as to facilitate researches on the nature, problems and 
prevention of fraud and corruption.
3. Conclusion
In conclusion, there is a need to point out that this 
chapter looks at the problem of fraud in a sociological 
manner. The internal factor of human beings, i.e. the 
personality of the individual or personal reasons, has not 
been discussed. However, it is equally important if not more 
and should not be neglected. History has provided the fact 
that corruption was basically caused by dishonest 
individuals who gave in to temptations when provided with 
the opportunities to do so. There must be both the 
opportunities and the wish to commit the offence. There are 
people with opportunities opened to them, but who do not 
wish to commit the crime. As Alatas correctly pointed out;
"The relation between man and his social structure is
similar to the relation between a dwelling and its
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occupants. The structure of the dwelling conditions the 
life of the occupants, but the occupants can change the 
structure if they so wish. If the structure begins to 
leak and all the occupants resign themselves to it, 
blaming it on the structure, the structure will 
continue to leak. In this case, the explanation still 
lies with the occupants who do not wish to repair the 
structure. Something non-human cannot be held 
responsible for something human. The structuralist 
explanation of corruption shifts the locus of 
responsibility from the human actor to factors external 
to the actor. These external factors are significant in 
understanding the extent and manifestation of the 
phenomenon, but they are not the terminal point of 
explanation. They are the starting point. The terminal 
point is the nature of man” (Alatas, 1990; 122).
The best and most sophisticated strategy designed to 
combat fraud will only provide a short term structural 
change. In the long run, it will still be defeated by some 
fraudsters. In order for these sophisticated strategies to 
stand a better chance, it should be complemented with 
strategies that will produce changes in behaviour and 
internalized values. As McKinney concluded, "Effective 
accountability can best be achieved when it is a learned 
pattern, a response to habit. This becomes particularly 
important when it is realized that unethical behaviour, 
inefficiency and inadequate initiative cannot be controlled 
simply by rules or other external means" (McKinney, 1986; 
6).
This point is also argued by Omar, the Chief Inspector 
of Police in Malaysia; "Therefore a reasonable presumption 
can be made that law and its enforcement alone are not a 
sufficient or complete answer to commercial crimes. Ethical 
values and virtues amongst persons in positions of trust in 
particular and amongst the populace in general must be 
nurtured and strengthened so that they become second nature
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for people, especially Malaysians (13)...Behaving strictly 
within the confines of the law is merely being prudent and 
law-abiding, but not necessarily ethical. Law imposes 
demands from outside, while ethics should come from inside. 
Besides, if law constitutes the only behaviour limits, 
Government and law enforcement agencies would swell to over­
whelming proportions” (Omar, 1990; 20). Ethics is an
internalised value from within the individuals themselves to 
guard against succumbing to base behaviour and temptations. 
The laws of Malaysia have made provision for more severe 
punishments to be meted out for crimes such as fraud, 
criminal breach of trust, cheating and forgeries, yet these 
severe penalties and sanctions will not deter everyone from 
perpetrating such crimes. Ethics will strengthen and enhance 
the effectiveness of these structural changes. It is also 
fair to say that the teaching of ethics alone does not 
prevent some people from committing crimes. There should be 
both structural changes and behavioural changes in order to 
reduce fraud.
The Chief Inspector of Police in Malaysia believed that 
the inculcation of ethics must be rooted in the homes and 
throughout the learning process (Omar, 1990; 18) . Outside of 
the home, the educational system can do its part by 
incorporating ethics into the system. Students from the 
primary level right up to the university and professional 
level should be inculcated with the appropriate universal 
ethical values and virtues like honesty, responsibility, 
accountability, kindness and justice. Ethical education 
should be planned and incorporated in the curriculum of
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education. At the end of the day, a more balanced individual 
is produced for managing any organisation.
Universities in Malaysia are encouraged to incorporate 
ethics in their curriculum. Even though the university is 
only one institution among many that will affect students' 
behaviour and lives, direct intervention by the university 
in instilling the right values and attitude is vital. The 
years the students spend there represent an important stage 
in the development of most young people. It is there that 
students learn how to form critical ideas on moral and 
ethical dilemmas. It is also a stepping stone for their 
future career. "Universities should therefore be the first 
to reaffirm the importance of basic values, such as honesty, 
integrity, good conduct, self-discipline, social 
responsibility, fair-play and mutual respect. These are 
principles essential to civilised society and they are 
values on which learning and personal maturity ultimately 
depend” (Abdullah, 1990; 10-11).
Universiti Utara Malaysia has introduced a course on 
business ethics to its students. This course is compulsory 
for all students. It covers one full semester, combining 
general, philosophical and professional ethics. It should be 
stressed that for any ethical education to make an impact on 
the students, the behaviour of the lecturers is important. 
In fact, the whole system and administration of the 
university must reflect and demonstrate the teachings of 
ethics. This is being stressed by the second Vice-Chancellor 
of the university, Othman Yeop Abdullah. If not, "the formal 
course on ethics would be a futile exercise and may only
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serve to produce cynics of ethics and morality” (Abdullah, 
1990; 9).
As has been discussed in the micro section of this 
chapter, Bank Negara, the central bank of Malaysia, has also 
issued a Code of Ethics in October 1988 after the BMF case, 
setting out the minimum standard of conduct expected of 
Directors, officers and employees of financial institutions 
in Malaysia. These guidelines lend support to the Chief 
Executives of all financial institutions in their efforts to 
uphold proper standards and are not binding on any financial 
institution which has decided to formulate its own code.
It is an encouraging sign that some, if not many, of 
the public institutions in Malaysia are trying to help 
control fraud and corruption in the country. At least there 
is a ray of hope among a deep sea of problems to be cleared 
up.
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion
It has been a rather frustrating and difficult task 
trying to write about fraud at the higher levels in 
Malaysia; something which everybody know exists, but which 
is difficult to prove. It is even more frustrating when no 
one dares to talk about it. Some even ignore the topic 
completely because it may lead them into serious trouble 
with the higher authorities in Malaysia if they are not 
cautious. This is the main reason why studies of fraud and 
corruption at higher levels are rare. Another reason is the 
difficulty in getting data and information. Any literature 
dealing with this topic is usually on fraud and corruption 
among ordinary citizens. I believe these problems do not 
apply only to Malaysia, but also to many other countries, 
especially developing countries where the leaders are 
usually more totalitarian. Conferences and seminars held on 
fraud and other white collar crimes also centre on those 
committed by ordinary citizens. The papers are usually 
presented by politicians who are supposedly experts. 
However, no mention is made of fraud and corruption among 
the politicians themselves. This makes a mockery of their 
papers because the amount lost through fraud committed by 
their colleagues is much higher than ordinary fraud among 
ordinary citizens. For example, the loss through the BMF
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scandal is much more than the loss incurred from other
commercial crime in Malaysia per year (see chapter 6) .
In late 1978, the Department of Justice in the United
States estimated the dollar loss in defrauded public funds
to be in the range of one to ten percent of all program
expenditures. The General Accounting Office projected losses
from known cases of fraud at between US$150 mil. to US$220
mil. and noted that the cost of undetected fraud was
probably much higher (Beall, Bowers & Lange, 1986; 60).
Politically-sustained fraud seems to be a taboo subject
everywhere. The attention concentrated on the crimes of
ordinary citizens has led to the impression that the less
well off are more prone to crime than the better off. As Box
argued that publicity given daily to these crimes of the
less well off by politicians, police, judges and journalists
through the media of newspapers and television had
sensitized the public to:
"muggers, football hooligans, street vandals, 
housebreakers, thieves, terrorists and scroungers. But, 
few are aware and sensitized to crimes committed by 
corporate top and middle management against 
stockbrokers, employees, consumers and the general 
public. Similarly, there is only a fog, when it comes 
to crimes committed by Governments, particularly when 
these victimize Third World countries or become
genocidal, or by Governmental agencies such as the
police when they assault or use deadly force 
unwarrantedly against the public or suspected persons 
or prison officers or special prison hospital staff 
when they brutalize and torture persons in their 
protective custody...Few people become aware of crimes 
of the powerful or how serious these are, because their 
attention is glued to the highly publicized social 
characteristics of the convicted and imprisoned 
population...Because of this, people make the 
attractive and easy deduction that those behind bars 
constitute our most serious criminals. As this captive 
audience is primarily young males amongst whom the 
unemployed and ethnic minorities are over-represented, 
it is believed that they, and those like them, 
constitute our 'public enemies'" (Box, 1983; 12-13).
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There is no evidence that the rich are less corrupted 
than the less well off or the poor. In order to give a more 
balanced picture of the crime scenario, attention and 
research should be concentrated equally on the crimes of the 
well to do. "The evidence points in fact the other way, for 
the appetite grows by what it feeds on, and when one thinks 
of corruption in West Africa the mind does not naturally 
turn to the masses of poor people, whose resources are 
indeed so slender that there is little about which they 
could be corrupt, but to the glossy and well-fed” (Wraith & 
Simpkin, 1963; 43).
At the plenary meeting of the Seventh United Nations 
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders held at Milan in 1985, it was suggested that 
improved standards of living, instead of reducing crimes, 
provided new opportunities for criminal activities. The 
economic criminal was said to be motivated by greed and 
would be spurred on with the realisation that there were 
generally lower risks of economic crimes being detected and 
prosecuted as opposed to the higher potential rewards they 
brought in (Hussin, 1986; 190).
From the case studies in Malaysia, it can be observed 
that fraud and corruption take place against a background of 
racial sentiments, the misuse of the New Economic Policy and 
the existing laws which help deter the public from 
questioning the actions of corrupt politicians. Gould and 
Mukendi, in their discussion of the African states, said,
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"with the coming of political independence in the early 
1960s, the state became the major engineer of social and 
economic changes and the focus of new aspirations and 
demands11 (Gould & Mukendi. 1989; 436). This position is
parallel to the case of Malaysia with the implementation of 
the New Economic Policy in the 1970s. There was a burgeoning 
of Government departments and agencies all set up to achieve 
the twin objectives of eradicating poverty and restructuring 
society. Thus, the expanding role of the state had been 
accompanied by an increase in institutions established, new 
rules and regulations made and a large amount of money 
expended, all of which contributed to the increase of
opportunities for fraud. With the shortage of educated and
well-trained staff, the boom in new institutions meant that 
there was a shortage of monitoring agencies that needed also 
to be set up. Ineffective financial and administrative 
controls thus encouraged fraud and corruption. Political 
mobilization and control exercised by the ruling elite led 
to the dominance of politics over bureaucratic values. Such 
a political environment provided fertile ground for
nepotism, corruption and clientalism. Administrative 
structures were used essentially as institutions of
patronage rather than as vehicles of social and economic 
development.
The Malaysian case is definitely not unique as 
discussed in chapter 5. The trend of fraud and corruption
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among unscrupulous politicians is quite similar in the 
majority of developing countries. The general similarities 
are:
1. The building of a developed nation leads to rapid 
urbanization which introduces new values of materialism 
and status consciousness. These new values begin to 
replace rural values of simplicity and frugality in 
life;
2. The sudden increase of economic and development 
activities of the Government in trying to build a new 
country means the availability of numerous project 
deals from which huge profits could be made. Companies 
most favourable to the Government will usually get the 
projects. These companies are also the ones which would 
bring substantial monetary benefits to some 
politicians. Politicians, too, may capitalise on this 
by involving themselves in business;
3. In developing countries, a high percentage of citizens 
have little education. Due to this fact, they place 
trust in their Governments to run their countries 
without questioning their actions because they are seen 
to have the necessary skill and intelligence. Below is 
table 8.1 which compares illiteracy rate between 
underdeveloped or developing countries and developed 
countries.
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Table 8.1
Illiteracy rate between underdeveloped or developing 
countries and developed countries in 1990
Africa 1 Asia 1 EuroDe & US Jl
Cameron 45.9 Bangladesh 64.7 France *
Egypt 51.6 Cambodia 64.8 Germany *
Gambia 72.8 China 22.2 Greece 6.8
Ghana 39.7 India 51.8 Italy 2.9
Kenya 31.0 Indonesia 18.4 Portugal 15.0
Morocco 50.5 Iran 46.0 Spain 4.6
Nigeria 49.3 Kuwait 27.0 Switzerland *
Uganda 51.7 Malaysia1 21.6 US *
Zaire 28.2 Pakistan 65.2
Philippines 10.3
Saudi Arabia 37.6
Sri Lanka 11.6
Thailand 7.0
Vietnam 12.4
* denotes zero or near zero
Source: World Education Report (UNESCO), 1993
The high percentage of illiteracy rates in 
underdeveloped or developing countries makes it easier 
for corrupt politicians to accumulate their wealth. 
This high rate of illiteracy is projected to stay for 
a considerable period of time by UNESCO as shown by 
tables 8.2 and 8.3;
4. If these politicians are being questioned about their 
actions, they can use their powers to invoke certain 
laws to keep their critics quiet. Corrupt politicians 
will try to take advantage of whatever policies or laws 
that exist in their countries for their own gains. With 
these laws and policies to protect them, they know they 
can get away with their corrupt acts. Thus, they will
illiteracy rate in Malaysia in 1970 was: Peninsula 
Malaysia - 41.5%, Sabah - 55.7%, Sarawak - 65.1% (UNESCO 
Statistical Yearbook, 1980).
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Table 8 . 2
Projected adult literacy rates by sex, 
1990-2000 (percentages)*
1990 2000
Both
sexes
Male Female Both
sexes
Male Female
WORLD TOTAL 73.5 80.6 66.4 78.2 84.6 71.8
Developing 65.1 74.9 55.0 71.9 80.3 63.2
countries of which:
Sub-Saharan 47.3 59.0 36.1 59.7 70.2 49.6
Africa
Arab States 51.3 64.3 38.0 62.0 73.1* 50.6
Latin America/ 84.7 86.4 83.0 88.5 89.7 87.3
Caribbean
Eastern Asia 76.2 85.7 66.4 82.8 90.0 75.4
Southern Asia 46.1 59.1 32.2 54.1 66.2 41.2
Least developed 39.6 51.4 27.9 49.0 60.8 37.3
countries
Developed 96.7 97.4 96.1 98.5 99.0 98.0
countries
BY CONTINENT
Africa 49.9 61.7 38.5 61.6 71.9 51.6
America 90.0 90.8 89.2 92.9 93.5 92.3
Asia 66.5 76.6 56.0 72.6 81.3 63.5
Europe/USSR 96.9 97.7 96.2 98.5 99.0 98.0
Oceania 92.5 93.9 91.1 94.5 96.0 93.0
*  Percentage of literate adults in the population aged 15 years and over.
Source: World Education Report 1991, UNESCO.
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Table 8.3
Projected adult l ite r a c y  ra tes in  developing countries in  the year 2000
X
Less than 50% 50 to 74% 75% or more
A frica A frica America A frica America Asia
Benin* Angola Guatemala A lgeria Argentina Bahrain
Burkina* Burundi* H aiti* Botswana* B oliv ia China
Chad* Cameroon Libyan Arab B razil Indonesia
Gambia* Central African Asia Jamahiriya Chile Jordan
Guinea* Republic* Madagascar Colombia Kuwait
Guinea-Bissau* Congo Bhutan* Tunisia Costa Rica Malaysia
Mauritania* Cote d’Ivo ire India Zaire Cuba Myanmar*
Mozambique* Egypt Islam ic Rep. of Zambia Dominican P h ilipp ines
Niger* , Equatorial Guinea* Iran Zimbabwe Republic Sri Lanka
Sierra Leone* Ghana Ecuador Syrian Arab Rep.
Somalia* L iberia Oceania Europe Guyana Thailand
Sudan* Mali* Honduras Turkey
Morocco Papua New Guinea Yugoslavia Jamaica Vietnam
Asia N igeria Mexico
Rwanda* Panama
Afghanistan* Senegal Paraguay
Bangladesh* Togo* Peru
Cambodia Uganda* Suriname
Nepal* Uruguay
Pakistan
:
Venezuela
i
*Countries belonging to the group of le a s t  developed countries
Note: Only those developing countries for which p rojections are a v a ila b le  are l i s t e d .  
Source: UNESCO: World Education Report, 1991.
be bold and daring enough to carry out these corrupt 
acts.
Politicians in these developing countries are no 
different from those corrupt ones in Malaysia. In fact, the 
Malaysian problems may not be as bad as those of some other 
developing countries like the Philippines during the Marcos 
era and Indonesia.
Political fraud and corruption are by no means 
concentrated only in developing countries as discussed in 
chapter 5. They exist in developed countries like Italy and 
Spain. Fraud and corruption are elements that do not 
discriminate. As explained in chapter 5, they exist among 
all age groups, among both sexes, at all classes of society, 
at every decision-making level within all organisations, at 
all economic situations i.e. underdeveloped, developing or 
developed economies, in all social and cultural settings and 
at all times and era, whether there is war or peace. The 
problems of fraud and corruption also affect all social 
systems; feudalism, capitalism, communism and socialism. The 
only difference between fraud and corruption in different 
societies is the different combinations of the social, 
economic and political conditions which give rise to 
different types of opportunities conducive to their 
occurrences. The intensity of corruption fluctuates with 
these different combinations.
Myrdal, in 1970, called corrupted countries the "soft 
state11. "The term soft state is understood to comprise all 
the various types of social indiscipline which manifest
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themselves by: deficiencies in legislation and in particular 
law observance and enforcement, a widespread disobedience by 
public officials on various levels to rules and directives 
handed down to them and often their collusion with powerful 
persons and groups of persons whose conduct they should 
regulate. Within the concept of the soft state belongs also 
corruption” (Myrdal, 1970; 211). A soft state was
characterised by the laxity and arbitrariness in the 
community that could be exploited for personal gain by 
people who had the economic, social and political power, who 
could afford egalitarian laws and policy measures, but were 
in an unchallenged position to prevent their implementation 
or non-implementation. This extensive discretionary control 
was apt to breed corruption as corrupt politicians and 
dishonest officials had strong vested interest in retaining 
and increasing control of this type. Although the 
opportunities for large-scale exploitation were only at the 
disposal of the upper class, persons quite low on the social 
ladder would also find such opportunities for petty gains. 
In such a society, there was no attempt to build up a system 
of community obligations. Of the South Asian countries, 
Myrdal said that their feature was traditional and 
conditioned by their history during pre-colonial and 
colonial times. Behind the resistance to overcome social 
indiscipline were also strong vested interests, mainly among 
the upper strata, but spread down into the masses. 
Corruption was part and parcel of the general condition in 
underdeveloped countries of their being soft states.
Myrdal's conclusion was that the fight against
412
corruption would succeed only to the extent to which a 
favourable social climate was created. Thus, there must be 
political and social change. Corruption must become 
abhorrent to the public and politicians and both must want 
a change in social outlook and traditions.
Caiden concluded that if there was no change, fraud and 
corruption would still be rampant even if the corrupt 
leaders were changed. "The script is changed, the actors are 
replaced and the scenery is altered, but the play is 
performed as before. The form is altered, but the behaviour 
continues. When this occurs bureaucratic corruption has been 
institutionalized. Wrong-doing is the norm. It is so 
regularized that the administrative system tolerates wrong­
doing and actually penalizes propriety and integrity" 
(Caiden, 1986; 38). He also blamed the public for the
corrupt actions of the politicians. He said that if the 
public allowed themselves to be intimidated, bullied, 
deceived and ignored, they would get bad Government. 
Likewise, the Government would get the people they deserved. 
If the Government intimidated, bullied, deceived and ignored 
people, they would get back in kind. "If the Government 
cheats them, they will cheat back. If the Government lies to 
them, they will lie back. If the Government does not 
identify with them, they will not identify with the 
Government. They will resist conscription, evade taxes, 
misinform and when the opportunity comes, get back at hated 
officialdom" (Caiden, 1986; 40).
Preventive measures can only work if the political and 
social system allows them to work. Moreover, these
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preventive measures will be expected to be different all 
over the world depending on the historical, traditional and 
cultural make-up of the country. For example, the racial 
problems in Malaysia have to be dealt with so that 
unscrupulous politicians would not be able to make use of 
them for covering their corrupt acts. However, the present 
system of free enterprise adopted by many countries in the 
world, which make profit the priority before the basic needs 
of the people, presents a bleak prospect of political fraud 
ever being prevented and controlled in future. For example, 
during the Marcos era, the United States Government knew 
that Marcos was squeezing his country dry at the expense of 
its large population of poor people and yet, because there 
was money to be made through business dealings in the 
Philippines, it ignored the dark side of Marcos. A similar 
scenario can be observed when the Clinton administration 
decided to renew the "Most Favoured Nation” status of China 
in 1994 even though human rights have not improved. The only 
reason for doing so is because America will lose out to 
other countries on the business dealings with China which is 
going through an economic boom. The Australian Government 
turned a blind eye to how the Indonesians were persecuting 
and robbing the East Timoreans of their natural resources by 
signing an oil deal with the Indonesian Government. As 
Muzaffar pointed out, "Development has turned into 
devilopment. This is why it is high time we question the 
very system. We should look at the capitalist scale of 
priorities and see the connections between corruption and 
the system” (Aliran Monthly, January 1985).
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To sum up, the basic factors that are necessary for 
preventing corruption are:
1. resocialization into new attitudes which abhor 
corruption and fraud;
2. commitment of both the public and the Government 
to fight fraud and corruption;
3. instilling ethical consciousness in the people;
4. an open Government;
5. free press and expression;
6. reduction of authoritarianism of the Government;
7. proper use of the law and the legal system;
8. improved administrative system and introduction of
well-planned fraud and corruption controls.
Singapore, the country that is known to have the
cleanest Government as explained in section 2.2 of chapter
7 has most of the factors listed above. As Quah said:
"The fact that corruption is incidental and not 
institutionalised in Singapore is not an accident, but 
the result of the determination of the PAP (People's 
Action Party) Government in general and Prime Minister 
Lee Kuan Yew in particular to eliminate the 'disease' 
of corruption in the country. In other words, the major 
reason for Singapore's success in controlling the 
problem of corruption is the quality of her political 
leaders and their commitments towards the elimination 
of corruption both within and outside the bureaucracy. 
In order to eradicate the problem of bureaucratic 
corruption in any country, comprehensive administrative 
reforms are needed. And such reforms can only succeed 
if the political leaders concerned lend their support 
and sponsorship. In other words, they must set an 
example by refraining from corrupt behaviour 
themselves" (Quah, 1978; 20).
In his book, "Hard Graft In Hong Kong", Lethbridge said 
the ICAC (Independent Commission Against Corruption) had
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managed to bring down the rate of corruption when it started 
its operations was because Sir Murray MacLehose, the then 
Governor of Hong Kong, "sought to cleanse Hong Kong and to 
moralize civic life" (Lethbridge, 1985; 214). The success of 
the ICAC was due to the quality of its leadership over the 
years, the type of person it has been able to select, 
recruit, train and keep, or even employ temporarily, and the 
strong support provided by the Government (Lethbridge, 1985; 
218) .
In both cases mentioned above, the most important 
factor for a country to eradicate corruption is the quality 
of her leaders and the determination they have to eradicate 
the problem. As the saying goes, "An organisation is only as 
good as its personnel". Thus, a country is only as good as 
her leaders.
In concluding this chapter, I would like to discuss 
fraud and corruption in Malaysia in the near future. In 
doing so, it should be emphasized that most of the large- 
scale corruption like the BMF case and the Deposit-taking 
Co-operatives case were only revealed and unearthed when the 
recession hit the Malaysian economy in 1981-82 and again in 
1985-86. The general reason is that when people have money, 
they are less careful and vigilant. However, when they are 
less well off during the recession, every penny counts.
The economic future of Malaysia seems bright at the 
moment. Malaysia is fast becoming an advanced nation. The 
Sixth Malaysia Plan announced on 10 July 1991 detailed how 
the Mahathir administration aimed to spend M$104 bil. 
(US$37.4 bil.) on infrastructure, social development and
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defence programs to achieve the goal of being a developed 
country. As reported in the "Far Eastern Economic Review”, 
the economic blue print represented the nuts and bolts of a 
Second Outline Perspective Plan for 1991-2000 unveiled on 17 
July 1991 (FEER, 25/7/1991). Both measures provided the 
pragmatic foundation for a New Development Policy which 
replaced the New Economic Policy, a pioneer outline for 
national development that ran its course from 1971-90. Like 
the New Economic Policy, the New Development Policy 
concentrates on development priorities and the sensitive 
issue of racial quotas. All these policies are grouped 
loosely under the banner of what the Prime Minister calls 
his 20/20 vision to turn Malaysia into a fully developed 
nation by the year 2020. With the economy forecasted to 
bring a comfortable growth rate at least until mid 1990s, 
following average annual Gross Domestic Product growth of 
about 9% from 1988-90, many of the targets are likely to be 
met easily. With this rosy future, the dark side of fraud 
and corruption will be hidden for a number of years. Chapter 
6 on the general data of commercial crime in Malaysia has 
already shown an upward trend. With the vast development 
being undertaken to build the country, the first group of 
people to gain from them, as history as shown, is the 
politicians. Moreover, there is no sign that the political 
and social system of the country is changing to accommodate 
the eradication of fraud and corruption although the Prime 
Minister has admitted in June 1994 that members of his 
ruling political party are corrupt (The Time, 20/6/1994). He 
also said that rising wealth and power among Malays and
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other groups represented by UMNO, the dominant party in the 
Barisan Nasional that had ruled since 1957, had created 
"individuals who are morally decayed”. With regards to 
allegations of vote-buying, he admitted, ”We no longer 
choose people who are qualified and capable in terms of 
party leadership calibre. We choose people who offer us 
money or gifts or other things” (The Times, 20/6/1994).
On 24-25 May 1994, the Prime Minister and the Deputy 
Prime Minister announced in the Malaysian local newspapers 
the decision of the Government to uphold the Internal 
Security Act. A few changes might be made to keep up with 
time. The reason given was the Act had helped bring peace 
and stability in the country. Although the Malaysian economy 
is doing well at the moment, the Government cannot overrule 
the threat of destabilising forces in the country, for 
example, racial tension and religious fundamentalism.
My feeling about fraud and corruption in the future is 
one of pessimism. My pessimism is made worse knowing that 
developed countries around the world like the United States 
(on the incident of giving the status of "Most Favoured 
Nation" to China in 1994) and Britain (the Pergau Dam affair 
in 1994) are more interested in safeguarding their overseas 
trades than issues of a humanitarian kind. There is a 
danger, in future, of what I would call the globalisation 
and internationalisation of fraud and corruption (as 
discussed in chapter 4) where leaders of different countries 
may collaborate and conspire to defraud citizens of their 
countries in order for them to have a good life. This could 
also lead to an imperialism in international fraud i.e. when
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a few Governments cooperate to defraud other Governments. 
Political fraud and corruption are all over the world and 
are here to stay because politicians are generally not 
interested in eradicating them at the expense of profits and 
wealth. Some politicians from different countries do 
collaborate directly or indirectly to defraud their ordinary 
citizens who have no knowledge of them taking place. If they 
have knowledge, it is difficult to prove or they choose to 
keep quiet because they do not want to run into trouble with 
the authorities. History has shown that political fraud and 
corruption have been with us for many centuries and cannot 
be eradicated completely. Because of these above reasons, 
political fraud and corruption will still be with us for 
many years to come. On this pessimistic note, I conclude my 
thesis.
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